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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 19-11503
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:17-cv-02982-WFJ-TGW
CECELIA N. KING,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JENNIFER BENCIE,
EDDIE RODRIGUEZ,
LYNNE DRAWDY,
SUSAN DOEBERLE,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(April 1, 2020)
Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Cecelia King, a citizen of Alabama proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights
complaint against Jennifer Bencie, Eddie Rodriguez, Susan Doeberl, and Lynne
Drawdy, all citizens of Florida, for numerous claims: breach of contract, fraudulent
inducement, and gross negligence against Bencie; fraudulent concealment and civil
conspiracy against Bencie and Rodriguez; tortious interference against Drawdy and
Doeberle; and intentional infliction of emotional distress against all four
defendants.
King alleged that the defendants engaged in conduct that damaged her after
she was recruited and arrived in Florida to develop an indigent healthcare plan for
Manatee County. The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss,
finding that all of King’s claims were barred by the applicable statute of
limitations, that some of King’s claims against Bencie were barred by res judicata,
and that King failed to state a viable claim against Rodriguez, Drawdy, and
Doeberl. On appeal, King argues that the district court erred in granting the
motions to dismiss because it used the incorrect date as the date by which all her
claims had accrued, inappropriately applied the doctrine of res judicata, and
erroneously found that she had failed to state a claim.
After review of the record, we agree with the district court that all of King’s
claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, and we therefore affirm.
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I
A district court’s interpretation and application of a statute of limitations is
reviewed de novo. Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. Hamilton,
453 F.3d 1331, 1334
(11th Cir. 2006). A federal court sitting in diversity must apply the substantive
law, including statutes of limitations, of the state in which it sits. See Saxton v.
ACF Indus., Inc.,
254 F.3d 959, 961–62 (11th Cir. 2001).
Likewise, we review a district court’s ruling on a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss de novo. Hill v. White,
321 F.3d 1334, 1335
(11th Cir. 2003). The complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and all of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts are accepted as true. Am.
United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez,
480 F.3d 1043, 1057 (11th Cir. 2007). Because
King proceeds pro se, we construe the complaint more liberally than usual. Powell
v. Lennon,
914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir. 1990).
Exhibits attached to a complaint may be considered on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, as they are considered part of the complaint. See Griffin Indus., Inc. v.
Irvin,
496 F.3d 1189, 1205-06 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A
copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading
for all purposes.”). A court also may take judicial notice of matters of public
record when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, at least where the truth of the
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statements in such records is not at issue for purposes of the motion to dismiss.
See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).
II
Each of King’s claims—breach of contract, fraudulent inducement, gross
negligence, fraudulent concealment, civil conspiracy, tortious interference with
contractual relations in a business relationship, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress—has a four-year statute of limitations. Under Florida law, an
action founded in negligence, a legal or equitable action founded on fraud, and a
legal or equitable action on an oral contract all must be brought within four years.
Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(a), (j), (k). Similarly, a four-year limitations period applies to
other intentional torts, except as otherwise provided in the statute.
Id.
§ 95.11(3)(o); see also Newberger v. U.S. Marshals Serv.,
751 F.2d 1162, 1166
(11th Cir. 1985) (holding that actions for conspiracy in Florida are governed by a
four-year statute of limitations); W.D. v. Archdiocese of Miami, Inc.,
197 So. 3d
584, 587 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (observing that a four-year limitations period
applies to claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Florida law);
Morsani v. Major League Baseball,
739 So. 2d 610, 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(recognizing that a four-year limitations period applies to claims of tortious
interference with contractual rights and advantageous business relationships). A
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limitations period begins to run from the time the cause of action accrues. Fla.
Stat. § 95.031.
Florida law recognizes the doctrine of delayed discovery and provides that
“a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff either knows or reasonably
should know of the tortious act giving rise to the cause of action.” Hearndon v.
Graham,
767 So. 2d 1179, 1184 (Fla. 2000). Florida courts have expressly held,
however, that this doctrine does not apply to claims of tortious interference. Yusuf
Mohamad Excavation, Inc. v. Ringhaver Equip., Co.,
793 So. 2d 1127, 1128 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
This suit was filed on December 12, 2017. Therefore, if King’s claims
accrued before December 12, 2013, they are barred by their applicable four-year
statutes of limitations.
The district court found that all of King’s claims had accrued by at least
August 9, 2013, the date on which King’s attorney sent a demand letter to
defendants asserting that King had a claim for breach of contract. King was
therefore aware of her breach-of-contract claim more than four years before filing
her complaint in this suit.
As to the fraudulent-inducement, civil-conspiracy, and fraudulent-
concealment claims, the record shows that the allegedly misleading statements
meant to induce King to enter the contract and forgo other opportunities, as well as
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an alleged cover-up of the fact that there was no funding for the position and that
King would not be paid, all occurred prior to the August 9 letter. King knew or
should have known of these facts no later than that date.
As to the gross-negligence claim, King’s own allegations in the complaint
show that she was aware that Bencie had not appropriately secured the funding to
pay King for her work as early as June 21, 2013 and no later than August 9, 2013
when she alleged damages for not having been paid for her work. Accordingly,
that claim is time-barred. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(a).
As to the tortious-interference claim, any damages that King suffered as a
result occurred no later than August 9, 2013, when King was aware of the breach-
of-contract claim. And as noted, Florida law is clear that the doctrine of delayed
discovery does not toll the statute of limitations for tortious-interference claims.
Yusuf Mohamad Excavation,
Inc, 793 So. 2d at 1128. Accordingly, it is also time-
barred. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(o).
Finally, the intentional-infliction claim is likewise time-barred because any
action causing emotional distress was done prior to August 9, 2013. Fla. Stat.
§ 95.11(3)(o);
W.D., 197 So. 3d at 587.
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* * *
The district court did not err in concluding that all of King’s claims are
barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. We need not address the merits of
the district court’s other conclusions.
AFFIRMED.
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