USCA11 Case: 20-13241 Date Filed: 07/07/2021 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 20-13241
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cr-00199-DHB-BKE-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ALLISON JONTIL BARNES,
a.k.a. Jah a.k.a. Shantae Davis,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
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(July 7, 2021)
Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Allison Barnes, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of her
motion for compassionate relief under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) as amended by
Section 603 of the First Step Act. Pub. L. 115-391, § 603,
132 Stat. 5194, 5239–41
(2018) (amending
18 U.S.C. § 3582). The district court found that, even assuming
Barnes’s medical condition qualified as extraordinary and compelling under
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, app. note 1(a)(i), “the factors of
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weigh[ed]
heavily against her release.” Specifically, the court explained that relief “would not
be justified in light of the nature and circumstances of her offense” and noted that
Barnes had “served just over half of her sentence, [so] early termination of her
sentence would fail to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the
law, provide just punishment, or afford adequate deterrence.”
As an alternative ground, the court also found that “given the nature of the
offense,” it could not “conclude with any amount of certainty that [Barnes] does not
pose a danger to the community,” as required by U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2). On appeal,
Barnes argues that her “severe[] obes[ity]” is an extraordinary and compelling
medical condition and that the terms of supervised release could ensure that she was
not a danger to anyone.
We review a district court’s grant or denial of a defendant’s Section
3582(c)(1)(A) motion based on the Section 3553(a) factors for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Bryant,
996 F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th Cir. 2021). When we apply the
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abuse of discretion standard, we recognize that the district court had a “range of
choice.” United States v. Harris,
989 F.3d 908, 912 (11th Cir. 2021) (citations
omitted). A district court abuses its discretion in assessing the Section 3553(a)
factors if it fails to consider relevant factors, considers irrelevant factors, or “weighs
those factors unreasonably, arriving at a sentence that does not ‘achieve the purposes
of sentencing as stated in § 3553(a).’” United States v. Irey,
612 F.3d 1160, 1189
(11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citation omitted).
Section 3582(c)(1)(A) allows a district court to reduce a defendant’s sentence
for “extraordinary and compelling reasons” but only after “considering the factors
set forth in section 3553(a).” Those factors include “the nature and circumstances of
the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant”; “the need for the
sentence imposed” to “reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law, … to provide just punishment for the offense,” to adequately deter, “to
protect the public,” and to rehabilitate; and the “kinds of sentences available” and
the recommended sentencing range.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(4). The weight given
to each factor is within the district court’s discretion. United States v. Kuhlman,
711
F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 2013).
The district court considered the relevant factors, it did not consider any
irrelevant factors, and nothing indicates that its weighing of those factors was
unreasonable. The district court expressly stated that it had considered all of the
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Section 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Turner,
474 F.3d 1265, 1281 (11th Cir.
2007) (holding that a district court’s acknowledgement that it has considered the
Section 3553(a) factors is sufficient). It even specifically identified several of them.
For instance, it explained that relief was not justified in light of the “nature and
circumstances of [the] offense.” It continued that relief would not “reflect the
seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, or
afford adequate deterrence” because Barnes had served just over half of her sentence.
The amount of time served is a valid Section 3553(a) consideration for Section
3582(c)(1)(A) motions “[b]ecause a defendant’s sentence reflects the sentencing
judge’s view of the § 3553(a) factors at the time of sentencing,” so “the time
remaining in that sentence may … inform whether” relief “would be consistent with
those factors.” United States v. Pawlowski,
967 F.3d 327, 331 (11th Cir. 2020).
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Barnes’s
Section 3582(c)(1)(A) motion based on its assessment of the Section 3553(a) factors.
Nor did it abuse its discretion in its alternative reason for denial—that Barnes
may be a danger to the community. Barnes was convicted of conspiracy to engage
in sex trafficking of a minor. She was the “pimp” for an underage girl, V.B.H. She
was paid for “handling” V.B.H., which consisted of setting up “dates” for V.B.H.,
meeting with the men, and taking a percentage of the money V.B.H. made as a
prostitute. Barnes also “participated in the production of the photographs and video
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of V.B.H.” that were used in online ads, rented rooms or drove V.B.H. to residences
where V.B.H. provided prostitution services, and gave V.B.H. “ice” (crystal meth),
which V.B.H. used “as a coping mechanism for having to perform prostitution
services.” When Barnes was arrested, she gave the FBI agents an alias, but her
fingerprints identified her. The district court reasonably concluded that, “given the
nature of the offense,” it could not find that Barnes was not a danger to the
community.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Barnes’s Section
3582(c)(1)(A) motion.
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