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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 20-12356
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
Agency No. A206-311-981
FRANCISCA ANTONIA MURILLO-VALLECILLO,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
________________________
(December 17, 2020)
Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Francisca Antonia Murillo-Vallecillo petitions for review of a Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision reinstating her order of removal. The
government has filed a motion for a summary denial of her petition. After careful
review, we grant the government’s motion.
Murillo-Vallecillo entered the United States without inspection, and the
Department of Homeland Security served her with a notice to appear, alleging that
she was subject to removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Although the notice
failed to identify the time or place of the removal hearing, the agency later notified
Murillo-Vallecillo of the time and place of the hearing. Murillo-Vallecillo failed to
appear for her removal hearing, and the immigration judge entered an order of
removal.
Later, Murillo-Vallecillo sought to reopen her proceedings and have the order
of removal rescinded, arguing that the agency lacked jurisdiction over her removal
proceedings because the notice to appear failed to set forth the time and place of her
removal hearing. The immigration judge agreed that the agency lacked jurisdiction
and entered an order terminating the removal proceedings. But the BIA vacated the
immigration judge’s decision and reinstated the removal order.
In this petition for review, Murillo-Vallecillo argues that the agency lacked
jurisdiction over her removal proceedings because she had been served with a
defective notice to appear. The government moved for summary disposition,
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arguing that our precedent forecloses Murillo-Vallecillo’s argument that the agency
lacked jurisdiction over her removal proceedings.
Summary disposition is appropriate either when time is of the essence, such
as “situations where important public policy issues are involved or those where
rights delayed are rights denied,” or when “the position of one of the parties is clearly
right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome
of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the appeal is frivolous.”
Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis,
406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969).1
We review de novo the BIA’s legal determinations and interpretations of law
or statutes, “deferring to an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers only if
the statute’s language is ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.” Perez-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
935 F.3d
1148, 1152 (11th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under our prior
panel precedent rule, “the holding of the first panel to address an issue is the law of
this Circuit” and “bind[s] all subsequent panels unless and until the first panel's
holding is overruled by the Court sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court.” Smith
v. GTE Corp.,
236 F.3d 1292, 1300 n.8 (11th Cir. 2001).
1
In Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we
adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions issued before October 1, 1981.
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The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that an immigration judge
shall conduct proceedings to determine whether a noncitizen is removable from the
United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1). The statute does not explicitly state the
conditions upon which jurisdiction vests with an immigration court, but regulations
provide that “[j]urisdiction vests . . . when a charging document is filed with the
Immigration Court.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a). A notice to appear is a type of
charging document.
Id. § 1003.13. By statute, a notice to appear must specify,
among other things, the time and place at which a removal hearing will be held.
8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). But under the regulatory framework, a notice to
appear is not required to specify the time or place of the removal hearing. See
8 C.F.R. § 1003.15(b), (c).
We previously considered whether the agency had jurisdiction over a
noncitizen’s removal proceedings when he was served with a notice to appear that
included no information about the time or place of the removal hearing. See Perez-
Sanchez, 935 F.3d at 1150. We determined that such a notice to appear was
“unquestionably deficient” under § 1229(a) and this statutory defect could not be
cured by a subsequent notice that informed the noncitizen of the time and place of
the removal hearing.
Id. at 1153–54. But we ultimately held that this defect did not
deprive the agency of jurisdiction over the removal proceedings.
Id. at 1154–57.
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Under our prior panel precedent rule, we are bound by Perez-Sanchez to reject
Murillo-Vallecillo’s argument that the agency lacked jurisdiction over her removal
proceedings. Murillo-Vallecillo admits that the Perez-Sanchez panel held that
defects in a notice of removal do not deprive the agency of jurisdiction. But, she
says, the panel in Perez-Sanchez wrongly decided this issue, and we may revisit its
decision because a later panel is permitted to revisit an issue when “the first panel to
address an issue failed to follow and apply controlling Supreme Court precedent.”
Petitioner’s Br. at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted). We disagree with Murillo-
Vallecillo’s characterization of our prior precedent rule. As a later panel, we are
bound by Perez-Sanchez because our Court has “categorically reject[ed]” the
argument that there is an “exception to the prior panel precedent rule based upon a
perceived defect in the prior panel’s reasoning or analysis.”
Smith, 236 F.3d at 1303;
see also United States v. Golden,
854 F.3d 1256, 1257 (11th Cir. 2017) (explaining
that even if an earlier panel’s decision was “flawed,” a later panel “does not [have]
. . . the authority to disregard it”).
We are bound by Perez-Sanchez to conclude that the agency had jurisdiction
over Murillo-Vallecillo’s removal proceedings. Because there is no substantial
question as to the outcome of the case, and the government’s position is correct as a
matter of law, we GRANT the government’s motion for summary denial and DENY
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Murillo-Vallecillo’s petition for review. See
Groendyke, 406 F.2d at 1162. In
addition, we DENY as moot the government’s motion to stay the briefing schedule.
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