Yvette Boykin v. Bank of America Corporation ( 2005 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-13494 DECEMBER 21, 2005
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 03-03467-CV-MHS-1
YVETTE BOYKIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION,
and its wholly-owned subsidiary
d.b.a Bank of America,
EQUICREDIT CORPORATION,
STATE OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT, DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
EQUICREDIT CORPORATION OF AMERICA,
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(December 21, 2005)
Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Bank of America
and its wholly-owned subsidiary EquiCredit Corporation (collectively the “Bank”)
on Yvette Boykin’s discrimination claim under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42
U.S.C. § 3601, et seq. Boykin now appeals, contending the following: (1) the
district court applied the wrong prima facie elements in resolving her claim, and
(2) to make out her claim, she did not need to show that the Bank continued to
approve loans for non-minority applicants with credit qualification and loan details
nearly identical and significantly parallel to hers, because that standard would be
virtually impossible to meet; (3) assuming the court used the correct prima facie
elements, she provided evidence sufficient to satisfy such elements; and (4) she
proved that the Bank’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason – that her loan was a
“high-cost” loan under New York state law and, as such, was in violation of the
Bank’s written lending policy – was a pretext for discrimination.1
The FHA makes it unlawful for “any person or other entity whose business
includes engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate
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In determining whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment –
because a material issue of fact remains to be litigated – we use the time-honored standard. That
is, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, here Boykin, and
give her the benefit of all reasonable inferences that evidence yields.
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against any person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or
conditions of such a transaction, because of race[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a). A
“residential real estate-related transaction” includes “[t]he making or purchasing of
loans” “for purchasing, constructing, improving, repairing, or maintaining a
dwelling[.]” Id. § 3605(b)(1)(A). In a case such as the instant case, where the
plaintiff relies on circumstantial – rather than direct – evidence of discrimination,
we use the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and Texas Dep’t of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), to
evaluate the claim of discrimination under the FHA. See Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of
Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Blackwell, 908 F.2d 864, 870 (11th Cir.1990).
“[T]he elements of a prima facie case are flexible and should be tailored, on
a case-by-case basis, to differing factual circumstances.” Fitzpatrick v. City of
Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1123 (11th Cir. 1993) (quotation marks omitted). In the
credit discrimination context, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of
discrimination by offering evidence showing: (1) that the plaintiff is a member of a
protected class; (2) that the plaintiff applied for and was qualified for a loan from
the defendant; (3) that the loan was rejected despite the plaintiff’s qualifications;
and (4) that the defendant continued to approve loans for applicants outside of the
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plaintiff’s protected class with similar qualifications. See Cooley v. Sterling Bank,
No. 03-14727, manuscript op. at 12 (11th Cir. July 16, 2004); see also Rowe v.
Union Planters Bank, 289 F.3d 533, 535 (8th Cir. 2002). “In order to meet the
comparability requirement a plaintiff is required to show that [she] is similarly
situated in all relevant aspects to the non-minority” comparator. Silvera v. Orange
County Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001) (discussing racial
employment discrimination). Comparators must be “nearly identical to prevent
courts from second-guessing” reasonable decisions and “confusing apples with
oranges.” Id. (quotation marks omitted) (discussing the similarity of misconduct
needed for a comparator in discrimination claim based on an adverse discipline
decision). In “the credit discrimination context, the Plaintiff must present evidence
that [she] was ‘similarly situated in all relevant aspects’ to the non-minority
applicants who received loans from [the lender]. In other words, a comparator’s
credit qualifications and loan details must be ‘nearly identical’ to the Plaintiff’s in
order to prevent this court from second guessing the bank’s business decision and
confusing apples with oranges.” Cooley v. Sterling Bank, 280 F.Supp.2d 1331,
1340 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (quotation marks omitted), aff’d, No. 03-14727 (11th Cir.
July 16, 2004).
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden
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shifts to the defendant to provide a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
actions.” Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428, 1432 (11th Cir.
1998). If the defendant satisfies his burden, the plaintiff must establish that the
employer’s reason was a “pretext to mask unlawful discrimination.” Id. In this
final step, the plaintiff carries the “ultimate burden of establishing by a
preponderance of the evidence that a discriminatory intent motivated the [lender’s]
action.” Perryman v. Johnson Products Co., 698 F.2d 1138, 1142 (11th Cir. 1983).
“[T]he plaintiff must then present concrete evidence in the form of specific facts
which show that the defendant’s proffered reason is mere pretext. Mere
conclusory allegations and assertions will not suffice.” Earley v. Champion Int’l
Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 1990). Federal courts do not sit as a court of
appeals that reexamines a bank’s business decisions. See Chapman v. AI
Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (addressing age discrimination
claim).
A plaintiff is not allowed to recast [a lender’s] proffered
nondiscriminatory reasons or substitute [her] business judgment for
that of the [lender]. Provided that the proffered reason is one that
might motivate a reasonable [lender], [a loan applicant] must meet
that reason head on and rebut it, and the [applicant] cannot succeed by
simply quarreling with the wisdom of that reason.
Id. Although “[d]epartures from normal procedures may be suggestive of
discrimination,” Morrison v. Booth, 763 F.2d 1366, 1374 (11th Cir.1985), “the
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mere fact that [a bank] failed to follow its own internal procedures does not
necessarily suggest that [the bank] was motivated by illegal discriminatory
intent[,]” Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 454 (10th Cir. 1995).
The district court applied the correct prima facie elements in granting the
Bank summary judgment. While the elements of a prima facie case are not rigid
and are applied on a case-by-case basis, requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate that
other similarly situated non-minority applicants obtained loans from the defendant
provides essential context to the defendant’s decisions, and, absent direct evidence
of discrimination, there is no basis for a trier of fact to assume that a decision to
deny a loan was motivated by discriminatory animus unless the plaintiff makes a
showing that a pattern of lending suggests the existence of discrimination. The
bank’s underwriting guidelines may be more stringent than the guidelines that
generally “qualify” an applicant, and the mere denial of an application to a
“qualified” minority applicant does not alone raise an inference of discrimination.
Thus, one element of the prima facie case must be that the lender continued to
approve loans to similarly situated non-minority applicants.
Boykin failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she
did not demonstrate that similarly situated applicants were treated differently.
Boykin’s evidence of similarly situated applicants included three white applicants
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whose loans were approved for property within the same geographic area as her
property. However, the evidence provided no details regarding the relevant
financial status of the applicants and showed that (1) two of the applicants applied
for first mortgages, not refinancings, and (2) one of the applicants applied with a
co-applicant. These comparators are not “nearly identical” to Boykin, as nothing is
known about their relevant financial backgrounds or the costs or amounts of their
loans. No other evidence in the record reveals any similarly situated applicants.
Even if we were to assume that Boykin established a prima facie case, the
Bank proffered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision, and Boykin
has not demonstrated that the reason was merely a pretext for discrimination. The
Bank denied Boykin’s loan because it determined that the loan was “high-cost”
under New York law and would be in violation of its written policy against such
loans. Boykin contends that the reason was pretextual because (1) the “high-cost”
regulations did not apply to her property because it was not owner-occupied, and
(2) the Bank failed to follow its internal procedures regarding “high-cost”
determinations early in the application process. These arguments are unavailing:
(1) we do not reexamine the Bank’s business decisions, and, because the
“high-cost” loan decision was one that would motivate a reasonable lender, Boykin
cannot simply contest the wisdom of the decision, and (2) the Bank’s failure to
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follow internal procedures alone is not evidence of pretext. Therefore, because
Boykin failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination or show that the
Bank’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason was pretextual, the district court
committed no error in granting the Bank summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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