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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 19-14191
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:03-cr-00343-JSM-AAS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GERALD WRIGHT,
a.k.a. Fella
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(August 13, 2020)
Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Gerald Wright appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for a sentence
reduction under the First Step Act of 2018 (“First Step Act”), Pub. L. No. 115-391,
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§ 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5194. Following our decision in United States v. Jones,
962
F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2020), Wright moved for summary reversal, arguing that the
district court erred in finding him ineligible for relief under the First Step Act
because of the drug quantity attributed to him at his sentencing. The government
did not oppose Wright’s motion for summary reversal.
Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of the essence, such
as “situations where important public policy issues are involved or those where
rights delayed are rights denied,” or where “the position of one of the parties is
clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the
outcome of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the appeal is
frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis,
406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969).
We review de novo whether a district court had the authority to modify a
term of imprisonment.
Jones, 962 F.3d at 1296. We review the district court’s
denial of an eligible movant’s request for a reduced sentence under the First Step
Act for an abuse of discretion.
Id. A district court abuses its discretion when it
“applies an incorrect legal standard.” Diveroli v. United States,
803 F.3d 1258,
1262 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted).
District courts lack the inherent authority to modify a term of imprisonment
but may do so to the extent that a statute expressly permits. 18 U.S.C.
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§ 3582(c)(1)(B). The First Step Act expressly permits district courts to reduce a
previously imposed term of imprisonment.
Jones, 962 F.3d at 1297.
The Fair Sentencing Act, enacted on August 3, 2010, amended 21 U.S.C. §§
841(b)(1) and 960(b) to reduce the sentencing disparity between crack and powder
cocaine. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (“Fair
Sentencing Act”); see Dorsey v. United States,
567 U.S. 260, 268-69 (2012).
Section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act changed the quantity of crack cocaine
necessary to trigger a 10-year mandatory minimum from 50 grams to 280 grams
and the quantity necessary to trigger a 5-year mandatory minimum from 5 grams to
28 grams. Fair Sentencing Act § 2(a)(1)-(2); see also 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A)(iii), (B)(iii). These amendments were not made retroactive to
defendants who were sentenced before the enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act.
United States v. Berry,
701 F.3d 374, 377 (11th Cir. 2012).
In 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act, which made retroactive the
statutory penalties for covered offenses enacted under the Fair Sentencing Act. See
First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194. Under § 404(b) of the
First Step Act, a court “that imposed a sentence for a covered offense may . . .
impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act . . .
were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.”
Id. § 404(b). The
statute defines “covered offense” as “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the
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statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair
Sentencing Act . . . , that was committed before August 3, 2010.”
Id. § 404(a).
The First Step Act further states that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to
require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant to this section.”
Id. § 404(c).
In Jones, decided after the district court denied Wright relief, we considered
the appeals of four federal prisoners whose motions for a reduction of sentence
pursuant to § 404(b) were denied in the district courts. See
Jones, 962 F.3d at
1293. First, we held that a movant was convicted of a “covered offense” if he was
convicted of a crack-cocaine offense that triggered the penalties in
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) or (B)(iii).
Id. at 1301. Interpreting the First Step Act’s
definition of a “covered offense,” we concluded that the phrase “the statutory
penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act”
(the “penalties clause”) modifies the term “violation of a Federal criminal statute.”
Id. at 1298; see First Step Act § 404(a). Thus, “a movant’s offense is a covered
offense if section two or three of the Fair Sentencing Act modified its statutory
penalties.”
Jones, 962 F.3d at 1298. Because section two of the Fair Sentencing
Act “modified the statutory penalties for crack-cocaine offenses that have as an
element the quantity of crack cocaine provided in subsections 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and
(B)(iii),” a movant has a covered offense if he was sentenced for an offense that
triggered one of those statutory penalties.
Id.
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District courts must consult the record, including the movant’s charging
document, the jury verdict or guilty plea, the sentencing record, and the final
judgment, to determine whether the movant’s offense triggered the penalties in
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) or (B)(iii) and, therefore, was a covered offense.
Id. at
1300-01. We rejected the government’s argument that, when conducting this
inquiry, the district court should consider the actual quantity of crack cocaine
involved in the movant’s violation.
Id. at 1301. Rather, the district court should
consider only whether the quantity of crack cocaine satisfied the specific drug
quantity elements in § 841—in other words, whether his offense involved 50 grams
or more of crack cocaine, therefore triggering § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), or between 5 and
50 grams, therefore triggering § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii).
Id.
Accordingly, any actual amount of drugs involved in the movant’s offense
beyond the amount related to his statutory penalty is not relevant to whether he
was convicted of a covered offense.
Id. at 1301-02. However, contrary to the
movants’ arguments, a judge’s actual drug-quantity finding remains relevant to the
extent that the judge’s finding triggered a higher statutory penalty.
Id. at 1302.
Thus, a movant sentenced prior to Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466 (2000), in
which the Supreme Court held that facts, such as a drug quantity, that increase a
defendant’s statutory maximum must be made by a jury, cannot “redefine his
offense” to one triggering a lower statutory penalty simply because the district
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court, not a jury, made the drug-quantity finding relevant to his statutory penalty.
See
id.
Applying this inquiry to the four movants in Jones, we concluded that all
four were sentenced for covered offenses because they were all sentenced for
offenses whose penalties were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act.
Id. at
1302-03. Specifically, similar to the situation in the instant case, we determined
that one movant, Thomas Johnson—who was charged in 2008 with five grams or
more of crack cocaine and found by a jury to be responsible for that drug
amount—was convicted of a covered offense.
Id. at 1295, 1303. We determined
that, because the Fair Sentence Act modified the statutory penalties for offenses
that involved five grams or more of crack cocaine, his offense qualified as a
covered offense as well.
Id. at 1303.
Next, we explained that a movant’s satisfaction of the “covered offense”
requirement does not necessarily mean that the district court is authorized to
reduce his sentence.
Id. Specifically, the “as if” qualifier in Section 404(b) of the
First Step Act, which states that any reduction must be “as if sections 2 and 3 of
the Fair Sentencing Act . . . were in effect at the time the covered offense was
committed,” imposes two limitations on the district court’s authority.
Id.
(quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original); see First Step Act § 404(b).
First, the district court cannot reduce a sentence where the movant received the
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lowest statutory penalty that would also be available to him under the Fair
Sentencing Act.
Jones, 962 F.3d at 1303. Second, in determining what a movant’s
statutory penalty would have been under the Fair Sentencing Act, the district court
is bound by a previous drug-quantity finding that was used to determine the
movant’s statutory penalty at the time of sentencing.
Id. Moreover, the
Constitution does not prohibit district courts from relying on judge-found facts that
triggered statutory penalties prior to Apprendi. See id at 1303-04.
Applying these limitations, we held that if a movant’s sentence necessarily
would have remained the same had the Fair Sentencing Act been in effect—in
other words, if his sentence was equal to the mandatory minimum imposed by the
Fair Sentencing Act for the quantity of crack cocaine that triggered his statutory
penalty—then the Fair Sentencing Act would not have benefitted him, and the First
Step Act does not authorize the district court to reduce his sentence.
Id. at 1303.
Applying this “as-if” framework, we affirmed the denials of two of the
movants’ motions, but vacated and remanded as to the others because the district
courts had authority to reduce their sentences under the First Step Act, but it was
unclear whether the courts had recognized that authority.
Id. at 1304-05.
Specifically, as to movant Johnson, we noted it was unclear whether the district
court recognized that it had the authority to reduce his sentence, which was already
below the reduced guideline range.
Id. at 1305. We held that it was error for the
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district courts to conclude that a movant was ineligible based on (1) a higher
drug-quantity finding that was made for sentencing—not statutory—purposes, (2)
a movant’s career-offender status, or (3) a movant’s sentence being at the bottom
of the guideline range. Because it was ambiguous whether the district courts
denied their motions for one of those reasons, we vacated and remanded the
denials for further consideration.
Id. at 1305.
Finally, we noted that, although a district court may have the authority to
reduce a sentence under Section 404 of the First Step Act, it is not required to do
so.
Id. at 1304. We held that a district court has wide latitude to determine
whether and how to exercise its discretion, and that it may consider the 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) factors and a previous drug-quantity finding made for the purposes of
relevant conduct.
Id. at 1301, 1304.
Here, applying the framework in Jones, the district court erred in finding
Wright ineligible for relief under § 404 of the First Step Act. Wright was
sentenced for a “covered offense” under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act. He
was charged in 2003 with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute “fifty (50)
grams or more” of crack cocaine, and possession with intent to distribute “fifty
(50) grams or more” of crack cocaine. Both the indictment and the jury verdict
made a drug-quantity finding of 50 grams or more of crack cocaine. Based on the
drug amount in his indictment and jury verdict, the statutory penalty for his
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offenses originally was a term of not less than 20 years’ imprisonment to life
imprisonment. However, the same offenses would not lead to the same statutory
range because the Fair Sentencing Act modified the statutory penalties for his
offenses by raising the amount triggering those statutory penalties to 280 grams.
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2012). Thus, because that Act modified his
statutory penalties, Wright’s offenses qualified as covered offenses. See
Jones,
962 F.3d at 1301.
Further, the district court had the authority to reduce Wright’s total sentence.
Wright’s mandatory statutory penalty at the time of sentencing would not be the
same under the Fair Sentencing Act. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2012).
Thus, Wright’s total sentence of 360 months’ imprisonment was not the lowest
statutory penalty that would be available to him under the Fair Sentencing Act, and
the district court had the authority to reduce his total sentence. See
Jones, 962 F.3d
at 1303-04. As such, Wright was eligible for relief under § 404 of the First Step
Act.
Accordingly, because Wright’s position is clearly correct as a matter of law,
we GRANT his motion for summary reversal and return the case to the district
court for further proceedings.
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