Albert Campbell v. United States , 619 F. App'x 852 ( 2015 )

Case: 14-12164 Date Filed: 07/23/2015 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-12164
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-22992-CMA
ALBERT CAMPBELL,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(July 23, 2015)
Before WILSON, MARTIN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 14-12164 Date Filed: 07/23/2015 Page: 2 of 7
Albert Campbell, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)’s
“savings clause.” Campbell appeals the district court’s dismissal of his § 2241
petition for a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Campbell argues that his sentence
was improperly enhanced because the judge, not the jury, determined the specific
quantity of drugs to be attributed to him, which violated his constitutional rights.
In support, Campbell relies on Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct.
2151 (2013), which he argues is a new rule of constitutional law to be applied
retroactively on collateral review. However, because we conclude that Alleyne
does not apply retroactively on collateral review, Campbell is foreclosed from
proceeding pursuant to § 2255(e)’s saving clause. Therefore, we affirm the district
court’s dismissal of Campbell’s § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction.
I.
The following factual synopsis is undisputed. Over twenty years ago,
Campbell was indicted by a federal grand jury and charged with conspiring to
possess cocaine and cocaine base with the intent to distribute. After a jury found
Campbell guilty of the charged offense, Campbell received a sentence of 420-
months’ imprisonment. Subsequently, Campbell appealed his sentence. On direct
appeal, Campbell raised a number of issues, none of which challenged the
enhancements he received for the quantity of drugs attributed to him. We affirmed
2
Case: 14-12164 Date Filed: 07/23/2015 Page: 3 of 7
Campbell’s conviction and sentence. See United States v. Butler, 102 F.3d 1191(11th Cir. 1997). Thereafter, Campbell filed a motion to vacate and correct his
sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 alleging that his trial counsel was
ineffective in several ways, including that his trial counsel failed to object to the
quantity of drugs attributed to Campbell. Campbell’s § 2255 motion and his
Certificate of Appealability (COA) were denied by the district court. Treating
Campbell’s COA as a timely notice of appeal, this Court denied Campbell’s COA
as well. Several years later, however, Campbell filed a motion for reconsideration
of his § 2255 motion, but the district court concluded that his motion for
reconsideration was the equivalent of a successive § 2255 motion that required
prior permission from this court, which Campbell never obtained. Concluding also
that the cases Campbell relied on were not retroactively applicable, the district
court denied his motion for reconsideration. Campbell again appealed that
decision to this court, but we refused to grant him a COA. Campbell has since
then filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241, which
was subsequently dismissed by the district court for lack of jurisdiction.
II.
We review de novo whether a prisoner may bring a § 2241 petition under the
savings clause of § 2255(e). Bryant v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium, 738 F.3d
1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2013). “The applicability of the savings clause is a threshold
3
Case: 14-12164 Date Filed: 07/23/2015 Page: 4 of 7
jurisdictional issue, and we cannot reach questions that the district court never had
jurisdiction to entertain.” Williams v. Warden, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 713 F.3d
1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied sub
nom. Williams v. Hastings, 135 S. Ct. 52 (2014). If the savings clause permits
Campbell’s § 2241 petition, then we may decide the substantive issue of whether
his sentence was improperly enhanced pursuant to the trial judge’s determination
of the specific quantity of drugs to be attributed to him. See id.
III.
Generally, a collateral attack on the validity of a federal sentence must be
brought under § 2255. See Sawyer v. Holder, 326 F.3d 1363, 1365 (11th Cir.
2003). Under circumstances such as this, where a prisoner has previously filed a
§ 2255 motion, he must apply for and receive permission from the appropriate
court of appeals before filing a successive § 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2244(b)(3)(A), 2255(h). A successive motion must contain “a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme
Court, that was previously unavailable.” Id. § 2255(h)(2). However, “[u]nder the
savings clause of § 2255[(e)], a prisoner may file a § 2241 petition if an otherwise
available remedy under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention.” Sawyer, 326 F.3d at 1365. Section 2255(e) applies by its own terms
irrespective of whether a prisoner failed to seek § 2255 relief or whether the trial
4
Case: 14-12164 Date Filed: 07/23/2015 Page: 5 of 7
court has previously denied him such relief; what is significant is whether § 2255
relief would not have adequately or effectively tested the legality of his
imprisonment. See Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1263. The burden is on the petitioner to
demonstrate that § 2255 relief was “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of
his detention for purposes of § 2255(e).” Id. at 1262 (internal quotation marks
omitted). We have held that in order for a petitioner to establish that a § 2255
motion was inadequate or ineffective to test whether his detention was lawful, he
must demonstrate that:
(1) throughout the petitioner’s sentencing, direct appeal, and first §
2255 proceeding, this Court’s precedent had specifically and squarely
foreclosed the claim raised in the § 2241 petition; (2) after the
petitioner’s first § 2255 proceeding, the Supreme Court overturned
that binding precedent; (3) that Supreme Court decision applies
retroactively on collateral review; (4) as a result of that Supreme
Court decision applying retroactively, the petitioner’s current sentence
exceeds the statutory maximum; and (5) the savings clause of §
2255(e) reaches his claim.
Jeanty v. Warden, FCI-Miami, 757 F.3d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam);
see also Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1274 (synthesizing circuit precedent for purposes of
interpreting § 2255(e) in a manner that “does not eviscerate or undermine §
2255(h)’s restrictions on second or successive § 2255 motions”). It is unnecessary
for the court to address all five requirements if the petitioner fails to satisfy any one
requirement. See Jeanty, 757 F.3d at 1285.
5
Case: 14-12164 Date Filed: 07/23/2015 Page: 6 of 7
Here, Campbell could not bring his Alleyne claim under § 2255, as he
previously filed a § 2255 motion and did not obtain this court’s permission to file a
second or successive § 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(A), 2255(h).
Thus, in order for the district court to have had jurisdiction over Campbell’s § 2241
petition, he was required to establish, through the lense of § 2255(e)’s savings
clause, that his prior § 2255 motion was “inadequate or ineffective.” See
§ 2255(e).
Campbell fails to fulfill his burden of demonstrating one of the necessary
requirements to show that § 2255 relief would have been in adequate or
ineffective, and, consequently, there is no need for this court to address the
remaining four. See Jeanty, 738 F.3d at 1285. Particularly, Campbell fails to
establish that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Alleyne applies retroactively. See id.
We acknowledge that in Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that any fact that
aggravates the legally prescribed range of allowable sentences, including a fact that
increases the statutory minimum, is an element of the offense that must be
submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. 570 U.S. at ___, 133
S. Ct. at 2162–63. However, we have held that the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Alleyne does not apply retroactively on collateral review for the following reasons:
1) the Supreme Court has not held that Alleyne’s application is retroactive; 2) the
Supreme Court explained that Alleyne is an application of the rule established in
6
Case: 14-12164 Date Filed: 07/23/2015 Page: 7 of 7
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), which is not
retroactively applicable; and 3) our sister circuits (that have had the opportunity to
consider whether Alleyne applies retroactively on collateral review in a published
decision) have concluded that it did not. See Jeanty, 757 F.3d at 1285. Because
we have held that Alleyne does not apply retroactively on collateral review,
Campbell is foreclosed from proceeding pursuant to § 2255(e)’s saving clause.
IV.
Therefore, we conclude that district court did not err in dismissing
Campbell’s § 2241 petition. Campbell’s § 2241 petition fails to recapture the
jurisdiction of the district court pursuant to § 2255(e)’s savings clause because
Campbell’s § 2241 petition relies on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Alleyne, which
is not retroactively applicable. To the extent that Campbell seeks to rely on
Alleyne for the proposition that the facts of his prior convictions should have been
submitted to a jury before his sentence could be enhanced, his reliance here is also
misguided. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (holding that any fact,
other than the fact of a prior conviction, is required to be submitted to the jury and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt); see also United States v. Harris, 741 F.3d
1245, 1249–50 (11th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, the district court’s dismissal of
Campbell’s § 2241 habeas petition is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
7