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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 19-11642
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 9:18-cr-80139-WPD-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JUNIOR JOEL JOSEPH,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(April 9, 2020)
Before LUCK, LAGOA and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Junior Joseph appeals his convictions for conspiring to export firearms to
Haiti without authorization, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count 1); knowingly and willfully
exporting rifles, pistols, and ammunition without authorization from the United
States State Department, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (Count 2); exporting shotguns without
authorization from the United States Department of Commerce, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1702
and 1705 (Count 3); fraudulently and knowingly attempting to export firearms, 18
U.S.C. § 554 (Count 4); and knowingly making false statements in documents
those licensed to sell firearms must keep, 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A) (Count 5). He
advances two arguments on appeal. First, he asserts the Government failed to
present sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that he was guilty of
Counts 1 through 5 beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, he contends the district
court clearly erred in finding that an out-of-court conversation between two
Government witnesses was only a technical violation of the sequestration rule and
abused its discretion in finding that the conduct was remedied through cross-
examination. After review, we affirm Joseph’s convictions.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Two standards of review govern Joseph’s sufficiency arguments. As to
Counts 1 through 4, we will review his arguments under a de novo standard of
review. United States v. Browne,
505 F.3d 1229, 1253 (11th Cir. 2007) (reviewing
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de novo the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal on sufficiency grounds).
However, where the defendant fails to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on
a particular count, as Joseph failed to do on Count 5, this Court reviews the
sufficiency of the evidence on that count for a manifest miscarriage of justice. See
United States v. Tagg,
572 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 2009). A miscarriage of
justice occurs when the evidence of an “element of the offense is so tenuous that a
conviction would be shocking.”
Id.
When determining sufficiency, we view the evidence “in the light most
favorable to the Government, drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility
choices in the Government’s favor.”
Browne, 505 F.3d at 1253. We will affirm a
district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal if a reasonable jury
could conclude the evidence establishes the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Id. This standard does not require the evidence to be inconsistent with
every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt, but rather, the jury may choose
between reasonable conclusions based on the evidence.
Id.
1. Count 1
To prove Count 1, the Government had to present evidence Joseph conspired
“to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States,
or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose,” and committed any act to
effect the object of the conspiracy. See 18 U.S.C. § 371. The elements of a
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conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 consist of: “(1) an agreement among two or
more persons to achieve an unlawful objective; (2) knowing and voluntary
participation in the agreement; and (3) an overt act by a conspirator in furtherance
of the agreement.” United States v. Hasson,
333 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2003).
Furthermore, it is unnecessary that the Government prove that Joseph knew all of
the details or participated in every aspect of the conspiracy. United States v.
Moran,
778 F.3d 942, 960 (11th Cir. 2015). Rather, the Government must only
prove that Joseph knew of the essential aspects of the conspiracy.
Id.
The jury heard sufficient evidence to reasonably infer that Joseph knew of
and agreed with others to export the firearms to Haiti. First, the Government was
allowed to prove its case through circumstantial evidence, despite Joseph’s
arguments to the contrary, and the jury was allowed to make reasonable inferences
from that evidence. See
id. (explaining the government may prove a conspiracy by
circumstantial evidence); United States v. Mendez,
528 F.3d 811, 814 (11th Cir.
2008) (“When the government relies on circumstantial evidence, reasonable
inferences, not mere speculation, must support the conviction.”); United States v.
Williams,
390 F.3d 1319, 1325 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating circumstantial evidence
may prove knowledge and intent). The evidence showed Joseph spoke with
Michael Foreman, Kevin Beary, James Anzalone, Vernon Starnes, and Susana
Anderson about exporting firearms and equipment to Haiti. Although Joseph
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asserts that his brother Jimy purchased and exported the firearms, the companies
indicated sales to Global Dynasty generally, not specifying whether it was Jimy,
rather than Joseph, who made the purchase.
The evidence also reflects that Joseph purchased two large gun safes and
was aware of the transfer of the firearms to Jimy prior to their export, as seen in the
Form 4473s. The jury further heard that Joseph: (1) paid Jimy $4,000 the day
before Jimy paid to have the truck shipped to Haiti, (2) paid for Jimy’s plane ticket
to Haiti, and (3) discussed the truck’s arrival and firearms sales with Haitian
officials and nationals, specifically, Edward Dollar, Aramick Louis, Nicholas
Herve, and Senator Herve. Although Charles Durand and David St. Vil had more
contact with Jimy than with Joseph and Joseph was not present when Durand
helped Jimy move the boxes or at the delivery of the truck to Monarch Shipping,
the Government was not required to prove Joseph’s knowledge of, or participation
in every aspect of, the conspiracy. See
Moran, 778 F.3d at 960. The Government
proved that Joseph knew of the “essential aspects” of the conspiracy. See
id. As
such, the jury reasonably inferred that Joseph agreed to, knew about, and
participated in the export of the firearms. See
Hasson, 333 F.3d at 1270.
2. Counts 2 through 4
The Arms Export Control Act (AECA), which regulates the commercial
export from the United States of the arms and ammunitions categorized as
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“defense articles,” imposes criminal sanctions for willful violations of its
regulations. 22 U.S.C. § 2778. The export of defense articles requires a license
under the AECA. United States v. Man,
891 F.3d 1253, 1265 (11th Cir. 2018). To
prove Count 2, the Government had to show a willful violation—that Joseph knew
that it was unlawful to export the firearms and intentionally violated the “known
legal duty” not to export them.
Id. at 1268. It is insufficient to show Joseph was
merely aware of the general unlawful nature of his actions.
Id.
Similarly, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)
grants the president the power to “regulate . . .any . . . importation or exportation of
. . . any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest
by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.” 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B). Under the delegated authority, the
Commerce Department may prohibit the export of certain items without a license.
See 50 U.S.C. § 1701; 15 C.F.R. Pt. 764. Consequently, to prove Count 3, the
Government had to show Joseph willfully committed, attempted to commit, or
conspired to commit a violation of a regulation issued under the IEEPA. 50 U.S.C.
§ 1705(c).
To prove Count 4, the Government had to show Joseph “fraudulently or
knowingly export[ed] or sen[t] from the United States, or attempt[ed] to export or
send from the United States, any merchandise, article, or object contrary to any law
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or regulation of the United States.” See 18 U.S.C. § 554(a). Knowledge, under
Count 4, may also be proven through a showing of willful blindness if the facts
support an inference that Joseph was aware of a high probability of the existence of
a fact in question. United States v. Steed,
548 F.3d 961, 977 (11th Cir. 2008).
The Government presented sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Joseph
of Counts 2, 3, and 4. The jury heard from numerous witnesses that Joseph
represented that he either had, or was applying for, the appropriate licenses, and
that he knew of his obligation to be licensed. The jury also heard the State
Department had, in fact, denied Joseph’s application and the Commerce
Department had revoked his license. Although Joseph asserts that the one Form
4473 that notes “hold for export” demonstrates that he was not willfully involved
with any smuggling or violations of the licensing requirements, the jury heard,
however, that after the licenses were denied Joseph (1) paid Jimy $4,000 before
Jimy paid for the truck, (2) messaged Herve with information about the truck’s
shipment, (3) messaged Dollar about picking up the truck, and (4) messaged Louis
about paying for 200 shotguns. From this evidence, the jury reasonably inferred
that Joseph willfully acted in violation of the licensing requirements, and as to
Count 4, specifically, that Joseph was, at the very least, willfully blind. See
Man,
891 F.3d at 1265;
Steed, 548 F.3d at 977; 50 U.S.C. § 1705(c); 18 U.S.C. § 554.
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3. Count 5
Finally, to prove Count 5, the Government had to show Joseph knowingly
made a false statement with respect to information federally licensed firearms
dealers are required to keep. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A). The Government’s
evidence was not so tenuous as to Count 5 as to constitute a miscarriage of justice.
See
Tagg, 572 F.3d at 1323. The jury heard that St. Vil met with Jimy at Global
Dynasty and signed paperwork purchasing a gun without ever possessing the
firearm and Joseph was also at Global Dynasty while he and Jimy did the
paperwork. St. Vil also testified that he returned later to complete the paperwork
and provided Joseph—not Jimy—with his identification to support the Form 4473.
Though Jimy’s initial interaction with St. Vil alone may have been insufficient to
infer Joseph had knowledge of the transaction, Joseph’s later transaction in
addition to his knowledge of the record keeping requirements for maintaining his
license—which he acknowledged—does not present such a tenuous factual basis
for his conviction as to constitute a miscarriage of justice. See id.; 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(a)(1)(A).
B. Sequestration
We review the district court’s finding of whether a sequestration order was
violated for clear error but review the remedy for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Costa,
947 F.2d 919, 927-28 (11th Cir. 1991) (violation); United States v.
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Jimenez,
780 F.2d 975, 980 (11th Cir. 1986) (remedy). Once a party invokes the
rule of sequestration, the district court must exclude witnesses from court
proceedings to prevent them from hearing one another’s testimony. Fed. R.
Evid. 615. When a witness violates the rule, the district court may impose
sanctions, including citing the violator for contempt, allowing cross-examination
about the nature of the violation, or, when a party has suffered “actual prejudice”
and there has been a collusion by the witness or counsel to violate the rule, the
court may strike testimony already given or disallow further testimony. United
States v. Blasco,
702 F.2d 1315, 1327 (11th Cir. 1983). Absent such misconduct,
however, allowing cross-examination ordinarily cures the violation by equipping
the factfinder to evaluate the witness’s credibility. United States v. Eyster,
948 F.2d 1196, 1211 (11th Cir. 1991).
The district court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion in the manner in
which it handled the violation of the sequestration order. The district court asked
Anderson the scope of her discussion with William Posick, to which she stated
their discussion was limited to the generalities of how to clearly discuss the terms
and types of documents she would testify to. Based on her testimony, the district
court did not clearly err in finding this did not constitute the type of collusion
prohibited by the rule because there was no indication that Anderson spoke with
Posick for the purpose of shaping her testimony to match his. See Blasco, 702
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F.2d at 1327. Also, because there was no indication of collusion, the district court
did not err in implicitly finding Joseph did not suffer actual prejudice. See
id. As
such, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing counsel to cross-
examine Anderson as to her and Posick’s discussion and leaving the jury to
conclude the ultimate weight given to her testimony. See
Eyster, 948 F.2d at 1211.
II. CONCLUSION
The district court did not err in denying Joseph’s motion for judgment of
acquittal because the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude he
committed Counts 1 through 4 beyond a reasonable doubt. Similarly, the evidence
was sufficient to support Joseph’s conviction on Count 5 and, therefore, the court
did not commit a miscarriage of justice by allowing it to go to the jury. Second,
the district court did not clearly err in determining the two witnesses’ out-of-court
conversation did not violate the purpose of the rule of sequestration, as they did not
intend to change their testimony, and, in any event, the district court did not abuse
its discretion in allowing any error to be remedied through cross-examination.
Accordingly, we affirm Joseph’s convictions.
AFFIRMED.
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