United States v. Louismar Francois , 661 F. App'x 587 ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •            Case: 16-10243   Date Filed: 09/09/2016   Page: 1 of 9
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 16-10243
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 9:15-cr-80152-DTKH-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    LOUISMAR FRANCOIS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (September 9, 2016)
    Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JORDAN, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 16-10243     Date Filed: 09/09/2016   Page: 2 of 9
    Louismar Francois appeals his 36-month sentence, imposed after he pled
    guilty to attempted exportation of a firearm, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 554
    (a). On
    appeal, Mr. Francois argues that the district court erred (1) in calculating his
    offense level using U.S.S.G. § 2M5.2(a)(1) instead of § 2K2.1; (2) by failing to
    consider the built-in departure provisions in § 2M5.2, application note 1; and (3) in
    imposing a below-guideline sentence because it was substantively unreasonable
    under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a). After a thorough review of the record and briefs, we
    affirm.
    I
    In June of 2015, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
    began investigating Mr. Francois after a confidential informant shared information
    that he was trafficking firearms from the United States to Haiti. Mr. Francois had
    made arrangements with the informant to buy five 9mm handguns. An undercover
    agent met with Mr. Francois to discuss shipping, and Mr. Francois explained that
    he would package the guns with other items—such as TVs, VCRs, and clothing—
    to conceal them from U.S. Customs. Mr. Francois told the undercover agent that he
    buys guns for $300 in the United States and sells them for $600 in Haiti; he also
    stated that he would need 10 more guns to ship the following month.
    On August 12, 2015, Customs agents seized and examined cargo that Mr.
    Francois was shipping to Haiti. They found four semi-automatic pistols hidden in
    2
    Case: 16-10243     Date Filed: 09/09/2016   Page: 3 of 9
    the cargo. Agents arrested Mr. Francois the next day. He admitted to packing the
    cargo, but denied knowing about the hidden guns. He later admitted his
    involvement, accepted responsibility, and expressed regret.
    In preparing the presentence investigation report, the probation officer
    calculated a base offense level of 26 under U.S.S.G. § 2M5.2(a)(1). Mr. Francois
    received a three-level reduction for accepting responsibility and a category I
    criminal history assignment, resulting in a total offense level of 23 and an advisory
    guideline range of 46 to 57 months in prison.
    At sentencing, Mr. Francois objected to the application of § 2M5.2(a)(1),
    arguing that the district court should apply § 2M5.2(a)(2), with a lower base
    offense level of 14, because §2M5.2 (a)(1) covers military weapons, missiles, and
    other explosives, and his case only involved handguns. The government responded
    that § 2M5.2(a)(2) was not applicable because Mr. Francois’ shipment exceeded
    two weapons. Mr. Francois also argued that rather than raising the base offense
    level from 14 to 26 for having four firearms instead of two, the district court
    should apply advisory guideline § 2K2.1 and impose a two-level increase for
    having between three and seven firearms.
    The district court overruled Mr. Francois’ objections to the base offense
    level, stating that “the guidelines are advisory, but the Court… really needs to look
    at the plain language and apply it.” The district court explained that it must look
    3
    Case: 16-10243   Date Filed: 09/09/2016   Page: 4 of 9
    first at the offense of conviction, which in this case was exportation of firearms,
    and then examine the Statutory Index of the Advisory Guidelines, which lists §
    2M5.2 as the appropriate sentencing guideline for Mr. Francois’ offense. Although
    the district court acknowledged there was a substantial difference between a base
    offense level of 14 and 26, it concluded that 26 was the appropriate offense level.
    Mr. Francois requested a downward variance under § 3553(a), arguing that
    his advisory sentencing range was too high considering the facts of the case and his
    lack of criminal history. He asked the court to analogize to § 2K2.1, which would
    result in a sentence within the range of 24 to 30 months. He asserted that under §
    2K2.1, he would have a base offense level of 14, a two-level increase for three-
    seven firearms, a four-level trafficking increase, and a three-level acceptance of
    responsibility reduction, resulting in an offense level of 17. Mr. Francois also
    argued that § 2M5.2 was intended to address activities that endangered national
    security or undermined United States foreign policy, and the facts of his case
    showed neither evidence of a threat to national security nor an effort to undermine
    foreign policy, so the court should take that in to consideration when computing
    his sentence.
    The district court evaluated the § 3553(a) factors and granted a downward
    variance to 36 months, a 10-month reduction from the bottom of the range
    calculated under § 2M5.2. The court stated: “[I]n this case, a sentence slightly
    4
    Case: 16-10243     Date Filed: 09/09/2016   Page: 5 of 9
    below the advisory guideline range would be a sentence that is sufficient, but not
    greater than necessary to achieve the goals that Congress has set forth.”
    II
    Legal interpretations of the advisory sentencing guidelines are reviewed de
    novo. See United States v. Bailey, 
    123 F.3d 1381
    , 1403 (11th Cir. 1997). A district
    court must determine which offense guideline covers the offense of conviction. See
    United States v. Belfast, 
    611 F.3d 783
    , 824 (11th Cir. 2010); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a).
    The district court identifies the appropriate offense guideline using the Statutory
    Index for the offense of conviction. See Belfast, 
    611 F.3d at 824
    ; U.S.S.G. §
    1B1.2(a). When a criminal statute has more than one corresponding guideline, the
    district court applies the guideline most appropriate for the conduct for which the
    defendant was actually convicted, and then determines the appropriate guideline
    range. See Belfast, 
    611 F.3d at 824
    .
    Mr. Francois first argues that the district court should have used § 2K2.1
    instead of § 2M5.2. We disagree. The Sentencing Guideline Manual lists four
    corresponding guidelines for a conviction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 554
    (a): §2B1.5, §
    2M5.2, and § 2Q2.1. See U.S.S.G. App. A. One of these, § 2M5.2, applies to the
    exportation of firearms, ammunition, or military equipment without a valid export
    license.
    5
    Case: 16-10243     Date Filed: 09/09/2016    Page: 6 of 9
    The district court did not err when it applied § 2M5.2. Mr. Francois pled
    guilty to a violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 554
    (a). The corresponding guideline in the
    statutory index that best matched Mr. Francois’ conviction was § 2M5.2. In
    contrast, § 2K2.1 is not listed in the statutory index for a violation of § 554.
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s ruling as to this issue.
    III
    We lack jurisdiction to review a district court’s refusal to grant a
    discretionary downward departure unless the district court incorrectly believed that
    it did not have the statutory authority to depart. See United States v. Norris, 
    452 F.3d 1275
    , 1282–83 (11th Cir. 2006). Barring an indication in the record to the
    contrary, we assume that the district court understood it has the authority to apply a
    downward departure. See United States v. Dudley, 
    463 F.3d 1221
    , 1228 (11th Cir.
    2006).
    Application note 1 of § 2M5.2 explains that the base offense level assumes
    that the conduct was or had the potential to be harmful to a United States security
    or foreign policy interest and notes that a downward departure may be applicable
    in the “unusual case” where no such harm or potential harm was present. See
    U.S.S.G. § 2M5.2, comment. (n.1). Mr. Francois argues the district court erred in
    failing to consider a departure under this application note.
    6
    Case: 16-10243     Date Filed: 09/09/2016    Page: 7 of 9
    We lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of whether a downward departure
    would have been appropriate under application note 1 to § 2M5.2 because there is
    no indication in the record that the district court believed it lacked the authority to
    grant one. Rather, the record suggests that no such departure was awarded because
    Mr. Francois never requested one. He only requested a downward variance,
    through an analogy to § 2K2.1, which the district court granted.
    IV
    We review the reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse of discretion
    standard. See Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 41 (2007). We review a
    sentence’s substantive reasonableness by examining the totality of the
    circumstances, which includes an inquiry into whether the § 3553(a) factors
    support the sentence. See United States v. Gonzales, 
    550 F.3d 1319
    , 1324 (11th
    Cir. 2008). The weight given to any specific § 3553(a) factor is left to the
    discretion of the district court. Id. A court can abuse its discretion when it (1) fails
    to consider relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives an improper
    or irrelevant factor significant weight, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in
    considering the proper factors. See United States v. Irey, 
    612 F.3d 1160
    , 1189
    (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of
    demonstrating that the sentence is substantively unreasonable. See United States v.
    Talley, 
    431 F.3d 784
    , 788 (11th Cir. 2005). A sentence well below the statutory
    7
    Case: 16-10243     Date Filed: 09/09/2016   Page: 8 of 9
    maximum is an indication of reasonableness. See United States v. Rosales-Bruno,
    
    789 F.3d 1249
    , 1256–57 (11th Cir. 2015).
    The district court must impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
    necessary, to comply with the purposes listed in § 3553(a).           In imposing a
    particular sentence the district court must consider the nature and circumstances of
    the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the need to reflect
    the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just
    punishment for the offense, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public from the
    defendant’s future criminal conduct. See § 3553(a)(1)–(2). The court must also
    consider the kinds of sentences available, the applicable guideline range, the
    relevant policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid
    unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to the
    victim. See § 3553(a)(3)–(7).
    Mr. Francois fails to demonstrate that the district court’s sentence is
    unreasonable under § 3553(a) and the totality of the circumstances. Although Mr.
    Francois’ offense involved “only” four handguns, his conversation with the
    undercover agent indicated that he was familiar with gun smuggling and that he
    intended to smuggle guns in the future. In Mr. Francois’ case, the district court felt
    that deterrence was necessary.     Mr. Francois’ sentence was a variance of 10
    months below the advisory guideline range and well below the statutory maximum
    8
    Case: 16-10243    Date Filed: 09/09/2016   Page: 9 of 9
    of 120 months. Although Mr. Francois argues that the court did not give enough
    weight to § 3553(a)(4) or (6), we do not find any abuse of discretion. See
    Gonzales, 
    550 F.3d at 1324
    . Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s sentencing
    order and find Mr. Francois’ sentence reasonable.
    V.
    Mr. Francois’ sentence is affirmed.
    AFFIRMED.
    9