United States v. Gregory Bane ( 2020 )


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  •             Case: 18-10232   Date Filed: 01/24/2020   Page: 1 of 23
    [PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 18-10232
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 8:09-cr-00352-VMC-MAP-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    BEN BANE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    No. 18-11086
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 8:09-cr-00352-VMC-MAP-2
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    GREGORY BANE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Case: 18-10232        Date Filed: 01/24/2020       Page: 2 of 23
    ________________________
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    _______________________
    (January 24, 2020)
    Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN, and SUTTON,* Circuit Judges.
    WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
    These appeals require us to decide whether Ben and Greg Bane may use a
    writ of error coram nobis to challenge a forfeiture judgment. After a jury convicted
    Ben and Greg of federal crimes related to their healthcare-fraud scheme, the
    district court imposed a forfeiture judgment, which stated that “the defendants are
    jointly and severally liable” for the total proceeds of the scheme—$5,846,685.
    Neither Ben nor Greg challenged the forfeiture judgment on direct appeal, and the
    government obtained property from both Ben and Greg to satisfy their forfeiture
    obligations. After the Supreme Court held in Honeycutt v. United States, 
    137 S. Ct. 1626
    , 1630 (2017), that a different forfeiture statute does not permit joint-and-
    several liability, Ben and Greg filed motions for relief. The district court denied
    their motions, and they appealed. We affirm because Ben and Greg procedurally
    defaulted their claims.
    *
    Honorable Jeffrey S. Sutton, United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by
    designation.
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    I. BACKGROUND
    Ben and his son Greg committed healthcare-fraud offenses in connection
    with their operation of two companies. Ben owned and operated the companies and
    Greg was the Vice President of Operations. The companies provided medical
    equipment, such as portable oxygen, to Medicare patients. For Medicare to
    reimburse the companies for the portable oxygen, an independent lab had to
    determine that the oxygen was medically necessary. Instead of following that
    crucial step, the companies performed the testing themselves and told Medicare
    that they had used independent labs.
    In 2010, a grand jury charged Ben and Greg by superseding indictment with
    one count of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 287, 371, 1001,
    1347, five counts of healthcare fraud, 
    id. §§ 2,
    1347, and four counts of making
    false claims for reimbursement to a healthcare benefit program, 
    id. §§ 2,
    287. The
    indictment also contained a forfeiture notice, which stated that the government was
    entitled to forfeit “any and all right, title, and interest [the Banes] may have in any
    property, real or personal, that constitutes or is derived, directly or indirectly, from
    gross proceeds traceable to the commission of the offense.” See 
    id. § 982(a)(7);
    see
    also 21 U.S.C. § 853(p). The forfeiture notice estimated that the proceeds of the
    offense totaled $5,000,000 and said that “the defendants are jointly and severally
    liable.”
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    That forfeiture notice came to fruition after a jury convicted Ben and Greg.
    The district court granted the government’s motion for a preliminary order of
    forfeiture in the amount of $5,846,684.54 and a preliminary order of forfeiture for
    substitute assets. See 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(7); 21 U.S.C. § 853(p). Ben and the
    government had stipulated that “the amount of proceeds traceable to the
    commission of the offenses for which he was convicted, and the forfeiture money
    judgment amount that should be entered by the Court at sentencing, is
    $5,846,684.54.” As with the forfeiture notice in the indictment, the preliminary
    order of forfeiture stated that “the defendants are jointly and severally liable” for
    the total forfeiture amount. Consistent with joint-and-several liability, the order
    listed property—belonging to Ben and Greg—that was subject to forfeiture. The
    preliminary order of forfeiture became final as to Ben and Greg when the district
    court included it in their final judgments. And in November 2011, the district court
    granted the government’s motion for a final order of forfeiture. Neither Ben nor
    Greg appealed the preliminary or final orders.
    Several years later, Ben and Greg saw an opportunity to challenge the
    forfeiture judgments when the Supreme Court interpreted a different forfeiture
    statute not to permit joint-and-several liability. 
    Honeycutt, 137 S. Ct. at 1630
    ; see
    also United States v. Elbeblawy, 
    899 F.3d 925
    , 941–42 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding
    that the reasoning of Honeycutt applies to the healthcare-fraud forfeiture statute).
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    Ben and Greg believed that the rule from Honeycutt should apply to them, but they
    struggled to find a way to bring that claim in the district court. Ben had a pending
    motion to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and filed a motion based on
    Honeycutt in that proceeding. He then filed a motion for summary judgment to
    encourage the district court to rule on the pending Honeycutt motion. Greg filed a
    “Motion In Opposition” to the forfeiture judgment. The district court struck Ben’s
    motion for summary judgment because it concluded that he was challenging the
    final order of forfeiture and lacked standing to bring that challenge. And it denied
    Greg’s motion as untimely because Greg filed it “more than six years after his
    sentencing.” Ben and Greg appealed, and we appointed counsel. Their counsel now
    argue that the appropriate vehicle for the claims is the common-law writ of error
    coram nobis.
    II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    “We review de novo questions of our jurisdiction.” United States v. Amodeo,
    
    916 F.3d 967
    , 970 (11th Cir. 2019). We review the denial of a writ of error coram
    nobis for abuse of discretion. United States v. Peter, 
    310 F.3d 709
    , 711 (11th Cir.
    2002). “[W]e may affirm for any reason supported by the record.” United States v.
    Al–Arian, 
    514 F.3d 1184
    , 1189 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
    omitted).
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    III. DISCUSSION
    The parties invite us to decide many issues in these appeals, such as whether
    Honeycutt announced a new rule that applies retroactively and whether a writ of
    error coram nobis may be used to challenge a forfeiture judgment, but we need not
    decide those questions to resolve these appeals. Even assuming that Honeycutt
    applies retroactively and that coram nobis may be used for this purpose, Ben and
    Greg are not entitled to relief because their failure to challenge their forfeiture
    judgments on direct appeal means they cannot challenge them now. But before we
    address their procedural default, we must first confirm that Ben and Greg have
    standing to bring this challenge.
    A. Ben and Greg Have Standing.
    A defendant has standing to challenge a preliminary order of forfeiture
    because that order causes his injury—the loss of his property. 
    Amodeo, 916 F.3d at 972
    ; United States v. Flanders, 
    752 F.3d 1317
    , 1343 (11th Cir. 2014). A final order
    of forfeiture, in contrast, is entered after the defendant has already lost ownership
    of the property and decides only third parties’ rights in the property. 
    Amodeo, 916 F.3d at 972
    . Ben and Greg have standing because they are challenging the
    preliminary order of forfeiture. Their motions in the district court claim that the
    district court erred when it held them jointly and severally liable for the forfeiture
    judgment. A complaint about the district court’s method of determining their
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    forfeiture liability is a complaint about the loss of their property—caused by the
    preliminary order of forfeiture. Assured that we have jurisdiction to hear these
    appeals, we turn to procedural default.
    B. Ben and Greg Procedurally Defaulted Their Claims.
    When a defendant fails to make a claim on direct appeal, procedural default
    ordinarily bars him from making that claim on collateral review. McKay v. United
    States, 
    657 F.3d 1190
    , 1196 (11th Cir. 2011); 
    Peter, 310 F.3d at 711
    . But the bar is
    not absolute. He can overcome it if he establishes cause and prejudice. 
    McKay, 657 F.3d at 1196
    . Or he can avoid the procedural-default bar altogether, meaning he
    can raise a claim for the first time on collateral review without demonstrating cause
    and prejudice, if the alleged error is jurisdictional. 
    Peter, 310 F.3d at 711
    –13.
    Ben and Greg attempt to use both of those ways to avoid procedural default.
    They first argue that a Honeycutt error is jurisdictional, and if not, they have
    overcome the procedural default. We reject both arguments in turn.
    1. A Honeycutt Error Is Not A Jurisdictional Error.
    Ben and Greg argue that they are permitted to raise their Honeycutt claims
    for the first time on collateral review because a Honeycutt error is jurisdictional.
    The Supreme Court has instructed courts to use caution in labeling errors
    “jurisdictional.” See Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs &
    Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, 
    558 U.S. 67
    , 81 (2009). Jurisdiction refers to
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    “the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” United States
    v. Cotton, 
    535 U.S. 625
    , 630 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
    Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 
    561 U.S. 247
    , 254 (2010); Union 
    Pac., 558 U.S. at 81
    . Federal district courts have statutory power to adjudicate prosecutions
    of federal offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Because the prosecution must be for a
    federal offense, we have held that when an indictment affirmatively alleges
    conduct that is not a federal offense, it does “not invoke the district court’s
    jurisdiction to enter judgment or accept a guilty plea.” United States v. Brown, 
    752 F.3d 1344
    , 1352–53 (11th Cir. 2014); accord 
    Peter, 310 F.3d at 713
    , 715. In Peter,
    for example, we held that the district court committed a jurisdictional error when it
    accepted a guilty plea to mail fraud when the indictment contained allegations of
    conduct that was “outside the reach of the mail fraud 
    statute.” 310 F.3d at 715
    .
    Ben and Greg rely on Peter to argue that a Honeycutt error is jurisdictional.
    They do not dispute that the indictment alleged that they engaged in conduct that
    qualifies as federal offenses. Instead, they focus on something else in the
    indictment: the forfeiture notice, which stated that “the defendants are jointly and
    severally liable” for the total forfeiture amount. They contend that allegations of a
    type of liability that the forfeiture statute does not permit are the same as
    allegations of conduct that is not a federal offense.
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    This argument fails because the forfeiture notice is included in the
    indictment to provide the defendant with notice, not to invoke the subject-matter
    jurisdiction of the district court. Forfeiture is not a federal offense. Libretti v.
    United States, 
    516 U.S. 29
    , 38–39 (1995). It is only “an element of the sentence
    imposed following conviction” of a federal offense. 
    Id. (first emphasis
    added).
    Although the Federal Rules require the charging document to contain notice of the
    forfeiture, they require the government to designate that notice in a manner
    different from the charged federal offenses, which are laid out in counts. See Fed.
    R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1), 32.2(a). The federal offenses in Ben and Greg’s indictment
    invoked the court’s authority to adjudicate the prosecutions, and the error in the
    forfeiture notice did not affect that authority.
    Ben and Greg also argue that a Honeycutt error is jurisdictional because the
    district court acted without authority when it used joint-and-several liability to
    impose a forfeiture amount above what the forfeiture statute permitted. See
    
    Honeycutt, 137 S. Ct. at 1631
    –32. They cite nineteenth-century Supreme Court
    decisions, such as Bigelow v. Forrest, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 339, 351 (1869), and Ex
    parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 176–77 (1873), to argue that when a district
    court exceeds its authority, it acts without jurisdiction.
    This argument fares no better than their first. The Supreme Court has
    clarified that the concept of “jurisdiction” has narrowed since those decisions. See
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    Cotton, 535 U.S. at 630
    . To the extent that later decisions have suggested that a
    court may commit a jurisdictional error when it acts without authority, see Welch v.
    United States, 
    136 S. Ct. 1257
    , 1265 (2016); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 
    136 S. Ct. 718
    , 730–31 (2016), the Supreme Court has not applied that rule to statutory errors
    in calculating the amount of a forfeiture judgment, and we decline to extend it
    here. We find support for this conclusion in the way our Court has treated similar
    errors in the context of restitution. Restitution and forfeiture both apply after
    conviction of a federal offense, do not have a statutory range, and require the
    defendant to pay money owed to the victim or the government, respectively. In the
    restitution context, we have reviewed for plain error when the district court
    exceeded its authority by imposing restitution beyond that allowed by the
    restitution statute. United States v. Cobbs, 
    967 F.2d 1555
    , 1557–58 (11th Cir.
    1992) (applying plain-error review to the claim that “a court order[ed] restitution
    beyond that authorized by the Victim and Witness Protection Act”); accord United
    States v. Davis, 
    714 F.3d 809
    , 815–16 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Inman, 
    411 F.3d 591
    , 595 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Randle, 
    324 F.3d 550
    , 555 (7th Cir.
    2003). And that standard of review does not apply to jurisdictional errors. See
    
    Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631
    (“Freed from the view that [the error is jurisdictional], we
    proceed to apply the plain-error test . . . .”). So precedent establishes that an order
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    of restitution greater than the amount the statute permits, like a Honeycutt error, is
    not jurisdictional.
    2. Procedural Default Bars Ben’s and Greg’s Claims.
    As a non-jurisdictional error, Ben and Greg needed to raise their Honeycutt
    claims on direct appeal to avoid procedural default. See 
    McKay, 657 F.3d at 1196
    .
    Greg acknowledges that he did not challenge his forfeiture judgment on direct
    appeal, but he contends that procedural default does not apply because he “put the
    factual basis for his Honeycutt claim before the district court.” Even assuming that
    contention is true, procedural default applies because Greg did not challenge the
    forfeiture judgment on appeal. See United States v. Pearson, 
    940 F.3d 1210
    , 1213
    n.6 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing 
    McKay, 657 F.3d at 1196
    ). So their failure to bring
    these claims on direct appeal means that they may not bring them now unless they
    can demonstrate cause and prejudice to overcome their procedural defaults.
    
    McKay, 657 F.3d at 1196
    . The cause-and-prejudice standard requires “showing
    cause for not raising the claim of error on direct appeal and actual prejudice from
    the alleged error.” 
    Id. (alteration adopted)
    (internal quotation marks omitted). Ben
    and Greg have not made either showing.
    Ben and Greg argue that they have established cause because it would have
    been novel and futile to challenge the imposition of joint-and-several liability on
    direct appeal. They contend that when the district court imposed the forfeiture, our
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    Court and every other circuit to have considered the issue decided that joint-and-
    several liability applies in the forfeiture context. See, e.g., United States v.
    Caporale, 
    806 F.2d 1487
    , 1506 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that joint-and-several
    liability applies to the forfeiture statute for the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
    Organizations Act); United States v. Newman, 
    659 F.3d 1235
    , 1244 (9th Cir. 2011)
    (affirming joint-and-several forfeiture liability and citing decisions from the
    Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits for support).
    The novelty of a claim may constitute cause for excusing the procedural
    default, but only when the claim is truly novel, meaning that “its legal basis [was]
    not reasonably available to counsel.” Reed v. Ross, 
    468 U.S. 1
    , 16 (1984);
    Hargrave v. Dugger, 
    832 F.2d 1528
    , 1530–31 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc). This
    exception to the procedural-default bar exists because the Supreme Court has
    acknowledged that it would be pointless to require “a defendant to raise a truly
    novel issue” that his counsel is likely unaware of and that the court would likely
    “reject . . . out of hand.” 
    Ross, 468 U.S. at 15
    –16. In Hargrave, for instance, we
    concluded that the petitioner’s claim was novel because he relied on a Supreme
    Court decision that announced a new constitutional right for capital 
    defendants. 832 F.2d at 1531
    (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 
    438 U.S. 586
    , 604 (1978)). In contrast, a
    claim is not novel when counsel made a conscious choice not to pursue the claim
    on direct appeal because of perceived futility, Smith v. Murray, 
    477 U.S. 527
    , 533–
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    35 (1986); 
    Ross, 468 U.S. at 13
    –14, or when the building blocks of the claim were
    available to counsel. McCoy v. United States, 
    266 F.3d 1245
    , 1258–59 (11th Cir.
    2001).
    Ben’s and Greg’s claims are not novel in any sense of the word. As long as
    they had access to the United States Code and dictionaries—the tools the Supreme
    Court used in Honeycutt—they could have raised their claims on direct appeal. 
    See 137 S. Ct. at 1632
    –33. Honeycutt was simply a matter of statutory interpretation;
    the Supreme Court did not announce a new constitutional right or overturn any
    Supreme Court precedent. 
    Id. An argument
    for an interpretation of a statute that is
    consistent with its ordinary meaning and structure is not something that counsel
    would not be aware of or that courts would “reject . . . out of hand.” 
    Ross, 468 U.S. at 15
    . That leaves Ben and Greg with only perceived futility, which does not
    establish cause. Bousley v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 614
    , 623 (1998) (“[F]utility
    cannot constitute cause if it means simply that a claim was unacceptable to that
    particular court at that particular time.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf.
    McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 
    851 F.3d 1076
    , 1087 (11th
    Cir. 2017) (en banc) (explaining that a postconviction remedy is not “inadequate or
    ineffective” when using it to make a particular claim would likely fail because of
    adverse circuit precedent). Ben and Greg have failed to establish cause for not
    raising their claims on direct appeal.
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    The second requirement for overcoming procedural default is prejudice. But
    overcoming the procedural-default bar requires both cause and prejudice, not one
    or the other. 
    McKay, 657 F.3d at 1196
    . So their failure to establish cause is fatal, as
    is their failure to make an argument about prejudice until their reply briefs,
    Riechmann v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 
    940 F.3d 559
    , 579 (11th Cir. 2019).
    Even if we were to look past these failures, Ben and Greg have not
    established prejudice. To establish prejudice, they would have to prove that they
    suffered actual prejudice, not merely “the possibility of prejudice.” Fordham v.
    United States, 
    706 F.3d 1345
    , 1350 (11th Cir. 2013). The error must have been one
    “of constitutional dimensions” and worked to their “actual and substantial
    disadvantage.” 
    Id. Ben and
    Greg cannot satisfy this tough standard. It is undisputed
    that Ben was the owner and operator of the two companies and the mastermind
    behind the fraud. And he has failed to prove that he was not responsible for the
    entire proceeds of the fraud. See 
    Honeycutt, 137 S. Ct. at 1635
    (holding that
    “property the defendant himself actually acquired as the result of the crime” is
    subject to forfeiture). Greg also cannot establish prejudice because he has failed to
    prove that the government could not have obtained his same property through
    restitution instead of forfeiture. It is well established that the government may
    “double dip” by obtaining the same amount in forfeiture and restitution. United
    States v. Hoffman–Vaile, 
    568 F.3d 1335
    , 1344 (11th Cir. 2009). The government
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    opted to obtain Greg’s property through forfeiture instead of restitution, but
    nothing suggests that it would not have turned to restitution instead if it had known
    that forfeiture was unavailable. If it had, Greg would be in the same position he is
    in now.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    We AFFIRM the judgment in favor of the United States.
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    MARTIN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
    The majority opinion is right to say that Ben and Greg Bane procedurally
    defaulted their claims contesting their joint and several liability for the forfeiture
    ordered in their cases. But in contrast to the majority, I believe Montgomery v.
    Louisiana, 577 U.S. ___, 
    136 S. Ct. 718
    (2016), and Welch v. United States, 578
    U.S. ___, 
    136 S. Ct. 1257
    (2016), require us to hold that it was jurisdictional error
    for the District Court to impose joint and several forfeiture liability against Greg
    Bane. The majority declines to extend the reasoning in Montgomery and Welch to
    forfeiture judgments. My reading of the precedent suggests that we should. And
    “the doctrine of procedural default does not apply” to jurisdictional error. United
    States v. Peter, 
    310 F.3d 709
    , 713 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). I write separately
    to set out why I believe Greg Bane’s waiver did not bar him from challenging his
    forfeiture judgment.
    Ben and Greg Bane were both convicted of healthcare-fraud offenses.
    However, the benefits each acquired from their crimes were dramatically different.
    Ben Bane stipulated that proceeds traceable to the offenses which he committed
    amounted to $5,846,684.54. But Greg Bane, unlike his dad, received only de
    minimis compensation for his role in the offenses. Mostly what Greg Bane got
    was his annual salary of approximately $30,000 for his work at the healthcare
    companies his father owned. Even so, after both Banes were convicted at trial, the
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    District Court granted the government’s motion for a preliminary forfeiture order
    holding both Ben and Greg “jointly and severally liable” for the total forfeiture
    amount pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(7)—that is, $5,846,684.54. The District
    Court also entered a preliminary order of forfeiture for substitute assets, which
    became final at sentencing. As a result of these orders, Greg Bane had to forfeit
    his home, in which he had estimated equity of $141,696, as well as half his interest
    in his personal truck, which was valued at approximately $7,000.
    The District Court took its authority to hold Greg Bane jointly and severally
    liable for all proceeds of the conspiracy from 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(7), the healthcare-
    fraud forfeiture statute. Then several years after the District Court entered the
    Bane forfeiture order, our Court ruled that § 982(a)(7) does not allow the
    imposition of joint and several liability. United States v. Elbeblawy, 
    899 F.3d 925
    ,
    941–42 (11th Cir. 2018). Elbeblawy applied the reasoning of Honeycutt v. United
    States, 581 U.S. ___, 
    137 S. Ct. 1626
    (2017), to § 
    982(a)(7). 899 F.3d at 941
    .
    Honeycutt addressed a separate (but similar) forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. §
    853(a)(1), holding that it did not permit a defendant to be “held jointly and
    severally liable for property that his co-conspirator derived from the crime but that
    the defendant himself did not acquire.” 
    Honeycutt, 137 S. Ct. at 1630
    . Looking to
    other provisions of § 853 for guidance, the Supreme Court concluded that
    Congress “did not authorize the Government to confiscate substitute property from
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    other defendants or co-conspirators; it authorized the Government to confiscate
    assets only from the defendant who initially acquired the property and who bears
    responsibility for its dissipation.” 
    Honeycutt, 137 S. Ct. at 1634
    . The Court
    expressed concern that permitting the government to confiscate substitute assets
    from other co-conspirators would be to “allow the Government to circumvent
    Congress’ carefully constructed statutory scheme.” 
    Id. Based on
    this Supreme Court ruling, I believe the District Court lacked the
    statutory authority to hold Greg Bane jointly and severally liable for the total
    forfeiture amount. This is not because of the method the District Court used to
    calculate Greg Bane’s forfeiture liability, but because of the amount of liability that
    it in fact imposed, which was substantively greater than what Greg Bane had
    acquired through the offenses of which he was convicted. I recognize this record
    does not contain a careful accounting of the exact proceeds of the conspiracy that
    went to Greg Bane. But it is nevertheless clear that Greg Bane got substantially
    less than $5,846,684.54.1 Thus, the District Court imposed a total forfeiture
    amount not authorized by statute, and this, in my view, was jurisdictional error.
    Longstanding Supreme Court precedent has it that when courts impose
    punishments beyond what the statute authorizes, they act beyond their jurisdiction.
    1
    Unlike Greg, Ben Bane has never argued that he did not “actually acquire” the full forfeiture
    amount. Ben Bane has not shown that the District Court held him liable for proceeds he did
    notactually acquire. I therefore see no jurisdictional error as to the forfeiture order against him.
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    See In re Bonner, 
    151 U.S. 242
    , 256, 
    14 S. Ct. 323
    , 325 (1894) (holding that a
    sentencing court was “without jurisdiction” to pass sentences that transcended its
    power); In re Mills, 
    135 U.S. 263
    , 270, 
    10 S. Ct. 762
    , 764 (1890) (same); Ex parte
    Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall) 163, 177 (1873) (holding that a sentence greater than
    what the legislature authorized was “void . . . , because in excess of the authority of
    the court, and forbidden by the Constitution”). It is true that, at the time these late-
    nineteenth-century cases were decided, the Supreme Court employed a “somewhat
    expansive” interpretation of jurisdiction in the service of correcting clear
    constitutional violations through habeas corpus relief. United States v. Cotton, 
    535 U.S. 625
    , 630, 
    122 S. Ct. 1781
    , 1784 (2002) (quoting Custis v. United States, 
    511 U.S. 485
    , 494, 
    114 S. Ct. 1732
    , 1737 (1994)). The majority notes that the Supreme
    Court has since narrowed its understanding of jurisdictional error in some respects.
    For example, in Cotton, the Supreme Court overruled Ex parte Bain, 
    121 U.S. 1
    , 
    7 S. Ct. 781
    (1887), when it held that defects in an indictment are not jurisdictional
    insofar as they “do not deprive a court of its power to adjudicate a case.” 
    Cotton, 535 U.S. at 630
    , 122 S. Ct. at 1785. But Cotton offers little guidance here because
    it did not address the question of whether the imposition of a sentence beyond the
    power granted by statute raises a jurisdictional question. I believe it does.
    Montgomery and Welch demonstrate the continued relevance of the
    “jurisdictional rationale” articulated in the late-nineteenth century cases. My
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    colleague ably described this in Lester v. United States, 
    921 F.3d 1306
    , 1310 (11th
    Cir. 2019) (W. Pryor, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc). The
    Montgomery Court, for example, relied heavily on the reasoning of Ex parte
    Siebold, 
    100 U.S. 371
    (1879), in holding that convictions and punishments that are
    beyond the government’s power to impose are “not just erroneous but contrary to
    law and, as a result, void.” 
    Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 731
    (citing 
    Siebold, 100 U.S. at 376
    ). There was similar thinking from the Supreme Court after it struck
    down the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act as void for vagueness
    in Johnson v. United States, 
    135 S. Ct. 2551
    (2015). Welch established retroactive
    application of Johnson because it “affected the reach of the underlying statute.”
    
    Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1265
    . After Johnson rendered the residual clause “invalid,”
    Welch said that portion of the statute could “no longer mandate or authorize any
    sentence.” 
    Id. This must
    be right, because courts are “prohibited from imposing
    criminal punishment beyond what Congress in fact has enacted by a valid law.”
    
    Id. at 1268.
    For well over a century, the Supreme Court has characterized such
    sentences as “void.” See In re 
    Bonner, 151 U.S. at 256
    .
    True, Montgomery and Welch presented the slightly different question of
    whether new constitutional rules had retroactive effect. Nevertheless, they speak
    to the limits on the jurisdiction of courts to impose sentences not authorized by
    statute, insofar as courts have “no authority” to leave such sentences in place.
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    Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 731
    . Based on this precedent, it must be true that
    objections to punishments imposed in excess of a court’s authority “can never be
    waived by parties,” even if that punishment was a forfeiture judgment, as opposed
    to a carceral sentence. See 
    Peter, 310 F.3d at 712
    .
    I am not persuaded by the majority’s ruling that forfeiture judgments entered
    without statutory authority should be treated differently from unauthorized carceral
    sentences. “We have squarely held that ‘criminal forfeiture acts in personam as a
    punishment against the party who committed the criminal act.’” 
    Elbeblawy, 899 F.3d at 940
    (alteration adopted) (quoting United States v. Fleet, 
    498 F.3d 1225
    ,
    1231 (11th Cir. 2007)). And we treat criminal forfeitures and incarceration
    similarly in other contexts. See, e.g., Jeffers v. United States, 
    432 U.S. 137
    , 155,
    
    97 S. Ct. 2207
    , 2218 (1977) (holding that “[f]ines . . . are treated in the same way
    as prison sentences for purposes of double jeopardy and multiple punishment
    analysis”); United States v. Bajakajian, 
    524 U.S. 321
    , 328, 
    118 S. Ct. 2028
    , 2033
    (1998) (holding that criminal forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) is subject to
    the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment). As this
    case illustrates, illegal forfeiture orders can impose debilitating burdens on
    criminal defendants well beyond the scope of any benefits they received from their
    criminal conduct. I see no basis for distinguishing between various types of
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    punishment, where they have been imposed beyond the authority granted by
    statute.
    And unlike the majority, I do not read United States v. Cobbs, 
    967 F.2d 1555
    (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam), to preclude such a holding. The majority
    reasons that (1) since Cobbs applied plain-error review to a restitution order which
    was “beyond the statutory power of the court to impose,” 
    id. at 1558,
    and (2)
    because this court does not apply plain-error review to jurisdictional errors, then
    (3) Cobbs must stand for the rule that restitution greater than the amount the statute
    permits is not jurisdictional error. Maj. Op. at 10. This is a weak justification for
    upholding a sentence not authorized by statute. Notably, the Cobbs court never
    discussed whether the error before it was jurisdictional. Indeed, the jurisdictional
    question does not appear to have been raised by the parties at all. What’s more,
    Cobbs was an appeal from an order of criminal restitution, not forfeiture, and they
    are 
    different. 967 F.2d at 1556
    (vacating criminal restitution order). Forfeiture “is
    meant to punish the defendant by transferring his ill-gotten gains to the United
    States.” United States v. Joseph, 
    743 F.3d 1350
    , 1354 (11th Cir. 2014) (per
    curiam). Restitution, in contrast, is intended “to ensure that victims . . . are made
    whole for their losses” and is “not designed to punish the defendant.” United
    States v. Martin, 
    803 F.3d 581
    , 594–95 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted);
    see also United States v. Hernandez, 
    803 F.3d 1341
    , 1343–44 (11th Cir. 2015) (per
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    Case: 18-10232     Date Filed: 01/24/2020   Page: 23 of 23
    curiam) (describing the distinct roles played by restitution and forfeiture in
    criminal sentencing). Because restitution orders do not serve the purpose of
    punishment, Cobbs’s ruling about restitution does not govern what we must do
    here.
    For these reasons, I would hold that the District Court’s error in imposing a
    joint and several forfeiture award was jurisdictional and then reach the question of
    whether Greg Bane was entitled to relief. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s
    decision to the contrary.
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