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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 20-11752
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:18-cv-00603-HTC
DARRELL EDGECOMB,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(December 30, 2020)
Before MARTIN, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Darrell Edgecomb (“Edgecomb”) appeals the district court’s order affirming
the Social Security Commissioner’s (“Commissioner”) denial of his applications
for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. He argues on appeal
that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in evaluating Dr. George Slade’s
opinion because she failed to explain why she diverged from Dr. Slade’s opinion
that he could stand for only 30 minutes at a time and walk for only 45 minutes at a
time. He further argues that the error was not harmless because the record does not
show that there would be work available with the limitations that Dr. Slade
described.
In a social security case, we review the agency’s legal conclusions de novo,
and its factual findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial
evidence. Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir.
2007). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence
as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011). “We may
not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that
of the Commissioner.”
Id. (quotation marks and brackets omitted). We have
applied the harmless error doctrine to Social Security appeals. See Diorio v.
Heckler,
721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 1983).
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A disability is defined as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
An individual claiming Social Security disability benefits must prove that
she is disabled. Moore v. Barnhart,
405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). The
Social Security regulations establish a five-step, “sequential” process for
determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(1).
Throughout the process, the burden is on the claimant to introduce evidence in
support of her application for benefits. Ellison v. Barnhart,
355 F.3d 1272, 1276
(11th Cir. 2003). If an ALJ finds a claimant disabled or not disabled at any given
step, the ALJ does not go on to the next step. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). At the
first step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in
substantial gainful activity.
Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(i), (b). At the second step, the ALJ
must determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments for which
the claimant allegedly suffers is “severe.”
Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). At the third
step, the ALJ must decide whether the claimant’s severe impairments meet or
medically equal a listed impairment.
Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d). Where, as here,
the ALJ finds that the claimant’s severe impairments do not meet or equal a listed
impairment, the ALJ must then determine, at step four, whether she has the
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residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform her past relevant work.
Id.
§ 416.920(a)(4)(iv), (e)-(f). “[RFC] is an assessment . . . of a claimant’s remaining
ability to do work despite his impairments.” Lewis v. Callahan,
125 F.3d 1436,
1440 (11th Cir. 1997). If the claimant cannot perform her past relevant work, the
ALJ must then determine, at step five, whether the claimant’s RFC permits her to
perform other work that exists in the national economy. 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920(a)(4)(v), (g). Finally, the burden shifts back to the claimant to prove she
is unable to perform the jobs suggested by the Commissioner. Hale v. Bowen,
831
F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987).
The ALJ may reject the opinion of any physician if the evidence supports a
contrary conclusion. Sryock v. Heckler,
764 F.2d 834, 835 (11th Cir. 1985). In
assessing medical evidence, an ALJ is required to state with particularity the
weight he gave the different medical opinions and the reasons therefor. Sharfarz v.
Bowen,
825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987). However, there is no rigid
requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his
decision, so long as the ALJ’s decision was not a broad rejection that did not
enable the court to conclude that the ALJ considered the claimant’s medical
condition as a whole. Dyer v. Barnhart,
395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005).
When the ALJ fails to state with some measure of clarity the grounds for the
decision, we will decline to affirm “simply because some rationale might have
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supported the ALJ’s conclusion.”
Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (quotation marks
omitted).
The Commissioner, not a claimant’s physician, is responsible for
determining whether the claimant is statutorily disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(d)(1). Specifically, “[a] statement by a medical source that [a claimant
is] ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that [the Commissioner] will
determine that [the claimant is] disabled.”
Id.
“In order for a vocational expert’s testimony to constitute substantial
evidence, the ALJ must pose a hypothetical question which comprises all of the
claimant’s impairments.”
Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1180 (quotation marks omitted).
The assessment of a claimant’s RFC is “based on all the relevant evidence in [the
claimant’s] case record” and not simply on medical opinions. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1545(a)(1). Although a claimant may provide a statement containing a
physician’s opinion of her remaining capabilities, the ALJ will evaluate such a
statement in light of the other evidence presented and the ultimate determination of
disability is reserved for the ALJ. 20 C.F.R §§ 404.1513, 404.1527, 404.1545.
Here, the ALJ did not commit reversible error by failing to explain the
exclusion of Dr. George Slade’s finding that Edgecomb was capable of standing
for 30 minutes at a time and walking 45 minutes at a time from her RFC
assessment. The ALJ’s decision was not a broad rejection of Dr. Slade’s opinion
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and made clear that the ALJ considered Edgecomb’s medical condition as a whole,
because the ALJ described Dr. Slade’s opinion, including the standing and walking
limitations, and then stated that she gave it substantial weight because it was
consistent with her own subjective findings and generally consistent with the other
objective medical evidence. Rather, the ALJ declined to include the limitations
that Edgecomb was capable of standing for 30 minutes at a time and walking 45
minutes at a time in the hypotheticals as posed to the VE because she determined
that including a sit/stand option was sufficient to address the frequency Edgecomb
needed to change positions within the 3 hours of standing or of sitting. This is
supported by the ALJ’s statement that, even though there was no evidence in the
record that a cane and walker were medically necessary, she had provided
Edgecomb with a “sit/stand option” in the RFC and that the VE determined he
would still be able to perform other work. The ALJ’s failure to address that portion
of Dr. Slade’s opinion itself is not reversible error, given that the ALJ is not
required to specifically refer to every piece of evidence so long as the decision was
not a broad rejection of the medical opinion and it makes clear that the ALJ
considered Edgecomb’s medical condition as a whole.
Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211.
Further, any error by the ALJ was harmless because there was no evidence
that the jobs suggested by the Commissioner could not be performed by
Edgecomb, even considering the limitations not referenced by the ALJ. The VE
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testified that the jobs available to Edgecomb—ticket seller, routing clerk, and
convenience store cashier—could be performed sitting or standing. (AR at 379).
The reasonable implication of the ALJ’s inclusion of a “sit/stand option” was that
the option would be at Edgecomb’s own volition. Thus, the frequency that
Edgecomb would need to alternate positions did not impact the VE’s determination
of which jobs Edgecomb could perform. The sit/stand option satisfied Edgecomb’s
needs as described by Dr. Slade, as he could do any of the jobs suggested by the
VE sitting or standing, and it is implied that he could stand for 30 minutes at a time
and sit as needed. The jobs suggested by the VE did not require walking, as
implied by the VE’s comment that they could be done sitting or standing, so the
failure of the ALJ to include the limitation that Edgecomb could walk for 45
minutes without stopping was also harmless. Edgecomb did not offer any evidence
that he could not perform the jobs identified by the VE based on his ability to sit or
stand for any period of time, and thus did not satisfy his burden of showing that he
could not perform the jobs proposed by the VE.
Hale, 831 F.2d at 1011. Thus,
there is no need for the ALJ to clarify whether a person with the limitations
described in Dr. Slade’s opinion would be capable of performing the jobs that the
VE identified. Therefore, any error committed by the ALJ in failing to explain her
exclusion of one portion of Dr. Slade’s opinion from the hypotheticals was
harmless.
Diorio, 721 F.2d at 728.
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AFFIRMED.
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