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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 19-12294
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:18-cv-01332-MCR-HTC
MICHAEL HOGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF FORT WALTON BEACH,
EDWARD J. RYAN,
in his official and individual capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(June 1, 2020)
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Before BRANCH, LUCK, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Hogan appeals the district court’s orders dismissing his complaint
and denying his motion for reconsideration in favor of the City of Fort Walton Beach
and its former police chief, Edward J. Ryan. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Hogan worked as a police officer for the City of Fort Walton Beach. In 2006,
one of Hogan’s arrestees was found lying in a pool of blood in a cell at the police
station. Sergeant Tom Matz was supposed to be watching the arrestee. Hogan asked
Matz what happened, and Matz said, “I didn’t see it.” As a joke, Hogan later put the
name “Det. Sgt. Tom ‘I didn’t see it’ Matz” in the signature block of a formal legal
document. The joke went unnoticed until after the document had already been filed
in court. Hogan was disciplined for the joke and then resumed his normal duties as
an officer.
In July 2016, Hogan applied for an open captain position with the city police
department. Hogan was interviewed by Ryan, the newly sworn chief of police. Ryan
asked Hogan about his disciplinary history but did not ask about the 2006 incident
with Matz. Ryan ultimately hired Tracy Hart for the position.
Shortly after, Hart called Hogan to meet with Ryan at the police department.
At the meeting, Ryan served Hogan with a notice of disciplinary hearing scheduled
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for the following day. Hogan appeared for the hearing with a union legal
representative and was immediately terminated. Hogan stated that his rights had
been violated and demanded the basis for his termination. Ryan said that the
decision was made based on Hogan’s 2006 disciplinary file, a letter that Ryan had
sent to the state attorney’s office, and an opinion letter he received in response.
Hogan asked for a copy of the relied-upon documents, and Ryan said he would
provide them. Two days later, Hogan received the documents and filed a request for
a disciplinary appeal hearing.
Ryan’s letter to the state attorney’s office solicited an opinion regarding
Hogan’s capacity to serve as a witness in criminal proceedings. Referring to the
2006 incident with Matz, Ryan wrote that Hogan had a “substantiated case of making
false statements concerning an employee during an internal investigation.” In
response, the state attorney’s office wrote an opinion letter that essentially rendered
Hogan Giglio-impaired. 1 The opinion letter remained in Hogan’s personnel file, and
he was no longer able to work in law enforcement as a result.
Hogan appeared for his disciplinary appeal hearing together with his union
legal representative. Also in attendance were Ryan, Hart, and a human resources
1
In Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972), the Supreme Court held that a
criminal defendant has a right to be informed of evidence affecting a government witness’s
credibility. Because law enforcement officers are typically called upon to serve as witnesses in
criminal proceedings, where there is evidence calling into question an officer’s credibility the
officer is sometimes referred to as being Giglio-impaired. Cf., e.g., Nguyen v. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec.,
737 F.3d 711, 712, 715–16 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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director. Hogan asked whether they had reconsidered his termination, but he was
told “no” and informed that he could not ask any further questions. Instead, Hogan
was permitted only to present his side of the story. Hogan asked Ryan about a notice
of intent to convene a complaint review board 2 but received no response. At the end
of the hearing, Hogan’s termination was upheld.
Later, Hogan again requested that a complaint review board be convened.
Acting in Ryan’s absence, Hart denied the request, explaining that Hogan was “not
under investigation, there were no external complaints, there was no internal
administrative investigation or interrogation[,] and there was no recommendation
through the chain of command for discipline.” The state attorney’s office likewise
refused to discuss Hogan’s termination with him.
Hogan sought a writ of mandamus in state court directing Ryan to convene a
complaint review board. The state court ruled that Hogan had no clear legal right to
have a complaint review board convened and dismissed Hogan’s complaint without
prejudice. Hogan then filed the complaint in this case in state court seeking a
declaratory judgment and damages against both the city and Ryan pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). Count one asserted a procedural due process violation
2
A complaint review board, empaneled pursuant to section 112.532(2), Florida Statutes,
serves to “provid[e] a law enforcement officer with a means of vindicating his actions and his
reputation against unjust and unjustifiable claims made against him by persons outside the agency
which employs him.” Migliore v. City of Lauderhill,
415 So. 2d 62, 64 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982),
aff’d,
431 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 1983) (emphasis added).
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of Hogan’s property right in his employment. Count two asserted a violation of
Hogan’s “Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights.” Specifically,
Hogan asserted that the city and Ryan “may not deprive [him] of fundamental rights
under the constitution” and that “[t]he constitutional protections afforded to [him]
are such that he has a property interest in his employment and good name.” Finally,
count seven asserted a conspiracy to violate Hogan’s civil rights. 3
The city and Ryan removed Hogan’s action to the Northern District of Florida
and moved to dismiss, arguing in part that Hogan failed to identify any protected
rights for his substantive due process claim. In response, Hogan admitted that “there
is no substantive right to a particular employment position” but claimed that “the
stigma to which [he] has been subjected, undermining his right to any position in his
chosen profession, is in fact protected by substantive due process.” The city and
Ryan then sought leave to file a limited reply, explaining that they did not brief
Hogan’s asserted liberty interest because that interest was not pleaded in Hogan’s
complaint. The district court agreed that Hogan had failed to plead a liberty interest
and permitted the city and Ryan to file a reply.
The district court later granted the city and Ryan’s motion to dismiss with
prejudice. The district court concluded that Hogan failed to state a procedural due
process claim in count one because “adequate state remedies existed” to protect his
3
The remaining counts were voluntarily dismissed and are not at issue on appeal.
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asserted interest. For instance, the district court noted that “a post-termination
administrative appeal was available to Hogan” and that “Hogan pursued this state
administrative remedy, by requesting an appeal, attending an appeal hearing with a
legal representative, and presenting arguments challenging his termination at the
appeal hearing.” The district court also noted that Hogan could have sought
“certiorari review” in a Florida state court.
As for count two, the district court concluded that Hogan did not adequately
plead a substantive due process claim based on a liberty right. The district court
determined that Hogan instead pleaded “a substantive due process claim based on
his alleged property right to employment.” The district court concluded that, as
pleaded, Hogan’s claim was “clearly foreclosed” by McKinney v. Pate,
20 F.3d
1550, 1560 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc), in which this court held that “an employee
with a property right in employment is protected only by the procedural component
of the Due Process Clause, not its substantive component.”
Finally, the district court concluded that Hogan failed to state a § 1985(3)4
conspiracy claim in count seven because he “failed to identify an underlying
constitutional right that was violated.” The district court further concluded that
4
Hogan’s complaint did not specify which subsection of § 1985 his claim was brought
under. The district court concluded that “neither . . . § 1985(1) nor (2), which prohibit conspiracies
to interfere with the duties of an officer of the United States and conspiracies to obstruct justice by
intimidating or threatening any party, witness, or juror, [we]re applicable.” We agree with the
district court’s assessment.
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Hogan failed to state a claim “because [Hogan’s complaint had] no allegations
showing, or even suggesting, racial or class-based discriminatory animus behind the
conspirators’ actions,” which the district court concluded was a requirement for a
§ 1985(3) claim. Moreover, the district court concluded that, “to the extent Hogan’s
§ 1985 claim [wa]s premised on a conspiracy between [the city] and Ryan, or
between any [city] employees, the claim [wa]s barred by the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine, which provides that ‘a corporation cannot conspire with its
employees, and its employees, when acting in the scope of their employment, cannot
conspire among themselves.’”
Hogan moved for reconsideration or, in the alternative, for leave to amend
count two of his complaint to include a reference to a “‘stigma plus’ liberty interest.”
The district court denied the motion. The district court rejected Hogan’s argument
that it “clearly erred in finding that he failed to adequately allege a substantive due
process claim based on a liberty-based interest.” The district court stated that
“Hogan did not so much as mention a liberty interest in Count II, and his allegations
of a constitutionally protected property interest combined with his general
allegations of reputational harm and Giglio impairment were insufficient to ‘give the
defendant[s] fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests.’”
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The district court likewise rejected Hogan’s claim that it “clearly erred in
dismissing Count II with prejudice.” The district court noted that Hogan “did not
seek leave to amend Count II until after [the] case was dismissed” and that it was
“not required to give Hogan leave to amend Count II sua sponte.” Even so, the
district court concluded that any amendment would have been futile, because Hogan
“could not state[] a substantive due process claim based on a ‘stigma-plus’ liberty
interest.” The district court concluded that “a ‘stigma-plus’ claim is only actionable
as a procedural due process claim, not as a substantive due process claim.” The
district court concluded that Hogan’s proposed amendment was both untimely and
futile for the same reasons.
The district court rejected Hogan’s claim that the district court clearly erred
in “considering arguments” in the city and Ryan’s reply to Hogan’s motion to
dismiss. The district court concluded that it was within its discretion to “consider
new arguments or facts in a reply brief” and that “Hogan opened the door” to the
arguments in the city and Ryan’s reply because Hogan did not identify his supposed
liberty interest until he did so in his response to their motion to dismiss. The district
court stated that “Hogan [could not] justifiably argue that he should . . . be allowed
to address [the city and Ryan’s] McKinney arguments, especially when he could
have requested leave to amend his complaint to correct the aforementioned
deficiencies or file a sur-reply to address [their] arguments.”
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Finally, the district court rejected Hogan’s claim that it “erred in dismissing
Count VII for failure to identify an underlying constitutional right that was violated.”
The district court disagreed for the reasons discussed it both of its orders. Moreover,
the district court noted “that it dismissed Count VII on multiple grounds, in addition
to Hogan’s failure to state a violation of an underlying constitutional right,” and that
Hogan “ma[de] no attempt to even address those separate grounds for dismissal in
his . . . motion.”
Hogan appealed both of the district court’s orders.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review the grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim de novo.” Henley v. Payne,
945 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2019). We
accept as true the allegations in Hogan’s complaint and construe them in the light
most favorable to Hogan.
Id. “We review the decision of the district court to grant
or deny a request for leave to amend for abuse of discretion.” Rosenberg v. Gould,
554 F.3d 962, 965 (11th Cir. 2009). We review the denial of a motion for
reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. Rodriguez v. City of Doral,
863 F.3d
1343, 1349 (11th Cir. 2017).
DISCUSSION
Hogan raises four issues on appeal: (1) whether the district court erred in
dismissing his procedural due process claim in count one; (2) whether the district
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court erred in dismissing his substantive due process claim in count two; (3) whether
the district court erred in dismissing his conspiracy claim in count seven; and (4)
whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Hogan leave to amend.
We address each issue in turn.
Dismissal of Hogan’s Procedural Due Process Claim
The district court dismissed Hogan’s procedural due process claim because it
concluded that Hogan had “adequate state remedies,” such as his post-termination
appeal hearing and certiorari review in a Florida state court. Hogan argues that no
such remedies were available. He argues that his post-termination appeal hearing
was inadequate because “[h]e was shut down and prohibited from asking questions,
and his requests for additional review were ignored.” He also claims that
“[c]ertiorari review was not available” because “there was no record from which
certiorari could be taken.”
To state a § 1983 procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must allege
“constitutionally-inadequate process.” Arrington v. Helms,
438 F.3d 1336, 1347
(11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). “[O]nly when the state refuses to provide a
process sufficient to remedy the procedural deprivation does a constitutional
violation actionable under section 1983 arise.”
McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1557; see also
Cotton v. Jackson,
216 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[A] section 1983 claim
is not stated unless inadequate state procedures exist to remedy an alleged procedural
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deprivation . . . .”). We agree with the district court that Hogan failed to plead the
lack of adequate state remedies.
Hogan’s disciplinary appeal hearing was an adequate state remedy. As Hogan
admitted in his complaint, he received notice of the basis for his termination.
Moreover, Hogan admitted that he was permitted to (and indeed did) “present facts
and/or information” at the hearing. In other words, he was afforded an opportunity
to present his case. Nothing more is required. While a post-deprivation hearing
must be “meaningful,” see Buxton v. City of Plant City,
871 F.2d 1037, 1042 (11th
Cir. 1989), there is no requirement that the employee be permitted to ask questions.
Instead, “courts have required only that the claimant be accorded notice of the
charges against him and an opportunity ‘to support his allegations by argument
however brief, and, if need be, by proof, however informal.’” Campbell v. Pierce
County,
741 F.2d 1342, 1345 (11th Cir. 1984) (quoting Memphis Light, Gas &
Water Div. v. Craft,
436 U.S. 1, 16 n.17 (1978)).
Certiorari review in a Florida state court was also an adequate state remedy.
McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1563–64 (holding that a defendant had an adequate state
remedy because he could have sought certiorari review in a Florida state court).
Hogan did not plead that this remedy was unavailable to him. Nor could he have.
Although he now argues that “there was no record from which certiorari could be
taken,” that argument is plainly contradicted by his admission that a disciplinary
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appeal hearing took place in which he was afforded an opportunity to present his
case. To the extent Hogan argues that the hearing was not transcribed or otherwise
recorded, he could have sought to prepare a “stipulated statement” of the record or
had a court reporter present at the hearing. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.200(a)(3); Fla. R.
App. P. 9.190(c)(6); see also Fla. R. App. P. 9.200(b)(4) (permitting parties to
prepare “a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means”).
Thus, Hogan has failed to state a procedural due process violation, and the district
court did not err in dismissing count one.
Dismissal of Hogan’s Substantive Due Process Claim
The district court dismissed Hogan’s substantive due process claim in part
because it found that Hogan’s asserted right—a “‘stigma-plus’ liberty interest”—
was not a fundamental right protected by substantive due process. We agree with
the district court that “a ‘stigma-plus’ claim is only actionable as a procedural due
process claim, not as a substantive due process claim.” Our precedent establishes
that stigma-plus claims are analyzed under a procedural due process framework.
Cannon v. City of West Palm Beach,
250 F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[A]
plaintiff claiming a deprivation based on defamation by the government must
establish the fact of the defamation “plus” the violation of some more tangible
interest before the plaintiff is entitled to invoke the procedural protections of the Due
Process Clause.” (emphasis added));
Cotton, 216 F.3d at 1330 (“[W]hen reputational
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damage is sustained in connection with a termination of employment, it may give
rise to a procedural due process claim . . . .” (emphasis added));
McKinney, 20 F.3d
at 1555, 1560 (holding that plaintiff’s allegations concerning loss of employment,
including allegations regarding his purported “liberty interest in his good name and
reputation,” only supported a procedural due process claim). Our sister circuits’
precedent establishes the same. See, e.g., Doe v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,
490
F.3d 491, 502 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Our review of the caselaw has failed to identify any
case that applies the stigma-plus test to a substantive due process claim.”); Segal v.
City of New York,
459 F.3d 207, 213 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[S]tigma plus is a species
within the phylum of procedural due process claims . . . .”). Accordingly, the district
court did not err in dismissing count two.
Dismissal of Hogan’s § 1985(3) Conspiracy Claim
The district court dismissed Hogan’s § 1985(3) conspiracy claim because
Hogan failed to identify an underlying constitutional right that was violated. This
was a sufficient basis for dismissal. See Denney v. City of Albany,
247 F.3d 1172,
1190 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Having concluded that Plaintiffs’ substantive claims fail on
the merits, their conspiracy claim fails as well because Plaintiffs would not have
been ‘deprived of any rights or privilege’ by the Defendants’ allegedly wrongful
acts.”); see also United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott,
463 U.S. 825, 833
(1983) (noting that § 1985(3) “provides no substantial rights itself” and that “[t]he
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rights, privileges, and immunities that § 1985(3) vindicates must be found
elsewhere” (citation omitted)).
Nevertheless, the district court also dismissed Hogan’s conspiracy claim
because the district court concluded that it was “barred by the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine.” We agree. “The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine holds that
acts of corporate agents are attributed to the corporation itself, thereby negating the
multiplicity of actors necessary for the formation of a conspiracy.” McAndrew v.
Lockheed Martin Corp.,
206 F.3d 1031, 1036 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). “Simply
put, under the doctrine, a corporation cannot conspire with its employees, and its
employees, when acting in the scope of their employment, cannot conspire among
themselves.”
Id. The doctrine applies to claims arising under § 1985(3),
id. at 1037–
38, and likewise “applies to public entities such as [a city] and its personnel,”
Denney, 247 F.3d at 1190. Although Hogan alleged in a conclusory fashion that the
city and Ryan, “together with others both inside [the city] and outside, intentionally
and unlawfully caused [Hogan] to be terminated in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment[] . . . and to become Giglio impaired,” Hogan failed to specifically
identify any actors outside the city. 5 Instead, Hogan specifically alleged that it was
the city and Ryan who “conspired to deprive [Hogan] of his property rights in his
5
To be clear, Hogan did not allege that the state attorney was involved in the conspiracy.
Indeed, Hogan alleged that “Ryan misrepresented the facts of [the] 2006 incident when he solicited
the State Attorney’s opinion.”
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employment by knowing of [Hogan’s] closed investigation and causing and/or
permit[ing] an investigation to be re-opened ten (10) years later, in violation of his
constitutional rights and to having him Giglio impaired.” “Our duty to accept the
facts in the complaint as true does not require us to ignore specific factual details of
the pleading in favor of general or conclusory allegations.” Griffin Indus., Inc. v.
Irvin,
496 F.3d 1189, 1205–06 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Fullman v. Graddick,
739
F.2d 553, 557 (11th Cir. 1984) (“A complaint may justifiably be dismissed because
of the conclusory, vague and general nature of the allegations of conspiracy.”).
Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing count seven.
Denial of Leave to Amend
The district court denied Hogan leave to amend his complaint because the
district court concluded that his request was untimely and futile. Both were valid
reasons to deny leave to amend. As already noted, Hogan could not assert a
substantive due process claim based on a “‘stigma plus’ liberty interest,” so his
amended complaint would still fail to state a claim. “[A] district court may deny a
motion for leave to amend as futile ‘when the complaint as amended would still be
properly dismissed.’” EEOC v. STME, LLC,
938 F.3d 1305, 1320 (11th Cir. 2019)
(citation omitted). Moreover, Hogan did not seek leave to amend until April 26,
2019—that is, after the district court had already entered judgment dismissing his
complaint and well after the mutually-agreed deadline of December 1, 2018 (which
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the district court adopted in its final scheduling order). Post-judgment, a plaintiff
may seek leave to amend only “if he is granted relief under Rule 59(e) or Rule
60(b)(6).” See United States ex rel. Atkins v. McInteer,
470 F.3d 1350, 1361 n.22
(11th Cir. 2006). And a party moving for leave to amend after the expiration of a
scheduling deadline must show “good cause” for why they could not diligently meet
the deadline. See Sosa v. Airprint Sys., Inc.,
133 F.3d 1417, 1418–19 (11th Cir.
1998). Here, Hogan failed to explain why he did not seek leave to amend before the
deadline—for instance, on August 7, 2008, when the district court explicitly
acknowledged that Hogan failed to plead a liberty interest. Thus, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying Hogan leave to amend.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not err in dismissing counts one, two, and seven. Nor
did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Hogan leave to amend.
AFFIRMED.
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