USCA11 Case: 22-10812 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2023 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10812
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MIGUEL MARTIN LUGO,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-20796-AHS-5
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10812
Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Miguel Martin Lugo appeals his total sentence of 292
months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to distribute 5 kilograms or
more of cocaine and conspiracy to commit money laundering. On
appeal, Lugo argues that the district court abused its discretion in
imposing a sentence that was longer than necessary to accomplish
the goals of sentencing, in refusing to vary from the guideline
range, and in failing to consider Lugo’s background and family sit-
uation or the sentence of his codefendant Jose Luis Perez. After
thorough review, we affirm.
We review the sentence a district court imposes for “rea-
sonableness,” which “merely asks whether the trial court abused
its discretion.” United States v. Pugh,
515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir.
2008) (quotations omitted). An appellant generally preserves a sub-
stantive reasonableness challenge for appeal by advocating for a
lesser sentence than what the district court imposed, which is suf-
ficient to bring to the district court’s attention his view that a longer
sentence is greater than necessary. Holguin-Hernandez v. United
States,
140 S. Ct. 762, 766–67 (2020).
We consider the “substantive reasonableness of the sen-
tence” based on the “totality of the circumstances.” Pugh,
515 F.3d
at 1190 (quotations omitted). The district court must impose a sen-
tence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with
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22-10812 Opinion of the Court 3
the purposes” listed in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 1 A court may abuse its
discretion if it (1) fails to consider relevant factors that are due sig-
nificant weight, (2) gives an improper or irrelevant factor signifi-
cant weight, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment by balancing
a proper factor unreasonably. United States v. Irey,
612 F.3d 1160,
1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Also, a court’s unjustified reliance
on any one § 3553(a) factor may be a symptom of an unreasonable
sentence. United States v. Crisp,
454 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir.
2006). The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of es-
tablishing that it is unreasonable based on the facts of the case and
the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Tome,
611 F.3d 1371, 1378
(11th Cir. 2010).
We have “underscored” that we must give “due deference”
to the district court to consider and weigh the proper sentencing
factors. United States v. Shabazz,
887 F.3d 1204, 1224 (11th Cir.
2018) (quotations omitted). The district court does not have to
give all the factors equal weight and is given discretion to attach
1 The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for
the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote re-
spect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need
for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence; (4) the need to protect
the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or voca-
tional training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sen-
tencing Guidelines range; (8) the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing
Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and
(10) the need to provide restitution to victims.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10812
great weight to one factor over another. United States v.
Rosales-Bruno,
789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015). Along with
the § 3553(a) factors, the district court should also consider the par-
ticularized facts of the case and the guideline range. Id. at 1259–60.
However, it still maintains discretion to give heavier weight to any
of the § 3553(a) factors or combination of factors than to the guide-
line range. Id. at 1259. The district court has wide discretion to
decide whether the § 3553(a) factors justify a variance. United
States v. Rodriguez,
628 F.3d 1258, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010), abrogated
on other grounds by Van Buren v. United States,
141 S. Ct. 1648
(2021).
In considering the need to avoid unwarranted sentence dis-
parities, see
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), we consider whether the de-
fendant is similarly situated to the defendants to whom he com-
pares himself. United States v. Azmat,
805 F.3d 1018, 1048 (11th
Cir. 2015). Accordingly, the district court should not draw com-
parisons to cases involving defendants who were convicted of less
serious offenses, pleaded guilty, or lacked extensive criminal histo-
ries, if those things are not true of the defendant. United States v.
Jayyousi,
657 F.3d 1085, 1118 (11th Cir. 2011).
The district court’s failure to specifically mention at sentenc-
ing certain mitigating factors does not compel the conclusion that
the sentence crafted in accordance with the § 3553(a) factors was
substantively unreasonable. United States v. Snipes,
611 F.3d 855,
873 (11th Cir. 2010). District courts need not explicitly address all
of the mitigating evidence, so long as the record reflects the court
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22-10812 Opinion of the Court 5
considered the factors and the parties’ arguments. United States v.
Taylor,
997 F.3d 1348, 1354 (11th Cir. 2021). In denying a request
for a downward variance, the court also need not expressly men-
tion every ground for the variance that the defendant argues.
United States v. Whyte,
928 F.3d 1317, 1339 (11th Cir. 2019).
We will vacate a sentence only if we are “left with the defi-
nite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear
error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a
sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dic-
tated by the facts of the case.” Irey,
612 F.3d at 1190 (quotations
omitted). Under abuse-of-discretion review, we will affirm a sen-
tence that falls within the range of reasonable sentences, even if we
would have deemed a different sentence more appropriate.
Id. at
1191. We do not apply a presumption of reasonableness to sen-
tences within the guideline range, but we ordinarily expect such a
sentence to be reasonable. See United States v. Stanley,
739 F.3d
633, 656 (11th Cir. 2014). A sentence being well below the statu-
tory maximum is also indicative of a reasonable sentence.
Id.
Here, Lugo failed to meet his burden of showing that the
district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. For
starters, Lugo claims that the court did not consider his background
or personal and family characteristics. But the record reflects that
the court heard at length Lugo’s arguments in mitigation, including
testimony from his sons, who said he had taught them to be good
men, fathers, and people in society. The court expressly acknowl-
edged Lugo’s sons’ successful careers and their “strong family
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-10812
unit,” and the letters from his loved ones, neighbors and business
associates that detailed Lugo’s personal characteristics. The court
then noted, however, that Lugo had committed “very, very seri-
ous” crimes -- which involved him supplying cocaine to his code-
fendant Perez and, together, them coordinating the delivery of
multiple kilograms of cocaine from McAllen, Texas to Miami, Flor-
ida, using semi-tractor trailers. The court noted that the same
judge had presided over the trial and ultimately determined that a
bottom-of-the-guidelines sentence would provide sufficient pun-
ishment and adequate deterrence, and promote respect for the law.
On this record, the court did not abuse its broad discretion in de-
termining that a variance was not warranted in light of the serious-
ness of Lugo’s crimes and the § 3553(a) factors. Rosales-Bruno,
789
F.3d at 1254, 1259–60; Rodriguez,
628 F.3d at 1264; Irey,
612 F.3d
at 1214. Further, to the extent the district court did not expressly
mention every mitigating factor or argument, our case law does
not require it to do so. Snipes,
611 F.3d at 873; Taylor, 997 F.3d at
1354; Whyte,
928 F.3d at 1339.
Lugo adds that the court did not consider the disparity be-
tween his sentence and his codefendant Perez’s sentence. How-
ever, the record reflects that the court heard extensive argument
about the differences between Lugo and Perez: (1) Perez entered a
plea agreement, accepting responsibility, whereas Lugo had a 6-day
trial; (2) the government only held Perez accountable for less than
50 kilograms based on his guilty plea, whereas Lugo had 150 to 450
kilograms attributed to him; and (3) Perez was a cooperating
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22-10812 Opinion of the Court 7
witness at Lugo’s trial and received a downward departure for his
substantial assistance. Because Lugo and Perez were not similarly
situated codefendants, the district court could not compare Lugo,
who did not accept responsibility and had higher exposure due to
the amount of cocaine attributed to him, to Perez, who received a
lesser sentence based on his lesser culpable conduct, guilty plea,
and cooperation with the government. Azmat,
805 F.3d at 1048;
Jayyousi,
657 F.3d at 1118.
As for Lugo’s claim that this sentence is essentially a life sen-
tence for someone of his age, we will not vacate a sentence under
abuse-of-discretion review only because we deem another sen-
tence more appropriate, so long as the sentence falls within the
range of reasonable sentences. Irey,
612 F.3d at 1190. Moreover,
Lugo’s sentence is at the bottom of the guideline range and well
below the statutory maximum of life imprisonment, both of which
indicate it is reasonable. Stanley,
739 F.3d at 656.
Accordingly, Lugo has not shown that the bottom-of-the-
guidelines sentence of 292 months’ imprisonment was substan-
tively unreasonable, and we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
