Samuel Davis, Jr. v. United States , 335 F. App'x 825 ( 2009 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-14124 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 9, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket Nos. 07-01961-CV-T-26-TGW,
04-00546-CR-T-24-TGW
SAMUEL DAVIS, JR.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(June 9, 2009)
Before BLACK, MARCUS and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Samuel Davis, Jr., a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the denial of
his motion to vacate his sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in which he
alleged, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel. Davis asserted his counsel
told him that if he had a bench trial he would still receive a sentencing reduction
for acceptance of responsibility and that without counsel’s advice he would have
pled guilty. The district court denied the motion, suggesting Davis had not
suffered prejudice because he failed to show his sentence would have been
different if he had pled guilty instead of going to trial. We granted a certificate of
appealability as to whether counsel was ineffective for advising appellant he would
receive a two-level sentencing reduction for acceptance of responsibility if he
maintained his not-guilty plea but waived his right to a jury trial.
Davis argues his counsel gave him constitutionally deficient advice that he
would receive a sentencing reduction for acceptance of responsibility if he
maintained his not guilty plea but waived his right to a jury trial. He contends this
advice was deficient because only in rare situations would a defendant receive the
sentencing reduction after pleading not guilty, and his counsel was aware of his
pre-trial false statements and resistance to arrest. Davis asserts he suffered
prejudice because, without counsel’s advice, he would have pled guilty, and the
district court would have reduced his guideline level for acceptance of
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responsibility. Davis acknowledges entering the guilty plea itself would not entitle
him to a sentencing reduction for acceptance of responsibility, but argues that
considering the totality of the circumstances, he demonstrated a reasonable
probability he would have received the reduction if he had pled guilty. Davis
contends the district court’s decision to deny his § 2255 motion should not reflect
on whether the court would have granted him a sentencing reduction for
acceptance of responsibility if he had pled guilty. He also argues the district court
did not fully address whether counsel’s performance was ineffective, instead
focusing on the prejudice caused by counsel’s advice, and he contends we could
remand for further findings about his counsel’s performance.
In reviewing a denial of a motion to vacate, we examine the factual findings
for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. Devine v. United States, 520 F.3d
1286, 1287 (11th Cir. 2008). An ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is a
mixed question of law and fact that is subject to de novo review. Gordon v. United
States, 518 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2008). “If the trial record is inadequate to
show conclusively that the [§ 2255] movant’s contentions are without merit, the
district court must conduct a[n evidentiary] hearing.” Anderson v. United States,
948 F.2d 704, 706 (11th Cir. 1991) (emphasis in original).
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Criminal defendants have a right to effective assistance of counsel.
Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984). To prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must demonstrate both (1) that his
counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e., the performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and (2) that he suffered prejudice as a result of that
deficient performance. Id. at 2064-68. A court need not “address both components
of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Id. at 2069.
Where an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim relates to the entry of a
guilty plea, a movant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, he would . . . have pleaded guilty and would [not] have insisted
on going to trial.” Coulter v. Herring, 60 F.3d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370 (1985)). In these cases, the
prejudice requirement “focuses on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective
performance affected the outcome of the plea process.” Hill, 106 S. Ct. at 370. If
the movant (1) failed to allege in his motion to vacate that, but for counsel’s
advice, he would not have pled as he did or (2) otherwise failed to show special
circumstances indicating that counsel’s advice affected his decision to plead, then
his allegation of prejudice is insufficient to satisfy Strickland. Id. at 371. Where
the district court has focused on only one prong of Strickland in denying a
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movant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, and we hold that, in the absence
of an evidentiary hearing, the record does not support that finding, we remand back
to the district court for it to determine in the first instance if movant has met the
other prong. Clark v. Crosby, 335 F.3d 1303, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 2003). On
remand in such a situation, the district court should determine if the alleged facts
warrant relief under Hill, and if the movant surmounts that threshold, the court
should hold an evidentiary hearing. Yordan v. Dugger, 909 F.2d 474, 478 (11th
Cir. 1990).
Davis asserted in his § 2255 motion that he only went to trial because of
counsel’s advice he would still receive the reduction for acceptance of
responsibility, and he would otherwise have pled guilty. Statements by Davis’
counsel suggest Davis agreed to the bench trial because he wanted to preserve his
right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress, yet it is not clear from the
record if that decision was the result of a promise by counsel that he would still
receive a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The record does not appear to
conclusively show that Davis’ ineffective-assistance allegation is without merit.
The district court should determine whether counsel’s advice caused Davis to not
plead guilty. In denying the § 2255 motion, it is not clear from the record if the
district court focused on whether, but for counsel’s advice, Davis would have pled
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guilty or if the district court focused on whether Davis’ sentence would have
changed if he pled guilty. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for further
proceedings, including an evidentiary hearing if necessary.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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