In re: Courtney Wild ( 2020 )


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  •              Case: 19-13843     Date Filed: 04/14/2020     Page: 1 of 120
    [PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 19-13843
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 9:08-cv-80736-KAM
    In re: COURTNEY WILD,
    Petitioner.
    ________________________
    On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States District Court for the
    Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (April 14, 2020)
    Before NEWSOM, TJOFLAT, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
    NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:
    This case, which is before us on a petition for writ of mandamus, arises out
    of a civil suit filed under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004. Petitioner
    Courtney Wild is one of more than 30 women—girls, really—who were victimized
    by notorious sex trafficker and child abuser Jeffrey Epstein. In her petition, Ms.
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    Wild alleges that when federal prosecutors secretly negotiated and entered into a
    non-prosecution agreement with Epstein in 2007, they violated her rights under the
    CVRA—in particular, her rights to confer with the government’s lawyers and to be
    treated fairly by them.
    Despite our sympathy for Ms. Wild and others like her, who suffered
    unspeakable horror at Epstein’s hands, only to be left in the dark—and, so it seems,
    affirmatively misled—by government lawyers, we find ourselves constrained to
    deny her petition. We hold that at least as matters currently stand—which is to say
    at least as the CVRA is currently written—rights under the Act do not attach until
    criminal proceedings have been initiated against a defendant, either by complaint,
    information, or indictment. Because the government never filed charges or
    otherwise commenced criminal proceedings against Epstein, the CVRA was never
    triggered. It’s not a result we like, but it’s the result we think the law requires.
    I
    The facts underlying this case, as we understand them, are beyond
    scandalous—they tell a tale of national disgrace.
    Over the course of eight years, between 1999 and 2007, well-heeled and
    well-connected financier Jeffrey Epstein and multiple coconspirators sexually
    abused more than 30 minor girls, including our petitioner, in Palm Beach, Florida
    and elsewhere in the United States and abroad. Epstein paid his employees to find
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    minor girls and deliver them to him—some as young as 14. Once Epstein had the
    girls, he either sexually abused them himself, gave them over to be abused by
    others, or both. Epstein, in turn, paid bounties to some of his victims to recruit
    other girls into his ring.
    Following a tip in 2005, the Palm Beach Police Department and the FBI
    conducted a two-year investigation of Epstein’s conduct. After developing
    substantial incriminating evidence, the FBI referred the matter for prosecution to
    the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida. Beginning
    in January 2007, and over the course of the ensuing eight months, Epstein’s
    defense team engaged in extensive negotiations with federal prosecutors in an
    effort to avoid indictment. At the same time, prosecutors were corresponding with
    Epstein’s known victims. As early as March 2007, they sent letters advising each
    one that “as a victim and/or witness of a federal offense, you have a number of
    rights.” The letters, which the government distributed over the course of about six
    months, went on to enumerate the eight CVRA rights then in force—including, as
    particularly relevant here, “[t]he reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the
    [Government] in the case” and “the right to be treated with fairness and with
    respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy.”
    By May 2007, government lawyers had completed both an 82-page
    prosecution memo and a 53-page draft indictment alleging that Epstein had
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    committed numerous federal sex crimes. In July, Epstein’s lawyers sent a detailed
    letter to prosecutors in an effort to convince them that, in fact, Epstein hadn’t
    committed any federal offenses. By September, the sides had exchanged multiple
    drafts of what would become an infamous non-prosecution agreement (“NPA”).
    Pursuant to their eventual agreement, Epstein would plead guilty in Florida court to
    two state prostitution offenses, and, in exchange, he and any coconspirators (at
    least four of whom have since been identified) would receive immunity from
    federal prosecution. 1 In June 2008, Epstein pleaded guilty to the state crimes as
    agreed and was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, 12 months’ home
    confinement, and lifetime sex-offender status.
    The district court found that “[f]rom the time the FBI began investigating
    Epstein until September 24, 2007”—when the government formally executed the
    NPA with Epstein—federal prosecutors “never conferred with the victims about
    a[n] NPA or told the victims that such agreement was under consideration.” Doe 1
    v. United States, 
    359 F. Supp. 3d 1201
    , 1208 (S.D. Fla. 2019). Worse, it appears
    that prosecutors worked hand-in-hand with Epstein’s lawyers—or at the very least
    1
    The agreement also contained several provisions concerning Epstein’s victims. The
    government, for instance, agreed to provide a list of known victims to Epstein and, “in
    consultation with and subject to the good faith approval of Epstein’s counsel,” to “select an
    attorney representative” for the victims, to be “paid for by Epstein.” Epstein agreed not to
    contest liability or damages in a victim’s civil suit, “so long as the identified individual elect[ed]
    to proceed exclusively under 
    18 U.S.C. § 2255
    , and agree[d] to waive any other claim for
    damages.” An odd set-up—and one that, it seems to us, was likely calculated to quickly and
    quietly resolve as many victim suits as possible.
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    acceded to their requests—to keep the NPA’s existence and terms hidden from
    victims. The NPA itself provided that “[t]he parties anticipate that this agreement
    will not be made part of any public record” and, further, that “[i]f the United States
    receives a Freedom of Information Act request or any compulsory process
    commanding the disclosure of the agreement, it will provide notice to Epstein
    before making that disclosure.” Moreover, at approximately the same time that the
    sides concluded the NPA, they began negotiating about what prosecutors could
    (and couldn’t) tell victims about the agreement. Seemingly in deference to
    Epstein’s lawyers’ repeated requests, the government held off—for nearly an entire
    year—on notifying Epstein’s victims of the NPA’s existence.
    And to be clear, the government’s efforts seem to have graduated from
    passive nondisclosure to (or at least close to) active misrepresentation. In January
    2008, for example, approximately four months after finalizing and executing the
    NPA, the government sent a letter to petitioner stating that Epstein’s case was
    “currently under investigation,” explaining that “[t]his can be a lengthy process,”
    and “request[ing her] continued patience while [it] conduct[ed] a thorough
    investigation.” The government sent an identical letter to another victim in May
    2008, some eight months after inking the NPA. 2
    2
    The government contends that these letters were technically accurate because the already-
    signed NPA remained under review by senior members of the Department of Justice. See Br. in
    Opp. to Pet. at 4 n.1.
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    If secrecy was the goal, it appears to have been achieved—there is no
    indication that any of Epstein’s victims were informed about the NPA or his state
    charges until after he pleaded guilty. On the day that Epstein entered his guilty
    plea in June 2008, some (but by no means all) victims were notified that the federal
    investigation of Epstein had concluded. But it wasn’t until July 2008—during the
    course of this litigation—that petitioner learned of the NPA’s existence, and until
    August 2008 that she finally obtained a copy of the agreement.
    We are doubtlessly omitting many of the sad details of this shameful story.
    For our purposes, we needn’t discuss the particulars of Epstein’s crimes, or the fact
    that the national media essentially ignored for nearly a decade the jailing of a
    prominent financier for sex crimes against young girls. 3 Today, the public facts of
    the case are well known—Epstein was eventually indicted on federal sex-
    trafficking charges in the Southern District of New York, and in August 2019,
    while awaiting trial, he was found dead in his jail cell of an apparent suicide.
    II
    In July 2008, petitioner brought suit in the United States District Court for
    the Southern District of Florida, styling her initial filing an “Emergency Victim’s
    3
    Cf. David Folkenflick, A Dead Cat, A Lawyer’s Call And A 5-Figure Donation: How Media
    Fell Short on Epstein, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Aug. 22, 2019, 6:06 PM),
    https://www.npr.org/2019/08/22/753390385/a-dead-cat-a-lawyers-call-and-a-5-figure-donation-
    how-media-fell-short-on-epstei.
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    Petition for Enforcement of Crime Victim’s Rights Act.” As the district court
    explained, “because no criminal case was pending” at the time—no federal charges
    having been filed against Epstein or anyone else—petitioner “filed [her] petition as
    a new matter . . . which the Clerk of Court docketed as a civil action.” Does v.
    United States, 
    817 F. Supp. 2d 1337
    , 1341 n.4 (S.D. Fla. 2011). Petitioner alleged
    that she was a “crime victim” within the meaning of the CVRA and that by
    keeping her in the dark about their dealings with Epstein, federal prosecutors had
    violated her rights under the CVRA—in particular, her rights “to confer with the
    attorney for the Government in the case,” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (a)(5), and “to be
    treated with fairness and with respect for [her] dignity and privacy,” 
    id.
    § 3771(a)(8). 4
    Over the course of the ensuing decade, the district court issued a number of
    significant rulings. For our purposes, three of the court’s orders are particularly
    important.
    Initially, in 2011 the district court “addresse[d] the threshold issue whether
    the CVRA attaches before the government brings formal charges against the
    defendant.” Does, 
    817 F. Supp. 2d at 1341
    . The court held that “it does because
    the statutory language clearly contemplates pre-charge proceedings.” 
    Id.
     As
    4
    A second petitioner joined the suit shortly after it was filed. For simplicity’s sake—and to
    avoid confusion—we will refer to “petitioner’s” suit, in the singular.
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    relevant here, the district court relied principally on two CVRA provisions in so
    holding. First, it pointed to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (c)(1), which the parties here have
    called the Act’s “coverage” provision. That subsection—of which much more
    later—states that “[o]fficers and employees of the Department of Justice and other
    departments and agencies of the United States engaged in the detection,
    investigation, or prosecution of crime shall make their best efforts to see that crime
    victims are notified of, and accorded, the rights described in subsection (a).” The
    district court held that “[s]ubsection (c)(1)’s requirement that officials engaged in
    ‘detection [or] investigation’ afford victims the rights enumerated in subsection (a)
    surely contemplates pre-charge application of the CVRA.” Does, 
    817 F. Supp. 2d at 1342
    . Second, the court pointed to subsection (d)(3), which the parties here call
    the “venue” provision and which states that a crime victim seeking to vindicate his
    or her rights under the CVRA must file a “motion” either “in the district court in
    which a defendant is being prosecuted or, if no prosecution is underway, in the
    district court in the district in which the crime occurred.” If, the district court
    reasoned, “the CVRA’s rights may be enforced before a prosecution is underway,
    then, to avoid a strained reading of the statute, those rights must attach before a
    complaint or indictment formally charges the defendant with the crime.” Does,
    
    817 F. Supp. 2d at 1342
    . Finally, the district court cited In re Dean, in which the
    Fifth Circuit had observed that “[a]t least in the posture of th[e] case” before it—
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    the court emphasized that it wasn’t “speculat[ing] on the applicability to other
    situations”—the victim’s right to confer with prosecutors applied pre-charge. 
    527 F.3d 391
    , 394 (5th Cir. 2008). Having “determined . . . as a matter of law [that] the
    CVRA can apply before formal charges are filed,” the district court here
    “defer[red]” ruling on the question whether federal prosecutors had violated the
    Act until the parties could conduct additional discovery. Does, 
    817 F. Supp. 2d at 1343
    .
    Following another eight years of litigation, the district court issued a pair of
    rulings that prompted the mandamus petition now before us. In February 2019, the
    court found that the government had infringed petitioner’s CVRA rights. See Doe
    1, 359 F. Supp. 3d at 1222. In particular, the court held that federal prosecutors
    violated the Act by “enter[ing] into a[n] NPA with Epstein without conferring with
    Petitioner[] during its negotiation and signing.” Id. at 1219. “Had the Petitioner[]
    been informed about the Government’s intention to forego federal prosecution of
    Epstein in deference to him pleading guilty to state charges,” the district court
    emphasized, she “could have conferred with the attorney for the Government and
    provided input.” Id. at 1218. The court concluded that it was precisely “this type
    of communication between prosecutors and victims that was intended by the
    passage of the CVRA.” Id. at 1291.
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    Having found CVRA violations, the court directed the parties—which by
    then included Epstein as an intervenor—to brief “the issue of what remedy, if any,
    should be applied.” Id. at 1222. In response, petitioner proposed multiple
    remedies: (1) rescission of the NPA; (2) an injunction against further CVRA
    violations; (3) an order scheduling a victim-impact hearing and a meeting between
    victims and Alexander Acosta, the former United States Attorney for the Southern
    District of Florida; (4) discovery of certain grand-jury materials, records regarding
    prosecutors’ decision to enter into the NPA, and files concerning law-enforcement
    authorities’ investigation of Epstein; (5) mandatory CVRA training for employees
    of the Southern District’s United States Attorney’s office; and (6) sanctions,
    attorneys’ fees, and restitution. In August 2019, while the court was considering
    the parties’ briefing regarding remedies, Epstein died of an apparent suicide; his
    death prompted another round of briefing on the issue of mootness.
    In September 2019, having considered the parties’ briefing and the impact of
    Epstein’s death, the district court dismissed petitioner’s suit, denying each of her
    requested remedies. See Doe 1 v. United States, 
    411 F. Supp. 3d 1321
     (S.D. Fla.
    2019). In its order, the district court made a number of rulings. First, it held that
    Epstein’s death mooted any claim regarding the NPA’s continuing validity, as he
    was no longer subject to prosecution. See 
    id. at 1326
    . Relatedly, the court held
    that it lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioner’s claim regarding the validity of the
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    NPA as it applied to Epstein’s coconspirators; any opinion regarding that issue, the
    court concluded, would be merely advisory because the coconspirators—as non-
    parties to the suit—couldn’t be estopped from asserting the NPA’s validity at any
    future prosecution. See 
    id.
     Second, the court denied petitioner’s request for an
    injunction on the ground that she had failed to show “continuing, present adverse
    effects” or any “real and immediate” threat of future CVRA violations. 
    Id. at 1328
    . Third, the court rejected petitioner’s requests for a victim-impact hearing
    and a meeting with Acosta on the grounds that petitioner had already participated
    in an Epstein-related hearing in New York, that the Epstein prosecution had
    concluded, and that the government had already agreed to confer with victims
    concerning any ongoing investigation of Epstein’s coconspirators. See 
    id.
     at 1328–
    29. Fourth, the court denied petitioner’s discovery requests for grand-jury
    materials and investigative files. See 
    id.
     at 1329–40. Fifth, the court declined to
    order “educational remedies,” as the government had already agreed to implement
    CVRA training for employees of the Southern District’s United States Attorney’s
    office. 
    Id. at 1330
    . And finally, the court rejected petitioner’s request for
    sanctions, fees, and restitution. See 
    id.
     at 1330–31.
    Seeking review of the district court’s order refusing every remedy that she
    had sought, petitioner filed—as the CVRA directs—a petition for writ of
    mandamus with this Court. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (d)(3) (stating that “[i]f the
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    district court denies the relief sought,” a victim “may petition the court of appeals
    for a writ of mandamus”). The government filed a “brief in response” in which it
    not only opposed petitioner’s arguments on the merits, but also raised several
    threshold arguments concerning the scope of the CVRA and the circumstances in
    which rights under the Act are judicially enforceable. In reply, petitioner
    contended (among other things) that by failing to “cross appeal,” the government
    had waived its arguments about the CVRA’s applicability and enforceability. 5
    * * *
    This case presents a host of issues, many of first impression. Before
    jumping in, we begin with an introductory summary of the CVRA.
    III
    The CVRA is a compact statute, occupying but one section (and only two
    pages) of the United States Code. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    . The entire Act comprises
    just six subsections, the pertinent portions of which we will summarize briefly.
    The Act opens, in subsection (a), with a catalogue of “rights” that federal
    law guarantees to “crime victims.” (The Act separately defines the term “crime
    victim” to mean “a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the
    commission of a Federal offense.” 
    Id.
     § 3771(e)(2)(A).) The version of the CVRA
    5
    Although the CVRA instructs the court of appeals to “take up and decide” any mandamus
    petition “forthwith within 72 hours,” the parties here stipulated to an extended briefing and
    decision schedule, which the CVRA authorizes. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (d)(3).
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    in effect during the events in question here—between 2006 and 2008—stated as
    follows:
    (a) Rights of crime victims.—A crime victim has the following
    rights:
    (1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused.
    (2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any
    public court proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the
    crime or of any release or escape of the accused.
    (3) The right not to be excluded from any such public court
    proceeding, unless the court, after receiving clear and convincing
    evidence, determines that testimony by the victim would be
    materially altered if the victim heard other testimony at that
    proceeding.
    (4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the
    district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole
    proceeding.
    (5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the
    Government in the case.
    (6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.
    (7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay.
    (8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the
    victim’s dignity and privacy.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (a).
    Subsection (b), titled “Rights afforded,” focuses on courts’ responsibilities
    under the Act. It provides—as relevant here—that “[i]n any court proceeding
    involving an offense against a crime victim, the court shall ensure that the crime
    victim is afforded the rights described in subsection (a).” 
    Id.
     § 3771(b)(1).
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    (Subsection (b)(2) pertains to habeas corpus proceedings, in which crime victims
    enjoy a more limited set of rights; it isn’t relevant here.)
    Subsection (c), titled “Best efforts to accord rights,” imposes obligations on
    non-judicial actors. One of its constituent clauses—which we introduced earlier as
    the so-called “coverage” provision—states as follows:
    Officers and employees of the Department of Justice and other
    departments and agencies of the United States engaged in the
    detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime shall make their best
    efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, and accorded, the
    rights described in subsection (a).
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (c)(1).
    Subsection (d) addresses “Enforcement and limitations.” Several of
    subsection (d)(3)’s provisions are relevant here. One—the “venue” provision—
    states that “[t]he rights described in subsection (a) shall be asserted in the district
    court in which a defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no prosecution is
    underway, in the district court in which the crime occurred.” Another provides that
    “[i]f the district court denies the relief sought, the movant may petition the court of
    appeals for a writ of mandamus”—and as amended in 2015, and thus before
    petitioner sought review here, it goes on to clarify that in deciding any mandamus
    petition under the CVRA, “the court of appeals shall apply ordinary standards of
    appellate review.” Subsection (d)(6) is also relevant in two respects. First, it states
    that “[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to authorize a cause of action for
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    damages.” Second, and separately, it emphasizes that “[n]othing in this chapter
    shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or
    any officer under his direction.”
    Finally, subsection (f)—we’ve already introduced subsection (e), which
    defines the term “crime victim”—instructs the Attorney General to “promulgate
    regulations to enforce the rights of crime victims and to ensure compliance by
    responsible officials with the obligations” concerning those victims. 
    Id.
    § 3771(f)(1).
    With that primer, we proceed to address petitioner’s case.
    IV
    Petitioner contends—and as already explained, the undisputed facts show—
    that federal prosecutors in the Southern District of Florida negotiated “a secret
    non-prosecution agreement” with Epstein, and that “[f]rom the time that the FBI
    began investigating Epstein through the consummation of the secret NPA, the
    Government never conferred with Epstein’s victims about the NPA [or] even told
    them that such an agreement was under consideration.” Petition for Writ of
    Mandamus at 4–5. By keeping her (and others) in the dark concerning Epstein’s
    NPA, petitioner asserts, the government violated the CVRA.
    The unique circumstances of this case—and in particular, the fact that
    Epstein was never charged in the Southern District of Florida—tee up what the
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    district court correctly called a “threshold” question: Does the CVRA apply in the
    period before criminal proceedings are initiated, either by criminal complaint,
    information, or indictment? If it does, then we must proceed to consider a cascade
    of logically subsequent questions—among them, (1) whether the Act authorized
    the district court to rescind the NPA, both generally and, more specifically, as
    applied to Epstein’s alleged coconspirators; (2) whether petitioner was entitled to
    discovery of certain grand-jury materials, DOJ records pertaining to prosecutors’
    decision to enter into the NPA, and FBI files concerning the Epstein investigation;
    (3) whether petitioner’s participation in an Epstein-related victim-impact hearing in
    New York effectively moots her request for relief here; and (4) whether federal law
    entitles petitioner to recover attorneys’ fees. If, by contrast, the CVRA doesn’t
    apply before the commencement of criminal proceedings, then our inquiry is at an
    end. 6
    6
    Before considering the merits of the question whether the CVRA applies before the initiation of
    criminal proceedings, we must briefly address a front-end procedural issue. Petitioner contends
    (Reply in Supp. of Pet. at 11–14) that the government waived any argument that the CVRA
    doesn’t apply here when it failed to file a “cross-appeal” from the district court’s 2011 order,
    which (as already explained) held “as a matter of law [that] the CVRA can apply before formal
    charges are filed.” Does, 
    817 F. Supp. 2d at 1343
    . We reject petitioner’s waiver argument. It’s
    true that in the usual case, the government’s failure to cross-appeal the district court’s adverse
    2011 order might well have precluded our review of that decision. See Greenlaw v. United
    States, 
    554 U.S. 237
    , 244–45 (2008). This, though, isn’t the usual case. Petitioner didn’t file an
    “appeal”; rather, as the CVRA requires, she filed a petition for writ of mandamus. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (d)(3); see also 16 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
    Procedure § 3932 (3d ed. 2019) (explaining that a mandamus petition is “an original application
    to the court of appeals”). The question before us, therefore, is not whether to affirm or reverse
    the district court’s orders, but rather whether to grant or deny the petition—and, it seems to us,
    16
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    Whether the CVRA applies prior to the initiation of criminal proceedings is
    not just a threshold question, but also a question of first impression in this Circuit.
    The Fifth Circuit has stated—albeit in dictum, without meaningful explanation,
    and seemingly without the benefit of adversarial testing—that the Act can apply
    before criminal proceedings begin. See In re Dean, 
    527 F.3d 391
    , 934 (5th Cir.
    2008). The Sixth Circuit has deemed it “uncertain” whether CVRA protections
    apply “prior to [the] filing of . . . charges.” In re Acker, 
    596 F.3d 370
    , 373 (6th
    Cir. 2010). The district courts that have considered the question are divided.
    Compare, e.g., United States v. Oakum, No. 3:08CR132, 
    2009 WL 790042
    , at *2
    (E.D. Va. Mar. 24, 2009) (holding that CVRA rights can attach prior to the
    commencement of criminal proceedings), with, e.g., United States v. Daly, No.
    3:11CR121 AWT, 
    2012 WL 315409
    , at *4 (D. Conn. Feb. 1, 2012) (holding to the
    contrary).
    As already explained, the district court here concluded that the CVRA can
    apply before the initiation of criminal proceedings—“pre-charge,” for short—and,
    accordingly, that petitioner enjoyed the protections of the Act during the period
    the government is entitled to raise any argument it likes in support of its position that we should
    deny. And while the CVRA (as amended in 2015 to resolve a then-existing circuit split) directs
    us to “apply ordinary standards of appellate review” in deciding the mandamus petition, see 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (d)(3)—rather than the heightened “clear usurpation of power or abuse of
    discretion” standard that typically applies in the mandamus context, In re Loudermilch, 
    158 F.3d 1143
    , 1145 (11th Cir. 1998)—it does not direct us to employ the rules of procedure that would
    apply if this were a typical appeal.
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    that preceded the execution of Epstein’s NPA. In particular, petitioner asserts in
    these proceedings that the government violated her “reasonable right to confer”
    with the lead prosecutor, 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (a)(5), and her right “to be treated with
    fairness,” 
    id.
     § 3771(a)(8)—neither of which, she says, is limited by its terms to the
    post-charge phase of a criminal prosecution. 7 In support of her position that
    CVRA rights can apply before criminal proceedings begin, petitioner points (as did
    the district court) to § 3771(c)(1)—which refers to federal-government agencies
    engaged in the “detection [and] investigation” of crime, in addition to its
    “prosecution”—and to § 3771(d)(3)—which, in specifying the venue where a
    victim should seek relief under the Act, refers to the eventuality that “no
    prosecution is underway.”
    The interpretation of the CVRA that petitioner advances, and that the district
    court adopted, is not implausible; the CVRA could be read to apply pre-charge.
    We conclude, though—reluctantly, especially given the mistreatment that
    petitioner seems to have suffered at the hands of federal prosecutors—that the Act
    is neither best nor most naturally read that way. For reasons that we will explain,
    we hold that (1) the CVRA’s text and structure, (2) the historical context in which
    7
    Petitioner also contends (albeit only in passing) that the government violated her right to
    “timely notice of any public court proceeding,” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (a)(2), in connection with the
    June 30, 2008 state-court hearing at which Epstein pleaded guilty to Florida prostitution
    offenses. See Pet. at 54.
    18
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    the Act was passed, and (3) the prosecutorial-discretion principles that the Act was
    designed to safeguard—and which, we think, petitioner’s interpretation would
    compromise—demonstrate that its protections apply only after the initiation of
    criminal proceedings. If Congress believes that we have misinterpreted the
    CVRA—or, for that matter, even if it believes that we have correctly interpreted
    the statute as currently written but that its scope should be expanded—then it
    should amend the Act to make its intent clear.
    A
    In construing the CVRA, “we begin, as we must, with a careful examination
    of the statutory text,” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 
    137 S. Ct. 1718
    ,
    1721 (2017), looking “to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the
    language and design of the statute as a whole,” K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 
    486 U.S. 281
    , 291 (1988). On balance, we conclude that the Act’s terms—including
    the provisions on which petitioner relies—demonstrate that its protections apply
    only after the commencement of criminal proceedings.
    1
    We begin where petitioner does, with the catalogue of “rights”—quoted in
    full above—that the CVRA guarantees to “crime victims.” (As already noted, the
    Act defines the term “crime victim”—more on that later.) Petitioner relies chiefly
    on § 3771(a)(5)’s guarantee of a “reasonable right to confer with the attorney for
    19
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    the Government in the case,” and § 3771(a)(8)’s guarantee of the “right to be
    treated with fairness.” She contends that by failing to inform her—and worse,
    affirmatively misleading her—about its ongoing negotiations with Epstein, the
    government violated both provisions. We will address subsections (a)(5) and (8) in
    due course, but because “[s]tatutory construction . . . is a holistic endeavor,” and
    because “[a] provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by
    the remainder of the statutory scheme,” United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of
    Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 
    484 U.S. 365
    , 371 (1988), we first examine the
    balance of § 3771(a). 8
    In the main, anyway—and there isn’t any real dispute about this—the
    CVRA’s enumeration seems to focus on the post-charge phase of a criminal
    prosecution, and in particular on ensuring that crime victims have notice of (and an
    opportunity to be heard in) pending criminal proceedings. Indeed, six of the eight
    rights listed in § 3771(a)—all except for those specified in subsections (5) and
    (8)—either expressly refer to or necessarily presuppose the existence of an ongoing
    criminal proceeding. Subsections (a)(2), (3), (4), and (7) leave no doubt
    8
    Accord, e.g., Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
    Texts at 167 (2012) (quoting Sir Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of
    England, or a Commentary upon Littleton § 728, at 381a (1628; 14th ed. 1791), for the
    proposition that “[i]f any section [of a law] be intricate, obscure or doubtful, the proper mode of
    discovering its true meaning is by comparing it with the other sections, and finding out the sense
    of one clause by the words or obvious intent of the other”).
    20
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    whatsoever—all of them apply, by their plain terms, to “proceeding[s],” “public
    proceedings,” or “public court proceedings.” Not surprisingly, there seems to be
    general agreement that these “proceeding”-focused rights apply only after the
    filing of a complaint or criminal charges. See Reply in Supp. of Pet. at 17; Paul G.
    Cassell, et al., Crime Victims’ Rights During Criminal Investigations? Applying
    the Crime Victims’ Rights Act Before Criminal Charges Are Filed, 104 J. of Crim.
    L. and Criminology 59, 71 (2014).
    Subsections (a)(1) and (6) aren’t quite as clear, but they too are best
    understood as specifying rights that attach only after criminal proceedings have
    begun. Subsection (1) guarantees a crime victim’s right to protection from “the
    accused.” § 3771(a)(1). Both in ordinary spoken English and as a legal term of
    art, the word “accused” refers to someone against whom criminal proceedings have
    been commenced. See, e.g., Webster’s New International Dictionary 17 (2d ed.
    1944) (defining “accused” as “one charged with an offense; the defendant in a
    criminal case”); see also Michigan v. Jackson, 
    475 U.S. 625
    , 632 (1986) (“[A]fter
    a formal accusation has been made . . . a person who had previously been just a
    ‘suspect’ has become an ‘accused’ within the meaning of the Sixth
    Amendment . . . .”). Subsection (a)(6), which guarantees a victim’s right to “full
    and timely restitution,” likewise presupposes the initiation—and indeed perhaps
    the maturation or even conclusion—of criminal proceedings. Black’s, for instance,
    21
    Case: 19-13843        Date Filed: 04/14/2020       Page: 22 of 120
    defines the term “restitution,” in relevant part, to mean “[c]ompensation for loss;
    esp., full or partial compensation paid by a criminal to a victim, not awarded in a
    civil trial for tort, but ordered as part of a criminal sentence or as a condition of
    probation.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1507 (10th ed. 2014).
    So, it seems to us, the rights enumerated in subsections (a)(1), (2), (3), (4),
    (6), and (7) are properly understood as applying only after the initiation of criminal
    proceedings. And again, petitioner doesn’t really contend otherwise. Instead, she
    focuses on subsections (a)(5) and (8), which she says are framed broadly enough
    that they can be understood to apply pre-charge. Let’s take a closer look.
    Subsection (a)(5) guarantees a crime victim the “reasonable right to confer
    with the attorney for the Government in the case.” Petitioner and her lead counsel
    (in his academic writings) emphasize that this provision refers to the attorney
    handling “the case” rather than “the charges,” Reply in Supp. of Pet. at 17, and
    they assert that the term “case” can “refer both to a judicial case before a court and
    an investigative case pursued by a law enforcement officer,” Cassell et al., supra,
    at 72 (emphasis added). 9 Although it’s true, at least in the abstract, that the term
    9
    Ordinarily, of course, we don’t impute a lawyer’s out-of-court positions to his client—and we
    needn’t do so even in this case. We cite Professor Cassell’s article here (and elsewhere) for
    several reasons: (1) because he is not only petitioner’s counsel but also one of the nation’s
    foremost authorities on victims’-rights issues in general and the CVRA in particular; (2) because
    the article is wholly consistent with petitioner’s position as articulated in her brief and at oral
    argument; and (3) because it expands on and deepens petitioner’s in-court arguments and thus
    ensures that we are considering the strongest version of her position.
    22
    Case: 19-13843     Date Filed: 04/14/2020    Page: 23 of 120
    “case” can mean either thing, in legal parlance the judicial-case connotation is
    undoubtedly primary. See, e.g., Black’s, supra, at 258–59 (defining “case” first as
    “[a] civil or criminal proceeding, action, suit or controversy at law or in equity”
    and only second as “[a] criminal investigation”); Webster’s New International,
    supra, at 415 (defining “case” as used in “[l]aw” as “a suit or action in law or
    equity; a cause”). Moreover, and in any event, two contextual considerations
    convince us that, as used in subsection (a)(5), the term “case” refers to an ongoing
    judicial proceeding, not a law-enforcement investigation.
    First, the Supreme Court has held that in the criminal context, a “case” does
    not “encompass the entire criminal investigatory process,” but rather “at the very
    least requires the initiation of legal proceedings.” Chavez v. Martinez, 
    538 U.S. 760
    , 766 (2003). Notably, in so holding, the Court drew on longstanding tradition,
    citing its now nearly 150-year-old decision in Blyew v. United States for the
    proposition that the word “case” is synonymous with the word “cause” and
    “mean[s] a proceeding in court, a suit, or action.” 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 595
    (1872). Second, and separately, subsection (a)(5) refers not just to “the case” in
    general, but more particularly to “the attorney for the Government in the case.”
    While it is undoubtedly true that government lawyers may be involved in a
    criminal investigation pre-charge, the provision’s reference to a single, specific
    individual—“the attorney for the Government”—indicates that the conferral right
    23
    Case: 19-13843        Date Filed: 04/14/2020       Page: 24 of 120
    attaches only after proceedings have begun, at which point that particular person
    will presumably be more readily identifiable. Cf. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 
    542 U.S. 426
    , 434–35 (2004) (holding that the “use of the definite article . . . indicates that
    there is generally only one” person covered). By the same token, there will surely
    be many criminal investigations to which no lawyers have (yet) been assigned—let
    alone a single, identifiable “attorney for the Government.” Accordingly, if, as
    petitioner asserts, subsection (a)(5) was intended to apply pre-charge, during the
    investigation phase, it makes little sense that Congress would have tethered the
    conferral right to a single government lawyer.
    On balance, therefore—and particularly in the light of subsections (a)(1),
    (2), (3), (4), (6), and (7), all of which clearly apply only after the initiation of
    criminal proceedings—we conclude that § 3771(a)(5)’s conferral right does not
    attach during the pre-charge, investigatory phase. Rather, subsection (a)(5) is best
    understood as guaranteeing a crime victim’s right to consult with the lead
    prosecutor—i.e., “the attorney for the Government”—in a pending prosecution—
    i.e., “the case.”10
    10
    See generally Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 13.1, at 849 (6th ed. 2017)
    (“Under the federal victims’ rights statute [i.e., 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    ], a crime victim is granted a
    ‘reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case,’ but it is nowhere
    specified that the conference must precede or concern the prosecutor’s charging decision . . . .”).
    24
    Case: 19-13843        Date Filed: 04/14/2020      Page: 25 of 120
    Petitioner also relies (albeit more obliquely) on subsection (a)(8), which
    vaguely guarantees a crime victim’s right “to be treated with fairness and with
    respect for [his or her] dignity and privacy.” It is certainly true that this fair-
    treatment right has no inherent temporal limitation—on its face, it could apply pre-
    charge, post-charge, or for that matter even post-conviction. But well-established
    canons of interpretation require us to interpret subsection (a)(8)’s general right to
    fair treatment by reference to the subsections (and their constituent rights) that
    precede it. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 
    559 U.S. 133
    , 139 (2010)
    (“Ultimately, context determines meaning . . . .”); Gutierrez v. Ada, 
    528 U.S. 250
    ,
    255 (2000) (“[W]ords and people are known by their companions.”). Because the
    rights enumerated in subsections (a)(1)–(7) are best understood as applying only
    after the institution of criminal proceedings, subsection (a)(8)’s guarantee of
    “fairness” is, too. What the Supreme Court said recently in applying noscitur a
    sociis—“the well-worn Latin phrase that tells us that statutory words are often
    known by the company they keep”—applies here as well: In § 3771(a), “we
    find . . . both the presence of company that suggests limitation and the absence of
    company that suggests breadth.” Lagos v. United States, 
    138 S. Ct. 1684
    , 1688–89
    (2018).11
    11
    In spending pages dissecting our citations to cases applying the noscitur a sociis canon, the
    dissent misses the forest for the trees. See Dissenting Op. at 98–100. The fundamental point is
    25
    Case: 19-13843      Date Filed: 04/14/2020       Page: 26 of 120
    Taken as a whole, then, we conclude that the catalogue of rights specified in
    § 3771(a) are best read as applying only after the institution of criminal
    proceedings.
    2
    We are fortified in that conclusion by the only two provisions of the Act that
    speak directly to judicial enforcement of victims’ statutory rights.
    The first is § 3771(b), titled “Rights afforded.” At oral argument,
    petitioner’s counsel invoked subsection (b)(1) affirmatively, noting—with
    emphasis—its directive that “the court shall ensure that the crime victim is
    afforded the rights” enumerated in subsection (a). See Oral Arg. at 5:45–5:57.
    True, but that’s only part of the story. In its entirety, subsection (b)(1) reads as
    follows: “In any court proceeding involving an offense against a crime victim, the
    court shall ensure that the crime victim is afforded the rights described in
    subsection (a).” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (b)(1) (emphasis added). By its plain terms,
    then, subsection (b)(1) empowers courts to enforce CVRA rights only during
    pending criminal proceedings—of which there were none here.
    simply that subsection (a)(8)’s meaning should be informed by its surrounding statutory context,
    and that because subsections (a)(1)–(7) are most properly read to apply only after the
    commencement of criminal proceedings, it makes sense—absent some contrary indication—to
    interpret subsection (a)(8)’s vague fair-treatment provision the same way.
    26
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    The second is § 3771(d), which specifies—and strictly circumscribes—the
    procedural mechanisms by which an alleged victim must assert and seek to enforce
    CVRA rights. Two (related) points are worth making. As an initial matter, the Act
    clearly indicates that Congress did not intend to authorize private individuals to
    initiate stand-alone suits or actions, outside the confines of existing criminal
    proceedings, to enforce their statutory rights. Quite the contrary, in fact—
    subsection (d)(6), titled “No Cause of Action,” expressly states that “[n]othing in
    this chapter shall be construed to authorize a cause of action for damages.”
    § 3771(d)(6)). Cf. Alexander v. Sandoval, 
    532 U.S. 275
    , 286 (2001) (explaining
    that “[l]ike substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal
    law must be created by Congress”).
    Instead—and this is point two—subsection (d)(3) specifies that a victim
    must assert his or her rights in a “motion for relief” filed in district court and
    requires the court to consider and decide that “motion” promptly. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (d)(3). As commonly understood, a “motion” is a request filed within the
    context of an ongoing judicial proceeding, not a vehicle for launching a new and
    freestanding piece of litigation. 12 See, e.g., Black’s, supra, at 1168 (“‘Frequently,
    12
    As already explained, subsection (d)(3) states that “[t]he rights described in subsection (a)
    shall be asserted in the district court in which a defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if
    no prosecution is underway, in the district court in which the crime occurred.” We address
    below petitioner’s contention that the “if no prosecution is underway” language demonstrates
    that the CVRA applies before the initiation of criminal proceedings. See infra at 33–36.
    27
    Case: 19-13843       Date Filed: 04/14/2020        Page: 28 of 120
    in the progress of litigation, it is desired to have the court take some action which
    is incidental to the main proceeding . . . . Such action is invoked by an application
    usually less formal than the pleadings, and is called a motion.’” (quoting John C.
    Townes, Studies in American Elementary Law 621 (1911)); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 3, 7
    (distinguishing between a “motion” and a “pleading”—the latter of which is
    defined to include a “complaint,” which is the prescribed vehicle for commencing
    a freestanding action). 13
    The facts that the CVRA (1) does not sanction freestanding suits and (2)
    does prescribe mid-proceeding “motion[s]” combine—especially in conjunction
    13
    A third aspect of § 3771(d)(3) likewise counsels—albeit perhaps a bit more indirectly—in
    favor of the conclusion that CVRA rights are intended to apply, and be enforced, only within the
    context of an ongoing criminal prosecution. As already explained, under subsection (d)(3), a
    crime victim’s sole recourse to this Court is via petition for writ of mandamus. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (d)(3) (“If the district court denies the relief sought, the movant may petition the court of
    appeals for a writ of mandamus.”). Although a petition for mandamus is “an original application
    to the court of appeals,” the writ “is not an independent grant of appellate jurisdiction” but,
    rather, “‘may go only in aid of appellate jurisdiction’ that exists on some other basis.” 16 Wright
    & Miller, supra, § 3932 (quoting Parr v. United States, 
    351 U.S. 513
    , 520 (1956)). The
    “minimum condition” for mandamus relief, therefore, is “that the case be one that may lie within
    the prospective future jurisdiction of the court of appeals, or that has in fact come within its
    jurisdiction in the past.” 
    Id.
     When CVRA rights are asserted in the context of a criminal
    proceeding, our mandamus jurisdiction is clear, because our appellate jurisdiction over the
    underlying criminal proceeding (and any rulings, verdicts, and judgments rendered therein) is
    clear. And the CVRA itself provides that “[i]n any appeal in a criminal case, the Government
    may assert as error the district court’s denial of any crime victim’s right in the proceeding to
    which the appeal relates.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (d)(4). By contrast, in the absence of a criminal
    prosecution, mandamus jurisdiction in this Court is less certain—harder to justify—simply
    because it’s less certain how the case could otherwise arrive, in the form of an appeal, on our
    doorstep.
    28
    Case: 19-13843        Date Filed: 04/14/2020        Page: 29 of 120
    with subsection (a)’s enumeration—to indicate that the Act’s protections apply
    only after the initiation of criminal proceedings. 14
    3
    In fairness, petitioner is not without her own textual arguments. In urging us
    to hold that CVRA rights—or at least some of them—apply even before the
    initiation of criminal proceedings, she relies principally on two subsections, which
    the parties call the “coverage” and “venue” provisions, respectively. Neither, we
    conclude, clearly demonstrates that the rights specified in the Act attach during the
    pre-charge, investigative phase.
    Petitioner first points to § 3771(c)(1)—the “coverage” provision—which, as
    already explained, states that “[o]fficers and employees of the Department of
    Justice and other departments and agencies of the United States engaged in the
    detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime shall make their best efforts to see
    that crime victims are notified of, and accorded, the rights described in subsection
    14
    It is also relevant, we think—even if more marginally so—that the drafters and ratifiers of the
    Federal Rules seem to have anticipated that CVRA “motions” would be filed within the context
    of an existing criminal proceeding—not as freestanding actions. The Federal Rules of Criminal
    Procedure, which “govern the procedure in all criminal proceedings” in United States courts, see
    Fed. R. Crim. P. 1(a)(1), expressly incorporate portions of the CVRA. In particular, Rule 60—
    titled “Victim’s Rights”—implements several of the rights specified in § 3771(a), and further
    (echoing § 3771(d)(3)) clarifies that “[a] victim’s rights described in these rules must be asserted
    in the district where a defendant is being prosecuted for the crime.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 60(b)(4).
    The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which “govern the procedure in all civil actions and
    proceedings in the United States district courts,” see Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, contain no similar
    provision, and make no reference to the CVRA.
    29
    Case: 19-13843     Date Filed: 04/14/2020    Page: 30 of 120
    (a).” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (c)(1). From the premise that “the CVRA applies to the
    ‘detection [or] investigation’ of crimes,” petitioner reasons to the conclusion,
    which the district court adopted, that “the Act’s drafters ‘surely contemplate[d]
    pre-charge application of the CVRA.’” Reply in Supp. of Pet. at 15 (quoting Does,
    
    817 F. Supp. 2d at 1342
    ). We disagree for two reasons.
    First, understood in proper context, it seems clear to us that subsection (c)(1)
    is a “to whom” provision, not a “when” provision. That is, it clarifies that CVRA
    obligations extend beyond the officers and employees of “the Department of
    Justice” to include, as well, the officers and employees of “other departments and
    agencies of the United States” that (like DOJ) are “engaged in the detection,
    investigation, or prosecution of crime”—e.g., IRS, ICE, and TSA. Those agencies’
    employees, like DOJ’s, must “make their best efforts to see that crime victims” are
    afforded CVRA rights. Subsection (c)(1) doesn’t expressly speak to when CVRA
    rights attach, and it certainly doesn’t clearly demonstrate that those rights attach
    before the initiation of criminal proceedings. Government employees (whether of
    DOJ or some other DOJ-like agency) who are involved in all three of the
    referenced phases are necessarily involved post-charge. Subsection (c)(1) simply
    30
    Case: 19-13843       Date Filed: 04/14/2020        Page: 31 of 120
    makes clear that the Act reaches beyond prosecutors (and DOJ) to reach other
    actors in the criminal-justice system.15
    Second, and more importantly, petitioner’s reliance on § 3771(c)(1) proves
    entirely too much. If, as petitioner thinks subsection (c)(1) shows, CVRA rights
    apply during the “detection” and “investigation” of crime, then there is no
    meaningful basis—at least no meaningful textual basis—for limiting the Act’s pre-
    charge application to the NPA context. To the contrary, on petitioner’s reading,
    subsection (c)(1) would—to cite just a few examples—require law-enforcement
    officers to “confer” with victims, subject only to a squishy “reasonable[ness]”
    limitation, see § 3771(a)(5), before conducting a raid, seeking a warrant, making
    an arrest, interviewing a witness, convening a lineup, or conducting an
    interrogation. Absent a much clearer indication, we cannot assume that Congress
    intended such a jarring result. Presumably sensing the slipperiness of their
    position, petitioner and her counsel have said that courts can simply draw the line
    15
    Petitioner’s counsel has contended that this interpretation of § 3771(c)(1) can’t explain “why
    Congress found it necessary to break out three separate phases of the criminal justice process: the
    ‘detection,’ ‘investigation,’ and ‘prosecution’ of crime.” Cassell et al., 
    supra, at 87
    . If, he
    argues, Congress’s “intent was simply to cover, for example, FBI agents or EPA agents during
    the post-charging phase of a case, it could have simply omitted” the words “detection” and
    “investigation” from the Act, because those agents “would be engaged in the ‘prosecution’ of the
    case when assisting the victim after the filing of formal charges.” 
    Id.
     Thus, he says, our
    interpretation impermissibly renders the terms “detection” and “investigation” meaningless. 
    Id.
    We don’t think so. We read subsection (c)(1) not as “break[ing] out” three different phases, but
    rather as attempting to broadly cover (perhaps using a belt-and-suspenders approach) all
    necessary government-employee participants—in short, to ensure that the Act’s protection
    extends beyond prosecutors.
    31
    Case: 19-13843        Date Filed: 04/14/2020        Page: 32 of 120
    farther downstream—when, for instance, as counsel put it at oral argument, an
    investigation has “matured” to the point where (as here) prosecutors “are
    negotiating with defense attorneys and signing agreements.” Oral Arg. at 8:30,
    9:10–9:17. “At that point at least,” counsel said, “a conferral right exists” under
    subsection (a)(5). 
    Id.
     at 9:10–9:17. That is a line, to be sure—and a line that
    happens to capture this case—but it has no footing whatsoever in the “detection
    [or] investigation” language to which petitioner points in support of her position. 16
    As tempting as it might be to do so—especially on the facts before us here—we
    cannot re-write, or arbitrarily circumscribe, the Act’s text simply to make it fit
    petitioner’s theory.17
    For these reasons, we cannot accept petitioner’s contention that § 3771(c)(1)
    demonstrates that the CVRA applies before the initiation of criminal proceedings.
    16
    In his article on the subject, petitioner’s lead counsel offered a similar limiting construction,
    which he framed this way:
    CVRA rights attach when an officer or employee of the Department of Justice or
    any other department or agency of the United States engaged in the detection,
    investigation, or prosecution of crime has substantial evidence that an identifiable
    person has been directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of
    a federal offense . . . and in the judgment of the officer or employee, that person is
    a putative victim of that offense.
    Cassell et al., supra, at 92 (emphasis added). Professor Cassell’s proposal reads like a finely-
    tuned statutory provision—but one that, unfortunately, Congress never enacted.
    17
    For reasons we will explain, the dissent’s interpretation—so far as we can discern it—suffers
    from the same flaw. See infra at 51–52.
    32
    Case: 19-13843      Date Filed: 04/14/2020     Page: 33 of 120
    Petitioner is on slightly stronger footing, we think, in pointing to the
    CVRA’s “venue” provision, § 3771(d)(3). In relevant part, that provision states
    that “[t]he rights described in subsection (a) shall be asserted in the district court in
    which a defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no prosecution is
    underway, in the district court in which the crime occurred.” Petitioner contends—
    and the district court agreed—that the “no prosecution is underway” clause must
    mean that CVRA rights “‘may be enforced before a prosecution is underway’” and,
    accordingly, that “‘those rights must attach before a complaint or indictment
    formally charges the defendant with the crime.’” Reply in Supp. of Pet. at 15
    (quoting Does, 
    817 F. Supp. 2d at 1342
    ). Petitioner’s interpretation of subsection
    (d)(3) is not implausible—that provision could be read to mean that CVRA rights
    attach before the commencement of criminal proceedings. But it isn’t necessary,
    either, and in light of the remainder of the Act’s text—and the practical
    implications of petitioner’s construction, the details of which we explore below—
    we are reluctant to adopt it, or at least to invest it with the significance that
    petitioner does.
    There are, we think, at least two alternative ways of understanding
    § 3771(d)(3). First, and perhaps most obviously, it could be read to apply to the
    period of time between the initiation of criminal proceedings—which may occur as
    early as the filing of a criminal complaint under Federal Rule of Criminal
    33
    Case: 19-13843         Date Filed: 04/14/2020         Page: 34 of 120
    Procedure 3—and the levying of formal charges in an indictment. 18 The word
    “prosecution”—on which subsection (d)(3) pivots—is a legal term of art; in
    relevant part, it refers to “[t]he institution and continuance of a criminal suit [and]
    the process of exhibiting formal charges against an offender before a legal tribunal,
    and pursuing them to final judgment on behalf of the state or government, as by
    indictment or information.” Webster’s New International, supra, at 1987.
    Moreover, the law is clear, at least for Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel
    purposes, that a “prosecution” does not begin with the criminal complaint’s filing.
    See United States v. Alvarado, 
    440 F.3d 191
    , 199–200 (4th Cir. 2006) (“The filing
    of a federal criminal complaint does not commence a formal prosecution.”); see
    also, e.g., United States v. States, 
    652 F.3d 734
    , 741–42 (7th Cir. 2011) (same);
    United States v. Boskic, 
    545 F.3d 69
    , 82–84 (1st Cir. 2008) (same). Rather, the
    Sixth Amendment right does not attach—because a “prosecution” does not
    begin—until, at the earliest, a suspect’s “initial appearance before a judicial
    officer.” Rothgery v. Gillsespie County, Tex., 
    554 U.S. 191
    , 199 (2008). All of
    which is to say that even if petitioner and the district court were correct that the
    “no prosecution is underway” clause meant that CVRA rights apply “before”
    18
    Presumably because it finds this the more difficult of the two interpretations of subsection
    (d)(3) to deal with, the dissent labels it our “alternative[]” position and relegates its response to a
    footnote—notwithstanding that we introduce it as the “[f]irst, and perhaps most obvious[]”
    reading. See Dissenting Op. at 92 n.17. By contrast, the dissent goes on for pages challenging
    what we offer (next page) as an “alternative[]” interpretation, (mis)stating our position as being
    that “this venue provision is about ‘post-judgment’ matters.” 
    Id.
     at 91–93.
    34
    Case: 19-13843     Date Filed: 04/14/2020     Page: 35 of 120
    formal charges are filed, they may yet be incorrect that those rights should be
    understood to attach during a pre-complaint investigation. Subsection (d)(3) can
    be read sensibly enough to apply (and to give victims the right, for example, to
    “confer” with prosecutors, § 3771(a)(5)) between the filing of the criminal
    complaint and the suspect’s initial appearance before a judge—and thus, for
    instance, to express their views to prosecutors about whether the defendant should
    be granted pretrial release. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(d)(1)(C) (noting that pretrial-
    release decisions are made at the “initial appearance”).
    Alternatively, subsection (d)(3) could be interpreted to refer to the period
    after a “prosecution” has run its course and resulted in a final judgment of
    conviction. Petitioner and the district court read the “no prosecution is underway”
    clause to say, in effect, “no prosecution is [yet] underway”—thereby necessarily
    pointing to the period “before” (their word) the prosecution’s commencement. But
    subsection (d)(3)’s is temporally agnostic—on its face, it could just as easily mean
    that “no prosecution is [still] underway.” Cf. Underway, Oxford English
    Dictionary, https://oed.com/view/Entry/212225?rskey=hlolT7&result=1#eid (last
    visited April 13, 2020) (defining “underway” as it pertains to “a process, project,
    [or] activity” to mean “set in progress; in the course of happening or being carried
    out”). No one doubts, for instance, that a victim could file a post-judgment motion
    alleging that the government violated her rights during the course of the
    35
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    prosecution and asking the court, say, to “re-open a plea or sentence.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (d)(5).19
    Moreover, petitioner’s broad reading of § 3771(d)(3) suffers from the same
    slippery-slope problems that plague her reading of § 3771(c)(1). To say, as the
    petitioner does—and as the district court did—that subsection (d)(3) indicates that
    CVRA “rights must attach before a complaint or indictment formally charges the
    defendant with the crime,’” Reply in Supp. of Pet. at 15 (quoting Does, 
    817 F. Supp. 2d at 1342
    ), tells us nothing about how long “before.” Again, must
    prosecutors consult with victims before law-enforcement officers conduct a raid,
    seek a warrant, or conduct an interrogation? That seems exceedingly unlikely. As
    we’ve explained, petitioner understandably wants to craft a rule that will cover this
    case without opening the floodgates to those possibilities—seemingly by reference
    to some sort of once-the-investigation-has-matured criterion. That criterion,
    though, has no basis in the CVRA’s text. Petitioner’s reading of subsection
    (d)(3)’s “no prosecution is underway” clause—like her reading of subsection
    (c)(1)’s “detection [or] investigation” clause—provides no logical stopping point.
    * * *
    19
    We concede that this reading isn’t perfectly seamless, in that it would require the victim to file
    her post-judgment motion “in the district in which the crime occurred” rather than, as one might
    expect, in the district in which the prosecution occurred and the conviction was entered.
    36
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    For all these reasons, we conclude that the CVRA’s text is best read as
    applying only after the commencement of criminal proceedings, whether by
    complaint, information, or indictment.20
    B
    The historical context in which the CVRA was enacted confirms what the
    Act’s text indicates—namely, that it was not meant to apply prior to the institution
    of criminal proceedings. Congress enacted the CVRA against the backdrop of
    another victims’-rights statute, the Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act of 1990.
    The CVRA repealed and replaced some parts of the VRRA, but left others intact.
    20
    Although a marginal consideration, we also note that our interpretation is consistent with that
    offered by the Department of Justice, both in its implementing regulations and in an explanatory
    memorandum authored by the Office of Legal Counsel.
    First, as already noted, in the CVRA’s concluding subsection Congress directed DOJ to
    “promulgate regulations to enforce the rights of crime victims and to ensure compliance by
    responsible officials with the obligations described in law respecting crime victims.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (f)(1). DOJ did so, and those regulations are codified at 
    28 C.F.R. § 45.10
    . Although the
    regulations don’t expressly address the question whether CVRA rights apply before the
    commencement of criminal proceedings, or instead only afterward, they do, on balance, seem to
    assume the latter interpretation. The provision specifying the information that an alleged victim
    must include in her administrative complaint, for instance, states that the document “shall
    contain,” among other information, “[t]he district court case number” and “[t]he name of the
    defendant in the case.” 
    Id.
     § 45.10(c)(2)(iii)–(iv). Needless to say, both items indicate (even if
    indirectly) DOJ’s considered view that the Act’s provisions apply only once a criminal case is
    pending.
    Second, in December 2010, DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel issued a formal 16-page
    opinion—titled “The Availability of Crime Victims’ Rights Under the Crime Victims’ Right Act
    of 2004”—in which it concluded, following an exhaustive analysis, that CVRA rights do not
    apply before the commencement of criminal proceedings. See The Availability of Crime
    Victims’ Rights Under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004, 
    35 Op. O.L.C. 1
     (Dec. 17, 2010).
    OLC’s 2010 opinion reinforced and formalized an earlier 2005 determination that had likewise
    concluded, “preliminar[ily],” that “the rights guaranteed by the CVRA [are] limited in their
    applicability to pending criminal proceedings.” Id. at 1.
    37
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    Notably, the “Services to victims” section of the VRRA, which the CVRA
    preserved, includes provisions that, by their express terms, plainly apply before
    criminal proceedings begin. 21
    That section opens with a phrase that the CVRA repeats—noting that it
    applies to government agencies “engaged in the detection, investigation, or
    prosecution of crime.” 
    34 U.S.C. § 20141
    (a). Unlike the CVRA, though, the
    VRRA directs the head of each such agency to designate individuals who will be
    responsible for identifying victims and for performing certain victim-related
    services “at each stage of a criminal case.” 
    Id.
     The VRRA goes on state that “[a]t
    the earliest opportunity after the detection of a crime at which it may be done
    without interfering with an investigation, a responsible official shall . . . identify
    the victim or victims of a crime [and] inform the victims of their right to receive,
    on request, [certain enumerated] services.” 
    Id.
     § 20141(b). By referring to the
    period immediately following “the detection of a crime” and to the existence of an
    ongoing “investigation”—with which the responsible official should be careful not
    to “interfer[e]”—the VRRA clearly extends victim-notice rights into the pre-charge
    phase.
    21
    In a legislative-history-laden footnote, the dissent accuses us of “fail[ing] to recognize the
    CVRA repealed significant parts of the VRRA.” Dissenting Op. at 101 n.21. As the paragraph
    to which this note is appended demonstrates, that is incorrect. The point—which we explain in
    text and to which the dissent offers no response—is that the portions of the VRRA that the CVRA
    left in place contain provisions that explicitly apply pre-charge, and that if Congress had
    intended the CVRA to have the same reach, it could (and should) have said so.
    38
    Case: 19-13843      Date Filed: 04/14/2020    Page: 39 of 120
    The VRRA is similarly explicit when describing the sorts of “services” to
    which victims are entitled. Following subsection (a)’s direction, subsection (c)
    marches—methodically, and roughly chronologically—through the various
    “stage[s]” of a crime’s commission, detection, investigation, and prosecution.
    Subsection (c)(1) states, for instance, that “the responsible official shall”—
    presumably immediately in the aftermath of a crime’s commission, and thus by
    definition before any charges are filed—inform the victim where she can “receive
    emergency medical and social services.” Id. § 20141(c)(1)(A). Subsection (c)(2)
    then provides that the responsible official shall ensure that the victim receives
    “reasonable protection from a suspected offender”—notably, not “the accused,” as
    in the CVRA, but “a suspected offender.” Id. § 20141(c)(2). Continuing,
    subsection (c)(3) states that the official shall provide the victim “the earliest
    possible notice” of, among other things, and under appropriate circumstances, “the
    status of the investigation of the crime” and “the arrest of the suspected
    offender”—both of which, obviously, refer to pre-charge events. Id.
    § 20141(c)(3)(A)–(B). It is not until subsection (c)(3)(C)—which refers to “the
    filing of charges against a suspected offender”—that the VRRA’s focus
    conspicuously shifts to rights pertaining to “charges,” “trial[s],” “hearing[s],” and
    “proceedings.” See id. § 20141(c)(3)(C)–(c)(5).
    39
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    The VRRA’s provisions—about which Congress indisputably knew when it
    framed and enacted the CVRA—demonstrate that when Congress wants to extend
    victims-rights protections pre-charge, it knows how to do so, and does so
    expressly. The fact that the CVRA contains no similar language counts heavily
    against petitioner’s interpretation under what we have called an entire “family” of
    interpretive canons. See Freemanville Water Sys., Inc. v. Poarch Band of Creek
    Indians, 
    563 F.3d 1205
    , 1209 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing the interrelated principles,
    for instance, that “where Congress knows how to say something but chooses not to,
    its silence is controlling,” and that “when Congress uses different language in
    similar sections, it intends different meanings” (citations omitted)). 22
    * * *
    Together, these textual and contextual considerations lead us to conclude
    that, on balance, the CVRA is best interpreted to apply only after the
    commencement of criminal proceedings. Although not precisely on point, we find
    resonance in much of what the Supreme Court recently said in Lagos v. United
    22
    One might reasonably ask why petitioner here didn’t proceed under the VRRA, some of whose
    provisions (unlike, we conclude, the CVRA’s) clearly apply before the initiation of criminal
    proceedings—and which, therefore, the government here may well have violated. The answer,
    in short, is that the VRRA provides no mechanism for judicial enforcement whatsoever—not
    even the limited “motion”-based remedy that the CVRA authorizes. See 
    34 U.S.C. § 20141
    (d)
    (“This section does not create a cause of action or defense in favor of any person arising out of
    the failure of a responsible person to provide information as required . . . .”). So, while (on our
    reading, anyway) the rights available under the VRRA are more broadly applicable than those
    under the CVRA, they are not judicially enforceable—and thus, as we will explain shortly, don’t
    give rise to the practical concerns that a pre-charge application of CVRA rights would.
    40
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    States, 
    138 S. Ct. 1684
     (2018), which concerned another federal victims’-rights
    statute, the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. In particular, the Court there
    addressed a portion of that statute requiring reimbursement of expenses that a
    crime victim “incurred during participation in the investigation or prosecution of
    the offense or attendance at proceedings related to the offense.” 18 U.S.C.
    § 3663A(b)(4). The question before the Court was whether that provision should
    be interpreted narrowly, to require reimbursement only of those expenses that a
    victim incurred during a government “investigation” and criminal “proceedings,”
    or more broadly, to include expenses incurred during any “investigation” and any
    case-related “proceedings.” Lagos, 
    138 S. Ct. at 1688
    .
    The Court unanimously adopted the narrower reading. In doing so, the
    Court readily acknowledged that there were “contrary arguments . . . favoring a
    broad interpretation”—in particular, that the more limited reading “will sometimes
    leave a victim without a restitution remedy sufficient to cover” some offense-
    related expenses and thereby contravene the Act’s “broad purpose.” 
    Id. at 1689
    .
    The Court further conceded that while it thought the statute’s “individual words
    suggest[ed]” a more “limited interpretation,” they “d[id] not demand” it. 
    Id. at 1688
    . Even so, the Court held that, understood in context—for instance, the fact
    that the terms “investigation” and “proceedings” were both linked to the word
    “prosecution”—the more limited reading was preferable from a textual and
    41
    Case: 19-13843    Date Filed: 04/14/2020    Page: 42 of 120
    structural standpoint. The Court also emphasized that “Congress ha[d] enacted
    many different restitution statutes with differing language, governing different
    circumstances,” and that while some of them contained provisions specifically
    requiring “full” restitution, the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act “contain[ed] no
    such language.” 
    Id.
     at 1689–90.
    The Court concluded its interpretive analysis this way: “[G]iven th[e]
    differences between the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act and other restitution
    statutes, we conclude that the considerations we have mentioned, particularly those
    based on a reading of the statute as a whole, tip the balance in favor of our more
    limited interpretation.” 
    Id. at 1690
    . Just so here. In light of CVRA’s text’s
    overarching focus on the period following the initiation of criminal proceedings,
    and the obvious differences between the CVRA and the VRRA—which by its
    terms plainly reaches into the pre-charge phase—we too conclude that the
    interpretive balance tips in favor of a more limited reading.
    C
    There is a final consideration here, and it is to our minds a weighty one. The
    CVRA’s final substantive provision—which Congress slotted in just before
    statutory definitions and a closing directive to the Attorney General to promulgate
    implementing regulations—states that “[n]othing in this chapter [i.e., the entirety
    of the Act] shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney
    42
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    General or any officer under his direction.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (d)(6). For reasons
    we will explain, we conclude that petitioner’s “constru[ction]” of the Act—as
    applying before the initiation of criminal proceedings—would indeed “impair . . .
    prosecutorial discretion.”
    Broadly defined, the term “prosecutorial discretion” refers to the soup-to-
    nuts entirety of “[a] prosecutor’s power to choose from the options available in a
    criminal case, such as filing charges, prosecuting, not prosecuting, plea-bargaining,
    and recommending a sentence to the court.” Black’s, supra, at 565. The core of
    prosecutorial discretion, though—its essence—is the decision whether or not to
    charge an individual with a criminal offense in the first place. The Supreme Court
    has repeatedly reaffirmed the principle—which dates back centuries—that “the
    Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide
    whether to prosecute a case.” United States v. Nixon, 
    418 U.S. 683
    , 693 (1974)
    (citing Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454 (1869)). 23
    23
    This prosecutorial discretion “flows not from a desire to give carte blanche to law enforcement
    officials but from recognition of the constitutional principle of separation of powers.” United
    States v. Ream, 
    491 F.2d 1243
    , 1246 n.2 (5th Cir. 1974). As we said in Ream—
    The discretionary power of the attorney for the United States in determining
    whether a prosecution shall be commenced or maintained may well depend upon
    matters of policy wholly apart from any question of probable cause. Although as
    a member of the bar, the attorney for the United States is an officer of the court,
    he is nevertheless an executive official of the Government, and it is as an officer
    of the executive department that he exercises a discretion as to whether or not
    there shall be a prosecution in a particular case. It follows, as an incident of the
    constitutional separation of powers, that the courts are not to interfere with the
    43
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    We believe that petitioner’s interpretation of the CVRA risks
    “impair[ing] . . . prosecutorial discretion” in at least two fundamental ways. As an
    initial matter, consider that the very first determination that a court must make
    when asked to enforce the CVRA is whether the party seeking the Act’s benefit is
    a “crime victim.” The reason is because the CVRA’s opening provision makes
    clear that the Act’s protections—the rights enumerated therein, already discussed
    at some length—are available only to “crime victim[s].” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (a) (“A
    crime victim has the following rights . . . .”). Notably for our purposes, the CVRA
    statutorily defines the term “crime victim” to mean “a person directly and
    proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense.” 
    Id.
    § 3771(e)(2).
    Accordingly, any movant asserting rights under the CVRA must, at the very
    outset, demonstrate to the district court that he or she is a “crime victim” entitled to
    statutory protection. And, given the statutory definition’s terms, in order to
    determine whether the movant has made the requisite showing, the court must
    decide whether a “Federal offense” has occurred. When a prosecutor has already
    free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United States in
    their control over criminal prosecutions.
    Id. (quoting United States v. Cox, 
    342 F.2d 167
    , 171 (5th Cir. 1965)); accord, e.g., Heckler v.
    Chaney, 
    470 U.S. 821
    , 832 (1985) (“[T]he decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not
    to indict . . . has long been regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as
    it is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully
    executed.’”).
    44
    Case: 19-13843     Date Filed: 04/14/2020   Page: 45 of 120
    commenced criminal proceedings against an identifiable individual for a specific
    crime, he or she has made at least a presumptive determination that the individual
    has in fact committed a “Federal offense.” So, as applied post-charge—in the
    context of ongoing criminal proceedings—the “crime victim” determination is
    straightforward: An individual who has been “directly and proximately harmed” as
    a result of the conduct charged by the government is entitled to CVRA protection.
    Not so before the commencement of criminal proceedings. In that
    circumstance, if a movant were to assert CVRA rights as a “crime victim,” the
    court would first have to determine—but this time without any initial
    determination by the government in the form of a charging decision and, indeed,
    presumably while the government’s investigation is ongoing—whether or not a
    “Federal offense” has been committed. That scenario—which is a necessary
    consequence of petitioner’s interpretation—presents at least three intractable
    problems.
    First, and most obviously, petitioner’s reading puts the cart before the horse:
    When else, if ever, is a court called on to decide whether an “offense” (i.e., a
    crime) has occurred—as opposed to a moral wrong more generally—before the
    government has even decided to press charges? The answer, so far as we are
    aware, is never. Second, how, in the absence of a charging decision, would the
    court even go about ascertaining whether an “offense” had occurred? What would
    45
    Case: 19-13843    Date Filed: 04/14/2020   Page: 46 of 120
    that proceeding look like? A mini- (or perhaps a not-so-mini-) trial in which the
    court finds facts and makes legal determinations regarding an “offense” yet to be
    named? Finally, and in any event, it seems obvious to us that simply by
    conducting such a proceeding and by concluding (up front) that an “offense” has—
    or has not—occurred, the court would not only exert enormous pressure on the
    government’s charging decisions, but also likely impair the government’s ongoing
    investigation. The “impair[ment]” of prosecutorial discretion, we think, would be
    palpable.
    Separately, even if the threshold “crime victim” barrier could be overcome,
    the enforcement of CVRA rights in the pre-charge phase would risk unduly
    impairing prosecutorial discretion. Consider, as a general matter, how CVRA
    enforcement occurs. If, for instance, an individual claiming to be a covered victim
    believes—as did petitioner here—that the government hasn’t “confer[red]” with
    her in the manner prescribed by § 3771(a)(5) or “treated [her] with fairness” as
    required by § 3771(a)(8), then she will—as did petitioner here—ask a district court
    to “order” prosecutors to confer and to treat her “fair[ly].” See Emergency Pet. at
    2. Even in the post-charge phase, those are pretty extraordinary requests. It is no
    small thing to ask a judge to issue an injunction ordering the government’s lawyers
    (presumably on pain of contempt) to conduct their prosecution of a particular
    matter in a particular manner. But at least after the commencement of criminal
    46
    Case: 19-13843     Date Filed: 04/14/2020   Page: 47 of 120
    proceedings—and accordingly after the government has submitted itself and its
    case to the district court’s jurisdiction and supervision—the CVRA explicitly
    authorizes the court’s intervention. Congress made a clear determination that the
    intrusion was necessary and appropriate.
    Before the commencement of criminal proceedings, though, the intrusion
    would be significantly greater, both quantitatively and qualitatively. As a
    quantitative matter, petitioner’s interpretation—pursuant to which the CVRA’s
    protections would extend into the “detection” and “investigation” phases—risks
    greatly multiplying the sheer number of opportunities for judicial intervention in
    law-enforcement and prosecutorial affairs. Freed from any line limiting the Act’s
    applicability to the post-charge phases of a prosecution, courts would be
    empowered to issue injunctions requiring (for instance) consultation with victims
    before raids, warrant applications, arrests, witness interviews, lineups, and
    interrogations. That would work an extraordinary expansion of an already-
    extraordinary statute.
    The intrusion occasioned by a pre-charge interpretation of the CVRA would
    also be qualitatively different. The commencement of criminal proceedings marks
    a sensible boundary on the prosecutorial-discretion spectrum. As already
    explained, before charges are filed—when the government is still in the process of
    investigating and deciding “whether to prosecute”—its authority and discretion are
    47
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    understood to “exclusive” and “absolute.” Nixon, 
    418 U.S. at 693
    . By contrast,
    once the charging decision is made, the prosecutor steps into the court’s
    jurisdiction—its “house,” to speak—and thus necessarily cedes some of her control
    of the course and management of the case. From that point forward, the court will
    “assume a more active role in administering adjudication of a defendant’s guilt and
    determining the appropriate sentence.” United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 
    818 F.3d 733
    , 737 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Interpreting the CVRA to apply post-charge—as
    its terms plainly permit—thus squares with the background expectation of judicial
    involvement. Interpreting the Act to apply pre-charge, by contrast, contravenes the
    background expectation of executive exclusivity. 24
    * * *
    For reasons we have explained, we conclude that the CVRA is best
    understood—in accordance with its terms and the context in which it was
    24
    For at least two reasons, it is no answer to say, as the district court did, that the CVRA would
    entitle movants only to a “voice” in a prosecutor’s pre-charge decisionmaking process, not a
    “veto” over the decisions themselves—or, as the dissent does, that “nothing in the CVRA
    empowers crime victims to force a prosecutor to prosecute.” Dissenting Op. at 63. First, giving
    movants even a guaranteed right under § 3771(a)(5) to “confer” with government actors before
    detection- and investigation-phase activities like raids, warrant applications, and interrogations
    could severely impact law-enforcement and prosecutorial decisionmaking. Second, there is
    essentially no limit to the sorts of pre-charge relief that an enterprising movant could seek—or
    that an innovative judge might grant—under § 3771(a)(8)’s fair-treatment provision. While
    perhaps not likely, it is not outside the realm of possibility that an alleged victim might argue—
    or that a district court might conclude—that the only “fair” thing to do in a particular
    circumstance would be to require the government to indict a suspect, or to charge him in a
    particular manner.
    48
    Case: 19-13843        Date Filed: 04/14/2020       Page: 49 of 120
    enacted—to apply only after the initiation of criminal proceedings. To the extent
    the Act’s language and structure leave any doubt about its proper scope, we must
    assume that Congress “acted against the backdrop of long-settled understandings
    about the independence of the Executive with regard to charging decisions.”
    Fokker Servs., 818 F.3d at 738. Had Congress intended to upend (rather than
    reinforce) those “long-settled understandings,” we can only assume it would have
    expressed itself more clearly. See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-
    Free Trust, 
    136 S. Ct. 1938
    , 1947 (2016) (“Congress ‘does not, one might say,
    hide elephants in mouseholes.’” (quoting Whitman v. American Trucking Assns.,
    Inc., 
    531 U.S. 457
    , 468 (2001))).25
    25
    The dissent relies heavily on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in In re Dean, 
    527 F.3d 391
     (5th Cir.
    2008), which it says “held” that “[t]here are clearly rights under the CVRA that apply before any
    prosecution is underway.” Dissenting Op. at 103 (quoting Dean, 
    527 F.3d at 394
    ). To the extent
    that Dean is properly read to “h[o]ld” that CVRA rights apply before the commencement of
    criminal proceedings—which we doubt, for reasons we will explain—we disagree with and
    decline to follow it. In that case, following an explosion at an oil refinery that killed 15 people
    and injured more than 170, the Department of Justice considered prosecuting the owner. Before
    bringing any charges, though, prosecutors filed an ex parte motion in the district court (1)
    alerting the court that a plea agreement was forthcoming and (2) asking the court’s permission to
    delay notifying known victims until after the agreement was executed, for fear that pre-plea
    notification would be impracticable and could jeopardize the plea-negotiation process. The
    district court agreed, the plea agreement was signed, and the victims were notified thereafter.
    Several victims subsequently moved to appear and urged the district court to reject the plea
    agreement on the ground that, by maintaining secrecy, prosecutors (and the court) had violated
    their CVRA-based “reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (a)(5). When the district court refused to reject the plea agreement, the victims sought
    mandamus relief from the court of appeals.
    Although the Fifth Circuit ultimately declined to issue the writ, it observed—in what,
    given its ultimate disposition, was technically dictum—that the district court had violated the
    CVRA by acceding to the government’s request that victims not be notified in advance of the
    plea deal. In so doing, it noted the district court’s “acknowledg[ment]” that “[t]here are clearly
    49
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    V
    For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the CVRA does not apply before the
    commencement of criminal proceedings—and thus, on the facts of this case, does
    not provide the petitioner here any judicially enforceable rights.
    Having so held, two final words.
    First, regarding the dissent: Although we have endeavored along the way to
    meet a few of the dissent’s specific critiques, we must offer here two more global
    responses. As an initial matter, with respect to the dissent’s charge (Dissenting
    Op. at 65) that we have “dresse[d] up” what it calls a “flawed statutory analysis”
    with “rhetorical flourish”—well, readers can judge for themselves whose rhetoric
    is in fact more florid. See, e.g., id. at 61 (“So how does the Majority bail the U.S.
    Attorney’s Office out of its egregious CVRA violations . . . ?”); id. at 94 (“So how
    rights under the CVRA that apply before any prosecution is underway.” 
    527 F.3d at 394
    .
    “Logically,” the court of appeals said, “this includes the CVRA’s establishment of victims’
    ‘reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (a)(5)). Thus, the Fifth Circuit noted, “[a]t least in the posture of this case (and we do not
    speculate on the applicability to other situations), the government should have fashioned a
    reasonable way to inform the victims of the likelihood of criminal charges and to ascertain the
    victims’ views on the possible details of a plea bargain.” 
    Id.
    We decline to follow Dean’s dictum for several reasons. First, the Dean briefing reveals
    that the parties there didn’t even dispute whether the CVRA applies before the commencement
    of criminal proceedings; accordingly, the question that this case so clearly tees up was never
    subjected to adversarial testing. Second, and perhaps relatedly, the Fifth Circuit’s three-sentence
    discussion—which does little more than echo the district court’s own “acknowledg[ment]”—is
    devoid of any analysis of the CVRA’s text, history, or structural underpinnings. Finally, even
    read for all it might be worth, the Fifth Circuit’s observation that the CVRA applied pre-charge
    in the circumstances before the court there was—for reasons we have explained at length and in
    detail, and with all due respect—simply incorrect.
    50
    Case: 19-13843      Date Filed: 04/14/2020     Page: 51 of 120
    in the holy name of plain text . . . ?”); 
    id.
     (“The Majority hacks away at the plain
    text with four tools.”); 
    id.
     (“The Majority cherry picks the meaning of
    ‘case’ . . . .”); id. at 96 (“Nonsense.”); id. at 98 (“As its third tool to axe the plain
    text . . . .”); id. (“Do not fall for this.”); id. 106 (accusing us of ruling “by judicial
    fiat”); id. at 109–10 (twice accusing us of fearing crime victims more than
    “wealthy defendants”).
    More substantively, it remains unclear to us exactly how the dissent thinks
    the CVRA should be interpreted and applied. It’s obvious that our dissenting
    colleague doesn’t particularly like our reading—namely, that CVRA rights don’t
    attach before the initiation of criminal proceedings. (Which is fine—as we’ve
    already confessed, we don’t particularly like it either.) But she offers no
    intelligible alternative of her own. At times, the dissent suggests—broadly, but
    without elaboration—that the Act should be construed to apply “pre-charge.” See
    Dissenting Op. at 67, 90, 95 n.19, 96–97, 104, 106, 109, 112. That reading (while
    we think wrong) at least has the benefit of coherence and clarity. But the dissent
    (we think wisely) doesn’t seem eager to defend so sweeping an interpretation,
    presumably because it has no logical stopping point. Instead, the dissent hints—
    although again, without any real explanation—that CVRA rights should be
    understood to apply only (or at least?) “once the criminal case has matured to plea
    51
    Case: 19-13843         Date Filed: 04/14/2020         Page: 52 of 120
    negotiations.” Id. at 96.26 Where, though—or as our dissenting colleague would
    say, where “in the holy name of plain text”—does that limiting criterion come
    from? As best we can tell, it is devised specifically to capture this case without
    risking a landslide. For reasons we have explained in detail, we believe that the
    CVRA is most properly (if imperfectly) read to apply only after the
    commencement of criminal proceedings. One thing of which we are certain: That
    interpretation is far superior to the dissent’s good-for-this-train-only, once-the-
    investigation-has-matured reading—which, so far as we can tell, has no
    meaningful footing in the Act’s text, history, or structure.
    Second, and far more importantly, regarding the consequences of our
    interpretation: It isn’t lost on us that our decision leaves petitioner and others like
    her largely emptyhanded, and we sincerely regret that. Under our reading, the
    CVRA will not prevent federal prosecutors from negotiating “secret” plea and non-
    prosecution agreements, without ever notifying or conferring with victims,
    provided that they do so before instituting criminal proceedings. We can only
    26
    Accord, e.g., id. at 66–67 (insisting that “[t]his case is not about the start or middle stages of a
    criminal investigation” but, rather, “a completed investigation” and prosecutors’ preliminary
    “deci[sion] to proceed with an indictment”); id. at 69 (“The prosecutors were prepared to indict
    Epstein.”); id. at 70 (“[P]rosecutors were recommending and ready to proceed with the federal
    indictment of Epstein.”); id. at 97 (asserting that the right to confer attaches “[o]nce an
    investigation is completed, the case has matured to the indictment-drafting stage and pre-charge
    plea negotiations with defense counsel have begun”); id. at 111 (contending that prosecutors had
    an obligation to confer here “given the investigation was completed, the 53-page indictment was
    drafted, and the prosecutor[s were] already conducting pre-charge plea negotiations with
    Epstein’s defense team”).
    52
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    hope that in light of the protections provided by other statutes—and even more so
    in the wake of the public outcry over federal prosecutors’ handling of the Epstein
    case—they will not do so.
    The question before us, though, isn’t whether prosecutors should have
    consulted with petitioner (and other victims) before negotiating and executing
    Epstein’s NPA. It seems obvious to us—and, indeed, the government has
    expressly conceded—that they should have. Our sole charge is to determine, on
    the facts before us, whether the CVRA obligated prosecutors to do so. We simply
    cannot say that it did.
    PETITION DENIED.
    53
    Case: 19-13843       Date Filed: 04/14/2020        Page: 54 of 120
    TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge, concurring:
    I concur without reservation in Judge Newsom’s opinion for the Court. I
    write separately because the model the dissent creates, in which a victim is
    permitted to sue the United States Attorney 1 for refusing to confer about a criminal
    matter prior to indictment, would, in operation, result in Judicial Branch
    interference with the Executive Branch’s function of investigating and prosecuting
    federal crimes. Such a model raises serious questions about whether, by doing so,
    the judiciary would be violating the constitutional principle of separation of
    powers.2
    There can be no doubt that the Executive Branch has exclusive power over
    prosecutorial decisions. See United States v. Nixon, 
    418 U.S. 683
    , 693, 
    94 S. Ct. 3090
    , 3100 (1974) (“[T]he Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute
    discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case . . . .”); Confiscation Cases, 
    74 U.S. 454
    , 457 (1868) (“Public prosecutions, until they come before the court to
    which they are returnable, are within the exclusive direction of the district
    attorney . . . .”); Heckler v. Chaney, 
    470 U.S. 821
    , 832, 
    105 S. Ct. 1649
    , 1656
    1
    I refer to the U.S. Attorney here and throughout this opinion for ease of analysis. Of
    course, in the typical case, the victim would sue the specific attorney in charge of the criminal
    investigation.
    2
    This case presents an atypical CVRA scenario. In the ensuing discussion, I explain how
    the dissent’s interpretation of the statute would likely be applied in a typical case, in which the
    U.S. Attorney’s Office is considering whether to impanel a grand jury to hear evidence
    indicating that an individual may have committed a criminal offense against another individual
    and caused the latter to suffer an injury.
    54
    Case: 19-13843       Date Filed: 04/14/2020        Page: 55 of 120
    (1985) (“[T]he decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict . . .
    has long been regarded as [within] the special province of the Executive Branch,
    inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to ‘take Care
    that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” (quoting U.S. Const., Art. II, § 3)). This
    Executive Branch authority obviously includes the decision to investigate
    suspected criminal activity and whether to seek, or not seek, an indictment from
    the grand jury. These pre-charge decisions are the focus of this case.
    The dissent interprets the CVRA as authorizing a victim to bring a U.S.
    Attorney to court for refusing to confer with her about a matter under criminal
    investigation. To illustrate what would likely occur if we permitted the victim to
    do that—i.e., to envision how the dissent’s interpretation of the CVRA would
    operate in practice—consider a simple case of mail fraud.
    Jane Doe is the victim of a fraudulent scheme. She finds out that the U.S.
    Attorney’s Office is investigating the scheme and wants to discuss it with the
    attorney handling the investigation. The attorney refuses her request, so she sues
    him. Applying the dissent’s interpretation, the district court finds that the attorney
    violated the CVRA by failing to confer with the victim. The court issues an
    injunction requiring the attorney to confer with Doe and to treat her fairly.3 Even
    3
    Another problem with the dissent’s interpretation is that such an injunction could not be
    crafted in compliance with Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under that rule, the
    55
    Case: 19-13843        Date Filed: 04/14/2020       Page: 56 of 120
    if the court could craft such an injunction to comply with Rule 65 of the Federal
    Rules of Civil Procedure, which I doubt, the court would then be continually
    involved in the criminal investigation from the moment it issued the injunction. At
    any moment during the inevitable twists and turns of a pre-indictment criminal
    investigation, the victim could allege that the attorney had violated the injunction,
    and the attorney would be back in front of the district court to show cause why he
    should not be held in contempt. 4 But the event most likely to trigger such a
    hearing is the attorney’s decision not to take the case to the grand jury, and that
    decision is completely within the Executive Branch’s prosecutorial discretion.
    Therefore, applying the dissent’s interpretation of the CVRA would clearly
    interfere with the Executive Branch’s investigative and prosecutorial functions.
    order must be “specific” and “describe in reasonable detail . . . the act . . . required.” Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(b)–(c). These requirements serve three purposes.
    First, they provide notice to the enjoined party of precisely what it must do to avoid being
    held in contempt—the party cannot be left guessing. Second, a specific and reasonably detailed
    order is easy to enforce, while a vague order is not. Third, an injunction that does not meet these
    requirements breeds disrespect for the courts and the rule of law.
    In cases like this one, an injunction requiring the attorney to confer with the victim and
    treat her fairly could not meet Rule 65’s requirements. In my hypothetical, “conferral” and
    “fairness” likely would mean different things to the attorney and Doe, meaning the parties would
    be left guessing about what the injunction required. Therefore, such an injunction would not
    comply with Rule 65. To make matters worse, failure to comply with Rule 65 would exacerbate
    the problem discussed below—specifically, excessive judicial interference with an ongoing
    investigation—because the district court would frequently need to oversee disputes about
    whether the attorney’s handling of the investigation was violating the inherently vague
    injunction.
    4
    Moreover, and perhaps worst of all, there is nothing stopping a victim from challenging
    the attorney’s decisions at multiple steps along the way. Once the district court is involved, a
    victim could allege that the attorney did not confer with her, or did not treat her fairly, whenever
    he makes each new investigatory or prosecutorial decision.
    56
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    Having explored the consequences of the dissent’s interpretation of the
    CVRA, it is clear that such an interpretation cannot be accepted. The notion that a
    district court could have any input on a U.S. Attorney’s investigation and decision
    whether to bring a case to the grand jury is entirely incompatible with the
    constitutional assignment to the Executive Branch of exclusive power over
    prosecutorial decisions. Additionally, it is hard to imagine a bigger intrusion on
    executive autonomy than the possibility that a U.S. Attorney will be held in
    contempt for violating an injunction if her investigation is not handled as the
    victim and district court see fit. Therefore, the dissent’s interpretation raises
    serious constitutional issues by concluding that there are no temporal limitations on
    the CVRA rights to confer with, and to be treated fairly by, the U.S. Attorney. 5
    In contrast, under Judge Newsom’s interpretation, this problem does not
    exist because the CVRA only gives victim’s post-charge rights. And, post-charge,
    the district court is not dragging the U.S. Attorney into court against his will and
    5
    The dissenting opinion asserts that it “in no way injects judicial interference into a
    prosecutor’s decisions” because “[t]he fact that a prosecutor must confer with a victim pre-
    charge does not mean the district court can exercise any control over the prosecutor’s ultimate
    decision whether to indict.” Dis. Op. at 113. But this is clearly wrong based on the facts of this
    case—prosecutors chose to enter an NPA with Epstein, and the victim wants the Court to undo
    that agreement. My dissenting colleague would likely argue that, because the U.S. Attorney
    could re-enter an NPA with Epstein’s co-conspirators after conferring with victims, forcing the
    U.S. Attorney to confer would not invade the executive’s prosecutorial discretion. This riposte
    overlooks the reality that exclusive discretion does not come with caveats. In other words,
    imposing the dissent’s conditions that the executive must satisfy before it can exercise its
    prosecutorial discretion means that it does not truly have exclusive discretion.
    57
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    imposing a condition upon his prosecutorial discretion—the attorney is voluntarily
    before the court, and it is appropriate for the court, in its active role in the criminal
    proceedings, to examine the attorney’s failure to comply with his CVRA
    obligations. In such circumstances, there is no concern about the separation of
    powers because the court is not meddling in the Executive Branch’s decisions until
    executive officers have chosen to present themselves to the court.
    In sum, the dissent’s interpretation creates serious constitutional concerns
    that Judge Newsom’s interpretation does not. And it is “settled policy” that, when
    confronted with two potential interpretations of a statute, we should avoid the
    interpretation that “engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative
    interpretation poses no constitutional question.” See Gomez v. United States, 
    490 U.S. 858
    , 864, 
    109 S. Ct. 2237
    , 2241 (1989). Therefore, Judge Newsom’s
    interpretation should be adopted. This conclusion is bolstered by the language of
    the statute, itself, which explicitly states that none of the CVRA’s provisions
    should be read to diminish prosecutorial discretion: “Nothing in this chapter shall
    be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any
    officer under his direction.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (d)(6). Clearly, the author of the
    58
    Case: 19-13843        Date Filed: 04/14/2020       Page: 59 of 120
    statute—Congress—recognized the need to avoid any construction that results in
    the problem that the dissent’s approach creates. 6
    For all of the reasons set forth in Judge Newsom’s opinion, and because
    such an interpretation avoids raising serious constitutional questions, the CVRA is
    best understood as not applying until charges are commenced against a defendant.
    6
    Putting aside the separation of powers problem, under the dissent’s approach, the
    judiciary, based on Congressional authority in the form of a statute, appears to be putting its
    thumb on the scale against the individuals being investigated by law enforcement. In a sense, the
    judiciary is telling the executive that it had better indict its suspects or potentially face a CVRA
    action. But the only time that it is appropriate for the judiciary to do so, based on Congressional
    authority, is during criminal sentencing, where sufficient due process safeguards are in place to
    protect the accused’s constitutional rights. Because such safeguards are obviously not in place
    pre-charge, this effect of the dissent’s interpretation is another reason not to adopt it.
    59
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    HULL, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
    This appeal presents legal questions of first impression in this Circuit
    regarding the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”), 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    , which
    grants a statutory “bill of rights” to crime victims. In my view, the Majority
    patently errs in holding, as a matter of law, that the crime victims of Jeffrey
    Epstein and his co-conspirators had no statutory rights whatsoever under the
    CVRA. Instead, our Court should enforce the plain and unambiguous text of the
    CVRA and hold that the victims had two CVRA rights—the right to confer with
    the government’s attorney and the right to be treated fairly—that were repeatedly
    violated by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of Florida. 1
    Here, the U.S. Attorney’s Office (1) drafted a 53-page indictment against
    sex trafficker and child abuser Epstein and (2) repeatedly wrote his defense team
    that the government had proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he victimized more
    than 30 women as minors. Shockingly though, the Office then (1) conducted many
    days of extensive plea negotiations with Epstein’s attorneys and secretly entered
    into a Non-Prosecution Agreement (“NPA”), granting Epstein federal immunity in
    return for his plea to two state prostitution-solicitation charges, (2) never conferred
    one minute with the victims about the NPA or told the victims that such an
    1
    Federal prosecutors located in the U.S. Attorney’s Offices in both West Palm Beach and
    Miami handled Epstein’s case. I will refer to those offices collectively as “the U.S. Attorney’s
    Office” or “the Office.”
    60
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    agreement was under consideration, (3) worked closely with Epstein’s lawyers to
    keep the NPA’s existence and terms hidden from the victims, (4) actively
    misrepresented to the victims that the criminal investigation continued when the
    NPA was already signed, and (5) never informed the victims about the NPA until
    after Epstein pled guilty in State Court and the secret sweetheart deal was done.
    Remarkably too, without notice and conferral with the victims, the NPA
    granted federal immunity not only to Epstein, but also to “any potential co-
    conspirator of Epstein, including but not limited to Sarah Kellen, Adriana Ross,
    Lesley Groff, or Nadia Marcinkova.” It is only because the victims filed this
    lawsuit, and the District Court ordered the NPA be produced, that the victims and
    the public learned the truth about the plea negotiations and the NPA’s grant of
    federal immunity to Epstein and his co-conspirators.
    So how does the Majority bail the U.S. Attorney’s Office out of its egregious
    CVRA violations and reverse the District Court’s ruling? The Majority holds that
    Epstein’s crime victims had no CVRA rights at all because the plea negotiations
    with Epstein’s defense counsel were conducted “pre-charge” and the Office never
    filed the indictment and commenced court proceedings. That is to say, the
    Majority crafts a bright-line, blanket restriction on the statute: the CVRA grants
    crime victims no rights whatsoever unless and until a formal indictment is filed in
    a court. See Maj. Op. at 2.
    61
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    The Majority concludes “the CVRA was never triggered” at all, even though
    the U.S. Attorney’s Office prepared a 53-page indictment against Epstein but later
    secretly entered into a plea deal, granting federal immunity to Epstein and his co-
    conspirators. 
    Id.
     According to the Majority, because the Office cleverly entered
    into a sweetheart plea deal with Epstein “pre-charge” and never filed the
    indictment, the victims never had any CVRA rights in the first place. Id. at 2, 18-
    19.2
    I dissent because the plain and unambiguous text of the CVRA does not
    include this post-indictment temporal restriction that the Majority adds to the
    statute. Although, as I discuss later, the two rights provisions at issue include other
    limiting principles, there is no textual basis for the bright-line, post-indictment only
    restriction the Majority adds to the statute. Rather, the Majority’s contorted
    statutory interpretation materially revises the statute’s plain text and guts victims’
    rights under the CVRA. Nothing, and I mean nothing, in the CVRA’s plain text
    requires the Majority’s result.
    See for yourself. The CVRA grants “crime victims” these two unambiguous
    rights in subsection (a):
    2
    The Majority holds that “the rights under the Act do not attach until criminal
    proceedings have been initiated against a defendant, either by complaint, information, or
    indictment.” See Maj. Op. at 2. But for ease of reference in my dissent, I collectively refer to
    the initiation of criminal proceedings as by “filing an indictment” because most prosecutions
    begin that way. In contrast, a “complaint” can initiate only misdemeanor prosecutions and an
    “information” can initiate felony charges only if the defendant waives grand jury presentment.
    62
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    (a) Rights of crime victims.—A crime victim has the following rights:
    ....
    (5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government
    in the case.
    ....
    (8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s
    dignity and privacy.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (a)(5), (8). The text does not contain the Majority’s post-
    indictment temporal restriction. Simply put, crime victims do not have to wait for
    the government to file a formal indictment and commence court proceedings
    before having these CVRA rights.
    In fact, the CVRA’s venue provision in § 3771(d) expressly provides that,
    “if no prosecution is underway,” the victims can file suit to assert their
    subsection (a) rights “in the district court in the district in which the crime
    occurred.” Id. § 3771(d)(1), (3). In filing this lawsuit back in 2008, the petitioner
    crime victims did what the CVRA expressly authorized them to do.
    To be clear, nothing in the CVRA empowers crime victims to force a
    prosecutor to prosecute. See id. § 3771(d)(6). As the Concurring Opinion well
    points out, the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion
    over prosecutorial decisions and whether to seek indictment or not. Conc. Op. at
    54-55. But what the CVRA does do is grant victims a statutory right to have an
    opportunity to speak to the prosecutor before the prosecutor makes that decision.
    In § 3771(c), the CVRA even mandates that the U.S. Attorney’s prosecutors, while
    63
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    “engaged in the . . . investigation[] or prosecution of crime shall make their best
    efforts” to accord victims these statutory rights in subsection (a). Id. § 3771(c)(1).
    After conferral, the prosecutor has the exclusive authority and discretion whether
    to indict or not. Pre-charge, the Office spent days conferring and negotiating with
    Epstein’s defense team, but had not a minute for the victims.
    Unlike the Majority, I agree with the Fifth Circuit that crime victims have a
    CVRA right to confer with the government attorney, even if a plea deal is struck
    before any formal indictment is filed. See In re Dean, 
    527 F.3d 391
    , 394 (5th Cir.
    2008). As the Fifth Circuit emphasized: “In passing the Act, Congress made the
    policy decision—which we are bound to enforce—that the victims have a right to
    inform the plea negotiations process by conferring with prosecutors before a plea
    agreement is reached.” 
    Id. at 395
    .
    What’s worse is that the Majority concedes, as it must, that § 3771(a)(5)’s
    conferral right and § 3771(a)(8)’s right to be treated with fairness have no temporal
    limitation on their face and that petitioners are “not without [their] own textual
    arguments.” Maj. Op. at 20, 25, 29. The Majority admits: “The interpretation of
    the CVRA that petitioner advances, and that the district court adopted, is not
    implausible; the CVRA could be read to apply pre-charge.” Id. at 18. Yet, the
    Majority refuses to enforce the Act as written by Congress and grafts onto the plain
    and unambiguous text a restriction Congress never enacted.
    64
    Case: 19-13843     Date Filed: 04/14/2020   Page: 65 of 120
    The roadmap for my dissent follows. First, I recount more facts about the
    undisputed conduct of the U.S. Attorney’s Office. This includes how initially the
    Office wrote the victims, and later Epstein’s attorneys, that the victims had
    ongoing CVRA rights to confer and be treated fairly. Tellingly, it was not until the
    petitioner victims filed this lawsuit that the Office reversed course and took the
    stance that the victims never had any CVRA rights in the first place.
    Next, I examine the CVRA text and apply the relevant canons of statutory
    interpretation. Then, I show the flaws in the Majority’s statutory analysis. In one
    breath, the Majority urges Congress to fill the gap left by (the Majority’s reading
    of) the CVRA and in the next tells us why granting victims two CVRA rights “pre-
    charge” would be a bad idea.
    Given this is a plain-text case, the Majority curiously carries on at length
    about slippery slopes and bad policy implications that the Majority says counsel
    against enforcing any victim rights “pre-charge.” Yet, since the Fifth Circuit’s
    2008 decision and the District Court’s 2011 decision, there has been no flood of
    civil suits by victims, no evidence of victims’ abuse of their CVRA rights, and no
    prosecutors’ complaints about impairment of their prosecutorial discretion.
    The Majority also dresses up its flawed statutory analysis with rhetorical
    flourish, using language like “scandalous,” “national disgrace,” and “the sad details
    of this shameful story,” while also expressing sincere empathy for the victims:
    65
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    “Despite our sympathy for Ms. Wild and others like her, who suffered unspeakable
    horror at Epstein’s hands, only to be left in the dark—and, so it seems,
    affirmatively misled—by government lawyers, we find ourselves constrained to
    deny her petition.” Maj. Op. at 2, 6. The Majority confesses that “[i]t isn’t lost on
    us that our decision leaves petitioner and others like her largely emptyhanded” and
    “we sincerely regret that.” Id. at 52. In addition to ruminating in sincere regret
    and sympathy, we, as federal judges, should also enforce the plain text of the
    CVRA—which we are bound to do—and ensure that these crime victims have the
    CVRA rights that Congress has granted them.
    Next, I address the constitutional concerns about the CVRA raised in the
    Concurring Opinion, although that, so far, has not been the issue in this appeal.
    Lastly, I address the remedy and why, due to the U.S. Attorney’s Office’s
    egregious violations of the victims’ rights, this Court should remand the case to the
    District Court for consideration of the victims’ requested remedies.
    I. PROSECUTORS ADVISE VICTIMS HAVE CVRA RIGHTS
    This case is not about the start or middle stages of a criminal investigation.
    Rather, as detailed below, this case is about (1) a completed investigation of
    federal sex-trafficking crimes against minor girls and (2) the U.S. Attorney’s
    Office’s repeated communications that it (a) had “proof beyond a reasonable
    doubt” that over 30 minor girls were victims of Epstein’s criminal sexual conduct
    66
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    and (b) had “decided to proceed with [Epstein’s] indictment.” Let’s start with the
    investigation and how the Office in 2006 wrote the victims that they did have
    CVRA rights pre-charge.
    A. 2005 – 2007 Criminal Investigation
    In 2005, the parents of a 14-year-old girl reported to the Palm Beach Police
    Department that Jeffrey Epstein sexually abused their daughter. This report began
    the investigation into the then 52-year-old billionaire Jeffrey Epstein—an
    investigation that ultimately revealed that Epstein assembled a network of
    underage girls whom he sexually abused at his mansion in Palm Beach, Florida,
    elsewhere in the United States, and overseas.
    In 2006, at the Palm Beach Police Department’s request, the Federal Bureau
    of Investigation (“FBI”) opened a federal investigation into Epstein’s and his
    personal assistants’ use of facilities of interstate commerce to induce girls between
    the ages of 14 and 17 to engage in illegal sexual activities. Thereafter, the U.S.
    Attorney’s Office accepted the case for prosecution and assigned specific federal
    prosecutors to the case.
    The FBI established that Epstein used young female recruiters and paid
    employees to find and bring minor girls to him, as often as three times a day, for
    his own and others’ sexual gratification. Epstein also directed other people to
    sexually abuse the minor girls, including his co-conspirator Nadia Marcinkova.
    67
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    This in-depth federal investigation proved that, between 2001 and 2007, Epstein
    sexually abused more than 30 minor girls, and multiple co-conspirators either
    procured the girls for Epstein’s sexual gratification or participated in the sexual
    abuse themselves. The victims include the petitioners in this case, Jane Doe 1 and
    Jane Doe 2, who were 15 years old when first sexually abused by Epstein.
    B. Aug. 2006 Letter to Crime Victim about CVRA Rights
    Throughout the two-year investigation, once a victim of Epstein’s sexual
    abuse was identified, the lead Assistant U.S. Attorney (“AUSA”) assigned to the
    case, A. Marie Villafana, sent a letter telling the victim that she was protected by
    the CVRA and explaining her statutory rights under the CVRA.
    For example, in 2006 and before an indictment was drafted in 2007, the U.S.
    Attorney’s Office told petitioner Jane Doe 2 in a letter that she had statutory rights
    “to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case,” “to be treated with
    fairness,” and to petition the District Court if her CVRA rights were being violated.
    See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (a), (d)(3). The Office’s 2006 letter explained that the
    Department of Justice would make its “best efforts” to ensure Jane Doe 2’s CVRA
    rights were protected. Later, in March 2007, the Office began sending similar
    letters to Epstein’s other victims, informing them of their ongoing CVRA rights.
    This initial position of the U.S. Attorney’s Office—that the petitioners had
    ongoing CVRA rights—is not surprising given that the CVRA was enacted to
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    protect crime victims’ rights and ensure their involvement in the criminal justice
    process. United States v. Moussaoui, 
    483 F.3d 220
    , 234 (4th Cir. 2007); Kenna v.
    U.S. Dist. Court, 
    435 F.3d 1011
    , 1016 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The [CVRA] was enacted
    to make crime victims full participants in the criminal justice system.”).
    II. MAY 2007: FEDERAL INDICTMENT PREPARED
    By May 2007, the U.S. Attorney’s Office had completed an 82-page
    prosecution memo and a 53-page draft indictment against Epstein, charging him
    with numerous federal crimes of sex trafficking minor victims. The prosecutors
    were prepared to indict Epstein. For the victims, so far, so good. But what the
    victims didn’t know is what was secretly going on behind the scenes.
    III. JAN. – SEPT. 2007: PROSECUTORS NEGOTIATE WITH EPSTEIN
    Meanwhile and unbeknownst to the victims, for over nine months in 2007
    (from January to September), the U.S. Attorney’s Office was discussing with
    Epstein’s defense team the forthcoming federal criminal charges. During this time,
    Epstein’s defense team made multiple presentations to the Office to try to convince
    them not to prosecute Epstein, maintaining he committed no federal crimes.3
    3
    Jeffrey Epstein’s defense team included at various times attorneys from multiple law
    firms, such as: (1) Jay P. Lefkowitz, Kirkland & Ellis, New York, NY; (2) Roy Black, Black
    Srebnick Kornspan & Stumpf, Miami, FL; (3) Gerald B. Lefcourt, Law Office of Gerald B.
    Lefcourt, P.C., New York, NY (4) Lilly Ann Sanchez, Fowler White Burnett, Miami, FL;
    (5) Jack A. Goldberger, Goldberger & Weiss, West Palm Beach, FL; and (6) Joe D. Whitley,
    Alston & Bird, Washington D.C.; as well as Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz. While not
    all attorneys participated in each defense presentation, the record here reveals some activity by
    each of Epstein’s defense attorneys during either 2007 or 2008.
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    Those defense presentations were not successful. The record contains extensive
    communications showing that, as of August 2007, the Office’s prosecutors were
    recommending and ready to proceed with the federal indictment of Epstein.
    In early September 2007, U.S. Attorney R. Alexander Acosta met with some
    of Epstein’s defense team, along with the federal prosecutors assigned to Epstein’s
    case and the Chief of the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section of the
    Department of Justice’s Criminal Division in Washington, D.C. Epstein’s defense
    team again raised federalism-based arguments that were rejected. As U.S.
    Attorney Acosta explained, “[a]fter considering the arguments raised at the
    September 7th meeting, and after conferring with the FBI and with [the Chief of
    the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section], our Office decided to proceed with
    the indictment.” At that time, the State of Florida had already charged Epstein
    with one count of solicitation of prostitution.
    IV. NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENT
    What happened next remains baffling, to put it mildly. During September
    2007, Epstein’s defense attorneys engaged in more intensive pre-indictment plea
    negotiations with the U.S. Attorney’s Office.
    Although the record does not explain why, the Office then took the position
    that two types of plea agreements could apply to Epstein’s federal crimes: (1) a
    plea agreement to federal charges; or (2) a non-prosecution agreement, whereby
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    the Office would agree not to federally prosecute Epstein and his co-conspirators,
    in return for which Epstein would plead guilty to a mere two state prostitution-
    solicitation charges and agree to an 18-month sentence in the county jail.
    On September 16, 2007, Epstein’s counsel Jay Lefkowitz sent the U.S.
    Attorney’s Office a proposed written agreement, wherein the Office would extend
    immunity from federal prosecution to Epstein and certain co-conspirators. 4 The
    next day, Epstein’s counsel Lefkowitz followed up, asking if the Office “intend[ed]
    to make the deferred prosecution agreement public,” should Epstein agree to “go
    that route.” AUSA Villafana responded: “A non-prosecution agreement would not
    be made public or filed with the Court, but it would remain part of our case file. It
    probably would be subject to a FOIA request, but it is not something that we would
    distribute without compulsory process.”
    The victims were not told that plea negotiations were ongoing, much less
    that the Office was seriously considering a non-prosecution agreement granting
    federal immunity to Epstein and his co-conspirators. Rather, the parties made
    great efforts to keep that secret from the victims and the public, too.
    4
    In an e-mail to Lefkowitz, dated September 16, 2007, AUSA Villafana suggested
    strategies to conceal portions of the plea deal from the courts, stating that a prosecutor had
    “recommended that some of the timing issues be addressed only in the state agreement, so that it
    isn’t obvious to the judge that we are trying to create federal jurisdiction for prison purposes.”
    AUSA Villafana added: “I will include our standard language regarding resolving all criminal
    liability and I will mention ‘co-conspirators,’ but I would prefer not to highlight for the judge all
    of the other crimes and all of the other persons that we could charge.”
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    A. Sept. 24, 2007: Execution and Terms of NPA
    On September 24, 2007, the U.S. Attorney’s Office and Jeffrey Epstein
    signed a seven-page agreement, entitled the “Non-Prosecution Agreement.”5 The
    NPA provided that the Office would not prosecute Epstein or his co-conspirators in
    the Southern District of Florida for federal felony crimes of sex trafficking more
    than 30 minors if: (1) Epstein pled guilty in Florida State Court to two state
    prostitution-solicitation charges, and (2) Epstein made a binding recommendation
    that the State Court impose an 18-month sentence in the county jail. The crimes
    listed in the NPA were: (1) sex trafficking of minors by force, fraud, or coercion,
    in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 1591
    (a)(1) and 2; (2) conspiracy to travel and traveling
    in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct with
    minor females, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2423
    (b), (e), and (f); and (3) conspiracy
    to use and using means of interstate commerce to knowingly persuade, induce, or
    entice minor females to engage in prostitution, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 2422
    (b)
    and 371.
    5
    The only four signature lines on the September 24, 2007 NPA were: (1) U.S. Attorney
    Acosta by AUSA Villafana; (2) Jeffrey Epstein; (3) Gerald Lefcourt, Counsel to Jeffrey Epstein;
    and (4) Lilly Ann Sanchez, Attorney for Jeffrey Epstein. From June 2005 to June 2009, Acosta
    was the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida.
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    As for the victims, the NPA added insult to injury. The NPA provided that
    if and only if the victims agreed to waive any other claim for damages, the victims
    could obtain an attorney paid for by Epstein and file 
    18 U.S.C. § 2255
     civil
    lawsuits against Epstein for restitution. Of course, restitution in a criminal case is
    not contingent upon a victim giving up rights to pursue damages claims.
    Even more striking, the NPA extended immunity to any “potential co-
    conspirator” of Epstein’s, stating: “In consideration of Epstein’s agreement to
    plead guilty and to provide compensation in the manner described above, . . . the
    United States also agrees that it will not institute any criminal charges against any
    potential co-conspirators of Epstein, including but not limited to Sarah Kellen,
    Adriana Ross, Lesley Groff, or Nadia Marcinkova.” 6 Apparently, the co-
    conspirators had not cooperated or assisted the government. Rather, the sole
    consideration for their federal immunity was that Epstein plead to two state
    charges and provide potential restitution to his victims, but only if the victims
    waived all damages claims against Epstein. The NPA even stated “that this
    agreement will not be made part of any public record.”7
    6
    At oral argument in this appeal, counsel for the respondent U.S. Attorney’s Office
    agreed that it was highly unusual—never seen before—that the government would extend federal
    immunity to Epstein’s co-conspirators without having the co-conspirators sign onto a plea
    agreement or provide some cooperation in exchange for federal immunity. The co-conspirators
    did not sign the NPA and were not listed as parties to it.
    7
    As the NPA was being signed, Epstein’s attorney Lefkowitz e-mailed AUSA Villafana,
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    B. Office Does Not Confer with Crime Victims
    Although the U.S. Attorney’s Office accepted the case for prosecution and
    prepared a 53-page indictment, the Office never conferred with the victims about
    the NPA and never told the victims that such an agreement was being considered,
    much less being negotiated. While the Office spent untold hours negotiating the
    NPA’s terms with Epstein’s skilled defense team, the Office never told the victims
    that it was negotiating and signing an agreement that would grant federal immunity
    to Epstein and his co-conspirators. The Office kept this information from
    Epstein’s victims, despite earlier having sent most, if not all, of the girls the CVRA
    letters, which advised that the victims had a “right to confer with the attorney for
    the United States in the case” and a “right to be treated with fairness.”
    V. SEPT. 2007 – JULY 2008: PROSECUTORS HIDE NPA
    The U.S. Attorney’s Office also failed to tell the victims about the NPA for
    at least nine months after it was executed. Instead, the Office misrepresented to
    the victims that “this case” was still under investigation, advised them “to be
    patient,” and never disclosed the government’s NPA with Epstein.
    requesting: “Marie—Please do whatever you can to keep this [NPA] from becoming public.”
    AUSA Villafana assured Lefkowitz that the NPA would be kept confidential.
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    A. Prosecutors Negotiate With Defense about Notifying Victims
    During that nine-month period, the U.S. Attorney’s Office and Epstein’s
    defense team negotiated whether and to what extent the victims would be told
    about the NPA’s resolution of the federal case. In this case, the Office admitted
    that it was a deviation from the government’s standard practices to negotiate with
    defense counsel about the extent of crime victim notifications. Nevertheless,
    Epstein’s defense attorneys demanded that the victims not be told about the
    resolution of the federal case because otherwise Epstein “will have no control over
    what is communicated to the identified individuals [the victims] at this most
    critical stage.”
    Epstein, of course, did not want the victims to know there would be no
    federal prosecution of his sex-trafficking-of-minors crimes if he pled guilty in State
    Court to merely soliciting prostitution. Everyone knew the victims would be
    disgusted, raise vigorous objections on the federal level, and try to convince the
    State Court judge not to be beguiled into accepting such a state plea that was tied
    to no federal prosecution for sex-trafficking crimes against more than 30 minor
    victims. While his state plea did not happen until June 30, 2008, in the interim,
    Epstein’s attorneys worked to keep the terms of the 2007 NPA secret until after
    Epstein’s state plea was accepted and the deal was done.
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    Case: 19-13843       Date Filed: 04/14/2020       Page: 76 of 120
    In later correspondence with Epstein’s attorneys, AUSA Villafana admitted
    that Epstein did not want the U.S. Attorney’s Office to inform the State Attorney’s
    Office of the facts supporting the additional state prostitution-solicitation charge,
    nor did Epstein want federal victims to contact the State Court or prosecutor
    because the state prosecutor’s “opinion may change if she knows the full scope of
    [Epstein’s] actions.” To this date, the U.S. Attorney’s Office has presented no
    evidence that it or anyone else told the State Court, either before or during
    Epstein’s state hearing, about the secret consideration Epstein had negotiated with
    the federal government—federal immunity for him and all co-conspirators—if the
    State Court accepted his state plea.8
    Consistent with Epstein’s demands, the U.S. Attorney’s Office did not notify
    the victims about the NPA. But before acquiescing, the manner in which the
    Office responded to Epstein’s demands unmasks the truth.
    8
    Epstein’s defense team had legitimate concerns that the State Court judge would not
    accept Epstein’s plea if tied to such a broad, secret federal immunity deal. Under Florida law, a
    State trial judge is never bound to honor a negotiated plea agreement. Goins v. State, 
    672 So. 2d 30
    , 31 (Fla. 1996). During a plea colloquy, a trial judge may announce that she is not bound by
    the plea agreement because other factors make the trial judge’s concurrence impossible. King v.
    State, 
    578 So. 2d 23
    , 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.171(d) (“After an
    agreement on a plea has been reached, the trial judge may have made known to him or her the
    agreement and reasons therefor prior to the acceptance of the plea. Thereafter, the judge shall
    advise the parties whether other factors (unknown at the time) may make his or her concurrence
    impossible.”). The NPA itself acknowledged that the entire deal was contingent on the State
    Court judge accepting the negotiated state plea agreement and sentence.
    If the victims had been told the truth about the 2007 NPA, they would have had ample
    time to make their views known to the State Court before Epstein’s plea on June 30, 2008. If the
    State Court rejected the plea, there was no federal immunity for Epstein and his co-conspirators.
    76
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    Initially, the Office responded that the government had statutory obligations
    under the CVRA to notify the victims of the NPA, to confer with the victims, and
    to tell them about upcoming events, such as Epstein’s state plea in return for no
    federal prosecution. Here are examples of what the Office wrote Epstein’s
    attorneys in November and early December of 2007:
    • “The United States has a statutory obligation (Justice for All Act of 2004)9
    to notify the victims of the anticipated upcoming events and their rights
    associated with the agreement entered into by the United States and Mr.
    Epstein in a timely fashion.”
    • “Section 3771 . . . commands that ‘employees of the Department of
    Justice . . . engaged in the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime
    shall make their best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, and
    accorded, the rights described in subsection (a).’”
    • “Our Non-Prosecution Agreement resolves the federal investigation by
    allowing Mr. Epstein to plead to a state offense. The victims identified
    through the federal investigation should be appropriately informed, and our
    [NPA] does not require the U.S. Attorney’s Office to forego its legal
    obligations.”
    • “[T]he Office believes that it has proof beyond a reasonable doubt that each
    listed individual was a victim of Mr. Epstein’s criminal conduct while the
    victim was a minor. The law requires us to treat all victims ‘with fairness
    and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy.’ 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (a)(8). We will not include any language that demeans the harm they
    may have suffered.”
    • “[W]e will not remove the language about contacting AUSA Villafana or
    Special Agent Kuyrkendall with questions or concerns. Again, federal law
    9
    The CVRA was enacted as part of the Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405,
    § 102, 
    118 Stat. 2260
     (codified as amended at 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
     (2015). As does the Majority, I
    quote the version of the CVRA in effect during the 2006 to 2008 events in question.
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    requires that victims have a ‘reasonable right to confer with the attorney for
    the Government in this case.’ 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (a)(5).”
    The evidence shows the Office repeatedly told Epstein’s attorneys that it had
    CVRA obligations to notify and confer with the victims about the NPA and
    upcoming events. As the state plea would resolve Epstein’s federal sex-trafficking
    crimes, the CVRA, as well as basic decency and fairness, demanded the Office tell
    the victims of that critical fact and about the State Court proceeding.
    Yet, on December 19, 2007, U.S. Attorney Acosta sent a letter to Epstein’s
    counsel addressing “the issue of victim’s rights pursuant to Section 3771.” U.S.
    Attorney Acosta stated: “I understand that the defense objects to the victims being
    given notice of time and place of Mr. Epstein’s state court sentencing
    hearing. . . . We intend to provide victims with notice of the federal resolution, as
    required by law. We will defer to the discretion of the State Attorney regarding
    whether he wishes to provide victims with notice of the state proceedings[.]”
    Despite U.S. Attorney Acosta representing that “[w]e intend to provide victims
    with notice of the federal resolution, as required by law,” the Office never did that
    before Epstein pled guilty in State Court on June 30, 2008, and the deal was
    consummated.
    B. 2008 Victims Misled
    Another chapter in this sordid story. Before going to State Court, Epstein
    apparently was not satisfied with his defense team’s success in securing the highly
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    favorable NPA. In January 2008, Epstein’s attorneys sought higher-level review
    within the Justice Department.10 U.S. Attorney Acosta agreed to allow Epstein to
    delay further his State Court plea while his attorneys appealed to main Justice.
    This time Epstein’s defense team got nowhere.
    Nonetheless, during this review period, the U.S. Attorney’s Office still did
    not tell the victims a signed NPA existed. Instead, on January 10, 2008, the
    government sent Epstein’s victims letters misrepresenting that “[t]his case is
    currently under investigation. This can be a lengthy process and we request your
    continued patience while we conduct a thorough investigation.”
    Jane Doe 1’s sworn testimony is revealing. On January 31, 2008, Jane Doe
    1 met with AUSA Villafana, FBI agents, and another federal prosecutor and
    provided additional details of Epstein’s sexual abuse of her. Jane Doe 1 said she
    hoped Epstein would be prosecuted and that she was willing to testify against him
    at trial. Based on the earlier letters she received, Jane Doe 1 believed the federal
    prosecutors would contact her before reaching any final resolution. During that
    meeting, however, the federal prosecutors and FBI agents still did not disclose to
    10
    Epstein wanted one last shot at convincing the U.S. government that there was no basis
    for his federal criminal liability and he should not have to plead to anything. Epstein’s appeal
    was unsuccessful. On June 23, 2008, the Office told Epstein’s attorneys that the Deputy
    Attorney General had completed his review of the Epstein matter and “determined that federal
    prosecution of Mr. Epstein’s case [wa]s appropriate.”
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    Jane Doe 1 that the Office had signed the NPA, which barred Epstein’s federal
    prosecution for sex-trafficking crimes against her.
    The U.S. Attorney’s Office continued to conceal the existence of the NPA
    from all the victims for months to come. In mid-June of 2008, Bradley Edwards,
    the Fort Lauderdale, Florida attorney for several of Epstein’s victims, contacted
    AUSA Villafana to inform her that he represented Jane Doe 1 and, later, Jane Doe
    2. AUSA Villafana and Edwards discussed the possibility of federal charges being
    filed against Epstein in the future. Edwards was led to believe that federal charges
    could still be filed by the Office, with AUSA Villafana failing to mention the NPA
    or any other possible resolution of Epstein’s federal case.
    VI. JUNE 30, 2008: EPSTEIN’S STATE PLEA
    On June 30, 2008, Epstein pled guilty in Florida State Court to
    (1) solicitation of prostitution and (2) procuring a person under the age of 18 for
    prostitution. That same day, the State Court sentenced Epstein to 18 months’
    imprisonment in the county jail. As the Majority concedes, there is no indication
    that any of Epstein’s victims were informed about the NPA or the terms of his state
    plea until later. Maj. Op. at 6.
    Having still not been informed of the resolution of Epstein’s federal case, on
    July 3, 2008, attorney Edwards sent a letter to the U.S. Attorney’s Office
    communicating the victims’ wishes that federal charges be filed against Epstein.
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    Attorney Edwards explained: “We urge you to move forward with the traditional
    indictments and criminal prosecution commensurate with the crimes Mr. Epstein
    has committed, and we further urge you to take the steps necessary to protect our
    children from this very dangerous sexual perpetrator.” Because Epstein was “a
    sexual addict that focused all of his free time on sexually abusing children,”
    Edwards emphasized that “[f]uture abuse and victimization is obvious to anyone
    who really reviews the evidence in this case, and future sexual abuse of minors is
    inevitable unless [Epstein] is prosecuted, tried and appropriately sentenced.”
    VII. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On July 7, 2008, Courtney Wild (proceeding as “Jane Doe 1”) filed an
    emergency petition alleging that she was a victim of Epstein’s federal crimes and
    that the U.S. Attorney’s Office had violated her CVRA rights (1) to confer with
    federal prosecutors, (2) to be treated with fairness, (3) to receive timely notice of
    relevant court proceedings, and (4) to receive information about restitution.
    Two days later, on July 9, 2008, the U.S. Attorney’s Office responded,
    arguing for the first time, that the CVRA did not apply at all to pre-indictment plea
    negotiations with a potential federal defendant. Once sued, the Office changed its
    position despite having earlier written the victims, and later Epstein’s defense
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    team, that the victims had ongoing CVRA rights, and that the Office had statutory
    obligations to accord the victims those rights.11
    It was only in the Office’s July 9, 2008, responsive pleading that Jane Doe 1
    first saw reference to the fact that, over nine months earlier in September 2007, the
    Office had signed an agreement with Epstein to not prosecute him for federal
    crimes if Epstein pled guilty to two state charges.
    Also on July 9, 2008, the U.S. Attorney’s Office sent short letters to
    petitioner Wild and Epstein’s other victims stating: (1) “the United States . . . was
    prepared to name [each girl] in an Indictment as victims of an enumerated offense
    by Mr. Epstein”; but (2) the “United States has agreed to defer federal prosecution
    in favor of [Epstein’s] state plea and sentence, subject to certain conditions.” That
    cursory notification still did not provide the full terms of the NPA, such as the
    provision extending federal immunity to Epstein’s co-conspirators.12
    11
    In a footnote, the Majority cites to a 2010 opinion by the Justice Department’s Office of
    Legal Counsel (“OLC”). Maj. Op. at 37 n.20. The Justice Department’s 2010 OLC opinion, like
    the change of position by the Justice Department’s local U.S. Attorney’s Office, came only after
    Epstein’s victims filed this lawsuit. See Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 
    447 U.S. 807
    , 825, 
    100 S. Ct. 2486
    , 2497 (1980) (holding that an agency’s “‘interpretation’ of a statute cannot supersede the
    language chosen by Congress”).
    12
    The Majority contends: “On the day that Epstein entered his guilty plea in June 2008,
    some (but by no means all) victims were notified that the federal investigation of Epstein had
    concluded” citing an e-mail AUSA Villafana sent to “Jason” (full name redacted) after Epstein’s
    State Court hearing. Maj. Op. at 6. There is no evidence, however, that the two petitioners here,
    their attorney Edwards, or other victims were told that the state plea was related to Epstein’s
    crimes against them, much less that the state plea would foreclose the possibility of federal
    prosecution for Epstein’s federal crimes against his victims.
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    After multiple hearings, the District Court ordered the U.S. Attorney’s
    Office to disclose the NPA to the victims. In August 2008, the petitioners finally
    obtained a copy of the NPA. Among other relief, the victims sought rescission of
    the NPA.
    What followed was more than a decade of contentious litigation between the
    victims, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, Epstein, and his various defense attorneys. 13
    In 2011, the District Court “addresse[d] the threshold issue whether the CVRA
    attaches before the government brings formal charges against a defendant.” Does
    v. United States, 
    817 F. Supp. 2d 1337
    , 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2011). In a thorough
    opinion, the District Court held that it does under the plain text of the CVRA. 
    Id. at 1341-43
    . Later, on February 21, 2019, the District Court ruled that the U.S.
    Attorney’s Office entered into the NPA without first conferring with the victims
    and violated the victims’ CVRA rights to confer and be treated fairly.14 Doe 1 v.
    United States, 
    359 F. Supp. 3d 1201
    , 1218-22 (S.D. Fla. 2019).
    After extensive briefing on remedies for the victims, Epstein was found dead
    on August 10, 2019. On September 16, 2019, the District Court entered an order
    13
    Epstein and some of his defense team intervened to argue against victims obtaining
    their correspondence about the negotiation and execution of the NPA. Although the petitioners
    seek rescission of the NPA as to Epstein’s co-conspirators, the co-conspirators never moved to
    intervene.
    14
    In a later order, the District Court explained that the petitioners’ “right to be treated
    with fairness and to receive notice of court proceedings . . . flow from the right to confer and
    were encompassed in the Court’s ruling finding a violation of the CVRA.”
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    denying the victims any remedies and closed the case. As to Epstein, the District
    Court determined that “there is no longer an Article III controversy” given his
    death. As to the co-conspirators, the District Court found it lacked jurisdiction
    over them.
    Victim Wild filed a petition for writ of mandamus with this Court, seeking
    review of the District Court’s order denying relief. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (d)(3) (“If
    the district court denies the relief sought, the movant may petition the court of
    appeals for a writ of mandamus. . . . In deciding such application, the court of
    appeals shall apply ordinary standards of appellate review.”).15
    VIII. QUESTION PRESENTED
    This appeal presents this legal question: Whether, after completing its
    investigation, preparing a 53-page indictment, and conferring with Epstein’s
    defense team about a pre-charge plea, the Office violated the victims’ CVRA rights
    by (1) not conferring with any of Epstein’s victims before agreeing to the NPA,
    (2) intentionally and unfairly concealing the NPA from the victims, and
    (3) affirmatively misrepresenting the case status to the victims after the NPA was
    executed. The answer depends solely on the text of the CVRA, to which I turn.
    15
    In this appeal, the Majority does not contest that: (1) our Court applies the ordinary
    standards of appellate review; and (2) we review de novo statutory interpretation issues and any
    fact findings for clear error. No party argues any fact-finding error occurred, and thus we review
    de novo the District Court’s ruling that the victims had pre-charge CVRA rights. If the victims
    had pre-charge CVRA rights to confer and be treated fairly, no party disputes those rights were
    repeatedly violated by the U.S. Attorney’s Office.
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    IX. CVRA’S STATUTORY TEXT
    A. CVRA’s Bill of Rights for Victims
    In interpreting the CVRA, our Court is guided by the traditional canons of
    statutory construction. “Our ‘starting point’ is the language of the statute itself.”
    EEOC v. STME, LLC, 
    938 F.3d 1305
    , 1313 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Harrison v.
    Benchmark Elecs. Huntsville, Inc., 
    593 F.3d 1206
    , 1212-14 (11th Cir. 2010)). We
    “assume that Congress used the words of the statute as they are commonly and
    ordinarily understood and must construe the statute so each of its provisions is
    given full effect.” United States v. McLymont, 
    45 F.3d 400
    , 401 (11th Cir. 1995).
    Therefore, “[w]e do not look at one word or term in isolation, but instead we look
    to the entire statutory context.” STME, 938 F.3d at 1314 (quoting Harrison, 
    593 F.3d at 1212
    ).
    The CVRA grants crime victims these eight rights in subsection (a):
    (1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused.
    (2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public
    court proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the crime or of
    any release or escape of the accused.
    (3) The right not to be excluded from any such public court proceeding,
    unless the court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence,
    determines that testimony by the victim would be materially altered if
    the victim heard other testimony at that proceeding.
    (4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the
    district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole
    proceeding.
    85
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    (5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government
    in the case.
    (6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.
    (7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay.
    (8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s
    dignity and privacy.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (a) (2008) (emphasis added). These are not merely aspirational
    principles. Section 3771(c)(1) directs that “[o]fficers and employees of the
    Department of Justice . . . engaged in the detection, investigation, or prosecution of
    crime shall make their best efforts to see that crime victims are . . . accorded[] the
    rights described in subsection (a).” 
    Id.
     § 3771(c)(1). And if crime victims’ rights
    are violated, the CVRA provides a procedural mechanism—this lawsuit—whereby
    the victims may assert their CVRA rights in federal court. Id. § 3771(d)(3).
    Undisputedly, the petitioners qualify as “crime victims” as defined in the CVRA.
    See id. § 3771(e) (“[T]he term ‘crime victim’ means a person directly and
    proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense.”).
    B. Subsections 3771(a)(5) and (a)(8)
    The two subsections at issue here are (a)(5) and (a)(8), which grant crime
    victims “[t]he reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in
    the case” and “[t]he right to be treated with fairness.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (a)(5), (8).
    These two statutory rights are stated in plain language. The text of the two rights
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    has no post-indictment temporal limitation on its face. The language of
    § 3771(a)(5) and (a)(8) is not ambiguous, intricate, obscure, or doubtful (as the
    Majority suggests). Maj. Op. at 20 & n.8. As enacted, Congress granted these
    rights to victims of crime, and though the rights are not wholly unlimited as
    discussed later, Congress did not restrict these rights to only the time after an
    indictment is filed in federal court. In interpreting a statute, when “the language at
    issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning,” we “need go no further.” United
    States v. St. Amour, 
    886 F.3d 1009
    , 1013 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    139 S. Ct. 205
    (2018) (quoting United States v. Fisher, 
    289 F.3d 1329
    , 1337-38 (11th Cir.
    2002)).16 Our statutory analysis thus should start and end with the language of
    subsections (a)(5) and (a)(8).
    The overall statutory structure of § 3771 also supports this plain text reading.
    Beyond their plain language, what Congress omitted from subsections (a)(5) and
    (a)(8) of § 3771, but expressly included in subsections (a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(4), is
    instructive too. In § 3771, subsection (a)(2) grants victims the right to “notice of
    any public court proceeding”; subsection (a)(3) grants victims the right “not to be
    16
    As noted, the CVRA was enacted to protect crime victims’ rights and ensure their
    involvement in the criminal justice process. See Moussaoui, 
    483 F.3d at 234
    ; Kenna, 
    435 F.3d at 1016
    . In this context, a comprehensive construction of the victims’ rights to confer and be
    treated fairly in § 3771(a)(5) and (a)(8) is fitting. See Yates v. United States, 
    574 U.S. 528
    , __,
    
    135 S. Ct. 1074
    , 1081-82 (2015) (explaining that “[t]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory
    language is determined [not only] by reference to the language itself, [but as well by] the specific
    context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole”).
    87
    Case: 19-13843      Date Filed: 04/14/2020    Page: 88 of 120
    excluded from any such public court proceeding”; and subsection (a)(4) grants
    victims the right “to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district
    court.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (a)(2)-(4).
    In stark contrast, in subsections (a)(5) and (a)(8), Congress granted victims
    rights to confer and be treated fairly without tying those rights to “public court
    proceedings” or “public proceedings in the district court.” Congress’s omission of
    the distinct phrase of “public court proceedings” in subsections (a)(5) and (a)(8) is
    highly significant.
    First, under the conventional rules of statutory construction, where Congress
    has used a more limited term in one part of a statute, but left it out of other parts,
    courts should not imply the term where it has been excluded. See Keene Corp. v.
    United States, 
    508 U.S. 200
    , 208, 
    113 S. Ct. 2035
    , 2040 (1993) (“[W]here
    Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
    another . . . , it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
    purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”); Russello v. United States, 
    464 U.S. 16
    , 23, 
    104 S. Ct. 296
    , 300 (1983) (declining to read a term appearing in two
    subsections of a statute to have the same meaning where there is “differing
    language” in the subsections).
    Second, “[a] familiar principle of statutory construction . . . is that a negative
    inference may be drawn from the exclusion of language from one statutory
    88
    Case: 19-13843     Date Filed: 04/14/2020   Page: 89 of 120
    provision that is included in other provisions of the same statute.” Hamdan v.
    Rumsfeld, 
    548 U.S. 557
    , 578, 
    126 S. Ct. 2749
    , 2765 (2006); see also Antonin
    Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 170
    (2012) (“[W]here a document has used one term in one place, and a materially
    different term in another, the presumption is that the different term denoted a
    different idea.”).
    In other words, had Congress wanted the conferral and fairness rights to
    apply only after the government has filed an indictment in court, Congress could
    have easily written subsections (a)(5) and (a)(8) more narrowly, as it did in other
    parts of subsection (a). But “the presumed point of using general words is to
    produce general coverage—not to leave room for courts to recognize ad hoc
    exceptions.” Scalia & Garner, supra at 101 (“General terms are to be given their
    general meaning (generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda).”). Indeed, the
    § 3771(a) subsections explicitly tied to court proceedings show that when Congress
    wants to limit crime victims’ rights to post-indictment court proceedings it knows
    how to do so and does so expressly. The CVRA’s text draws a clear distinction
    between a victim’s rights to confer and be treated fairly and a victim’s rights to
    have notice of and participate in “public court proceedings,” and our Court is
    required to enforce the statute’s distinction as Congress wrote and enacted it.
    89
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    C. Subsections 3771(c) and (d)
    Two other CVRA subsections—§ 3771(c) and (d)—also support my
    conclusion that Epstein’s victims had the rights to confer and be treated fairly
    before plea negotiations were completed. “It is a fundamental canon of statutory
    construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a
    view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v.
    Jackson, 587 U.S. __, __, 
    139 S. Ct. 1743
    , 1748 (2019) (quoting Davis v. Mich.
    Dep’t of Treasury, 
    489 U.S. 803
    , 809, 
    109 S. Ct. 1500
    , 1504 (1989)). “Ultimately,
    context determines meaning.” Johnson v. United States, 
    559 U.S. 133
    , 139, 
    130 S. Ct. 1265
    , 1270 (2010). Subsections (c) and (d) not only provide context for
    subsection (a), but expressly refer to the rights in subsection (a).
    Section 3771(c), titled “Best efforts to accord rights,” instructs that the
    Justice Department and “other departments and agencies of the United States
    engaged in the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime shall make their
    best efforts to see that crime victims are . . . accorded[] the rights described in
    subsection (a).” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (c)(1) (emphasis added). Logically, there would
    be no reason to mandate that federal agencies involved in crime “detection” or
    “investigation” see that victims are accorded their CVRA rights if those rights did
    not exist pre-charge. Indeed, the use of disjunctive wording—the “or”—indicates
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    Case: 19-13843     Date Filed: 04/14/2020     Page: 91 of 120
    agencies that fit either description must comply, and not just, for example, the FBI,
    which is at times engaged in both crime investigation and prosecution.
    A victim’s right to conferral is with the government’s attorney in the case,
    not with the FBI. But the fact that the FBI has a “best efforts” duty during the
    criminal investigation to see that a victim’s conferral rights are honored is another
    textual signal that the victim has conferral rights pre-charge, where the case has
    matured to the point that a government attorney is assigned.
    Lest any doubt remains, the CVRA’s venue provision in § 3771(d)(3)
    conclusively demonstrates that the Act gives crime victims rights pre-charge.
    Section 3771(d)(3) provides: “The rights described in subsection (a) shall be
    asserted in the district court in which a defendant is being prosecuted for the crime
    or, if no prosecution is underway, in the district court in the district in which the
    crime occurred.” Id. § 3771(d)(3) (emphasis added).
    Read most naturally, this venue provision provides that, if a prosecution is
    underway, victims may assert their rights in the ongoing criminal action. Id. If,
    however, “no prosecution is underway,” victims may assert their rights in the
    district court of the district in which the crime occurred. Id. And if a crime
    victim’s CVRA rights may be enforced before a prosecution is formally underway
    in district court, then to avoid a strained reading, those rights must attach at some
    point before an indictment formally charges the defendant with the crime.
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    So how does the Majority resist the plain reading of the venue provision in
    § 3771(d)(3)? To be fair, the Majority admits first that: “Petitioner’s interpretation
    of subsection (d)(3) is not implausible—that provision could be read to mean that
    CVRA rights attach before the commencement of criminal proceedings.” Maj. Op.
    at 33. But then the Majority argues that, after a criminal case is totally over, there
    is no prosecution underway and hence this venue provision is about “post-
    judgment” matters. Id. at 35-36. The Majority’s reading of § 3771(d)(3) does not
    comport with how the word “underway” is ordinarily or commonly understood. In
    everyday parlance, if “a process, project, [or] activity,” is not “underway,” we
    generally understand that to mean it has not yet begun. Id. at 35. It is a stretch to
    say that when something is not “underway,” it is commonly or ordinarily
    understood to mean that the something is completed. 17
    In addition, the Majority’s interpretation of the phrase—“if no prosecution is
    underway”—makes no sense because a post-judgment action would logically be
    filed in the district court where the conviction was entered. Even the Majority
    17
    Alternatively, the Majority argues that § 3771(d)(3)’s “no prosecution is underway”
    provision applies to the very narrow and specific period between the filing of a criminal
    complaint and levying formal charges by indictment. Maj. Op. at 33-35. But there is, of course,
    no such temporal limitation in the plain language of § 3771(d)(3), nor is there any indication this
    provision applies only to the subset of criminal proceedings involving a complaint. It is also not
    readily apparent why the Majority only looks to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for its
    construction of “prosecution” and not also to the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial right in all
    criminal “prosecutions.” Id. at 34. The Sixth Amendment speedy trial right “may attach before
    an indictment and as early as the time of arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge.” United
    States v. Gouveia, 
    467 U.S. 180
    , 190, 
    104 S. Ct. 2292
    , 2298 (1984).
    92
    Case: 19-13843      Date Filed: 04/14/2020     Page: 93 of 120
    “concede[s] that this reading isn’t perfectly seamless, in that it would require the
    victim to file her post-judgment motion ‘in the district in which the crime
    occurred’ rather than, as one might expect, in the district in which the prosecution
    occurred and the conviction was entered.” 
    Id.
     at 36 n.19.
    Not “perfectly seamless” is an odd statutory interpretation. The Majority’s
    faulty interpretation actually makes this part of the venue provision superfluous.
    See Corley v. United States, 
    556 U.S. 303
    , 314, 
    129 S. Ct. 1558
    , 1566 (2009)
    (“[O]ne of the most basic interpretive canons [is] that a statute should be construed
    so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or
    superfluous, void or insignificant.”); Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc.,
    
    540 F.3d 1242
    , 1247 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating under the canon against surplusage,
    “we strive to give effect to every word and provision in a statute when possible”).
    Our job is to enforce the statute as written by Congress.
    In sum, the victims’ two statutory rights—to confer and be treated fairly—
    though not unlimited, have no bright-line, post-indictment temporal restriction on
    their face. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (a)(5), (8). Federal agencies and prosecutors
    engaged in the “detection, investigation, or prosecution” of crime “shall make their
    best efforts” to see that crime victims are “accorded[] the rights described in
    subsection (a).” See 
    id.
     § 3771(c)(1). And “if no prosecution is underway,” the
    venue provision directs victims that “[t]he rights described in subsection (a) shall
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    Case: 19-13843      Date Filed: 04/14/2020    Page: 94 of 120
    be asserted . . . in the district court in the district in which the crime occurred.” See
    id. § 3771(d)(3).
    D. Majority’s Flawed Statutory Analysis
    So how in the holy name of plain text does the Majority add such a
    substantive and temporal restriction on the victims’ rights to confer and be treated
    fairly and hold that victims have no CVRA rights until after the government files
    an indictment and commences proceedings? The Majority hacks away at the plain
    text with four tools.
    First, the Majority cherry picks the meaning of “case” in § 3771(a)(5) and
    narrows it to mean judicial case only. Maj. Op. at 22-23. “Case,” however, has
    long had a much broader meaning than the Majority uses. As stated in dictionary
    definitions, “case” is both “a circumstance or situation (as a crime) requiring
    investigation or action by the police or other agency” and “the matters of fact or
    conditions involved in a suit: a suit or action in law or equity.” Case, Webster’s
    Third New International Dictionary 345 (2002). Likewise, in Black’s Law
    Dictionary, the term “case” can mean both “[a] civil or criminal proceeding, action,
    suit, or controversy at law or in equity ” and “[a]
    criminal investigation .” Case, Black’s Law Dictionary 258-59
    (10th ed. 2014). As shown in my factual background, everyone involved in
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    Epstein’s case—from AUSA Villafana, to the Deputy Attorney General, and even
    Epstein’s defense team—called this a “case” before an indictment was filed.
    The Majority brushes aside the fact that the term “case” can mean both a
    judicial case and an investigative case on the basis that Black’s first defines “case”
    as a civil or criminal proceeding and only second as a criminal investigation. Maj.
    Op. at 22-23.18 But since when is statutory interpretation as simple as picking the
    first definition listed in a Black’s dictionary entry to the exclusion of a word’s
    ordinary meaning? The Majority cites no legal support for its “first listed
    dictionary definition” canon of construction. 19
    18
    The Majority argues: “Although it’s true, at least in the abstract, that the term ‘case’ can
    mean either thing, in legal parlance the judicial-case connotation is undoubtedly primary.” Maj.
    Op. at 22-23.
    19
    As to the term “case,” even the Majority cites Chavez v. Martinez, 
    538 U.S. 760
    , 766,
    
    123 S. Ct. 1994
    , 2000-01 (2003), which supports my conclusion that the CVRA’s conferral right
    attaches pre-charge. See Maj. Op. at 23. In Chavez, the Supreme Court construed the Fifth
    Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause, which prohibits a person from being “compelled in any
    criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Supreme Court
    concluded the phrase “criminal case” “requires the initiation of legal proceedings” and does not
    “encompass the entire criminal investigatory process” because a person can only be compelled to
    be “a witness against himself” in his own criminal prosecution. Chavez, 
    538 U.S. at 766
    , 
    123 S. Ct. at 2000-01
    . But Chavez itself points out that, for the target of a criminal case, “legal
    proceedings” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination includes
    pre-indictment grand jury proceedings—at which the target cannot be compelled to testify. 
    Id. at 767-68
    , 
    123 S. Ct. at 2001
    . More importantly for this case, the Supreme Court clarified: “We
    need not decide today the precise moment when a ‘criminal case’ commences; it is enough to say
    that police questioning does not constitute a ‘case’ any more than a private investigator’s
    precomplaint activities constitute a ‘civil case.’” 
    Id. at 766-77
    , 
    123 S. Ct. at 2001
    . Here, the
    CVRA conferral right is with the government’s attorney in the case, not with the police or an
    investigator. Not only did the Office target Epstein, but it drafted an indictment and met with
    Epstein’s defense counsel about a plea in the case. To say that mature stage is not a CVRA
    “case” under Chavez’s reasoning is illogical.
    The Majority also cites to Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 595 (1872) for
    95
    Case: 19-13843      Date Filed: 04/14/2020      Page: 96 of 120
    Although “case” means both criminal investigation and formal criminal
    proceedings, it is worth noting whom the conferral right is between: the victim and
    the attorney for the government. That fits the petitioners’ claim that once the
    criminal case has matured to plea negotiations by “the attorney for the Government
    in the case” with defense counsel, the victims had the right to know that and to
    confer with the government’s attorney.
    As its second instrument, the Majority drills down on the meaning of “the
    attorney for the Government” in § 3771(a)(5). The Majority argues that it means
    one attorney and therefore the conferral right “attaches only after proceedings have
    begun, at which point that particular person will presumably be more readily
    identifiable.” Maj. Op. at 23-24. I don’t quarrel with the fact that an attorney
    needs to be “readily identifiable,” as the Majority puts it. But the Majority
    wrongly concludes that happens only once court proceedings begin after a formal
    indictment. That conclusion is divorced from reality and sorely lacking in
    explanation. Who does the Majority think procures an indictment—just some
    random attorney not assigned to the case pre-charge? Nonsense. Contrary to the
    Majority’s presumption, specific government attorneys are routinely assigned to
    the unremarkable proposition that the words “case” and “cause” are synonyms and can “mean[] a
    proceeding in court, a suit or action.” Maj. Op. at 23. But if in Chavez, over 130 years after
    Blyew, the Supreme Court still hasn’t defined the precise moment a criminal case commences, I
    don’t see how Blyew supports the Majority’s proposition that a “case” means only post-
    indictment proceedings.
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    Case: 19-13843     Date Filed: 04/14/2020   Page: 97 of 120
    draft indictments and handle pre-charge matters. Once an investigation is
    completed, the case has matured to the indictment-drafting stage and pre-charge
    plea negotiations with defense counsel have begun, there is obviously a “readily
    identifiable” attorney in the case.
    What I quarrel with is the Majority’s leap from this statutory phrase to its
    mistaken conclusion that this phrase translates to the Majority’s claimed post-
    indictment restriction on the conferral right. Notably, the pre-charge period has
    become crucial to white-collar defense attorneys, who are hired to represent
    potential defendants pre-charge precisely in order to negotiate with the already
    assigned, readily identifiable prosecutor and extract the best plea deal in advance
    of any indictment. The Majority’s pre-charge rule will deny victims’ CVRA rights
    to confer and fairness in cases involving white-collar and other wealthy defendants
    who commonly engage in pre-charge plea negotiations.
    Jeffrey Epstein’s case illustrates my point. The U.S. Attorney’s Office
    assigned specific attorneys, with AUSA Villafana being the lead prosecutor and
    primary attorney who negotiated with Epstein’s defense team. And Epstein’s
    defense team spent days negotiating with the Office to extract the best plea deal
    pre-charge. As such, there was a readily identifiable attorney—“the attorney for
    the Government”—for Epstein’s victims to confer with even though formal court
    proceedings had not yet commenced. We should take the victims’ rights granted in
    97
    Case: 19-13843       Date Filed: 04/14/2020       Page: 98 of 120
    § 3771(a)(5) and (a)(8) at face value and not restrict them to benefit the privileged
    few.20
    As its third tool to axe the plain text, the Majority contends that its reading
    of § 3771(a)(5) and (a)(8) is supported by the canon noscitur a sociis, that is, “‘a
    word is known by the company it keeps.’” See S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of
    Envtl. Prot., 
    547 U.S. 370
    , 378, 
    126 S. Ct. 1843
    , 1849 (2006); Maj. Op. at 25-26.
    Do not fall for this. The noscitur a sociis principle is a “useful rule of construction
    where words are of obscure or doubtful meaning and then, but only then, its aid
    may be sought to remove the obscurity or doubt by reference to the associated
    words.” Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 
    261 U.S. 514
    , 520, 
    43 S. Ct. 428
    ,
    430 (1923). But here, the meaning of the plain words in § 3771(a)(5) and (a)(8) is
    not in doubt and all other contextual clues support that meaning. Thus, the canon
    cannot be invoked to defeat Congress’s decision to grant crime victims these
    plainly-worded rights of conferral and fairness. See Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
    
    552 U.S. 214
    , 226-27, 
    128 S. Ct. 831
    , 839-40 (2008) (rejecting the invocation of
    20
    The Majority does not dispute that prosecutors and defense counsel routinely negotiate
    pre-charge plea agreements, particularly in white-collar cases. Paul G. Cassell, et al., Crime
    Victims’ Rights During Criminal Investigations? Applying the Crime Victims’ Rights Act
    Before Criminal Charges Are Filed, 104 J. Crim. L. and Criminology 59, 84 (2014). Guilty
    pleas, in fact, account for over 97% of all criminal convictions obtained by the government. See
    U.S. Courts, Judicial Business 2019 Tables: Criminal Defendants Terminated, by Type of
    Disposition and Offense (Table D-4) (Sept. 30, 2019) (only 1,663 of the 78,767 defendants
    convicted of federal crimes in the year ending September 30, 2019, were found guilty by a judge
    or jury after a criminal trial; the rest pled guilty), https://www.uscourts.gov/judicial-business-
    2019-tables.
    98
    Case: 19-13843     Date Filed: 04/14/2020   Page: 99 of 120
    this canon as an “attempt to create ambiguity where the statute’s text and structure
    suggest none”).
    Moreover, the cases the Majority cites for this canon involved statutes with
    much stronger and closer contextual clues than in § 3771(a). See Gutierrez v. Ada,
    
    528 U.S. 250
    , 254-58, 
    120 S. Ct. 740
    , 743-46 (2000) (applying the canon to narrow
    the phrase “any election” where it was closely surrounded by six specific
    references to gubernatorial elections); Lagos v. United States, 584 U.S. __, __, 
    138 S. Ct. 1684
    , 1688-89 (2018) (applying the canon to narrow the words
    “investigation” and “proceedings” to government investigations and criminal
    proceedings where the words were closely surrounded by three specific expenses
    victims would incur during government investigations and prosecutions, but not in
    private investigations and bankruptcy proceedings).
    Importantly too, the three subsection (a) rights in § 3771 that refer to court
    or public “proceeding[s]” are rights that could not exist absent such a proceeding.
    A victim’s right to receive “timely notice of,” “not . . . be excluded from,” or “be
    reasonably heard at” a proceeding would not attach until the time when such a
    proceeding would or could be held. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (a)(2)-(4). Those rights
    are contingent on the existence of a court proceeding, of which a victim might be
    notified, from which a victim might be excluded, or at which a victim might be
    heard. In contrast, a victim’s rights to confer or be treated fairly in no way flow
    99
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    from or presuppose ongoing court proceedings. It makes little sense to take the
    inherent temporal limits placed on rights explicitly tied to and dependent upon
    court proceedings and transfer them to rights which do not carry that particular
    limitation.
    Although public court proceedings are mentioned in three different rights in
    § 3771(a)(2)-(4), and crime victims have the right to be protected from the accused
    in § 3771(a)(1), as well as the right to “full and timely restitution” in § 3771(a)(6),
    nothing in the overall statutory context suggests subsection (a) is focused
    exclusively on victims’ rights accruing only after the filing of an indictment. See
    Ali, 
    552 U.S. at 225-26
    , 128 S. Ct. at 839-40 (refusing to apply the canon noscitur
    a sociis to narrow the phrase “any other law enforcement officer” in 
    28 U.S.C. § 2680
    (c) to the scope of the phrase that preceded it, “any officer of customs or
    excise,” because “nothing in the overall statutory context suggests that customs
    and excise officers were the exclusive focus of the provision”); see also Beecham
    v. United States, 
    511 U.S. 368
    , 371, 
    114 S. Ct. 1669
    , 1671 (1994) (explaining that
    the noscitur a sociis “canon of construction is by no means a hard and fast rule”).
    The temporal limitations in other § 3771(a) subsections are not inconsistent in any
    way with the conclusion that crime victims’ rights to confer and be treated fairly
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    “sweep[] as broadly as [the] language suggests.”21 See Ali, 
    552 U.S. at 226
    , 128 S.
    Ct. at 840.
    The Majority’s fourth attempted blow at the CVRA’s plain text in
    subsections (a)(5) and (a)(8) comes via a marred reading of the word “motion” in
    subsection (d)(3). Section 3771(d)(3) provides that a CVRA victim asserts her
    subsection (a) rights in the district court by filing a “[m]otion for relief.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (d)(3). Again, “if no prosecution is underway,” that motion is to be filed “in
    the district court in the district in which the crime occurred.” 
    Id.
     Once filed, “[t]he
    district court shall take up and decide any motion asserting a victim’s right
    forthwith.” 
    Id.
    In considering the usage of “motion” in § 3771(d)(3), the Majority asserts
    that a “motion” is solely a request filed within the context of an ongoing judicial
    21
    Unable to find support in the CVRA’s plain text, the Majority turns to language in an
    older victims-rights enactment—the Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act of 1990 (“VRRA”).
    Maj. Op. at 38-41. But the Majority fails to recognize the CVRA repealed significant parts of
    the VRRA because the legislation was ineffective. See Justice for All Act of 2004, § 102(c).
    The CVRA’s legislative history refers to earlier unsuccessful victims’ litigation under the VRRA
    and cautions that “[i]t is not the intent of this bill that its significance be whittled down or
    marginalized by the courts or the executive branch. [The CVRA] . . . is meant to correct, not
    continue, the legacy of the poor treatment of crime victims in the criminal [justice] process.”
    150 Cong. Rec. S4269 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
    In any event, the VRRA did not contain any “right to confer,” or a “right to be treated
    with fairness,” and thus it does not provide guidance for construing the CVRA’s conferral and
    fairness rights here. More still, as the Majority hints at, had Congress wanted to limit the
    CVRA’s conferral and fairness rights to certain stages of a criminal case, it could have simply
    drafted the legislation more narrowly and tied those rights to “charges,” “trial[s],” “hearing[s],
    and “proceedings” like it did with different rights in the VRRA. See Maj. Op. at 39-40. When
    Congress wants to limit victims-rights protections to only certain stages of a criminal case, it
    knows how to do so.
    101
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    proceeding. Maj. Op. at 27-28. The Majority argues that, since CVRA rights can
    only be asserted in a “mid-proceeding ‘motion[],’” the CVRA’s protections apply
    only after court proceedings have started. See id. at 28.
    As with “case,” the Majority slices in half the definition of the word
    “motion.” The common legal definition of “motion” is more general and broader:
    a motion is “[a] written or oral application requesting a court to make a specified
    ruling or order.” Motion, Black’s, supra, at 1168. This general definition
    encompasses a motion initiating a new lawsuit or proceeding, as well as one filed
    mid-proceeding. In fact, the federal rules and statutes allow quite a few motions to
    initiate new proceedings in the district court, such as motions to quash grand jury
    and other subpoenas, Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(2), and motions to vacate, set aside, or
    correct sentences, 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    . See also 
    28 U.S.C. § 1361
     (mandamus
    proceedings are initiated as a new lawsuit). This very case is a free-standing civil
    action litigated for a decade because the CVRA expressly provides that “if no
    prosecution is underway,” the “[m]otion for relief” is filed “in the district court in
    the district in which the crime occurred.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (d)(3). If anything,
    § 3771(d)(3) demonstrates that the Majority has added a very substantive
    102
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    restriction—victims have no CVRA rights until an indictment commences court
    proceedings—that has no meaningful footing in the text of the statute.22
    E. In re Dean, 
    527 F.3d 391
     (5th Cir. 2008)
    The only other circuit court to address this precise issue has come to the
    same conclusion as I do. The Fifth Circuit has held: “‘[T]here are clearly rights
    under the CVRA that apply before any prosecution is underway.’ . . . Logically,
    this includes the CVRA’s establishment of victims’ ‘reasonable right to confer
    with the attorney for the Government.’ 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (a)(5).” In re Dean, 
    527 F.3d at 394
    . The facts of In re Dean are instructive too.
    After an explosion at a refinery owned and operated by BP Products North
    America Inc. (“BP”) killed 15 people and injured more than 170, the Department
    of Justice investigated and decided to bring federal charges against BP. 
    Id.
     at 392-
    93. Before filing them, the government negotiated a plea deal with BP. 
    Id. at 392
    .
    At the government’s request, the district court entered an ex parte order that
    prohibited the government from notifying the victims of a potential plea agreement
    until after one was executed. 
    Id. at 392-93
    . Later, the government and BP signed
    a plea agreement without the government’s attorneys conferring with the victims.
    
    Id. at 393, 395
    .
    22
    Let’s be clear: If the Majority’s view holds, this civil case should have been dismissed
    at its very inception because the Office never filed a formal indictment.
    103
    Case: 19-13843     Date Filed: 04/14/2020    Page: 104 of 120
    The Fifth Circuit concluded that the government violated the victims’ right
    to confer under § 3771(a)(5) by executing the plea agreement without informing
    the victims of the likelihood of the criminal charges and learning the victims’
    views on the possible details of the plea bargain. Id. at 394.
    Here, similar to the posture in In re Dean, the U.S. Attorney’s Office
    investigated Epstein’s sex-trafficking crimes, decided to bring federal charges
    against him, and engaged in pre-indictment plea negotiations with Epstein’s
    defense team. The Office and Epstein then executed an NPA, extending immunity
    to Epstein and his co-conspirators, without ever conferring with Epstein’s victims
    in violation of § 3771(a)(5). What’s worse, here, the Office deliberately concealed
    the NPA’s existence and misled the victims to believe that federal prosecution was
    still a possibility, telling them to be “patient” while the investigation proceeded.
    The Majority heavily criticizes the Fifth Circuit’s In re Dean for merely
    “echo[ing]” the Texas district court’s conclusion that “[t]here are clearly rights
    under the CVRA that apply before any prosecution is underway” and as lacking
    discussion of the CVRA’s text, history, or structure. Maj. Op. at 49-50 n.25. What
    the Majority leaves out is that the Texas district court’s decision—echoed by the
    Fifth Circuit—contains a thorough examination of the CVRA’s text, history, and
    structure, which led it to conclude that § 3771(a)(5)’s right to confer and
    § 3771(c)’s related notice obligation apply to the period before a charging
    104
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    instrument is filed. See United States v. BP Prods. N. Am. Inc., No. H-07-433,
    
    2008 WL 501321
     at *11-15 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2008). We should join our Fifth
    Circuit sister.
    F. Majority’s Slippery Slopes and Policy Arguments
    The Majority invokes a parade of horribles—“a jarring result”—that it
    believes would follow if (1) the CVRA was interpreted to grant crime victims the
    right to confer with the government’s attorney before an indictment is filed and
    (2) courts were “[f]reed from any line limiting the Act’s applicability” to post-
    charge court proceedings. Maj. Op. at 31, 47. The Majority suggests that
    interpreting § 3771(d)(3)’s “no prosecution is underway” clause to mean that
    CVRA rights attach pre-charge would open the floodgates to victim lawsuits
    seeking to make prosecutors consult with victims before “law-enforcement officers
    conduct a raid, seek a warrant, or conduct an interrogation[.]” Id. at 36. The
    Majority also posits that interpreting the CVRA to grant rights during the
    “investigation” of a crime would “require law-enforcement officers to ‘confer’
    with victims . . . before conducting a raid, seeking a warrant, making an arrest,
    interviewing a witness, convening a lineup, or conducting an interrogation.” Id. at
    31.
    Like all slippery slope arguments, the soundness of the Majority’s position
    depends on “an empirical prediction that a proposed rule will increase the
    105
    Case: 19-13843      Date Filed: 04/14/2020    Page: 106 of 120
    likelihood of some other undesired outcome occurring.” See B.H. ex rel. Hawk v.
    Easton Area Sch. Dist., 
    725 F.3d 293
    , 317 (3d Cir. 2013); Frederick
    Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 
    99 Harv. L. Rev. 361
    , 381 (1985) (“[A] persuasive
    slippery slope argument depends for its persuasiveness on temporally and spatially
    contingent empirical facts,” and “without empirical evidence” of an underlying
    reality, “the slippery slope argument has nothing on which to stand.”). Yet, the
    Majority offers no empirical basis for its slippery slope arguments or its professed
    need to add, by judicial fiat, a bright-line, post-indictment restriction on the
    CVRA’s plain text.
    What’s more, the actual facts show the Majority’s feared hypotheticals are
    pure conjecture. For 12 years, it’s been the rule in the Fifth Circuit that crime
    victims have the right to confer with the government’s attorney before formal
    criminal proceedings have commenced. Yet there is no evidence whatsoever that
    federal prosecutors in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi must confer with crime
    victims before law-enforcement officers “conduct[] a raid, seek[] a warrant, mak[e]
    an arrest, interview[] a witness, conven[e] a lineup, or conduct[] an interrogation.”
    And in the nine years since the District Court’s 2011 opinion in this case—also
    holding that crime victims have the right to confer with government’s attorney pre-
    charge—we haven’t seen reports that federal prosecutors in the Southern District
    106
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    of Florida are conferring with victims before law enforcement conducts a raid or
    convenes a lineup, for example. The Majority’s misgivings are illusions.
    G. Limiting Principles in the CVRA
    Besides lacking empirical plausibility, the Majority’s feared hypotheticals
    are legally implausible and ignore several limiting criteria contained in the text of
    the CVRA itself. In this regard, here are the Majority’s stated worries: (1) if a
    victim’s rights can attach pre-charge, then there is “no logical stopping point” and
    no “limiting criterion,” see Maj. Op. at 36, 52; (2) “there is essentially no limit to
    the sorts of pre-charge relief that an enterprising movant [victim] could seek—or
    that an innovative judge might grant,” see id at 48 n.24; and (3) if crime victims
    have rights pre-charge, then courts would intrude on prosecutorial discretion
    because: “Freed from any line limiting the Act’s applicability to the post-charge
    phases of a prosecution, courts would be empowered to issue injunctions requiring
    (for instance) consultation with victims before raids, warrant applications, arrests,
    witness interviews, lineups, and interrogations,” see id. at 47.
    While the Majority scrutinizes the text of § 3771(c)(1) and (d)(3) for its
    limiting principle and finds none for subsection (a)(5)’s conferral right, it
    conspicuously overlooks the text of the conferral right itself, which contains
    powerful limiting criteria. First, § 3771(a)(5)’s conferral right is with “the attorney
    for the Government in the case,” not with police or investigators. That alone
    107
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    resolves some of the Majority’s slippery slope concerns because the CVRA does
    not give crime victims the right to confer with anyone other than the government’s
    attorney.
    Second, and relatedly, as the Majority concedes, § 3771(a)(5)’s conferral
    right presupposes that a “readily identifiable” attorney for the government has been
    assigned to the case. As even the Majority recognizes, that also means the case has
    matured beyond the police investigative stage before the right applies.
    Third, § 3771(a)(5) grants crime victims the right to confer with the
    government’s attorney, but only to the extent that conferral is “reasonable.” The
    Majority summarily discards this reasonableness limitation as “squishy.” Maj. Op.
    at 31. Yet, a victim’s “reasonable right to confer” is a forceful limiting principle
    and embodies a common, workable legal standard that is sufficient to stave off the
    Majority’s speculations about “enterprising” crime victims and “innovative”
    judges. Reasonableness has long stood the test of time in limiting other actors’
    conduct. See, e.g., Hardy v. Cross, 
    565 U.S. 65
    , 69-70, 
    132 S. Ct. 490
    , 493-94
    (2011) (for purposes of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, the “lengths
    to which the prosecution must go to produce a witness” is a “question of
    reasonableness”); United States v. Banks, 
    540 U.S. 31
    , 35-36, 
    124 S. Ct. 521
    , 524-
    25 (2003) (for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the execution of a warrant is
    subject to a reasonableness standard); Ohio v. Robinette, 
    519 U.S. 33
    , 39, 117 S.
    108
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    Ct. 417, 421 (1996) (“We have long held that the ‘touchstone of the Fourth
    Amendment is reasonableness.’”); Kyles v. Whitley, 
    514 U.S. 419
    , 432-33, 
    115 S. Ct. 1555
    , 1565 (1995) (under the Due Process Clause and Brady v. Maryland,
    
    373 U.S. 83
    , 
    83 S. Ct. 1194
     (1963), prosecutors must disclose all evidence, upon
    request, that is favorable to the defense, so long as the evidence is “material,”
    meaning it is reasonably probable that the result of the proceeding would have
    been different had the evidence been disclosed); Doggett v. United States, 
    505 U.S. 647
    , 651, 654, 656, 
    112 S. Ct. 2686
    , 2690, 2692-93 (1992) (in determining whether
    the government violated a defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial right, courts
    must consider, inter alia, whether any delays attributable to the prosecution were
    reasonable); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 
    490 U.S. 401
    , 413, 
    109 S. Ct. 1874
    , 1881
    (1989) (prison regulations affecting the sending of publications to prisoners must
    be analyzed under a reasonableness standard); Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 688, 
    104 S. Ct. 2052
    , 2065 (1984) (“The proper measure of attorney
    performance” under the Sixth Amendment “remains simply reasonableness under
    prevailing professional norms.”).
    Looking beyond the text of § 3771(a)(5), the conferral right is also subject to
    the CVRA’s express mandate that nothing in the Act “shall be construed to impair
    the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his
    direction.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (d)(6). Likewise, only a “crime victim” has the
    109
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    conferral right, which limits the right to a person “directly and proximately harmed
    as a result of the commission of a Federal offense.” 
    Id.
     § 3771(e). Taken together,
    these statutory provisions bound the conferral right, such that the Majority’s
    trepidations are too far-fetched to justify disregarding the CVRA’s plain text. The
    Majority does not cite a single factual incident or judicial decision where its
    apprehensions have become reality. Despite its best efforts, the Majority has
    identified no reason to contravene the CVRA’s plain text as Congress enacted it.
    Because the Majority’s blanket restriction denies victims all conferral rights
    during the pre-charge period, the Majority admits that its rule “will not prevent
    federal prosecutors from negotiating ‘secret’ plea and non-prosecution
    agreements” pre-charge. Maj. Op. at 52. In light of the public outcry about the
    Epstein case, the Majority says it “can only hope” that prosecutors “will not do
    so.” Id. at 52-53. Let’s distill this further. The Majority is more afraid of a future
    “crime victim” potentially asking a “readily identifiable” government “attorney” to
    confer “reasonably” with her pre-charge, than it is of secret pre-charge plea deals
    for wealthy defendants, even though it’s now common practice for them to seek
    the best plea deal in advance of indictment. The Majority’s new blanket restriction
    eviscerates crime victims’ CVRA rights and makes the Epstein case a poster-child
    for an entirely different justice system for crime victims of wealthy defendants.
    110
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    Rather than rewriting the CVRA to protect against so-called “enterprising”
    victims and “innovative” judges, this Court should: (1) recognize that the CVRA’s
    text already contains powerful limiting principles—“a reasonable right to confer”
    only “with the attorney for the Government in the case,” granted only to defined
    “crime victims” and without impairment of prosecutorial discretion; (2) enforce the
    plain text of § 3771(a)(5) and (a)(8) in this case; (3) hold that the Office’s
    prosecutor in the case had an obligation to confer with Epstein’s victims, given the
    investigation was completed, the 53-page indictment was drafted, and the
    prosecutor was already conducting pre-charge plea negotiations with Epstein’s
    defense team; and (4) conclude that the Office violated the victims’ right to be
    treated fairly by not disclosing the signed NPA before the State Court hearing and
    by misrepresenting the case status to the victims.
    H. Concurring Opinion
    Now, my brief response to my colleague’s Concurring Opinion. His
    Opinion submits that “the Executive Branch has exclusive power over
    prosecutorial decisions” and that “authority obviously includes the
    decision . . . whether to seek, or not seek, an indictment from the grand jury,” both
    propositions with which I wholeheartedly agree. Conc. Op. at 54-55.
    The Concurring Opinion contends, however, that “the model the dissent
    creates”—requiring the U.S. Attorney’s Office to confer with a victim about a
    111
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    criminal matter prior to indictment—(1) “raises serious questions about whether,
    by doing so, the judiciary would be violating the constitutional principle of
    separation of powers,” and (2) “would clearly interfere with the Executive
    Branch’s investigative and prosecutorial functions.” Id. at 54, 56. The Concurring
    Opinion further states: “The notion that a district court could have any input on a
    U.S. Attorney’s investigation and decision whether to bring a case to the grand jury
    is entirely incompatible with the constitutional assignment to the Executive Branch
    of exclusive power over prosecutorial decisions.” Id. at 57. The Opinion
    concludes, therefore, that “the CVRA is best understood as not applying until
    charges are commenced against a defendant” because “such an interpretation
    avoids raising serious constitutional questions.” Id. at 59.
    This Concurring Opinion is helpful because it highlights what is and what is
    not the issue in this appeal. First, nothing in the CVRA as Congress wrote it
    permits the district court to suggest to a U.S. Attorney any investigation or grand
    jury steps that he must take. The CVRA requirement is only that the prosecutor
    speak with the victim before making a final indictment decision. If a U.S.
    Attorney, after reasonably conferring with the victim, decides not to take the case
    to the grand jury, there will be no CVRA violation for the district court to remedy,
    and thus no “meddling in the Executive Branch’s” exclusive powers under the
    Constitution. See id. at 58.
    112
    Case: 19-13843    Date Filed: 04/14/2020   Page: 113 of 120
    Happily enough, my plain reading of the statute in no way injects judicial
    interference into a prosecutor’s decisions. In fact, not even the victims here claim
    they have any authority over a prosecutor’s decision as to who to indict or not
    indict, or for what crime. The victims’ bare-bones claim is only that the CVRA
    required a prosecutor in the Office to confer with them before making those
    weighty and final decisions. The fact that a prosecutor must confer with a victim
    pre-charge does not mean the district court can exercise any control over the
    prosecutor’s ultimate decision whether to indict.
    Here, after drafting a 53-page indictment, the U.S. Attorney’s Office spent
    not hours, but days conferring pre-charge with Epstein’s defense team. All the
    CVRA does is obligate the prosecutor to give the victims a reasonable opportunity
    to confer with them too. This is no impairment whatsoever on the prosecutor’s
    authority to decide whether to indict or not. The CVRA even expressly mandates
    that nothing in the Act “shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of
    the Attorney General or any officer under his direction.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3771
    (d)(6).
    At oral argument in this appeal, counsel arguing for the respondent U.S.
    Attorney’s Office agreed the constitutionality of the CVRA was not being
    challenged. With all due respect, this constitutional separation-of-powers concern
    is a red herring.
    113
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    Also, the canon of constitutional avoidance does not apply here because the
    CVRA is plain and unambiguous. See United States v. Stevens, 
    559 U.S. 460
    ,
    481, 
    130 S. Ct. 1577
    , 1591-92 (2010) (providing that courts cannot “rely upon the
    canon of construction that ‘ambiguous statutory language [should] be construed to
    avoid serious constitutional doubts’” unless the statute is first ambiguous). As the
    Supreme Court recently explained, “[s]potting a constitutional issue does not give
    a court the authority to rewrite a statute as it pleases.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 538
    U.S. __, __ 
    138 S. Ct. 830
    , 843-44 (2018) (declining to apply the canon of
    constitutional avoidance because the statutory language at issue was not
    ambiguous). Instead, constitutional avoidance serves the “basic democratic
    function of maintaining a set of statutes that reflect, rather than distort, the policy
    choices that elected representatives have made.” Almendarez-Torres v. United
    States, 
    523 U.S. 224
    , 237-38, 
    118 S. Ct. 1219
    , 1277-28 (1998). To that end, the
    Supreme Court has cautioned that, “rewrit[ing] a law to conform it to constitutional
    requirements . . . would constitute a serious invasion of the legislative domain.”
    Stevens, 
    559 U.S. at 481
    , 130 S. Ct. at 1592.
    Another observation. The Concurring Opinion insists the problems it
    identifies would not exist post-charge because, in that case, the district court would
    not be “imposing a condition upon his prosecutorial discretion.” Conc. Op. at 57-
    58. But a government attorney makes all sorts of discretionary prosecutorial
    114
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    decisions following an indictment, chief among them whether to enter into a plea
    agreement with the accused and potentially dismiss some or all of the charges.
    Thus, to the extent the Concurring Opinion perceives separation-of-powers issues
    with a district court ordering the government’s attorney merely to confer with
    victims about prosecutorial discretionary decisions, it is not clear why the
    Majority’s post-indictment restriction avoids those issues, given the victims can
    complain about lack of conferral following an indictment too.
    In any event, the Concurring Opinion usefully illustrates the importance of
    the CVRA’s mandate in § 3771(d)(6)—nothing in the Act “shall be construed to
    impair . . . prosecutorial discretion”—as yet another forceful limiting principle in
    the CVRA text that alleviates any need for the Majority to transplant its very
    substantive and temporal restriction on top of the plain text of § 3771(a)(5) and
    (a)(8).
    X. REMEDY
    To remedy the Office’s proven CVRA violations, the victims proposed the
    following: (1) an order scheduling a public hearing in the Southern District of
    Florida in which the victims could participate and present victim-impact statements
    to the District Court; (2) discovery of records regarding law-enforcement’s
    investigation of the crimes against the victims; (3) discovery of records explicating
    why the U.S. Attorney’s Office decided to grant Epstein federal immunity; (4) the
    115
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    Department of Justice’s designation of a representative to explain the Office’s
    decision to resolve the Epstein case without any federal prosecution; (5) mandatory
    CVRA training for criminal prosecutors in the Office; (6) a requirement that the
    Office use its best efforts to provide victims (who request it) accurate and timely
    notice of future case events regarding Epstein’s crimes; and (7) sanctions,
    attorney’s fees, and restitution.
    Yet before the District Court ruled on the remedies, Epstein died on August
    10, 2019. On September 16, 2019, the District Court directed the Clerk to “close
    the case and all pending motions are denied as moot.” Because the Office could no
    longer prosecute the intervenor Epstein, the victims’ additional remedy requests—
    such as rescission of the NPA as to him—were clearly moot. However, as the
    victim petitioner argues before us, this civil case remains live as between the
    victims and the Office with respect to the victims’ other requested remedies.
    Accordingly, I would remand this case to the District Court to fashion a
    remedy for the proven CVRA violations. Federal courts have had broad authority
    to fashion equitable remedies after petitioners have proven a violation of statutory
    provisions. Hardison v. Cohen, 
    375 F.3d 1262
    , 1266 (11th Cir. 2004); Nichols v.
    Hopper, 
    173 F.3d 820
    , 824 (11th Cir. 1999); Ala. Hosp. Ass’n v. Beasley, 
    702 F.2d 955
    , 962 (11th Cir. 1983) (in light of statutory violation, we “accordingly remand
    to the district court so that it may devise an appropriate equitable remedy”).
    116
    Case: 19-13843       Date Filed: 04/14/2020       Page: 117 of 120
    Furthermore, it has long been an “indisputable rule, that where there is a
    legal right, there is also a legal remedy.” Marbury v. Madison, 
    5 U.S. 137
    , 163
    (1803) (quoting 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *23). For that reason,
    “[w]here legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a
    general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy
    to make good the wrong done.” Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 
    503 U.S. 60
    ,
    66, 68-69, 
    112 S. Ct. 1028
    , 1033-34 (1992) (rejecting government’s argument that
    courts have abandoned the general rule that all appropriate relief is available to
    vindicate a federal right); Bruschi v. Brown, 
    876 F.2d 1526
    , 1531 (11th Cir. 1989)
    (taking “special note” the Supreme Court has made clear that “where federally
    protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that
    courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant necessary relief”). 23
    In closing the case, the District Court did mention that there had been an
    Epstein-related hearing in New York on August 27, 2019, but that was held after
    the remedy briefing here was completed. That hearing, scheduled on six days’
    notice, involved potential prosecution in New York for crimes in New York—not
    those in Florida. There is no evidence, and the District Court made no factual
    23
    In the remedy briefing, the Office did not appear to oppose the District Court’s ordering
    a public hearing in Florida in this case, at which the victims could make victim impact
    statements—an equitable remedy well within the District Court’s discretion. The District Court
    could preside over the public hearing in a manner similar to the way district courts handle victim
    impact statements in the context of a criminal sentencing.
    117
    Case: 19-13843        Date Filed: 04/14/2020       Page: 118 of 120
    findings, about what transpired at the New York hearing. The Office’s claim on
    appeal that the New York hearing was a sufficient remedy for its CVRA violations
    wholly lacks merit. 24
    Epstein’s death also heightened the need for the District Court to carefully
    examine the victims’ remedy request for document disclosure. Early on, the
    District Court denied certain document requests based on attorney-client privilege.
    Subsequently, in the course of the litigation, the U.S. Attorney’s Office made
    numerous representations about its deliberations, both internally and externally
    with Epstein’s attorneys, including a detailed affidavit from a line prosecutor
    purporting to describe those deliberations. Thereafter, the victims filed motions
    claiming that the Office had waived, in whole or in part, the work-product
    privilege given what the Office itself had now filed and how the Office sought to
    defend its conduct in this case. The District Court never made a waiver ruling, or
    any document-by-document findings, as to this remedy request. If anything, the
    informational remedies sought by the victims have enhanced importance now.
    Mysteries still exist about how Epstein and his co-conspirators escaped federal
    24
    In closing the case as moot in light of Epstein’s death, the District Court sua sponte
    concluded the co-conspirators had become necessary and indispensable parties and their
    participation as parties was now needed to afford the victims any relief. Prior to Epstein’s death,
    no one contended that the victims needed to join the co-conspirators as indispensable parties to
    this action. Because the District Court did not afford the victims notice and at least an
    opportunity to consider whether to move to join the four named co-conspirators, the petitioner
    victim asks for a remand on this remedy issue too.
    118
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    prosecution for multiple sex-trafficking crimes against over 30 minor girls in
    Florida.25
    XI. CONCLUSION
    While the Majority laments how the national media fell short on the Jeffrey
    Epstein story, this case is about how the U.S. prosecutors fell short on Epstein’s
    evil crimes. See Maj. Op. at 6. Our criminal justice system should safeguard
    children from sexual exploitation by criminal predators, not re-victimize them.
    The Majority concludes that our Court is constrained to leave the victims
    “emptyhanded,” and it is up to Congress to “amend the Act to make its intent
    clear.” Id. at 19, 52. Not true. The empty result here is only because our Court
    refuses to enforce a federal statute as Congress wrote it. The CVRA is not as
    impotent as the Majority now rewrites it to be.
    Given the undisputed facts that the U.S. Attorney’s Office completed its
    investigation, drafted a 53-page indictment, and negotiated for days with Epstein’s
    defense team, the Office egregiously violated federal law and the victims’ rights by
    (1) not conferring one minute with them (or their counsel) before striking the final
    NPA deal granting federal immunity to Epstein and his co-conspirators,
    25
    In closing the case as to the victims’ request for attorney’s fees, the District Court did
    not cite the Hyde Amendment or any legal standard. See Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 105-
    119, § 617, 
    111 Stat. 2440
    , 2519 (1997) (reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, historical and statutory
    notes). Some of the requested documents would shed further light on that issue. This is only to
    say these are potential remedies that are not moot, which the District Court should first explore
    further.
    119
    Case: 19-13843      Date Filed: 04/14/2020   Page: 120 of 120
    (2) intentionally and unfairly concealing the NPA from the victims, as well as how
    the upcoming State Court plea hearing would directly affect them, and
    (3) affirmatively misrepresenting the status of the case to the victims after the NPA
    was executed. I would remand for the District Court to fashion a remedy.
    For all of these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s
    (1) decision that the crime victims of Epstein and his co-conspirators had no
    statutory rights whatsoever under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, and (2) denial of
    the victims’ petition in this case as a matter of law.
    120