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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 19-12831
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:99-cr-00125-KMM-4
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
EFRAIN CASADO,
a.k.a. E-4,
a.k.a. Efro,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(July 2, 2020)
Before JORDAN, NEWSOM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Efrain Casado, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of his motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that it was an unauthorized second
or successive motion to vacate his convictions and sentence under
28 U.S.C.
§ 2255. Casado contends that his motion was a proper Rule 60(b) motion because
it challenged a procedural defect in his earlier § 2255 proceedings, namely the
district court’s alleged failure to warn him under Castro v. United States,
540 U.S.
375 (2003) before it recharacterized his 2006
18 U.S.C. § 3582 motion as a § 2255
motion. After review, 1 we affirm the district court.
Rule 60(b) provides an avenue for a petitioner to seek relief from a final
civil judgment on several narrowly defined grounds. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
Rule 60(b) has a limited application in habeas proceedings and may not be used to
circumvent the prohibition on filing a successive § 2255 motion without our
permission. See Williams v. Chatman,
510 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2007).
A Rule 60(b) motion is properly treated as a successive § 2255 motion if it:
“(1) seeks to add a new ground of relief; or (2) attacks the federal court’s previous
1
We review questions of the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction de novo. United
States v. Al-Arian,
514 F.3d 1184, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008). “[W]e may affirm for any reason
supported by the record, even if not relied upon by the district court.”
Id. (quotations omitted).
“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and
will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States,
148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th
Cir. 1998).
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resolution of a claim on the merits.” See
id. at 1293-94 (quotations and emphasis
omitted). A Rule 60(b) motion is not treated as a successive § 2255 motion if it
attacks the integrity of the prior federal habeas proceedings, rather than the
substance of the court’s resolution of the claim on its merits. See id. at 1294.
Rule 60(b) motions must be filed within one year after entry of the
judgment, order, or proceeding being challenged if the motion is based on, inter
alia, mistake, newly discovered evidence, or fraud. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), (c)(1).
Rule 60(b) motions raised on other grounds must be brought “within a reasonable
time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). The determination of what constitutes a
reasonable time depends upon the facts of an individual case and, in making that
determination, courts are to consider whether the movant had justification for
failing to raise his claims sooner. Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co.,
542 F.2d 928,
930 (5th Cir. 1976).2
As an initial matter, contrary to the Government’s position, we have
jurisdiction over Casado’s appeal despite the lack of a certificate of appealability
(COA). No COA is required to appeal from the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion
where, as here, the district court construed the motion as an unauthorized second or
successive § 2255 motion and concluded that it lacked jurisdiction. See Hubbard
2
We are bound by cases decided by the former Fifth Circuit before October 1, 1981.
Bonner v. City of Pritchard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
3
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v. Campbell,
379 F.3d 1245, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding an order dismissing a
§ 2255 motion for lack of jurisdiction because it is an impermissible second or
successive § 2255 motion is not a final order for the purposes of
28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c) and thus does not require a COA).
Liberally construing Casado’s pro se Rule 60(b) motion, the district court
erred in construing it as an unauthorized successive § 2255 motion because Casado
was attacking the integrity of his prior § 2255 proceedings, as evidenced by his
claims that the judges in those proceedings were biased and that he was not given
Castro warnings. See Williams v. Chatman,
510 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2007)
(stating a Rule 60(b) motion should not treated as a successive § 2255 motion if it
attacks the integrity of the prior habeas proceedings rather than the resolution of
the merits of a claim). While Casado referenced his life sentence, in the context of
his entire motion, we construe his argument to be that the resolution of his claim is
of magnified importance given that he is serving a life sentence and that a motion
to vacate may be his only avenue to seek relief. And given Casado’s reference to
extraordinary circumstances, it seems likely that he was referring to our caselaw
requiring that motions under Rule 60(b)(6) demonstrate “circumstances []
sufficiently extraordinary to warrant relief.” See Cano v. Baker,
435 F.3d 1337,
1342 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted). Thus, because Casado’s motion was a
proper Rule 60(b) motion, the district court had jurisdiction to consider it.
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Moreover, because Casado’s motion was not a successive § 2255 motion,
§ 2244 and its limitations do not apply. See
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b); § 2255(h).
Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that § 2244(b) applies only where a court is
acting on a prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus, see Gonzalez v.
Crosby,
545 U.S. 524, 530 (2005), and Casado’s motion was not a successive
§ 2255 motion. Thus, § 2244(b)(1) did not provide an alternative basis for the
district court to dismiss Casado’s claims, even assuming they were substantially
the same as the claims he raised in his 2013 § 2255 motion.
Additionally, the law-of-the-case doctrine does not bar the claims Casado
raised in his Rule 60(b) motion. We have noted a motion judge’s ruling on a
motion for COA does not carry law-of-the-case import in a future appeal. See
Jones v. United States,
224 F.3d 1251, 1256 (11th Cir. 2000). That statement is
further supported by caselaw explaining that a decision on a COA motion is not a
merits decision on the issues raised themselves but, instead, addresses only
whether reasonable jurists would debate the district court’s resolution of the § 2255
motion. See Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). In essence, a single
judge’s order that does not address the merits of the issue should not bind a future
panel tasked with addressing the merits of the same issue. Thus, applying Jones,
we conclude that Casado’s claims were not barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine.
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Nonetheless, we may affirm on any ground supported by the record and,
although not addressed by the district court, Casado’s Rule 60(b) motion was
untimely. See United States v. Al-Arian,
514 F.3d 1184, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Whether the delay in bringing such a motion was
reasonable is a fact-intensive inquiry, see Lairsey,
542 F.2d at 930, and here,
Casado waited 12 years to file his Rule 60(b) motion challenging the proceedings
in his 2006 § 3582 motion that was recharacterized as a § 2255 motion. Casado
offered no justification for that delay in any of his filings in the district court or in
his brief on appeal. Accordingly, although the district court did not so rule, the end
result of concluding that Casado’s Rule 60(b) motion was untimely is the same—
the district court did not err by denying the motion, and we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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