Quality of Life, Corp. v. The City of Margate ( 2020 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 18-14443
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 0:17-cv-61894-BB
QUALITY OF LIFE, CORP.,
formerly known as
Margate Rehabilitation Center,
MMJ FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
versus
THE CITY OF MARGATE,
Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(February 28, 2020)
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Before NEWSOM, TJOFLAT, and GINSBURG,* Circuit Judges.
NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:
This case arises from a protracted zoning dispute between Quality of Life
and MMJ Financial Services (two Florida entities owned by Miryam Jimenez to
which we’ll refer collectively as “Quality of Life”) and the City of Margate,
Florida. Quality of Life sought and received permission from the City to operate
an assisted-living facility for the elderly in an area zoned for residential use.
Rather than following through with that plan, though, Quality of Life decided to
open a drug-detoxification facility and insisted that the City’s green light to operate
an assisted-living facility also permitted it to operate a detox. When the City
opposed its change of plans, Quality of Life took the dispute to court, alleging that
the City’s actions were motivated by discrimination against people in recovery.
Having lost at summary judgment in the district court, Quality of Life argues on
appeal (1) that the City’s actions violated the Fair Housing Act and the Americans
with Disabilities Act, (2) that the City is estopped from preventing it from
operating as a drug-detox facility, (3) that the district court didn’t properly address
its declaratory and injunctive relief claims, and (4) that the district court erred in
denying its motion for reconsideration.
*
Honorable Douglas H. Ginsburg, United States Circuit Judge for the D.C. Circuit, sitting by
designation.
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We reject each of Quality of Life’s contentions. We therefore affirm the
district court’s orders granting the City’s motion for summary judgment and
denying Quality of Life’s motion for reconsideration.
I
In any given zone within the City of Margate, there are three categories of
uses: (1) permitted use (i.e., the use is allowed as of right), (2) special-exception
use (i.e., the use is allowed, so long as the City approves it), and (3) prohibited use
(i.e., the use isn’t allowed in the zoning district at all). Quality of Life owns the
property at issue, which is located in a multi-family residential zoning district.
Quality of Life’s founder, Miryam Jimenez, sought a special-exception use
from the City to operate an assisted-living facility on the property. In her
application, and when appearing before the City’s governing bodies, Jimenez
repeatedly represented that she was applying to open an independent- or assisted-
living facility for the elderly. The City Commissioners voted 5-0 in favor of
approving Jimenez’s application.
After this approval, though, Jimenez notified the City that she instead
wanted to open a drug-detoxification facility and began representing to others that
she would do so. For example, she put up a sign in front of the property stating
“COMING SOON MARGATE DETOX” and submitted building plans to the City
that included labels such as “Margate Rehabilitation Center” and references to
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inpatient treatment areas. The City rejected the building plans, giving as its reason
that the “[s]pecial exception approval was given for [an] independent living
facility.”
The City sought assurances from Jimenez that she would not operate a detox
facility without the City’s approval. Jimenez tendered an affidavit (requested by
the City, but prepared by her attorney), in which she swore (1) that she “intend[ed]
to operate a group care facility, as defined by the City of Margate Code of
Ordinances, and as approved in City Resolution No. 15-010,” which had approved
her special-use application, and (2) that she would “not operate a detoxification
facility from the Property without the prior approval of the City.” Jimenez also
revised her building plans, changing the project’s name from “Margate
Rehabilitation Center” to “Quality of Life,” and removing references to doctor’s
offices, exam rooms, and a laboratory. The City subsequently approved the
building plans as satisfying the “Institutional Group I-2 standards” of Florida’s
Building Code, which are used for both medical and residential properties.
Despite the affidavit and revised building plans, Jimenez continued to pursue
a detox facility. She contended that the special-exception use that the City had
granted her to open an assisted-living facility also allowed her to open a drug-detox
facility. In a letter to the City, Jimenez acknowledged that she had said “under
oath that [she would] not operate a Detoxification facility” without the City’s
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approval. Jimenez explained, however, that because there was a state-imposed
moratorium on hospital beds, 1 she wanted to use her existing special exception to
open a detox, which, according to her, wouldn’t require “chang[ing] the zoning
since the facilities are equivalent in nature.”
When the City refused Jimenez’s requests to open a detox under her existing
approval, she—through Quality of Life—sued. As relevant here, Quality of Life
claimed violations of the Fair Housing Act and Americans with Disabilities Act,
argued that the City was estopped under state law from rejecting Jimenez’s request,
and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. After dueling motions, the district
court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of the City and denied Quality
of Life’s motion for reconsideration.
This is Quality of Life’s appeal.2
II
A
We first examine Quality of Life’s argument that the City discriminated
against it in violation of the Fair Housing Act and the Americans with Disabilities
1
The district court’s summary judgment order states that the moratorium didn’t apply to
assisted-living facilities, so it apparently wouldn’t have prevented Jimenez from opening one.
2
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and “construe all reasonable
doubts about the facts in favor of” Quality of Life, as the non-movant. Michael Linet, Inc. v.
Village of Wellington, 408 F.3d 757, 761 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). We review a
district court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. Rodriguez v. City
of Doral, 863 F.3d 1343, 1349 (11th Cir. 2017).
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Act. The FHA prohibits, among other things, discrimination on the basis of a
handicap in the sale, rental, and financing of “dwellings” and in other housing-
related matters. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f); see also Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island,
544 F.3d 1201, 1212 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988 amended the FHA to add the handicapped as a protected
class). Title II of the ADA prohibits public entities from discriminating against
individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County,
480 F.3d 1072, 1081 (11th Cir. 2007). 3
Quality of Life asserts violations of the FHA and ADA under three theories:
(1) disparate treatment, (2) disparate impact, and (3) failure to provide a reasonable
accommodation. See, e.g., Schwarz, 544 F.3d at 1216–28 (analyzing a plaintiff’s
FHA claims under each theory); Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Lamone, 813 F.3d 494,
503 n.5 (4th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “Title II [of the ADA] allows plaintiffs to
pursue three distinct grounds for relief”). We’ll consider each theory in turn.4
3
It’s unclear whether the property at issue—as Quality of Life presents it, at least—constitutes a
“dwelling” and therefore whether the FHA applies. We have held that “the longer the typical
occupant lives in a building, the more likely it is that the building is a ‘dwelling.’” Schwarz, 544
F.3d at 1215. In Schwarz, we decided that halfway houses were “dwellings” in part because
guests stayed “six to ten weeks.” Id. at 1215–16. Quality of Life’s consultant testified that a
patient’s stay in the detox facility “would be short term” and “anywhere from five to 20 days.”
We needn’t resolve the issue here because even assuming that Quality of Life’s proposed detox
facility could be considered a “dwelling,” its FHA claims would fail for the reasons we explain
in text.
4
The district court analyzed Quality of Life’s FHA and ADA claims together. The parties
likewise don’t differentiate between the FHA and ADA claims on appeal, relying on cases
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1
To succeed on its disparate-treatment claim, Quality of Life must show that,
because of the disabilities of its potential clients, it “has actually been treated
differently than similarly situated non-handicapped people.” Schwarz, 544 F.3d at
1216. Quality of Life could prove disparate treatment through either direct or
circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton County,
466 F.3d 1276, 1283 (11th Cir. 2006). If direct evidence is put forward, the
inquiry is straightforward; if circumstantial evidence is presented, however, we
analyze the evidence through the burden-shifting framework provided in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, which requires a plaintiff to first make a
prima facie case of discrimination. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Cinnamon
Hills Youth Crisis Ctr., Inc. v. Saint George City, 685 F.3d 917, 920 (10th Cir.
2012) (Gorsuch, J.) (applying McDonnell Douglas to FHA and ADA claims).
arising under both statutes as well as other federal anti-discrimination laws. While courts often
analyze FHA and ADA claims in tandem, see, e.g., Cinnamon Hills Youth Crisis Ctr., Inc. v.
Saint George City, 685 F.3d 917, 919 (10th Cir. 2012) (Gorsuch, J.) (analyzing FHA, ADA, and
Rehabilitation Act claims together); Caron Found. of Fla., Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 879 F.
Supp. 2d 1353, 1364 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (“Due to the similarity of the ADA and the FHA’s
protections of individuals with disabilities in housing matters, courts often analyze the two
statutes as one.”), we note that the standards governing the FHA and ADA aren’t the same in all
respects, see, e.g., Schwarz, 544 F.3d at 1212 n.6 (stating that “there are important differences”
between the FHA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADA, including that “coverage under the FHA
is limited to statutorily defined ‘dwellings’”). Fortunately for us, any differences between the
two statutes have no impact on our analysis here; therefore, we’ll address the FHA and ADA
claims together.
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Quality of Life argues that it has presented direct and circumstantial
evidence of disparate treatment in the form of (a) statements from City officials
and the City’s administrative acts, (b) the “facially discriminatory” language of
City Zoning Ordinance § 16.2(B), and (c) an amendment to the zoning code that
added detoxification facilities as a permitted use in community-facility zones, but
“limit[ed] detoxification facilities” to such zones. We’re unpersuaded. As we’ll
explain, Quality of Life has not put forward either direct or circumstantial evidence
of discrimination.
a
Quality of Life contends that statements made by City officials and some of
the City’s administrative acts constitute evidence of disparate treatment. We first
consider Quality of Life’s argument regarding City of Margate Mayor Arlene
Schwartz’s deposition, in which she testified (1) that having a sober house or a
drug-recovery facility in a residential community “would be a concern as much as
any sexual predator . . . who lives in my neighborhood,” and (2) that a drug-detox
facility may have a greater impact on the neighborhood because of “the
clientele”—i.e., “people in a medical detox could be a possible danger because
their condition is far more critical and possibly far more dangerous than people in a
skilled nursing facility.”
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Though Schwartz’s first statement is a little jarring, the larger context of the
deposition indicates that her fundamental concern was about businesses or other
entities in residential zones. Schwartz said that she would want to know if a detox
facility was coming into her neighborhood because “residential is zoned that way
for a reason” and that she probably wouldn’t want a general practitioner’s office in
her neighborhood either “if it wasn’t zoned that way.” Schwartz’s second
comment, in context, likewise doesn’t reveal discriminatory intent. In the
deposition, Quality of Life’s attorney defined “detox” for Schwartz as “a
facility . . . where people who have significant levels of drugs or alcohol in their
system go for medical care, tranquilizing and other care, until the drugs and
alcohol work their way out of the system.” Given this definition, Schwartz’s
comment that detox-facility patients have a “far more critical and possibly far more
dangerous” condition seemed to recognize that, in withdrawing from harmful
substances, such patients are in a vulnerable position and require medical attention.
And when stating that detox-facility patients may be a “possible danger,” Schwartz
specified that she thought they could pose a danger to “themselves,” as well as
others, “because [of] their condition.” In addition, these comments were made
during a deposition—not while Schwartz was “explaining [her] basis for the
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contested decision”—which renders them even less persuasive. 5 See Cinnamon
Hills, 685 F.3d at 920.
Quality of Life also asserts that the City’s administrative acts—specifically,
the City’s request that Jimenez sign an affidavit and the noted restriction on her
property’s certificate of occupancy—evidence disparate treatment. Not so. The
City sought assurances from Jimenez through the affidavit only after she indicated
that she might use the City’s approval for an assisted-living facility to instead
operate a detox. Moreover, the affidavit was prepared by Jimenez’s attorney.
Quality of Life’s argument about the certificate of occupancy fares no better. The
City specified “no medical detox” on the certificate of occupancy because of its
concern that Jimenez might use the certificate to seek licensure from the state to
operate a detox facility—a use that Jimenez had never applied for and that the City
had never approved. The City’s acts constitute neither direct nor circumstantial
evidence of disparate treatment.
b
Quality of Life further argues that § 16.2(B)—the City’s zoning ordinance
governing special-exception uses for residential zones—is facially discriminatory.
5
To the extent that Quality of Life argues that it was the fear and bias of private citizens that
drove the City to prevent it from operating as a detox, we are unconvinced. “[E]vidence that
neighbors and city officials are biased against recovering substance abusers is irrelevant absent
some indication that the recoverers were treated differently than non-recoverers.” Schwarz, 544
F.3d at 1216–17. As we explain, Quality of Life has not made that showing.
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According to Quality of Life, the ordinance impermissibly applies different criteria
to special-exception uses for the elderly than it does to special-exception uses for
dependent children and the physically handicapped. More specifically, Quality of
Life points to language in § 16.2(B) that indicates special-exception uses catering
to dependent children and the physically handicapped, but not those catering to the
elderly, (1) must be designed for “sixteen (16) clients or less,” (2) are permitted
only if they don’t “provid[e] psychiatric care,” (3) and are subject to other impact-
related criteria. This, Quality of Life contends, “exclude[s] people in recovery
from [residential] zones.”
By alleging that § 16.2(B) is discriminatory, Quality of Life is, in effect,
challenging “[t]he basic purpose of zoning,” which “is to bring complementary
land uses together, while separating incompatible ones.” Schwarz, 544 F.3d at
1221. Even if a drug-detox facility wouldn’t be allowed in a residential zone
because of § 16.2(B), the City acknowledges that detox facilities are, and always
have been, allowed to operate in community-facility zones. Unlike other cases in
which zoning ordinances have been invalidated as facially discriminatory, the
City’s zoning ordinance doesn’t operate to ban detox facilities entirely. Cf. MX
Grp., Inc. v. City of Covington, 293 F.3d 326, 345 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that
“the blanket prohibition of all methadone clinics from the entire city is
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discriminatory on its face”). Section 16.2(B) is neither facially discriminatory nor
evidence of disparate treatment.
c
As its last piece of disparate-treatment evidence, Quality of Life contends
that a 2017 amendment to the City’s zoning code—which added “detoxification
facilities” as a permitted use in community-facility zones, alongside hospitals and
other long-term care facilities—is discriminatory.6 This amendment to the City’s
code isn’t evidence of disparate treatment. Under the City’s zoning categories, a
“permitted use” is a use allowed as of right. The addition of “detoxification
facilities” as a permitted use actually shows that the City’s zoning code expressly
permits detox facilities, albeit in certain zones. And as far as we can tell, nothing
would prevent Quality of Life from seeking, through the City’s normal variance-
request procedures, that its property be re-zoned to a community-facility
designation so that it could support a detox facility.
2
Now, to Quality of Life’s disparate-impact claim. We’ve held that “the
relevant comparison for disparate impact purposes ‘is between (1) recovering
alcoholics and recovering drug abusers (“recoverings”) and (2) people who are
6
To the extent that Quality of Life asserts that other changes to the zoning code impacted its
approval to operate an assisted-living facility, the City responds that it advised Jimenez that the
prior approval for an assisted-living facility would not be affected by the changes.
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neither recovering alcoholics nor recovering drug abusers (“non-recoverings”).’”
Schwarz, 544 F.3d at 1217 (quoting Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire Dep’t, 352
F.3d 565, 577 (2d Cir. 2003)). “[I]t’s not enough to show that a few people are
affected by a policy—rather, the disparity must be substantial enough to raise an
inference of causation.” Schaw v. Habitat for Humanity of Citrus Cty., Inc., 938
F.3d 1259, 1274 (11th Cir. 2019). “Typically, a disparate impact is demonstrated
by statistics.” Hallmark, 466 F.3d at 1286; see also Schwarz, 544 F.3d at 1217
(explaining that “plaintiffs could have made a prima facie case of disparate impact
by providing statistical evidence” (quotation omitted)).
Quality of Life must demonstrate that the City’s zoning decisions had a
greater adverse impact on people in recovery (i.e., its potential clients) than those
not in recovery. It hasn’t made this showing. Quality of Life presented only one
entity, VIP Memory Care, as evidence of disparate impact. Because VIP is
allowed to provide medical services to “patients who suffer from memory loss” in
a residential zone, Quality of Life’s argument goes, the City’s decision to exclude a
detox facility (which also provides medical services) from the same residential
zoning category constitutes a disparate impact. But VIP isn’t a true comparator.
That entity received the exact same approval from the City that Quality of Life
received—permission to operate an assisted-living facility in a residential zone. In
order for the City’s treatment of VIP to constitute evidence of disparate impact,
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Quality of Life would’ve had to have applied to operate a detox and been rejected. 7
It didn’t do so. “Because [Quality of Life] has completely failed to present
relevant comparative evidence, the district court was right to reject its disparate
impact claim.” Schwarz, 544 F.3d at 1218.
3
Lastly, we address Quality of Life’s argument that the City failed to provide
a reasonable accommodation. We’ve held that “the duty to make a reasonable
accommodation does not simply spring from the fact that the handicapped person
wants such an accommodation made.” Schwarz, 544 F.3d at 1219 (quotation
omitted). A defendant must be “given an opportunity to make a final decision with
respect to [a plaintiff’s] request, which necessarily includes the ability to conduct a
meaningful review of the requested accommodation to determine if such an
accommodation is required by law.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Simply put, a
plaintiff must actually request an accommodation and be refused . . . .” Id.
Quality of Life’s first problem is that it didn’t request a reasonable
accommodation. It argues that Jimenez made two such requests: (1) a written
request in a March 28, 2017 letter to the City, in which she wrote that, although she
7
We similarly reject Quality of Life’s argument that it is its own “strongest comparator.” Even
if it could be a comparator with itself, Quality of Life would have had to have applied to operate
a detox facility and been rejected for there to be any comparison with its approved application to
operate an assisted-living facility.
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swore under oath that she would never operate a detox facility, she was now
“requesting that approval”; and (2) an oral request for a reasonable accommodation
at a May 3, 2017 meeting, when she told the City Commission that she was
planning on using the building as a detox and that she “would like a reasonable
accommodation” because she couldn’t get a license from the state to open an
assisted-living facility (due to the supposed moratorium).
We note initially that Quality of Life didn’t comply with the City’s
procedure for requesting reasonable accommodations. Even assuming that this
failure isn’t fatal to its claim,8 it suggests that Quality of Life didn’t provide the
City with the information that it needed to “conduct a meaningful review” of its
purported request. See Schwarz, 544 F.3d at 1219 (quotation omitted). Jimenez
may have suggested in the letter, or stated explicitly at the meeting, that she
wanted a “reasonable accommodation,” but importantly, she never fully explained
why the accommodation was reasonable or necessary to accommodate the detox
facility’s potential patients. Rather, Jimenez seems to have cast her requests to
8
In Schwarz, we acknowledged that “[s]everal courts have held that if there is a local procedure
(such as a variance process) through which the plaintiffs can obtain the accommodations they
want, they must use that procedure first and come away unsatisfied prior to filing suit in federal
court.” Schwarz, 544 F.3d at 1219 n.11. The Schwarz Court ultimately had “no occasion to
address the matter” because “the City d[id] not argue that there were any local procedures
available” to the plaintiffs in that case. Id. Here, by contrast, the City of Margate has had
reasonable-accommodation procedures in place since 2008.
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operate a detox as necessary to avoid what she took to be a state-wide moratorium
that prevented her from opening an assisted-living facility.
Quality of Life attempts to escape its failure to request a reasonable
accommodation by arguing that any efforts to do so would have been futile. It
argues that several comments made at the May 3, 2017 meeting—including
Commissioner Peerman’s statement that private citizens had opposed a different
detox facility—demonstrate futility. But at that same meeting, Mayor Ruzzano
suggested that Jimenez call the City to put her on the agenda, apparently for a
future meeting. The mayor didn’t say that Jimenez could never operate a detox.
Rather, he said “the thing is, right now, you cannot put the detox there,” while also
telling Jimenez that she could pick up the permit for the use that she was approved
for (an assisted-living facility). The lack of futility in this case is even more stark
when compared with a case on which Quality of Life relies, MX Group, Inc. v. City
of Covington. In that case, the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff had sufficiently
exhausted administrative remedies because he “had already faced substantial
opposition from city administrators” and the City had—after the plaintiff found a
new location for his methadone clinic—changed the city’s zoning code to bar such
a clinic “from opening in any zone in the city.” MX Group, 293 F.3d at 343–44.9
9
Quality of Life also asserts that the 2017 amendment to the zoning code is further evidence of
futility. As we have explained, see supra at 12, this argument fails.
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* * *
In sum, Quality of Life cannot show disparate treatment, disparate impact, or
that the City failed to provide a reasonable accommodation. The district court
didn’t err in granting summary judgment in favor of the City on Quality of Life’s
discrimination claims.
B
We next address Quality of Life’s claim that the district court erred in
granting summary judgement on its state-law estoppel claim. In Coral Springs
Street Systems, Inc. v. City of Sunrise, we explained that, under Florida law, vested
rights in something like a building permit can be created in two ways: (1) “when a
party has reasonably and detrimentally relied on existing law, creating the
conditions of equitable estoppel,” or (2) if detrimental reliance hasn’t been
demonstrated, “when the defendant municipality has acted in a clear display of bad
faith.” 371 F.3d 1320, 1334 (11th Cir. 2004). The “first and more common way a
vested right is created”—the doctrine of equitable estoppel—can be invoked
against a local government “when a property owner (1) in good faith (2) upon
some act or omission of the government (3) has made such a substantial change in
position or has incurred such extensive obligations and expenses that it would be
highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the right he acquired.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
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Quality of Life doesn’t dispute that it never applied to operate a detox
facility and that, accordingly, the City never gave its approval for such a use. See
Br. of Appellants at 52–53 (“[Quality of Life] did not obtain approval from the
City specifically for a detoxification facility, and [Quality of Life] did not allege
this.”). It instead asserts that it has “vested rights to offer onsite medical services.”
But Quality of Life applied to operate an “independent living facility,” which
would require only “one nurse practitioner” and “[o]ne RN on call 24/7.” When
appearing before the City Commission, Jimenez described her project as “an
assisted living facility” that would cater to “people that are mostly healthy.” And
while Jimenez stated that she would be “working with a doctor,” she explained
further that she would be “partnering up” with him because the doctor’s twin
brother (also a doctor) operated an assisted-living facility elsewhere in Florida.
The City approved Quality of Life’s application based on these representations.
The City consistently rejected Quality of Life’s attempts to operate a drug-
detox facility because that is not the use that the City had approved. Quality of
Life’s building plans were accepted by City officials only after Jimenez removed
labels (e.g., “Margate Rehabilitation Center” and references to inpatient treatment
areas) that indicated that she was attempting to build a drug-detox facility.
Although the building plans apparently met “Institutional Group I-2” standards
(which encompass medical facilities) under the Florida Building Code, such a
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distinction doesn’t change the zoning designation or the approved use. Thus,
Quality of Life cannot claim detrimental reliance because it is—and has always
been—the City’s position that Quality of Life could operate as an assisted-living
facility, but not as a drug-detox facility. Because Quality of Life cannot prove
equitable estoppel and there is no evidence that the City acted “in a clear display of
bad faith,” Coral Springs, 371 F.3d at 1334, Quality of Life’s vested-rights claim
fails.
C
Quality of Life also argues that the district court erred in “failing to address”
its request for declaratory and injunctive relief. Other than the blanket assertion
that the district court committed “reversible error,” Quality of Life doesn’t cite any
cases or flesh out its argument. By failing to explain its claim, we consider Quality
of Life’s argument to be abandoned. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.,
739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (“We have long held that an appellant
abandons a claim when he either makes only passing references to it or raises it in
a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority.”). Even if we
construed its briefs more liberally, the district court did address Quality of Life’s
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief—and it denied them. The district court
held that “[t]he declaratory and injunctive relief sought is neither necessary nor
warranted.” After deciding that the underlying FHA, ADA, and estoppel claims
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failed, neither injunctive nor declaratory relief could be granted. We therefore
affirm the district court’s denial of declaratory and injunctive relief.
D
We turn, finally, to examine Quality of Life’s last claim—that the district
court erred in denying its motion for reconsideration. Quality of Life devotes one
sentence to challenging the district court’s order by asserting that the district court
abused its discretion and that the errors “resulted in manifest injustice.” Quality of
Life cites only one case, Rodriguez v. City of Doral, 863 F.3d 1343, 1349 (11th
Cir. 2017), seemingly for the standard of review. This lack of explanation leads us
to consider this claim abandoned, as well. See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681. In any
event, the district court didn’t abuse its discretion. “A motion for reconsideration
cannot be used ‘to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that
could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.’” Richardson v. Johnson,
598 F.3d 734, 740 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of
Wellington, 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005)). The district court denied Quality
of Life’s motion because Quality of Life raised “many of the same arguments” as it
did at summary judgment, confirming that it merely disagreed with the district
court’s summary judgment order. Refusing Quality of Life’s attempt to get
another bite at the apple is not an abuse of discretion and we therefore affirm the
district court.
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III
In conclusion, the district court didn’t err in granting the City’s motion for
summary judgment. Quality of Life cannot show that the City discriminated
against it in violation of the ADA and FHA. The district court also properly
rejected Quality of Life’s state-law estoppel claim and its request for declaratory
and injunctive relief. Finally, the district court didn’t abuse its discretion in
denying Quality of Life’s motion for reconsideration.
AFFIRMED.
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