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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 18-15065
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:17-cv-00990-JDW-AEP
JOHN MCCASLAND,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
PRO GUARD COATINGS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(January 23, 2020)
Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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In this products-liability lawsuit, John McCasland contends that he suffered
permanent injuries from using “Liquid Roof,” a product manufactured and sold by
Pro Guard Coatings, Inc. (“Pro Guard”). From 2010 to 2013, McCasland used
Liquid Roof as intended, and in compliance with all safety instructions, to repair
aging or damaged roofs for his work as a Recreational Vehicle restoration specialist.
He began to suffer mysterious health problems in 2012, first presenting with an
arrhythmia. In 2013, he began to experience unexplained and involuntary
movements of his tongue and mouth, which worsened over time despite medical
treatment. Then, in 2014, a physician diagnosed the involuntary movements as
oromandibular dystonia, which McCasland was told was likely permanent.
McCasland then filed a counseled lawsuit alleging that Pro Guard was liable in
negligence or strict liability for failing to adequately warn of the risks posed by
Liquid Roof.
After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to Pro Guard.
Summary judgment was appropriate, according to the court, because McCasland
offered no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find, within a reasonable
degree of medical certainty, that Liquid Roof was capable of causing and did in fact
cause his medical conditions. Specifically, the court found that McCasland was
required, but failed, to present expert testimony to establish that causal connection.
McCasland now appeals.
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We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment and apply
the same standard used by the district court. Burton v. Tampa Hous. Auth.,
271 F.3d
1274, 1276 (11th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In evaluating a
summary-judgment motion, “all evidence and factual inferences reasonably drawn
from the evidence” are viewed “in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party”—here, McCasland. Burton,
271 F.3d at 1277. “But while all reasonable
inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, an inference based on
speculation and conjecture is not reasonable.” Hinson v. Bias,
927 F.3d 1103, 1115
(11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted).
In diversity cases, federal courts apply the substantive law of the state in which
the case arose—here, Florida. Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,
592 F.3d 1119,
1132–33 (11th Cir. 2010). Under Florida Law, a claim for failure to warn, whether
in negligence or strict liability, requires a plaintiff to show “(1) that the product
warning was inadequate; (2) that the inadequacy proximately caused her injury; and
(3) that she in fact suffered an injury from using the product.” Eghnayem v. Boston
Sci. Corp.,
873 F.3d 1304, 1321 (11th Cir. 2017). This appeal concerns the third
element only.
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To prove causation in a toxic-tort case, a plaintiff generally must show both
“general causation” and “specific causation.” See McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc.,
401 F.3d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 2005). General causation refers to “whether the drug
or chemical can cause the harm plaintiff alleges.”
Id. Specific causation refers to
“whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that the substance actually caused injury in
her particular case.” Guinn v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP,
602 F.3d 1245, 1248 n.1
(11th Cir. 2010). To show general causation, the plaintiff may offer proof that “the
medical community recognizes that the agent causes the type of harm a plaintiff
alleges.” McClain,
401 F.3d at 1239. But even where the medical community
generally recognizes that the agent causes the type of harm a plaintiff alleges, the
plaintiff still must offer proof that the agent was a substantial factor in causing the
plaintiff’s injuries. See id.; Guinn,
602 F.3d at 1256 (describing Florida’s
“substantial factor” test for proving causation).
Moreover, in cases where a jury is asked to assess complex medical or
scientific issues outside the scope of a layperson’s knowledge, an expert’s testimony
is required. See Chapman v. Procter & Gamble Distrib., LLC,
766 F.3d 1296, 1316
(11th Cir. 2014) (stating that, to prove a product caused the plaintiff’s injury, the
plaintiff was “required to have Daubert-qualified, general and specific-causation-
expert testimony that would be admissible at trial to avoid summary judgment”
(emphasis in original)); McClain,
401 F.3d at 1237 (proving that the toxicity of an
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agent caused the plaintiff’s injuries “requires expert testimony”); Shepard v.
Barnard,
949 So. 2d 232, 233 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (approving trial court’s grant
of summary judgment against plaintiff after excluding plaintiff’s medical experts’
testimony, because the doctors were needed “to provide opinions regarding any
causal link between the alleged injury and the medical treatment”). Expert testimony
was required in this case because the question whether Liquid Roof can and did cause
the harm McCasland alleges “concerns matters that are beyond the understanding of
the average lay person.” United States v. Frazier,
387 F.3d 1244, 1262 (11th Cir.
2004).
Here, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Pro Guard
because McCasland failed to create a genuine issue of a material fact regarding
causation. Guinn,
602 F.3d at 1256. To be sure, McCasland produced some evidence
that Liquid Roof was hazardous. Specifically, his sole expert, Dr. Justin White, a
biochemist, opined that Liquid Roof was “particular[ly] hazardous” based on an
analysis of its component chemicals. McCasland also points to the warning label on
the product, which advised that it “[m]ay affect the brain or nervous systems causing
dizziness, headache, or nausea,” and that “[r]eports have associated repeated and
prolonged occupational overexposure to solvents with permanent brain and nervous
system damage.” But, even so, McCasland’s evidence fails to show that Liquid Roof,
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even if it’s generally hazardous and can cause nervous system damage, is capable of
causing the particular condition—oromandibular dystonia—of which he complains.
More importantly, McCasland failed to offer any expert testimony to establish
specific causation—that Liquid Roof did in fact cause his medical condition.
Dr. White admitted in his deposition that it was outside of his training to provide an
opinion regarding causation for a condition and that he would not be providing an
opinion regarding the cause of McCasland’s condition. Additionally, McCasland’s
physicians offered no opinion as to what caused his oromandibular dystonia or other
symptoms. Because the record contains no expert testimony of specific causation,
the district court properly granted summary judgment. See Chapman, 766 F.3d at
1316 (stating that the plaintiffs “were required to have Daubert-qualified, general
and specific-causation-expert testimony that would be admissible at trial to avoid
summary judgment”); Guinn,
602 F.3d at 1256 (granting summary judgment in the
absence of expert testimony as to specific causation); McClain,
401 F.3d at 1237
(stating that proving causation in a toxic tort case “requires expert testimony”).
In his pro se brief on appeal, which we liberally construe, see Timson v.
Sampson,
518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008), McCasland argues that a reasonable
jury could find a causal nexus as a matter of logical reasoning. He points out that he
developed medical problems only after using Liquid Roof and breathing its fumes
regularly and that his symptoms matched the symptoms described on the product’s
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warning label. We do not doubt the symptoms McCasland describes or his sincere
belief that his exposure to Liquid Roof caused his health problems. But his lay
opinion on the matter is not sufficient to withstand summary judgment because the
question whether Liquid Roof caused his injuries is a matter “beyond the
understanding of the average lay person.” Frazier,
387 F.3d at 1262. On this record,
too much speculation is required for a jury to conclude that Liquid Roof more likely
than not was a substantial factor in causing the McCasland’s injuries. See McClain,
401 F.3d at 1239; Hinson, 927 F.3d at 1115 (“[A]n inference based on speculation
and conjecture is not reasonable.”). And while McCasland states that he has engaged
in extensive research on the issue, we see no indication that he could meet the
requirements to qualify as an expert witness. See Fed. R. Evid. 702.
McCasland compares this case to cases brought against tobacco companies and
argues that, in light of that comparison, his proof should be considered sufficient to
withstand summary judgment. But there is at least one key difference: in tobacco
cases, “the medical community generally recognizes the toxicity of the drug or
chemical at issue.” McClain,
401 F.3d at 1239 (stating that “cigarette smoke . . .
causes cancer”). This case, by contrast, is one “in which the medical community
does not generally recognize the agent as both toxic and causing the injury plaintiff
alleges.”
Id. As a result, McCasland needed to offer more by way of proof of
causation. See
id.
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Finally, we are unpersuaded by McCasland’s claim that the district court
violated his right to trial by jury. “It is beyond question that a district court may grant
summary judgment where the material facts concerning a claim cannot reasonably be
disputed.” Garvie v. City of Ft. Walton Beach, Fla.,
366 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir.
2004). And even though granting summary judgment “prevents the parties from
having a jury rule upon those facts, there is no need to go forward with a jury trial
when the pertinent facts are obvious and indisputable from the record; the only
remaining truly debatable matters are legal questions that a court is competent to
address.”
Id. Thus, the grant of summary judgment—based on a determination that
there are no genuine issues of fact for a jury to resolve—does not violate a plaintiff’s
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. See
id. Because we agree with the district
court that there are no genuine issues of material fact, McCasland’s right to a jury
trial was not violated.
For these reasons, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment
to Pro Guard. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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