United States v. Jerry Wana Taylor , 669 F. App'x 520 ( 2016 )


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  •            Case: 15-14991    Date Filed: 09/23/2016   Page: 1 of 4
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 15-14991
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 5:15-cr-00002-WTH-PRL-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    JERRY WANA TAYLOR,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (September 23, 2016)
    Before WILLIAM PRYOR, ROSENBAUM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 15-14991       Date Filed: 09/23/2016       Page: 2 of 4
    Jerry Wana Taylor appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm after
    having been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Taylor
    argues the district court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal
    because there was a high probability the DNA evidence recovered from the firearm
    was contaminated. After review, 1 we affirm.
    I. DISCUSSION
    Taylor contends a reasonable juror could not conclude his guilt beyond a
    reasonable doubt because the responding officer did not use the proper protocol in
    collecting the DNA evidence and placed the firearm on Taylor’s seat while
    unloading it, resulting in a false positive.
    A court must enter a judgment of acquittal on the defendant’s motion with
    respect to any offense “for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
    conviction.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction
    if a reasonable trier of fact, choosing among reasonable interpretations of the
    evidence, could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Diaz-Boyzo,
    
    432 F.3d 1264
    , 1269 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
    The only contested issue is whether Taylor possessed the firearm, since the
    parties stipulated the other elements of § 922(g) are satisfied. Possession can be
    1
    We review the denial of a motion for acquittal de novo. United States v. Hernandez,
    
    433 F.3d 1328
    , 1332 (11th Cir. 2005). Additionally, we review the sufficiency of the evidence
    supporting a conviction de novo. 
    Id. However, all
    factual and credibility inferences are made in
    favor of the jury’s verdict. United States v. Tampas, 
    493 F.3d 1291
    , 1297–98 (11th Cir. 2007)
    (quotation omitted).
    2
    Case: 15-14991    Date Filed: 09/23/2016    Page: 3 of 4
    actual or constructive and proven via direct or circumstantial evidence. United
    States v. Greer, 
    440 F.3d 1267
    , 1271 (11th Cir. 2006). A defendant has
    constructive possession over a firearm if he “exercises ownership, dominion, or
    control” or “has the power and intention to exercise dominion or control” over it.
    
    Id. (citing United
    States v. Gunn, 
    369 F.3d 1229
    , 1235 (11th Cir. 2004)).
    The district court did not err in denying Taylor’s motion for acquittal
    because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine Taylor knowingly
    possessed the firearm. At trial, the Government presented evidence Taylor’s DNA
    profile matched DNA recovered from the firearm’s hammer and trigger. The
    Government also presented evidence showing that, though the firearm was
    improperly handled, neither officer directly handled its hammer or trigger.
    According to Government witnesses, the hammer and trigger never made direct,
    physical contact with any other surface, including the passenger seat, which was
    dry even though Taylor had been sweating. Both the Government’s and Taylor’s
    expert witnesses agreed that such contact would have been necessary to transfer
    DNA to the weapon. Though Taylor’s expert believed there to be a high likelihood
    of DNA contamination, the Government presented sufficient evidence to the
    contrary, and the jury was free to choose among reasonable interpretations of the
    evidence. See 
    Diaz-Boyzo, 432 F.3d at 1269
    ; United States v. McLean, 
    802 F.3d 1228
    , 1233 (11th Cir. 2015) (“The government need not rebut all reasonable
    3
    Case: 15-14991     Date Filed: 09/23/2016   Page: 4 of 4
    hypotheses other than guilt, and the jury may choose among the conclusions to be
    drawn from the evidence at trial.”); see also United States v. Vernon, 
    723 F.3d 1234
    , 1252 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he district court must accept all reasonable
    inferences and credibility determinations made by the jury.”) (citation omitted).
    II. CONCLUSION
    The Government presented sufficient evidence to support Taylor’s
    conviction, and accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Taylor’s
    motion for a judgment of acquittal.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-14991 Non-Argument Calendar

Citation Numbers: 669 F. App'x 520

Judges: Pryor, Rosenbaum, Black

Filed Date: 9/23/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024