Linda A. Nash v. State of Florida Fifth District Court of Appeals ( 2020 )


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  •           Case: 19-12898      Date Filed: 04/01/2020   Page: 1 of 7
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 19-12898
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 6:19-cv-00885-RBD-GJK
    LINDA A. NASH,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    RICHARD M. ANNETTE,
    Plaintiff,
    versus
    STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS,
    RICHARD B. ORFINGER,
    WENDY W. BERGER,
    JAMES A. EDWARDS,
    BRIAN D. LAMBERT, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (April 1, 2020)
    Case: 19-12898      Date Filed: 04/01/2020     Page: 2 of 7
    Before JORDAN, NEWSOM and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Linda Nash appeals the district court’s dismissal of her amended complaint
    under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants, five judges on Florida’s Fifth
    District Court of Appeal (the “judges”), violated her civil rights by ruling against her
    in a state foreclosure proceeding, as well as the district court’s subsequent denial of
    her motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order. On appeal, Nash argues that
    the district court erred by concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
    her amended complaint pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1 The judges have
    moved for dismissal based on a lack of appellate jurisdiction or, in the alternative,
    for summary affirmance, and to stay the briefing schedule. Nash has moved for
    leave to file a supplemental response to the judges’ motion. 2
    Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of the essence, such
    as “situations where important public policy issues are involved or those where
    rights delayed are rights denied,” or where “the position of one of the parties is
    clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the
    outcome of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the appeal is
    1
    The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 
    263 U.S. 413
    (1923),
    and D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 
    460 U.S. 462
    (1983).
    2
    We GRANT Nash’s motion for leave to file, and we considered her supplemental response in
    the disposition of the judges’ motion.
    2
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    frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 
    406 F.2d 1158
    , 1162 (5th Cir. 1969).
    An appeal is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in law or fact. See Napier
    v. Preslicka, 
    314 F.3d 528
    , 531 (11th Cir. 2002).
    We review questions of our jurisdiction de novo. See Club Madonna, Inc. v.
    City of Miami Beach, 
    924 F.3d 1370
    , 1378 (11th Cir. 2019). We have appellate
    jurisdiction to review the district court’s determination that it lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction, including a determination that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars
    review. See Boyd v. Home of Legend, Inc., 
    188 F.3d 1294
    , 1297-1300 (11th Cir.
    1999); Doe v. Fla. Bar, 
    630 F.3d 1336
    , 1340 (11th Cir. 2011).
    We review de novo the district court’s decision that the Rooker-Feldman
    doctrine deprives it of subject-matter jurisdiction. See May v. Morgan Cty. Ga., 
    878 F.3d 1001
    , 1004 (11th Cir. 2017). We review the denial of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
    motion for an abuse of discretion. Bender v. Mazda Motor Corp., 
    657 F.3d 1200
    ,
    1202 (11th Cir. 2011).
    Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts and courts of
    appeals do not have jurisdiction to review state-court decisions. 
    May, 878 F.3d at 1004
    . The doctrine applies in “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of
    injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
    proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
    judgments.”
    Id. (quotation marks
    omitted). The doctrine applies to federal claims
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    raised in state court and to those inextricably intertwined with the state court’s
    judgment.
    Id. at 1004–05.
    It does not apply where a party did not have a reasonable
    opportunity to raise her federal claim in state proceedings.
    Id. at 1005.
    A claim is inextricably intertwined if it would “effectively nullify” the state
    court judgment, or if it “succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly
    decided the issues.”
    Id. (quotation marks
    omitted). Even if the federal case is not
    styled as an appeal of the state-court judgment, it falls within Rooker-Feldman if the
    claim challenges the state-court decision itself, rather than the statute or law
    underlying that decision.
    Id. Other circuits
    have recognized an exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
    where the state-court judgment is void ab initio due to the state court’s lack of
    jurisdiction, but we have not adopted that exception. See Casale v. Tillman, 
    558 F.3d 1258
    , 1261 (11th Cir. 2009).
    To succeed on appeal from the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion, the appellant
    must demonstrate a justification so compelling that the district court was required to
    vacate its order. Cano v. Baker, 
    435 F.3d 1337
    , 1342 (11th Cir. 2006).
    Here, as an initial matter, we have jurisdiction to review the district court’s
    determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-
    Feldman doctrine. See 
    Boyd, 188 F.3d at 1297
    –1300; 
    Doe, 630 F.3d at 1340
    .
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    Accordingly, the judges’ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is due to be
    denied.
    Moving to their motion for summary affirmance, the judges’ arguments are
    clearly correct as a matter of law, and there is no substantial question as to the
    outcome of this appeal. See 
    Davis, 406 F.2d at 1162
    . Liberally construed, Nash
    argues on appeal that, in her amended complaint, she identified two due-process
    violations arising from the state-court proceedings: (1) the entry of the foreclosure
    judgment before she could present her affirmative defenses; and (2) the judges’
    application of the law-of-the-case doctrine to bar her from presenting argument on
    that issue in her second appeal. The district court did not err by concluding that the
    Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred both of these claims.
    First, to the extent that Nash alleged that the entry of the foreclosure judgment
    deprived her of due process, it is clear as a matter of law that the district court
    correctly concluded that her claim fell squarely within Rooker-Feldman, as she
    concededly raised this issue without success at every level of the state court during
    the foreclosure proceedings. 
    May, 878 F.3d at 1004
    –05. Federal review of this issue
    would be nothing more than review of a federal claim already raised and rejected in
    state court, which is exactly what the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars. See
    id. As to
    the second claim, which Nash argues could not have been raised in the
    state court because it was not available until the judges applied the law-of-the-case
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    doctrine to bar her claim, the district court correctly concluded that a ruling in Nash’s
    favor would “effectively nullify” the state-court judgment. See
    id. at 1005.
    The only
    way for a federal court to conclude that the second appellate decision violated Nash’s
    due process rights would be to find that it was improper for the judges to apply the
    law-of-the-case doctrine to Nash’s claims—in other words, that the state court
    wrongly decided the issues. See
    id. Thus, it
    is clear as a matter of law that Nash’s
    claim that the judges’ ruling in the second appellate decision violated her due process
    rights is inextricably intertwined with the state court’s judgment and, therefore, is
    barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See
    id. Next, to
    the extent that Nash argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does
    not apply because the state-court judgment was void, we have not found such an
    exception to exist. See 
    Casale, 558 F.3d at 1261
    . However, this does not create an
    issue that would warrant denying summary affirmance here, because Nash does not
    challenge the state court’s jurisdiction to enter the judgments against her. See
    id. Rather, she
    argues that the state-court judgments were void because the state court
    incorrectly applied state law. Such a finding would necessarily be a finding that the
    state court wrongly decided the issues, which Rooker-Feldman bars us from doing.
    See 
    May, 878 F.3d at 1005
    .
    Finally, because she does not show any error by the district court in dismissing
    her amended complaint, Nash cannot make a meritorious argument that a compelling
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    justification existed for the district court to grant her Rule 60(b) motion. See 
    Cano, 435 F.3d at 1342
    . Thus, any argument that the district court abused its discretion by
    denying her Rule 60(b) motion would be frivolous. See 
    Preslicka, 314 F.3d at 531
    .
    In conclusion, because we have jurisdiction to review the district court’s
    orders, the judges’ motion to dismiss is DENIED. Because the judges’ arguments
    in their motion for summary affirmance are clearly correct as a matter of law and
    there is no substantial question as to the outcome of the appeal, their motion for
    summary affirmance of the district court’s order is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
    motion to stay the briefing schedule is DENIED as moot.
    7