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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 19-12839
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:19-cv-61639-BB
TODD E. WATSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BROWARD COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,
BROWARD COUNTY STATE ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,
BROWARD COUNTY INTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICE,
FOUR U.S. MARSHALLS,
AL LAMBERTI, et. al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(April 6, 2020)
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Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JILL PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Todd E. Watson appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. §
1983 complaint without prejudice as frivolous and for failing to state a claim. We
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Watson filed a pro se 60-page complaint naming 52 defendants “in their
individual and professional capacities,” including the Broward County Sheriff’s
Office, the Broward County State Attorney’s Office, the Broward County Internal
Affairs Office, unnamed United States Marshals, current and former sheriffs of
Broward County, law enforcement officers employed by the Broward County
Sheriff’s Office, the Broward County and Miami-Dade County State Attorneys,
Broward County and Miami-Dade County Assistant State Attorneys, the Broward
County and Miami-Dade County public defender, current and former Broward
County and Miami-Dade County Assistant Public Defenders, judges on Florida’s
17th Judicial Circuit, court reporters employed by the 17th Judicial Circuit, six
“private actors who acted in concert with State actor’s [sic] to deprive Defendant
of his constitutionally protected rights,” and a Florida Supreme Court justice.
Watson stated that he sought damages arising from his March 2009 arrest by
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Broward County Sheriff’s officers and a resulting ten-year-long conspiracy to
violate his constitutional rights.
In Count One, he alleged that Broward County Sheriff’s officers falsely
arrested him in 2009 for fabricated charges related to his management of a pain
clinic and fraudulent prescriptions written to William Steers, one of the “private
actor” defendants. In Count Two, Watson realleged the previous 33 paragraphs
and claimed that all of the individual defendants conspired to deprive him of his
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, beginning with his 2009 arrest and continuing
through various criminal proceedings in 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2017, 2018, and
2019, in violation of his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. In Count Three, he realleged the previous 120 paragraphs, and claimed
malicious prosecution by Broward County law enforcement arising from his 2009
arrest. In Count Four, he realleged the previous 124 paragraphs and claimed
intentional infliction of emotional distress by all defendants. In Count Five, he
realleged the first 125 paragraphs and claimed spoliation of evidence related to his
2009 arrest. In Count Six, he realleged the previous 127 paragraphs and claimed
prosecutorial misconduct by Broward County Assistant State Attorneys during his
2009 and 2014 criminal proceedings. Watson also attached numerous exhibits,
totaling 1,718 pages.
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The district court conducted a preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 19
15(e) and dismissed Watson’s complaint without prejudice as frivolous and for
failing to state a claim. The district court stated that the complaint was a shotgun
pleading, the defendants were immune from liability, the claims based on events
occurring prior to 2015 were barred by the statute of limitations, and the claims
were otherwise baseless.
On appeal, Watson’s brief fails to present an argument as to how the district
court erred in dismissing his complaint without prejudice. Instead, Watson’s brief
makes conclusory arguments that “the indisputable facts surrounding the
circumstances of [his] instant brief presents many issues of first impression.” The
argument portion of his brief consists of allegations of fact pertaining to the crimes
committed against him during the alleged conspiracy and he cites no cases
pertaining to the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his complaint.
II. DISCUSSION
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the district court shall dismiss any case filed
in forma pauperis that: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who
is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for
frivolity under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Hughes v. Lott,
350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir.
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2003). “Discretion means the district court has a ‘range of choice, and that its
decision will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not
influenced by any mistake of law.” Zocaras v. Castro,
465 F.3d 479, 483 (11th
Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v.
M/V Monada,
432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005)). Pursuant to §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i), the district court is required to dismiss a case if it determines that
the action is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Dismissal for
frivolity is warranted when a claim is “based on an indisputably meritless legal
theory” or when it relies on factual allegations that are “clearly baseless,” which
includes allegations that are “fanciful,” fantastic,” and “delusional.” Denton v.
Hernandez,
504 U.S. 25, 32-33,
112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v.
Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325, 327,
109 S. Ct. 1827, 1831, 1833 (1989)).
Additionally, a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when it appears that a
“plaintiff has little or no chance of success.” Bilal v. Driver,
251 F.3d 1346, 1349
(11th Cir. 2001).
A district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is reviewed de novo, using the same standards that govern
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissals. Mitchell v. Farcass,
112 F.3d
1483, 1489-90 (11th Cir. 1997). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a
complaint must allege sufficient facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face.
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.
Id., 129 S. Ct. at 1949. A plaintiff must provide more than labels and
conclusions to show he is entitled to relief.
Id., 129 S. Ct. at 1949. “[C]onclusory
allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as
facts will not prevent dismissal.” Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd v. Jaharis,
297 F.3d
1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002). Ordinarily, where a more carefully drafted complaint
might state a claim, a pro se plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend
the complaint before the district court dismisses the action with prejudice.
Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit,
927 F.3d 1123, 1132 (11th Cir. 2019).
“In order to prevail on a civil rights action under § 1983, a plaintiff must
show that he or she was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color
of state law.” Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka,
261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001).
The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims corresponds to the state personal injury
statute of limitations, which in Florida is four years. City of Hialeah v. Rojas,
311
F.3d 1096, 1103 n.2 (11th Cir. 2002). “Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent
standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally
construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States,
148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
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Here, the district court correctly concluded that many of Watson’s claims
were barred by the statute of limitations. Counts One, Three, Five, and Six were
based exclusively on conduct occurring prior to 2015 and, thus, were barred by the
four-year statute of limitations. See
id. To the extent that Count Two is based on
claims occurring in 2015, 2017, 2018, and 2019, the district court correctly
dismissed them as baseless because Watson offered only conclusory statements
regarding “fanciful,” fantastic,” and “delusional” scenarios wherein the judges,
state attorneys, public defenders, and law enforcement of Broward County and
Miami-Dade County conspired to arrest and prosecute him based on fabricated
charges. See
Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33, 112 S. Ct. at 1733 (quoting
Neitzke, 490
U.S. at 325,
327, 109 S. Ct. at 1831, 1833). Finally, because the district court
dismissed Watson’s complaint without prejudice, it did not err in failing to provide
him an opportunity to amend before dismissing his complaint. See Am. United Life
Ins. Co. v. Martinez,
480 F.3d 1043, 1057 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he court dismissed
this particular claim without prejudice, granting the [plaintiff] leave to amend the
complaint a second time, thereby neutralizing one of our concerns regarding sua
sponte dismissals.”).
AFFIRMED.
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