David W. Fitzgibbon v. Fulton County, Georgia ( 2021 )


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  •        USCA11 Case: 20-11583   Date Filed: 01/11/2021   Page: 1 of 10
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 20-11583
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-03718-SDG
    DAVID W. FITZGIBBON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    FULTON COUNTY, GEORGIA,
    THE FULTON COUNTY BOARD OF ASSESSORS,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ___________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (January 11, 2021)
    Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    USCA11 Case: 20-11583     Date Filed: 01/11/2021   Page: 2 of 10
    David W. Fitzgibbon appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment
    in favor of his former employers, Fulton County, Georgia and the Fulton County
    Board of Assessors. Specifically, he appeals the grant of summary judgment on
    his retaliation claim brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
    VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Fitzgibbon argues the district court erred in
    granting summary judgment against him, because (1) he presented evidence that
    his belief that he engaged in a protected activity was objectively reasonable, and
    (2) he also established a causal connection between his protected activity and his
    termination and that his protected activity was the “but-for cause” of his
    termination. After careful review, we affirm.
    I.
    Fitzgibbon, who is white, served as the chief tax appraiser of Fulton County
    Tax Assessor’s Office beginning in 2012. The primary function of the Tax
    Assessor’s Office is to produce a timely and accurate tax digest every year. The
    chief tax appraiser’s job is to “compile[] a consolidation report containing
    information about parcels of property from which the net taxable digest is
    calculated,” which is then submitted to the Board of Assessors for approval. After
    additional review, the tax digest is ultimately submitted to the Department of
    Revenue.
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    USCA11 Case: 20-11583       Date Filed: 01/11/2021   Page: 3 of 10
    In 2016, while Fitzgibbon was serving as the chief tax appraiser, Fulton
    County experienced difficulties producing the tax digest in a timely and accurate
    manner. These difficulties included erroneous valuation calculations. As a result,
    the Department of Revenue gave the County an extension to September 1, 2016 to
    submit its tax digest, which caused a two-month delay in the collection of taxes.
    This delay created a host of “complications and distractions” for local
    governments. On August 19, 2016, the Board of Assessors called for a closed
    meeting, expressing that it was “extremely concerned about the delays associated
    with the tax digest and wanted to discuss a plan of action to remedy any future
    problems.” Fitzgibbon, as the chief tax appraiser, was not invited to attend.
    However, Fitzgibbon was aware of the meeting and knew that he was the subject
    of the meeting.
    Meanwhile, that same year, Fitzgibbon and the Tax Assessor’s Office
    received a series of anonymous complaints from employees alleging that
    Fitzgibbon and certain others in management were creating a racially hostile work
    environment. As a result, the Department of Human Resources Management and
    the Office of Diversity and Civil Rights Compliance initiated investigations, which
    culminated in a Workplace Environment Assessment Report and an Executive
    Summary (the “Human Resources Report”), dated August 24, 2016. The Human
    Resources Report detailed employee complaints of management, and
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    USCA11 Case: 20-11583           Date Filed: 01/11/2021       Page: 4 of 10
    recommended actions for improving morale in the office. It did not, however,
    recommend any disciplinary action against Fitzgibbon.
    When Fitzgibbon was provided a copy of the Human Resources Report on
    August 26, 2016, he responded with an email on August 29, 2016 (the “August 29
    email”), sent to (1) the personnel director for Fulton County, (2) members of the
    Board of Assessors, and (3) five other individuals. In that email, Fitzgibbon
    alleged “reverse discrimination” based on race.1 Many of members of the Board of
    Assessors found Fitzgibbon’s email “unprofessional.”
    1
    The email stated the following:
    It is very apparent that after nine months in which you were
    supposed to interview all the Assessor’s staff that you have drawn
    conclusions based on unsubstantiated statements from less than half
    of the staff, and no supporting evidence. Those staff interviewed
    obviously included those that distributed the anonymous letters
    filled with lies and accusations that were not supported by facts or
    evidence and that any reasonable person would have discounted as
    a small faction of staff with a racial agenda against the only two
    caucasian managers in the Assessors’ Office.
    As the environment in the Assessors Office described in your report
    is in no way reflective of the true working environment in the
    Assessors Office, it becomes obvious that you are not qualified to
    conduct an impartial and thorough review as indicated by the report
    which bases the conclusions of, according to your staff investigators
    on a small faction of those interviewed, which in turn are less than
    one half of the total staff.
    It seems very apparent that your staff investigators, all African-
    American, and those interviewed, also African-American have an
    agenda that smacks of reverse discrimination and the sole purpose
    of those that seem so discontented is not to seek Justice but to bring
    about a change in leadership that would take the Assessors’ Office
    back to those days of incompetency so evident and so thoroughly
    described in the Department of Revenue’s Performance Review
    Board of 2006, and which has been completely changed under the
    4
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    On August 28, 2016, the day before Fitzgibbon’s email, a member of the
    Board of Assessors sent an email to the rest of the Board recommending that they
    terminate Fitzgibbon. The Board of Assessors voted to terminate Fitzgibbon on
    September 15, 2016.
    Fitzgibbon filed suit against Fulton County and the Board of Assessors
    alleging, among other things, Title VII retaliation. Specifically, Fitzgibbon
    claimed he was fired for sending the August 29 email, which he says alleged race
    discrimination and thereby constituted protected activity under Title VII. He
    alleged that his firing was thus unlawful retaliation. He also alleged that the reason
    given for his termination—the delay of the tax digest preparation—was pretextual.
    As relevant to this appeal, Fitzgibbon and the Defendants filed cross-
    motions for summary judgment on the Title VII retaliation claim. The district
    current leadership team.
    Before further comments or distribution of the report the following
    information needs to be furnished to me and the Board of Assessors’
    for review:
    Please send me the following data:
    •the race, gender and age of each staff interviewed
    •a list of questions asked each and their verbatim responses
    •any spreadsheets, group discussions, or method of analyzing the
    results of the interviews
    •specific instances of complaints or statements that would support
    the preposterous accusations other than personal observations or
    opinions
    •the race age and gender of every member or the interview panel and
    their professional qualifications and specialized training in these
    matters.
    I expect these items by close of business Wednesday, August 31.
    5
    USCA11 Case: 20-11583       Date Filed: 01/11/2021    Page: 6 of 10
    court denied Fitzgibbon’s motion and granted the Defendants’ motion. The court
    found insufficient evidence to infer that Fitzgibbon’s subjective belief that he
    engaged in a protected activity was objectively reasonable. The court said
    Fitzgibbon failed to proffer specific evidence that racial animus motivated those
    who participated in the investigation and produced the Human Resources Report.
    The court also found that, even assuming Fitzgibbon had established that his email
    was a protected activity, he could not meet his burden that the email was the but-
    for cause of his termination, given that his termination was already in motion
    before his participation in the alleged protected activity. Fitzgibbon timely
    appealed.
    II.
    Title VII prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee
    “because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice . . .
    or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner
    in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C.
    § 2000e-3(a). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, the
    plaintiff must prove (1) he was engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) he
    suffered an adverse action; and (3) a causal link existed between the protected
    activity and the adverse employment action. Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 
    843 F.3d 1295
    , 1310 (11th Cir. 2016).
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    USCA11 Case: 20-11583       Date Filed: 01/11/2021   Page: 7 of 10
    A plaintiff has the ultimate burden of showing that a retaliatory motivation
    was the but-for cause of the adverse action. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v.
    Nassar, 
    570 U.S. 338
    , 352, 
    133 S. Ct. 2517
    , 2528 (2013). Thus, to survive
    summary judgment, a plaintiff must show that the complained of adverse decision
    was because of his protected activity, and his employer would not have made the
    decision but for his engagement in that protected activity. 
    Id.
     A plaintiff can
    establish causation for prima facie purposes by showing a “very close” temporal
    proximity between the statutorily protected activity and the adverse action.
    Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 
    506 F.3d 1361
    , 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (per
    curiam) (quotation marks omitted). However, “in a retaliation case, when an
    employer contemplates an adverse employment action before an employee engages
    in protected activity, temporal proximity between the protected activity and the
    subsequent adverse employment action does not suffice to show causation.” Drago
    v. Jenne, 
    453 F.3d 1301
    , 1308 (11th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).
    We review de novo a district court’s grant or denial of summary judgment.
    Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 
    291 F.3d 1307
    , 1311 (11th Cir. 2002). Summary
    judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to
    the nonmoving party, presents no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
    compels judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); State Farm Mut. Auto.
    Ins. Co. v. Duckworth, 
    648 F.3d 1216
    , 1219 n.5 (11th Cir. 2011). “All reasonable
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    USCA11 Case: 20-11583        Date Filed: 01/11/2021   Page: 8 of 10
    inferences arising from the undisputed facts should be made in favor of the
    nonmovant, but an inference based on speculation and conjecture is not
    reasonable.” Ave. CLO Fund, Ltd. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 
    723 F.3d 1287
    , 1294
    (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). A “mere scintilla of evidence”
    supporting the nonmoving party’s position will not suffice to survive summary
    judgment. Brooks v. Cnty. Comm’n of Jefferson Cnty., 
    446 F.3d 1160
    , 1162 (11th
    Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted).
    III.
    We conclude the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to
    Defendants on Fitzgibbon’s retaliation claim. We need not reach the issue of
    whether the August 29 email constitutes protected activity under Title VII, because
    even assuming that it does, Fitzgibbon has not shown that he can meet his burden
    of establishing but-for causation.
    Here, the district court found that even assuming that Fitzgibbon’s August
    29 email constituted protected activity under Title VII, he could not establish that it
    was the but-for cause of his termination. Specifically, the court found:
    [T]he record here is replete with evidence that
    [Fitzgibbon’s] termination from employment was already
    contemplated and in motion prior to his participation in
    alleged protected activity. In fact, [Fitzgibbon] had
    recently failed to perform an essential part of his job—the
    timely and accurate production of a tax digest.
    [Fitzgibbon] cannot show, on this record, that the
    8
    USCA11 Case: 20-11583       Date Filed: 01/11/2021    Page: 9 of 10
    termination of his employment would not have occurred
    but for his allegation of race discrimination.
    We conclude the district court did not err in finding that Fitzgibbon failed to
    establish the causal connection required to establish a prima facie retaliation claim
    because his termination was contemplated separate from, and before, he engaged in
    any allegedly protected activity. This record shows that Fitzgibbon’s termination
    was in motion even before he sent the email he claims as his protected activity.
    The record shows that the Board of Assessors was considering termination due to
    employee complaints about the “tense” and “unprofessional” work environment
    Fitzgibbon reportedly created in the Tax Assessor’s Office. We know that the
    Board of Assessors met ten days before Fitzgibbon sent his email to discuss the
    problems caused by the faulty 2016 tax digest, and a Board member recommended
    Fitzgibbon’s termination to the rest of the Board before Fitzgibbon ever alleged
    discrimination. Although Fitzgibbon was fired two weeks after the August 29
    email, the earlier discussions of termination precludes him from establishing a
    causal connection based on temporal proximity alone. See Drago, 
    453 F.3d at 1308
     (“[I]n a retaliation case, when an employer contemplates an adverse
    employment action before an employee engages in protected activity, temporal
    proximity between the protected activity and the subsequent adverse employment
    action does not suffice to show causation.”).
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    USCA11 Case: 20-11583          Date Filed: 01/11/2021       Page: 10 of 10
    Moreover, Fitzgibbon carries the ultimate burden of persuasion that the
    reasons for his termination were pretextual and that the adverse employment action
    was instead the result of intentional discrimination. See Furcron, 843 F.3d at
    1310–11. On this record, we cannot say the reasons discussed by officials for
    firing him in advance of his emails—namely, the untimely preparation of the
    required tax digest, and unprofessionalism detailed in the Human Resources
    Report—were pretextual.2 Therefore, we affirm.
    AFFIRMED.
    2
    The record also contains evidence showing that another former chief tax appraiser, who
    was African-American, was removed from her position in 2006 for failing to present a tax digest
    in a timely manner, and that an assistant chief appraiser, a person of color, was also terminated
    for creating an “unpleasant” work environment for employees.
    10