Eglise Baptiste Bethanie De Ft. Lauderdale, Inc. v. Seminole Tribe of Florida ( 2020 )


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  •            Case: 20-10173   Date Filed: 08/10/2020   Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 20-10173
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 0:19-cv-62591-BB
    EGLISE BAPTISTE BETHANIE DE FT. LAUDERDALE, INC.,
    a Florida Not-For-Profit Corporation,
    ANDY SAINT-REMY,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    versus
    SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA,
    AIDE AUGUSTE,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (August 10, 2020)
    Before WILSON, MARTIN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 20-10173     Date Filed: 08/10/2020    Page: 2 of 6
    Before the district court, Eglise Baptise Bethanie De Ft. Lauderdale, Inc.,
    and Andy Saint-Remy (plaintiffs) sued the Seminole Tribe of Florida and Aide
    Auguste (defendants), alleging various causes of action including claims under 18
    U.S.C. § 248. The Tribe moved for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that, because it
    is a federally recognized Indian tribe, it was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity.
    Auguste sought dismissal as well and argued, in part, that the plaintiffs’ allegations
    involved non-justiciable questions of internal church governance. The district
    court agreed with the defendants and dismissed the action. This appeal followed.
    We affirm the district court.
    DISCUSSION
    I.
    We write for the benefit of the parties and thus assume their familiarity with
    the facts. Turning to the merits, we consider first the district court’s dismissal of
    the plaintiffs’ claims against the Tribe. We review a district court’s dismissal of a
    complaint due to tribal sovereign immunity de novo. Furry v. Miccosukee Tribe of
    Indians of Fla., 
    685 F.3d 1224
    , 1227–28 (11th Cir. 2012).
    “Indian tribes benefit from the same common-law immunity from suit
    traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.” Williams v. Poarch Band of Creek
    Indians, 
    839 F.3d 1312
    , 1317 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation mark omitted).
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    However, tribal sovereign immunity is not absolute; tribes are “domestic
    dependent nations” and “are subject to plenary control by Congress.” Michigan v.
    Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 
    572 U.S. 782
    , 788 (2014). Therefore, suits against tribal
    entities are barred by tribal sovereign immunity, “unless the plaintiff shows either a
    clear waiver of that immunity by the tribe, or an express abrogation of the doctrine
    by Congress.” 
    Williams, 839 F.3d at 1317
    .
    Here, the underlying suit fails to satisfy either prerequisite and is thus
    barred. First, everyone agrees Seminole Tribe did not expressly waive immunity
    from suit. See Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 
    243 F.3d 1282
    , 1286 (11th Cir.
    2001) (“[W]aivers of tribal sovereign immunity cannot be implied on the basis of a
    tribe’s actions, but must be unequivocally expressed.”). And second, § 248 does
    not evidence any clear and unequivocal Congressional intent to abrogate tribal
    sovereign immunity. See 
    Furry, 685 F.3d at 1233
    (“[C]ongressional abrogation
    must come from ‘the definitive language of the statute itself’[;] . . . ‘legislative
    history and inferences from general statutory language are insufficient.’”).
    That the plaintiffs allege criminal violations under § 248 cannot change our
    conclusion; where tribal sovereign immunity applies, it “bars actions against tribes
    regardless of the type of relief sought.” Freemanville Water Sys., Inc. v. Poarch
    Band of Creek Indians, 
    563 F.3d 1205
    , 1208 (11th Cir. 2009). Also unavailing is
    the plaintiffs’ contention that tribal sovereign immunity is inapplicable here
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    because the alleged conduct occurred off-reservation. “To date, [the Supreme
    Court has] sustained tribal immunity from suit without drawing a distinction based
    on where the tribal activities occurred” nor has the Court “drawn a distinction
    between governmental and commercial activities of a tribe.” Kiowa Tribe of Okla.
    v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 
    523 U.S. 751
    , 754–55 (1998); see also Bay Mills Indian 
    Cmty., 572 U.S. at 800
    (discussing Kiowa and quoting its relevant holding).
    In short, Congress knows how to expressly subject an Indian tribe to private
    suit in state or federal court; it did not do so when it enacted § 248. See 
    Furry, 685 F.3d at 1233
    . Seminole Tribe is entitled to tribal sovereign immunity and was
    appropriately dismissed from this suit.
    II.
    Next, we turn to the plaintiffs’ claims against Auguste. We review de novo
    a district court’s legal conclusions underlying its dismissal of a complaint for lack
    of jurisdiction, and we review the district court’s “findings of jurisdictional facts
    for clear error.” Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 
    733 F.3d 1323
    , 1328 (11th
    Cir. 2013).
    “[R]eligious controversies are not the proper subject of civil court inquiry.”
    Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. and Can. v. Milivojevich, 
    426 U.S. 696
    , 713
    (1976). We have long recognized that both the Establishment and Free Exercise
    Clauses require a “prohibition on judicial cognizance of ecclesiastical disputes.”
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    Crowder v. S. Baptist Convention, 
    828 F.2d 718
    , 721 (11th Cir. 1987). “By
    adjudicating religious disputes, civil courts risk affecting associational conduct and
    thereby chilling the free exercise of religious beliefs.”
    Id. And “by entering
    into a
    religious controversy and putting the enforcement power of the state behind a
    particular religious faction, a civil court risks ‘establishing’ a religion.”
    Id. The interplay between
    these two constitutional provisions generally requires
    that we refrain from adjudicating matters involving “theological controversy,
    church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of
    the church to the standard of morals required of them.”
    Id. at 722.
    Moreover, we
    “are bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious
    organization of hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith, internal
    organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law.” 
    Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713
    .
    The plaintiffs claim that the district court erred in dismissing the claims
    against Auguste because their claim—rather than involving ecclesiastical
    disputes—is merely a property dispute. That framing ignores two threshold issues.
    Before reaching the plaintiffs’ § 248 claim, a court would need to determine
    whether Auguste was the rightful successor to the church’s leadership and, if she
    was, whether Auguste had the authority to exclude the plaintiffs from the church’s
    property. Answering these questions would require us to inquire into church rules,
    policies, and decision-making and questions of church governance are manifestly
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    ecclesiastical. See
    id. at 717
    (“[Q]uestions of church discipline and the
    composition of the church hierarchy are at the core of ecclesiastical concern.”).
    Auguste’s decision to exclude the plaintiffs from church property and the
    related events are part and parcel of ecclesiastical concerns (e.g., matters of church
    governance, administration, and membership). The adjudication of these issues
    would “excessively entangl[e] [us] in questions of ecclesiastical doctrine or
    belief”—the very types of questions we are commanded to avoid. See 
    Crowder, 828 F.2d at 722
    (footnote omitted).
    Summed up, the district court correctly determined that it could not
    adjudicate the claim against Auguste because the dispute was “strictly and purely
    ecclesiastical in its character.” See 
    Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713
    . The claim
    against Auguste was appropriately dismissed.
    We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’
    complaint.
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