Brandon Myles Pate v. Warden ( 2020 )


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  •              Case: 19-14678    Date Filed: 07/29/2020   Page: 1 of 10
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 19-14678
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-01381-WMR
    BRANDON MYLES PATE,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    WARDEN,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (July 29, 2020)
    Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Brandon Pate, a counseled Georgia prisoner, challenges the district court’s
    denial of his 28 U.S.C § 2254 petition on the merits. Pate argues that his twenty-
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    year sentence for the crime of statutory rape, which he committed when he was
    fifteen years old, violates his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
    unusual punishment. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that it did not, and that
    decision is entitled to our deference. We affirm.
    I.
    After a jury trial in 2010, Pate was convicted of statutory rape, aggravated
    assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony. He was
    acquitted of nine other offenses including forcible rape, terroristic threats, and child
    molestation. According to the Georgia Supreme Court, the evidence presented at
    Pate’s trial showed the following:
    On an evening in late December 2006 or early January 2007, 13-year-
    old M.R. was at her home in Gwinnett County. Although her father
    had forbidden visitors, M.R. invited her best friend, K.E., to visit. Pate
    (who then was 15 years old) and another boy drove K.E. to M.R.’s
    home and dropped her off. K.E. snuck through a window into M.R.’s
    bedroom, where the girls watched television and ate snacks. All the
    while, M.R.’s father was asleep in an adjoining bedroom.
    At some point, Pate and the other boy returned to M.R.’s home,
    ostensibly to pick up K.E. Pate entered M.R.’s bedroom through the
    window and asked M.R., “When are you going to give it up to me?”
    M.R. told Pate that she did not want to have sex with him. Pate
    continued to ask for sex, and M.R. continued to refuse him. Pate then
    pulled a knife from his pocket and said, “Well, if you’re not going to
    have sex with me, then I’m going to slit your dad’s throat.” Believing
    the threat to be credible, M.R. gave in to Pate’s demands. He took off
    her clothes and twice had sex with her. After Pate finished, he left with
    K.E. and the other boy. M.R. kept quiet about the incident for nearly
    two years, and in December 2008, she told her father, who reported the
    incident to law enforcement.
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    Conley v. Pate, 
    825 S.E.2d 135
    , 137 (Ga. 2019). The state also presented testimony
    that Pate engaged in similar behavior with another victim soon after this incident.
    Pate was sentenced to the statutory maximum of twenty years of
    imprisonment for statutory rape, a consecutive term of twenty years of probation for
    aggravated assault, and a consecutive term of five years of probation for the knife
    possession offense. Pate appealed his convictions, and the Georgia Court of Appeals
    affirmed. See Pate v. State, 
    726 S.E.2d 691
    , 693 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
    In December 2013, Pate filed a pro se state petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
    After obtaining counsel, Pate filed an amended petition raising the claim at issue
    here: that his twenty-year sentence was so disproportionate to the crime of statutory
    rape that it amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
    Amendment. Relatedly, Pate maintained that the statutory rape offense was a
    misdemeanor which could not sustain a felony sentence of twenty years.
    After a hearing, the state habeas court determined that Pate was entitled to
    relief and granted the writ of habeas corpus. In relevant part, the habeas court
    concluded that the twenty-year sentence for statutory rape was “grossly
    disproportionate” to his offense. The court reasoned that Pate was not sufficiently
    culpable to warrant the maximum penalty due to his “youth, immaturity and
    impulsivity” when he committed the offense. In addition, the court described Pate’s
    conduct as a “passive felony” merely involving “consensual sex with an individual
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    younger than him,” which the court said was either a misdemeanor or not a crime in
    other jurisdictions. Finally, the court asserted that the offense was, in fact, a
    misdemeanor because it fell within O.C.G.A. § 16-6-3(c), which makes statutory
    rape a misdemeanor “[i]f the victim is at least 14 but less than 16 years of age and
    the person convicted of statutory rape is 18 years of age or younger and is no more
    than four years older than the victim.”
    The Georgia Supreme Court unanimously reversed the grant of habeas relief.
    
    Pate, 825 S.E.2d at 137
    . First, the court found that Pate had been convicted of a
    felony, not a misdemeanor.
    Id. at 138.
    Because § 16-6-3(c) “applies only when the
    victim is ‘at least 14 [years of age],’” the court explained, it did not apply where, as
    in this case, the victim was thirteen years old at the time of the crime.
    Id. Second, the Georgia
    Supreme Court found that Pate had not created an
    inference that the sentence was grossly disproportionate to the offense under the
    Eighth Amendment.
    Id. The court explained
    that, when assessing the gravity of the
    offense, courts “consider what actually happened” rather than just the statutory
    elements.
    Id. at 139.
    And in the court’s view, the actual facts showed that the state
    habeas court had “grossly mischaracterize[d] what Pate did to M.R.,” which was to
    “brandish[] a knife and threaten[] to kill her father” to pressure her to have sex with
    him.
    Id. The court also
    addressed § 16-6-3(c), reasoning that, because it expressly
    did not apply to Pate’s offense, there was no indication that the Georgia legislature
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    had determined that his conduct ought to be punished only as a misdemeanor.
    Id. at 139–40.
    Thus, the court stated that, “despite [Pate’s] young age, his sentence for
    statutory rape must stand.”
    Id. at 140.
    Pate sought habeas relief in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising his
    Eighth Amendment claim, among others. A magistrate judge recommended that the
    § 2254 petition be denied, and the district court adopted that recommendation over
    Pate’s objections. While the district court recognized that Pate, “as a fifteen-year-
    old at the time of his crimes, may be less deserving of the most severe punishment,”
    it agreed with the Georgia Supreme Court that his twenty-year sentence, though
    “harsh,” was not “grossly disproportionate” to the conduct of brandishing a knife to
    pressure a resistant thirteen-year-old to have sex. The court granted a certificate of
    appealability on this issue, which Pate advances on appeal.
    Pate maintains that it is cruel and unusual, in violation of the Eighth
    Amendment, to sentence a juvenile first offender to the maximum penalty of twenty
    years in prison for statutory rape when the conviction resulted from consensual sex
    with another teenager.
    II.
    In a § 2254 case, we review the district court’s decision de novo, but we
    generally review the state court’s decision with deference. Reed v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t
    of Corr., 
    593 F.3d 1217
    , 1239 (11th Cir. 2010). When a state court has resolved a
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    petitioner’s claim on the merits, we must defer to the state court’s decision unless it
    was objectively unreasonable in view of clearly established federal law or the
    evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state
    court’s decision is objectively unreasonable “only if no ‘fairminded jurist’ could
    agree” with the state court’s determination of the facts or its application of clearly
    established law. Holsey v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 
    694 F.3d 1230
    , 1257
    (11th Cir. 2012).
    III.
    Under the Eighth Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth
    Amendment, the states cannot inflict “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const.
    amend. VIII; see Estelle v. Gamble, 
    429 U.S. 97
    , 101 (1976). This prohibition covers
    not only “inherently barbaric punishments,” such as torture, but also punishments
    that are “disproportionate to the crime.” Graham v. Florida, 
    560 U.S. 48
    , 59 (2010).
    In non-capital cases, the Eighth Amendment does not “require strict
    proportionality but rather forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly
    disproportionate to the crime.”
    Id. at 59–60
    (quotation marks omitted).         To
    determine whether a sentence for a term of years is grossly disproportionate to the
    crime, the court must “begin by comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity
    of the sentence.”
    Id. at 60
    . 
    This inquiry is based on “all of the circumstances of the
    case.”
    Id. at 59.
    If this “threshold comparison” yields an “inference of gross
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    disproportionality,” which will be “rare,” “the court should then compare the
    defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the same
    jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other
    jurisdictions.”
    Id. at 60
    (quotation marks omitted). Only if this “comparative
    analysis” validates the initial inference of gross disproportionality is the sentence
    cruel and unusual. Id.; see United States v. Raad, 
    406 F.3d 1322
    , 1323–24 (11th
    Cir. 2005) (outlining the same basic approach).
    The Georgia Supreme Court applied this analysis and concluded that Pate
    failed to show at the “threshold” stage that his sentence was constitutionally
    disproportionate. According to the Georgia Supreme Court, the trial evidence and
    the jury verdict established that Pate pressured a resistant thirteen-year-old girl to
    have sex with him by brandishing a knife and threatening to kill her father. This
    conduct was serious enough in the court’s view that, “despite his young age,” his
    twenty-year sentence did not establish an inference of gross disproportionality.
    Pate falls short of showing that the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision is not
    entitled to our deference. See United States v. Farley, 
    607 F.3d 1294
    , 1343 (11th
    Cir. 2010) (“Successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences are
    exceedingly rare.”). We acknowledge that juveniles, particularly those like Pate who
    were under sixteen years old at the time of the crime, are “less culpable than adults.”
    Roper v. Simmons, 
    543 U.S. 551
    , 571 (2005); see Miller v. Alabama, 
    567 U.S. 460
    ,
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    471 (2012) (because of their “diminished capacity and greater prospects for reform,”
    juveniles are “constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing”).
    For that reason, the Supreme Court over time has either ruled out or limited a state’s
    “harshest penalties”—the death penalty and life without parole—for juvenile
    offenders. See 
    Miller, 567 U.S. at 470
    –79 (reviewing this precedent).
    Nevertheless, Pate was not subject to Georgia’s “harshest penalties,” and his
    conduct was serious and violent, despite his youth. Although Pate claims that the
    sex was consensual, pointing to his acquittal of forcible rape, he does not identify
    any specific factual dispute with the Georgia Supreme Court’s description of his
    conduct, which we quoted at length above. As that court recounted, when the victim
    refused Pate’s demands to have sex, he pulled a knife from his pocket and told the
    victim, “Well, if you’re not going to have sex with me, then I’m going to slit your
    dad’s throat,” after which she gave in to his demands. Plus, the jury convicted Pate
    of aggravated assault with a knife, so it was certainly reasonable for the Georgia
    Supreme Court to conclude that the sex was not “consensual” in a colloquial sense—
    persons under sixteen cannot give legal consent in Georgia—and that his conduct
    was therefore significantly more blameworthy than if a fifteen-year-old had simply
    engaged in “consensual” sex with a thirteen-year-old.
    A twenty-year sentence for a fifteen-year-old first-time offender is without a
    doubt a severe penalty. But it is not comparable to a sentence of life without parole
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    or of death. See 
    Miller, 567 U.S. at 470
    –79. And based the circumstances of the
    case, which included Pate pressuring a resistant thirteen-year-old girl to have sex by
    brandishing a knife and threatening to kill her father, we cannot say that the Georgia
    Supreme Court was unreasonable in concluding that Pate had not established an
    inference that the twenty-year sentence was “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.
    Pate’s arguments in response are unpersuasive. Highlighting the fact that he
    received the maximum statutory penalty, Pate stresses a comparison between
    himself (“a 15-year[-]old boy who had sex with a 13-year[-]old girl once”) and a
    hypothetical adult male repeat offender (“a 50-year[-]old man who has twice before
    had sex with a 13-year[-]old girl”), arguing that it would be “absurd” and cruel to
    give them both the same sentence. But the Georgia Supreme Court was not required
    to consider the sentences imposed on others, whether real or hypothetical, because
    the court did not unreasonably concluded that Pate failed to make a threshold
    showing of disproportionality.1 See 
    Graham, 560 U.S. at 59
    –60; United States v.
    Raad, 
    406 F.3d 1322
    , 1324 n.4 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Because Raad cannot make a
    1
    Moreover, statutory limits play little if any role in the threshold proportionality analysis,
    which compares the gravity of the conduct and the length of the sentence. See 
    Graham, 560 U.S. at 60
    ; 
    Farley, 607 F.3d at 1343
    (disregarding that the thirty-year sentence at issue was the statutory
    minimum sentence in analyzing whether it was “constitutionally disproportionate”). But see
    United States v. Johnson, 
    451 F.3d 1239
    , 1243 (11th Cir. 2006) (“In general, a sentence within the
    limits imposed by statute is neither excessive nor cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment.”
    (quotation marks omitted)).
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    threshold showing of disproportionality, we need not consider the sentences imposed
    on others.”).
    Pate also suggests that we should consider the fact that his counts of
    conviction, had they been charged independently of the counts of acquittal, would
    have been prosecuted in juvenile court. That, of course, is not what happened. And
    even assuming this may be a relevant consideration, there is no “clearly established
    [f]ederal law” that required the Georgia Supreme Court to consider it, see 28 U.S.C.
    § 2254(d), nor would it undermine that court’s reasoning. Moreover, the court
    considered and rejected Pate’s similar arguments based on § 16-6-3(c) and the
    alleged views of the Georgia legislature regarding whether his conduct was less
    blameworthy than other violations of § 16-6-3(a).
    For these reasons, Pate has not shown that the Georgia Supreme Court’s
    decision was based on either an unreasonable application of clearly established
    federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
    The Georgia Supreme Court applied the correct analytical framework under
    controlling Supreme Court precedent and did not unreasonably conclude, based on
    both the facts and the law, that Pate’s twenty-year sentence, despite his young age,
    was not grossly disproportionate to the crime. We affirm the denial of his § 2254
    petition.
    AFFIRMED.
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