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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 19-14118
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 3:16-cv-00579-HES-JRK
CARLTON MATHEWS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
OFFICER J. WETHERBEE,
SERGEANT MA COULTER #7533,
OFFICER D. BRABSTON,
Defendants-Appellants,
J.C. BENOIT,
Lieutenant, et al.,
Defendants.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(December 31, 2020)
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Before MARTIN, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jeffrey Wetherbee, Dale Coutler, and Derek Brabston appeal the district
court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified
immunity. On appeal, they argue that the district court erred in not viewing the
evidence from the perspective of a reasonable officer. They also argue that the
district court erred in not conducting an individualized qualified immunity analysis
for each officer.
We review de novo a district court’s ruling on summary judgment, including
the district court’s decision to deny qualified immunity. Lee v. Ferraro,
284 F.3d
1188, 1190 (11th Cir. 2002). On summary judgment, a district court’s denial of
qualified immunity is an immediately appealable collateral order, provided that it
concerns solely the pure legal decision of (1) whether the implicated federal
constitutional right was clearly established and (2) whether the alleged acts violated
that law. Koch v. Rugg,
221 F.3d 1283, 1294 (11th Cir. 2000). The appeal must
“present a legal question concerning a clearly established federal right that can be
decided apart from considering sufficiency of the evidence relative to the correctness
of the plaintiff's alleged facts.”
Id.
Section 1983 prohibits officials acting under color of state law from depriving
another of their constitutional rights.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. As noted more fully infra,
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a pretrial detainee has a right under the Fourteenth Amendment to not be exposed to
excessive force, in accordance with binding precedent. See Patel v. Lanier County
Georgia,
969 F.3d 1173, 1181-82 (11th Cir. 2020).
Qualified immunity, however, protects a defendant from liability in a § 1983
claim arising from discretionary acts, “as long as [those] acts do not violate clearly
established . . . constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Jackson v. Sauls,
206 F.3d 1156, 1164 (11th Cir. 2000). Once an official
demonstrates that he was performing a discretionary function, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity
grounds. Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland,
370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir.
2004).
In cases with multiple named defendants, each defendant is entitled to an
independent qualified immunity analysis as it relates to his actions. Alcocer v. Mills,
906 F.3d 944, 951 (11th Cir. 2018) (reversing and remanding when district court did
not individually evaluate each defendant’s specific actions and omissions and the
district court did not look at evidence from the perspective of the officers). When a
district court fails to engage in such individual analysis, we will reverse a denial of
summary judgment and remand for the district court to engage in such individual
determinations.
Id. at 952.
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To show that a defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds, the plaintiff must show that a reasonable jury could find both
that the defendant violated a constitutional right and that the constitutional right was
clearly established.
Id. at 1267. We have held that a right may be clearly established
for qualified immunity purposes through: (1) case law with indistinguishable facts
clearly establishing a constitutional right; (2) a broad statement of principle within
the Constitution, statute, or case law that clearly establishes a constitutional right; or
(3) the conduct was so egregious that a constitutional right was clearly violated, even
in the complete absence of case law. Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach, Fla.,
561 F.3d
1288, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2009). “Exact factual identity with a previously decided
case is not required,” but rather, the key inquiry is whether the law provided the
official with “fair warning” that his conduct violated the constitution. Coffin v.
Brandau,
642 F.3d 999, 1013 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). This
inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad
general proposition.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted). However, if there is no caselaw
directly on point, general statements of the law and the reasoning of prior cases may
provide fair warning of unlawful conduct if they “clearly apply” to the novel factual
situation at issue. Mercado v. City of Orlando,
407 F.3d 1152, 1159 (11th Cir. 2005).
To determine whether a pretrial detainee’s right to be free from the use of
excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment has been violated, he must show
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that the force used against him was objectively unreasonable, which is a fact-specific
inquiry. Kingsley v. Hendrickson,
135 S.Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015). “A court must make
this determination from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,
including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight,”
taking into account the government’s need to manage the facility and deferring to
policies and practices officials use to preserve order, discipline, and security.
Id.
Considerations in determining the reasonableness of force include: the relationship
between the need for force and amount used; the extent of the injury; efforts made
by the officer to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem; the
threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively
resisting.
Id.
Here, the district court erred in two ways. First, it erred in not viewing the
evidence from the perspective of a reasonable officer. See Kingsley,
135 S.Ct. at
2473. Instead, the district court listed Mathews’s contentions in conjunction with
the officers’ contentions, but it did not indicate that it was looking at the evidence
from the viewpoint of an officer at the scene, such as the need to keep order in the
facility.
Id. Thus, the district court did not view the evidence using the proper
standard.
Second, the district court erred in not engaging in an individualized qualified
immunity analysis for each defendant. See Alcocer, 906 F.3d at 951. Instead of
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engaging in a qualified immunity analysis for each defendant, the district court
instead referred to the defendants collectively in determining that they were not
entitled to qualified immunity. Because the officers are entitled to an individualized
qualified immunity analysis, this constituted error.
While viewing the evidence from the perspective of a reasonable officer and
applying an individualized analysis might have led the district court to the same
conclusions, it is also possible that it could have reached a different conclusion,
whether in whole or in part. Accordingly, the district court’s omissions cannot be
disregarded as harmless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. We therefore vacate the denial of
summary judgment and remand with instructions to properly engage in the qualified
immunity analysis.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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