Andrew Hall v. HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc. , 581 F. App'x 800 ( 2014 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-11626
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-01964-WSD
ANDREW HALL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
HSBC MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(September 19, 2014)
Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Andrew Hall appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for leave to file
an amended complaint. Hall filed an initial complaint against HSBC Mortgage
Services, Inc. (HSBC) alleging causes of action arising from HSBC’s foreclosure
on Hall’s property and subsequent efforts to evict Hall from the property. After
HSBC filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation
(R&R) concluding Hall’s complaint should be dismissed. Before the district court
reviewed the magistrate judge’s R&R, Hall filed a motion for leave to amend his
complaint.
In his proposed amended complaint, Hall alleged that on September 29,
2005, he executed a promissory note and security deed in favor of Fieldstone
Mortgage Company for a loan in the amount of $191,292. Hall alleged that the
loan was subsequently deposited in the HSBC Home Equity Loan Trust 2005-3, of
which U.S. Bank, N.A. was the trustee and HSBC was the servicing agent. In late
2009, Hall defaulted on the loan. On June 25, 2010, the grantee of the security
deed, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc., assigned all rights, title, and
interest under the security deed to HSBC. Sometime thereafter, HSBC issued
letters to Hall and published a “Notice of Sale Under Power” which stated that Hall
had defaulted on the loan and indicated the property would be sold on July 6, 2010.
The property was then sold in a non-judicial foreclosure sale on that date. In his
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proposed amended complaint, Hall alleged that none of the letters HSBC sent him
complied with the notice requirements specified in the security deed for
accelerating repayment of the loan and, further, that HSBC failed to comply with
the statutory notice requirements of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2. Hall asserted claims
for (1) declaratory relief, (2) breach of contract, (3) violation of § 44-14-162.2, (4)
wrongful foreclosure, and (5) violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
The district court dismissed Hall’s initial complaint, finding that it failed to
state a claim for relief. The district court also denied Hall’s motion for leave to file
an amended complaint. This appeal followed.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the district court’s denial of a motion for leave to amend for
abuse of discretion, but review de novo the district court’s conclusion that an
amendment to the complaint would be futile. SFM Holdings, Ltd. v. Banc of Am.
Sec., LLC, 600 F.3d 1334, 1336 (11th Cir. 2010). We may affirm the district
court’s judgment on any ground supported by the record. Kernel Records Oy v.
Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294, 1309 (11th Cir. 2012).
II. DISCUSSION
It is axiomatic that the district court should freely give leave to amend
“when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); see also Foman v. Davis, 371
U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Nonetheless, “a motion to amend may be denied on
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numerous grounds such as undue delay, undue prejudice to the defendants, and
futility of the amendment.” Mann v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 1306, 1316 (11th Cir. 2013)
(quotation omitted).
Contrary to Hall’s contentions, the district court did not err in determining
that Hall’s proposed amendments to the complaint would be futile. Hall’s
amended complaint would still be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim,
and the district court was not required to waste its time allowing Hall to file a
legally insufficient pleading. See Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230,
1255 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Because justice does not require district courts to waste
their time on hopeless cases, leave may be denied if a proposed amendment fails to
correct the deficiencies in the original complaint or otherwise fails to state a
claim.”). Hall’s amended complaint does not contain sufficient factual matter “to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quotation omitted). Although Hall claims that the letters and notices
HSBC sent to him did not comply with the notice requirements of the security
deed, Hall nowhere provides the actual content of those letters and did not attach
them as exhibits to his proposed amended complaint. Instead, Hall merely
“tender[ed] naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” which did not
allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. (quotations and alteration omitted). Hall also failed to
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plead sufficient facts plausibly raising an inference of causation and damages
stemming from HSBC’s alleged breach of contract. See BAC Home Loans
Servicing, L.P. v. Wedereit, 759 S.E.2d 867, 872 (Ga. Ct. App. July 8, 2014)
(explaining that to prevail on a breach of contract claim, a party must show
damages resulting from a failure to give proper pre-acceleration notice).
Similarly, Hall’s allegations that HSBC failed to comply with the notice
requirements of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2 and wrongfully foreclosed on the
property did not “raise [his] right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Hall’s assertions of causation and
damages amount only to conclusory statements and legal conclusions couched as
factual allegations and, as such, do not suffice. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;
Gregorakos v. Wells Fargo Nat’l Ass’n, 647 S.E.2d 289, 292 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)
(“In Georgia, a plaintiff asserting a claim of wrongful foreclosure must establish a
legal duty owed to it by the foreclosing party, a breach of that duty, a causal
connection between the breach of that duty and the injury it sustained, and
damages.” (quotation and brackets omitted)). Hall’s purported claim for violations
of § 44-14-162.2 was premised on the assertion that HSBC did not have full
authority to negotiate, amend, and modify the terms of the loan because it was
merely a servicing agent. The Georgia Supreme Court, however, has indicated that
a servicing agent may have full authority within the meaning of § 44-14-162.2, You
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v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 743 S.E.2d 428, 433-34 (Ga. 2013), and HSBC was
specifically assigned both the security deed and the promissory note, as well as all
powers, options, privileges, and immunities arising under those instruments.
Hall’s allegations regarding violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., also amounted only to “unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Hall’s conclusory allegations that HSBC wrongfully and deceptively attempted to
collect a debt from him did not allow the district court “to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct,” and did not move his claims “across the line from
conceivable to plausible.” Id. at 679-80 (quotations omitted). Accordingly, the
district court was not required to allow Hall to amend his complaint to assert them.
Finally, because Hall failed to sufficiently plead any claims for relief, his
claim for declaratory relief premised on those claims was also insufficient.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s decision denying
Hall leave to amend.
AFFIRMED.
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