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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 19-10818
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 3:17-cv-00373-HES-JRK
CHRISTOPHER GLOSTON,
by Tamika Gloston, his next friend,
parent, and natural guardian,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JACK VANCE,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(January 10, 2020)
Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Defendant-Appellant Jack Vance appeals the district court’s denial of his
motion for summary judgment against plaintiff-appellee Christopher Gloston’s §
1983 suit. For the reasons given below, we vacate the relevant part of the opinion
below and remand.1
Gloston, by and through his mother Tamika, filed a complaint against
Vance, as well as the Duval County School Board and School District. 2 The
complaint alleges that Gloston had multiple disabilities, including cerebral palsy,
and that he was relegated to a wheelchair. It alleges that Vance, one of Gloston’s
teachers, placed a towel over Gloston’s head, put his arm around his neck, put him
in a chokehold, and struck him in the face with his hand.
Gloston asserted claims against Vance and the school board and district.
Two of those claims are relevant here; they allege that Vance violated the
Fourteenth Amendment by engaging in conduct that was shocking to the
conscience and that violated Christopher’s due process rights.
The defendants moved for summary judgment. The defendants’ statement
of undisputed facts stated that Vance was a special education teacher who taught
Christopher. According to the statement of facts, Christopher had a habit of
1
We asked the parties whether we had jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified immunity
below. Upon review of Vance’s brief, we are satisfied that we do, as he is raising, at least in
part, a legal challenge to the denial of qualified immunity, and not merely a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence. See Cottrell v. Caldwell,
85 F.3d 1480, 1484 (11th Cir. 1996);
Stanley v. City of Dalton, Ga.,
219 F.3d 1280, 1287 (11th Cir. 2000).
2
Vance is the only appellant here.
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screaming and disrupting class. Vance used a technique to reduce the stimuli
affecting Christopher, referred to as the “towel technique.” This involved lightly
placing a towel over Christopher’s face and explaining to Christopher that he could
laugh, giggle, or clap his hands, but not scream. According to the defendants, this
technique was effective in helping Christopher stop screaming.
The defendants stated that Vance used this towel technique during the field
trip because Christopher was screaming. The defendants disputed the allegation
that Vance put Christopher in a chokehold. The defendants acknowledged that
Gloston had a photograph of the incident, but argued that the photograph was
unauthenticated.
The defendants argued that they were entitled to summary judgment because
Gloston did not show that Vance violated a constitutional right—specifically, that
Gloston could not demonstrate that Vance’s conduct shocked the conscience—and
that even assuming Vance did violate a constitutional right, Gloston had failed to
demonstrate that it was clearly established.
The district court denied summary judgment. It noted that the parties
disputed whether there was evidence in the record that Vance improperly
disciplined Gloston, taunted him, or caused him any pain, and whether the towel
technique had the legitimate purpose of stopping Gloston’s disruptive behavior.
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The district court described this as a genuine dispute of material fact that precluded
summary judgment.
We conclude that the district court did not properly analyze Vance’s claim
of qualified immunity. When considering a defendant’s putative qualified
immunity, a district court must follow the procedures set forth in our decision in
Robinson v. Arrugueta,
415 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2005). It must “take the facts in
the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury. When a district court
considers the record in this light, it eliminates all issues of fact. By approaching
the record in this way, the court has the plaintiff’s best case before it. With the
plaintiff’s best case in hand, the court is able to move to the question of whether
the defendant committed the constitutional violation alleged in the complaint
without having to assess any facts in dispute.”
Id. at 1257. The court must then
determine whether, if the defendant did violate a constitutional right, that right was
“clearly established.”
Id. at 1255.
The district court did not conduct this analysis. It held that the disputed
issue of whether the towel technique had a legitimate purpose prevented it from
granting summary judgment. But when a defendant raises qualified immunity, a
district court cannot simply deny that defendant’s summary judgment motion
because the facts are disputed. It must consider “the plaintiff’s best case in hand”
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and determine whether those facts give rise to a constitutional violation, and, if so,
whether that violation breached a clearly established right.
Id. at 1257.
Here, the district court should have taken the record in the light most
favorable to Gloston. It then should have considered whether Vance violated
Gloston’s constitutional rights, and whether those rights were clearly established.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court’s decision concerning
Gloston’s § 1983 claims and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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