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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 19-13088
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D.C. Docket No. 4:18-cv-00158-HLM
HASMUKH PATEL, M.D.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
HAMILTON MEDICAL CENTER, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(July 30, 2020)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, ROSENBAUM and LUCK, Circuit
Judges.
WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:
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This appeal requires us to decide whether a plaintiff may invoke the subject-
matter jurisdiction of a district court by seeking a declaratory judgment that a
defendant enjoys no immunity from damages under a federal statute. After
Hamilton Medical Center, Inc., suspended his medical staff privileges, Hasmukh
Patel filed a complaint against the Medical Center that sought damages, an
injunction against the suspension, and a declaration that the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(1), provided no immunity from damages
to the Medical Center. Patel contended that the district court had federal-question
jurisdiction over the request for declaratory relief and could exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over his remaining claims, all of which arose under state law. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Medical Center. Because
Patel’s request for a declaratory judgment does not fall within federal-question
jurisdiction, we vacate the judgment against him and remand with instructions to
dismiss his complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND
Patel is a gastroenterologist in Dalton, Georgia, who has held medical staff
privileges at the Medical Center since 1982. The Medical Center, which is also
located in Dalton, conditioned Patel’s privileges on his compliance with its bylaws
and Credentials Policy. The Credentials Policy required Patel to be available to
provide care for or to otherwise arrange coverage for his patients at all times.
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This litigation concerns a suspension that the Medical Center levied against
Patel for allegedly failing to provide coverage over his Thanksgiving vacation in
November 2014. After a physician reported the gap to administrators from the
Medical Center, two standing committees recommended suspending Patel’s
privileges for more than 30 days. Patel, who insisted that he arranged coverage
during his vacation, demanded a hearing. The hearing panel upheld the
recommendation of the standing committees. Patel then appealed to a review panel,
which reduced his suspension to 29 days but otherwise upheld the recommendation
of the hearing panel.
Patel filed a complaint against the Medical Center that sought damages and
injunctive relief under state law and a declaratory judgment that the Medical
Center was not immune from damages under the Health Care Quality Improvement
Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(1) (providing hospitals with immunity from
damages that arise out of certain peer-review proceedings). Patel alleged that the
district court had federal-question jurisdiction over his request for declaratory
relief, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and that it could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
his claims under state law
, id. § 1367(a).
The district court granted the Medical Center’s motion for summary
judgment. It ruled that the Health Care Quality Improvement Act provided
immunity from damages to the Medical Center, that each of Patel’s state-law
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claims failed on the merits, and that Patel abandoned several of those claims. Patel
appealed only the ruling on his request for declaratory relief.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The district court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we
review de novo.” United States v. Iguaran,
821 F.3d 1335, 1336 (11th Cir. 2016).
III. DISCUSSION
“Longstanding principles of federal law oblige us to inquire sua sponte
whenever a doubt arises as to the existence of federal jurisdiction.” Green v.
Graham,
906 F.3d 955, 961 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As inferior courts, federal circuit and district courts are “empowered to hear only
those cases within the judicial power of the United States as defined by Article III
of the Constitution[] and which have been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional
grant authorized by Congress.” Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
168 F.3d 405,
409 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bryan A. Garner
et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent § 65, at 551 (2016). In other words, an
inferior court’s jurisdiction “must be both (1) authorized by statute and (2) within
constitutional limits.” OFS Fitel, LLC v. Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C.,
549 F.3d
1344, 1355 (11th Cir. 2008).
The record gives rise to questions both about whether statutory jurisdiction
exists over this action, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and about whether this appeal
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presents a justiciable controversy, see U.S. Const. art. III. For statutory
jurisdiction, Patel contends only that federal-question jurisdiction exists over his
suit, but a request for declaratory relief that a federal law does not entitle the
opposing party to a defense ordinarily does not raise a federal question under
section 1331. See First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Lake Worth v. Brown,
707 F.2d
1217, 1220 (11th Cir. 1983). And Patel may have deprived us of Article III
jurisdiction when he appealed the denial of his request for a declaratory judgment
without also challenging the ruling of the district court on his only claim that
requested damages. Without an active claim that could produce damages, Patel
might not have a legally cognizable interest in receiving a declaration that the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act does not shield the Medical Center from
damages. See Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk,
569 U.S. 66, 72 (2013)
(holding that a case is moot if “an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff
of a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Although mootness implicates our jurisdiction under Article III, we can
resolve this appeal on either jurisdictional ground. Even if mootness deprives us of
jurisdiction to reach the merits, Article III leaves intact our statutory authority “to
enter orders necessary and appropriate to the final disposition of a suit that is
before us for review.” U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship,
513 U.S.
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18, 21–22 (1994); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (“[A]ny . . . court of appellate
jurisdiction may . . . vacate . . . any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully
brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such
appropriate judgment . . . .”). And so “[i]f a judgment has become moot while
awaiting review, [we] may not consider its merits, but may make such disposition
of the whole case as justice may require.”
Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 21 (alteration
adopted) (quoting Walling v. James V. Reuter, Inc.,
321 U.S. 671, 677 (1944)). In
other words, we may “choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a
case on the merits” in this Court. Gardner v. Mutz,
962 F.3d 1329, 1336–38 (11th
Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (vacating the judgment of the district
court on standing grounds without resolving whether the suit became moot on
appeal).
In the light of this discretion, we start and end with the question of statutory
jurisdiction. Because the Declaratory Judgment Act does not enlarge our
jurisdiction, the plaintiff must still assert “an underlying ground for federal court
jurisdiction.” Household Bank v. JFS Grp.,
320 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2003);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (empowering district courts to enter declaratory
judgments in “case[s] of actual controversy within [their] jurisdiction”). As
discussed, Patel contends that his request for declaratory judgment establishes
federal-question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. He does not raise any other
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possible ground for statutory jurisdiction. Although Patel’s request for declaratory
judgment turns on an issue of federal law, “we do not look to the face of the
declaratory judgment complaint in order to determine the presence of a federal
question.” Hudson Ins. Co. v. Am. Elec. Corp.,
957 F.2d 826, 828 (11th Cir. 1992).
Federal-question jurisdiction exists “over a declaratory judgment action if . . . a
plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint alleges facts demonstrating the defendant could
file a coercive action arising under federal law.” Household
Bank, 320 F.3d at
1259.
Patel’s complaint does not establish that the Medical Center could file a
coercive action under federal law. The Health Care Quality Improvement Act—the
only federal law at issue—does not create a private right of action. See Bok v. Mut.
Assurance, Inc.,
119 F.3d 927, 929 (11th Cir. 1997). It creates an affirmative
defense from damages. See Bryan v. James E. Holmes Reg’l Med. Ctr.,
33 F.3d
1318, 1332–33 (11th Cir. 1994). And a plaintiff cannot create federal-question
jurisdiction by seeking a declaration that a federal defense does not protect the
defendant. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
339 U.S. 667, 673–74
(1950) (refusing to “sanction suits for declaratory relief as within the jurisdiction
of the District Courts merely because . . . artful pleading anticipates a defense
based on federal law”);
Brown, 707 F.2d at 1220 (“A case does not present a
federal question of the sort necessary to confer subject matter jurisdiction . . .
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where it merely anticipates a federal question defense which the defendant might
raise . . . .”). So Patel’s request for declaratory judgment does not establish federal-
question jurisdiction.
Patel contends that “he could be forced to defend a claim for liability for
expenses of litigation under” the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, but he
misinterprets the Act. The Act allows a court to award attorney’s fees “at the
conclusion of the action” in some circumstances. 42 U.S.C. § 11113. Because
Congress tied this provision to the underlying suit, the Medical Center could not
“file a coercive action” for attorney’s fees. Household
Bank, 320 F.3d at 1259.
Patel also alleges that his suit “requires interpretation of a substantial federal
issue and a substantial question of federal law,” but we would lack jurisdiction
even if this allegation were true. To be sure, “federal jurisdiction over a state law
claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3)
substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the
federal-state balance approved by Congress.” Gunn v. Minton,
568 U.S. 251, 258
(2013). But to reiterate, our jurisdiction turns on whether the Medical Center
“could file a coercive action arising under federal law,” Household
Bank, 320 F.3d
at 1259, and Patel’s complaint does not establish that the Medical Center could
bring any claim against him, much less one that satisfies these four conditions. Cf.
Iberiabank v. Beneva 41-I, LLC,
701 F.3d 916, 919 n.4 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding
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that the district court had jurisdiction over a declaratory-judgment action because
the defendant “likely could bring its own state contract claim, which would
necessarily raise a federal question”). Nor do we see how a state claim could ever
“necessarily raise” a federal issue under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act,
which creates only an affirmative defense.
Gunn, 568 U.S. at 258–59 (examining
whether the elements of a claim under state law would implicate a federal
question); Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg,
552 F.3d 1290, 1297–98 (11th
Cir. 2008) (holding that a claim under state law did not did not necessarily raise a
federal issue when its elements did not implicate federal law). After all, affirmative
defenses do not necessarily arise in suits. A defendant can forfeit an affirmative
defense by failing to raise it, and “[a]n affirmative defense, once forfeited, is
excluded from the case.” Wood v. Milyard,
566 U.S. 463, 470 (2012) (alteration
adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court lacked jurisdiction over this suit. Patel has not met his
burden to establish federal-question jurisdiction, and we see no other possible
avenue for statutory jurisdiction. In the light of this defect, we need not address
mootness and cannot consider the merits of this appeal.
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IV. CONCLUSION
We VACATE the judgment in favor of the Medical Center and REMAND
with instructions to DISMISS Patel’s complaint for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
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