Case: 19-13991 Date Filed: 07/07/2020 Page: 1 of 9
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 19-13991
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:18-cv-00512-LC-EMT
PATRICIA SHUE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(July 7, 2020)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, MARTIN and JILL PRYOR, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Patricia Shue appeals the district court’s order affirming the Social Security
Administration’s (the “Agency”) denial of her application for widow’s insurance
benefits. She claims that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) committed
Case: 19-13991 Date Filed: 07/07/2020 Page: 2 of 9
reversible error in finding that her conviction for involuntary manslaughter in
connection with her husband’s death was a crime of intent that precludes her from
receiving benefits as a matter of law. After careful review, we affirm the Agency’s
denial of widow’s insurance benefits.
I.
Where, like here, an ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies
review, “we review the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s final decision.”
Doughty v. Apfel,
245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). “[W]e review de novo
the legal principles upon which the Commissioner’s decision is based.” Moore v.
Barnhart,
405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). But we review the
Commissioner’s decision “only to determine whether it is supported by substantial
evidence.” Id.; see
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence is . . . such relevant
evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Moore,
405 F.3d at 1211. Our limited review does not allow us to
“decid[e] the facts anew, mak[e] credibility determinations, or re-weigh[] the
evidence.”
Id.
II.
First, some background on widow’s insurance benefits. Generally, the
widow of a fully insured person is entitled to benefits if she is not married, has
attained age 60, and files an application. See
42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(1); 20 C.F.R.
2
Case: 19-13991 Date Filed: 07/07/2020 Page: 3 of 9
§ 404.335; Soc. Sec. Admin., Program Operations Manual System (the “Manual”
or “POMS”) RS 00207.001(A)(1); see also
42 U.S.C. § 416(c) (defining the term
“widow”). However, a claimant is not entitled to any survivor’s benefits on the
earnings record of another person if the claimant was “convicted of a felony or an
act in the nature of a felony of intentionally causing that person’s death.”
20
C.F.R. § 404.305(b); see POMS GN 00304.060(A). This case therefore depends
on whether the ALJ erred in determining that Shue intentionally caused the death
of her husband.
In reviewing the ALJ’s decision, we may look to the Manual, 1 which sets
out a framework for reviewing particular types of homicides to determine whether
they constitute the intentional taking of life. POMS GN 00304.065(B). If a
claimant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, the Manual establishes a
rebuttable presumption that there was a lack of intent to take a life.
Id. However,
if the conviction was for voluntary manslaughter, there is no presumption and the
“facts relative to the slaying must be developed” to determine if the killing was
intentional.
Id. That decision in turn “depends on the laws of the State in which
1
The Manual is the Agency’s publicly available operating instructions for processing
Social Security claims. Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Keffeler,
537 U.S. 371,
385,
123 S. Ct. 1017, 1025 (2003). As the Supreme Court has noted, the Manual’s regulations
and procedures are not products of formal rulemaking.
Id. at 385,
123 S. Ct. at 1026. Even
though the Manual does not have the force of law, the Agency’s formal interpretations contained
in it “nevertheless warrant respect.” Id.; see Stroup v. Barnhart,
327 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir.
2003) (“While the POMS does not have the force of law, it can be persuasive.”).
3
Case: 19-13991 Date Filed: 07/07/2020 Page: 4 of 9
the charge is preferred.”
Id. Where state law “does not distinguish between
voluntary and involuntary manslaughter,” the analysis follows the steps for
voluntary manslaughter, i.e., applying no presumption and developing the facts.
Id.
Shue argues on appeal that because Florida does distinguish between
voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, the ALJ’s determination to the contrary
grounded the benefits analysis in a faulty premise. She claims this legal mistake
led to the ALJ’s finding that her conviction was for an intentional act that
disqualified her from receiving benefits, which is reversible error. Instead, she
claims her act was the result of culpable negligence. Finally, Shue says the ALJ
erred by “readjudicating” her criminal case.
III.
The first issue we must address is the ALJ’s finding that Florida law does
not differentiate between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Shue argues
this determination led the ALJ to misapply Florida law and err in making specific
factual findings relevant to the killing to determine whether it was intentional
under the Agency’s standards.
Florida defines manslaughter as “[t]he killing of a human being by the act,
procurement, or culpable negligence of another.” Fla Stat. § 782.07(1). The
statute does not, on its face, distinguish between voluntary and involuntary
4
Case: 19-13991 Date Filed: 07/07/2020 Page: 5 of 9
manslaughter. See id. However, Florida law draws a line between manslaughter
by act and by procurement—which equates to voluntary manslaughter—and
manslaughter by culpable negligence, which equates to involuntary manslaughter.
Bolin v. State,
8 So. 3d 428, 430 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). Florida treats only
voluntary—not involuntary—manslaughter as a crime of intent.
Id.
The ALJ clearly erred in concluding that Florida law does not distinguish
between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. See
id. But the effect of that
error was harmless because the ALJ reasonably compared the scienter for
involuntary manslaughter under Florida law with the Agency’s definition of intent
and found them to be compatible. Cf. Boyd v. Heckler,
704 F.2d 1207, 1209 (11th
Cir. 1983) (noting a determination supported by substantial evidence may still be
meaningless “if it is coupled with or derived from faulty legal principles”),
superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Elam v. R.R. Ret. Bd.,
921
F.2d 1210 (11th Cir. 1991).
We must look to Florida law, see POMS GN 00304.065(B), which describes
culpable negligence as “gross and flagrant,” or, in other words, “consciously doing
an act or following a course of conduct that the defendant must have known, or
reasonably should have known, was likely to cause death or great bodily injury.”
Fla. Crim. Jury Instr. 7.7; see also Pethtel v. State,
177 So. 3d 631, 636 n.2 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2015) (describing Florida Standard Jury Instruction for Criminal Cases 7.7).
5
Case: 19-13991 Date Filed: 07/07/2020 Page: 6 of 9
Florida’s interpretation of the scienter required for involuntary manslaughter tracks
the Agency’s interpretation of the scienter for an intentional homicide. The
Manual explains that the Agency has expanded on the traditional meaning of an
intentional state of mind, and excludes only the following cases from an
intentional homicide: (1) accidental homicide (involuntary manslaughter might fall
within this exception); (2) justifiable homicide (generally self-defense); or (3)
excused homicide (insane or influenced by intoxication).” See POMS GN
00304.065(A); Davis v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
867 F.2d 336, 340 (6th
Cir. 1989) (adopted as agency policy in SSR 89-6c,
1989 WL 251364, at *6 (Sept.
13, 1989)). Therefore, “a conviction for the indifferent performance of a voluntary
act that the actor knows is potentially fatal to another, even if the death of the other
is not specifically intended, disqualifies the actor from eligibility for survivor’s
insurance benefits.” Davis,
867 F.2d at 340. The ALJ did not err by determining
that a conviction for involuntary manslaughter under Florida law disqualifies a
claimant from widow’s insurance benefits.
To the extent Shue argues that the ALJ erred by failing to apply the
presumption of lack of intent she was due based on her conviction of involuntary
manslaughter, see POMS GN 00304.065(B), this error does not provide grounds
for reversal. See Wiggins v. Schweiker,
679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982)
(“Failure to apply the correct legal standards or to provide the reviewing court with
6
Case: 19-13991 Date Filed: 07/07/2020 Page: 7 of 9
the sufficient basis to determine that the correct legal principles have been
followed is grounds for reversal.”). This is because the Manual does not set forth a
binding legal standard. 2 Stroup,
327 F.3d at 1262 (“[T]he POMS does not have the
force of law . . . .”). In this scenario, our inquiry thus depends not on whether the
ALJ improperly applied the Manual, but on whether the ALJ exercised reasoned
decision-making by finding that the facts of the killing showed Shue had the sort of
intent that bars widow’s insurance benefits. See Owens v. Heckler,
748 F.2d 1511,
1514 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (explaining that an appellate court’s review for
substantial evidence does not result in automatic affirmance).
The ALJ acknowledged that there was evidence showing Shue’s shooting of
her husband was potentially accidental, which Shue continued to rely on to
challenge the Agency’s denial of her application for benefits. But the ALJ noted
that although the jury’s findings established the scienter for felony manslaughter
under Florida law, “case law and relevant regulations” required him to explore the
underlying facts “to determine if the crime satisfies the Agency’s definition of
‘intentional.’”
2
We also note that the Agency has seemingly ignored its own Manual in at least one
legal precedent opinion issued by the Regional Chief Counsel. In In re Donald E. S~, ~, the
Agency did not expressly apply the presumption of a lack of intent when it determined that a
claimant convicted of involuntary manslaughter under Florida law was precluded from receiving
widow’s insurance benefits. See POMS PR 02905.011(A).
7
Case: 19-13991 Date Filed: 07/07/2020 Page: 8 of 9
The ALJ summarized each of the “several versions” of the events Shue told
about the circumstances of her husband’s death. Based on all the evidence, the
ALJ found that Shue was holding the gun at the time it fired the shot that killed her
husband. He described evidence that Shue “had been upset with her controlling
husband” in the days leading up to the shooting and she had brought the gun
downstairs “with the intention of getting her husband’s attention.” In applying
these facts to the relevant law, the ALJ first noted that
20 C.F.R. § 404.305(b) was
not limited to “specific intent” felony convictions and explained that under the
Manual’s guidance, “intentional” meant having “a wish or expectancy that an act
will have a certain result (regardless of the actual likelihood of such result).” He
went on to describe the Florida jury’s conclusions based on this evidence.
The ALJ said the jury’s rejection of Shue’s accidental shooting defense
barred a finding by the Agency of an accidental shooting. Additionally, the ALJ
said the jury’s dismissal of that defense required finding that Shue’s actions
qualified as “intentional” under the Agency’s guidance. And, because the jury
found that Shue “affirmatively ‘used a firearm,’ a deadly weapon,” the ALJ in turn
found that the fatal results of Shue’s actions were foreseeable—and thus that she
“expect[ed] that [her] act w[ould] have a certain result.” See POMS GN
00304.060(B)(1). The ALJ further found that Shue’s actions were not lawfully
justified under the Agency’s regulations, noting in part that “the record d[id] not
8
Case: 19-13991 Date Filed: 07/07/2020 Page: 9 of 9
support the conclusion that she was unaware of the nature and consequences of her
actions, nor d[id] the jury verdict support such [a] conclusion.” Based on these
findings, the ALJ ultimately decided that Shue was precluded from receiving
widow’s insurance benefits.
A reasonable person would accept the ALJ’s findings as adequate to support
a conclusion that Shue “wish[ed] or expect[ed]” that bringing a firearm downstairs
with the intention of getting her husband’s attention would have a certain result.
See POMS GN 00304.060(B)(1); Miles v. Chater,
84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir.
1996) (explaining that “substantial evidence” is based on a “reasonable person”
standard). We therefore cannot say that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by
substantial evidence. See Moore,
405 F.3d at 1211 (“[R]eview precludes deciding
the facts anew, making credibility determinations, or re-weighing the evidence.”);
see also
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (stating that findings supported by substantial evidence
“shall be conclusive”).
Neither can we say the ALJ improperly “readjudicated” Shue’s criminal
case. The ALJ looked to the facts surrounding the killing and relied on his
interpretation of the jury’s findings to reach his decision. See Davis,
867 F.2d at
338, 340–41 (holding that claimant’s second-degree manslaughter conviction “falls
within the regulation’s definition of an intentional homicide”). This was not error.
AFFIRMED.
9
