United States v. Francis , 131 F.3d 1452 ( 1997 )

PUBLISH
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
_________________
No. 95-3029
__________________
D. C. Docket No. 93-304-CR-T-23B
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
HENRY FRANCIS, JACQUELINE
DENNIS,
Defendants-Appellants.
_____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
____________________
(December 30, 1997)
Before DUBINA, Circuit Judge, and HILL and GIBSON*, Senior Circuit
Judges.
JOHN R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge:
Henry Francis and Jacqueline Dennis appeal their convictions
of conspiring to murder a federal official engaged in and on
account of the performance of his official duty, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1117 (1994), and six counts of using interstate
and foreign commerce facilities in the commission of murder for
*Honorable John R. Gibson, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for
the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (1994). Francis also
appeals his conviction of solicitation to commit a crime of
violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 373 and 2 (1994). Francis
argues that he was entrapped as a matter of law and that the
district court misapplied the sentencing guidelines. Francis and
Dennis both argue that the district court1 erred in allowing the
government to introduce summaries of wiretapped telephone
conversations. Dennis also argues that the district court erred
in refusing to grant her a severance. We affirm.
On May 10, 1993, Francis and Rendiff Green were arrested for
selling crack cocaine. Shortly thereafter, Green and another
inmate began making arrangements to have a Jamaican Obeah priest
put a voodoo curse on Ernest Hardy, the informant to whom Green and
Francis sold crack. Francis joined the voodoo plot.
In June of 1993, Green began cooperating with government
agents. On August 31, 1993, Green informed the F.B.I. that Francis
had told him that Francis had contacted a Jamaican named "Mauler"
to kill Assistant United States Attorney Kevin Darken, Task Force
Agent Larry Bahnsen, and Hardy, but he had unsuccessfully tried to
call in debts to finance the killings. On September 8, 1993, Green
informed the F.B.I. that Francis said he had recruited some friends
in Jamaica to perform the assassinations because they were
1
The Honorable Steven D. Merryday, United States District
Judge for the Middle District of Florida.
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"cheaper" and more "loyal" than Mauler. In addition, Francis
wanted Green to help him obtain false passports for the Jamaicans.
Francis also asked Green to take pictures of Kevin Darken if Green
were released on bond.
Based on this information, the F.B.I. obtained a warrant to
intercept Francis's telephone conversations originating from his
cell block. Meanwhile, Green agreed to tell Francis that he had a
Jamaican contact who could obtain false passports. Green gave
Francis the telephone number of Miami detective Richard Archie,
telling Francis that Archie had provided Green with false documents
in the past.
On September 29, 1993, Francis contacted Archie. Over the
next two months, Francis and Archie had approximately twenty
telephone conversations.
Initially, Archie agreed to provide four passports to Francis
at $500 each. Francis asked Green to pay for two of the passports,
and Green agreed. After a few conversations with Francis, Archie
expanded his role and offered to assist Franics in ways other than
providing false passports. In the course of a long conversation,
Archie made the following statements to Francis, "[W]hen the
brethren come up, will they need anything?"; "Whatever you want,
me can hook up."; "[M]e know if your brethren come up, they are
going to need some things.... Tool and all those sort of things,
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you know?"; "[M]e have a whole heap of tools2 and things."
Francis replied, "Right, we will need all those things...
They are coming to do certain things for me." Later in the
conversation, Archie stated, "[M]e brought up some brethren ...
(a)bout two months ago... Those boys took care of thing and they
went back down." Francis replied, "Me want to deal with something
like that.... But me only vex because me in here." Archie asked,
"Some little local boys, up there in Tampa?" Francis answered,
"Yeah man, it's them man." Archie replied, "You should have told
me, man, and me would have helped you out already.... All of those
boys don't have to come way up here for that.... They don't have
to come up to do that.... [M]e have some youths who can take care
of a whole heap of things like that." Francis replied, "Alright."
A week later, after the Jamaicans delayed in sending Archie
photographs necessary for Archie to prepare the passports, Francis
stated, "[M]e have to get with them and see what they are dealing
with.... If they are joking around, me will have to make you take
care of certain things for me.... Me will call up the youth, and
find out if they are just joking around, and then me can know what
to tell you, see?"
Four days later, after Archie told Francis that he had still
not received the photographs from the Jamaicans, Francis told
2
Detective Archie testified that, in this conversation,
"tools" is Jamaican patois for guns or firearms.
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Archie, "You probably have to come up here and deal with a thing."
In a later conversation, Archie and Francis discussed how
Francis would have Jacqueline Dennis furnish Archie with an
"address." Francis asked Archie, "You will go on the scene?"
Archie replied, "Yeah man.... But we have to work out the tax
part." Francis then stated, "Me don't know how much because me
much you are going to want for that." Archie replied, "[M]e don't
want you to include my boy Renny part inside that, y'know?....
Because that is taking care of a totally different business."
Francis replied, "Me know, me know." Archie then stated, "The five
piece that you are going to send? Send that for the other part of
this thing here.... And when its done, me will tax you for the
rest." Francis responded, "Alright boss.... Me will send that off
in this week, about Monday.... Or, or you, you want me to wait
until you get those things before me send it?" Archie responded,
"No man, that thing is going to take care of a totally different
thing, you know?" Francis then stated, "That's why me say me will
send that off about Monday, Man." To which Archie replied,
"Alright, and when my man done, when me done with the plumbing part
... me will let you know.... And then me tax you." Francis
responded, "Yeah."
Later, Francis sent Archie $500. In addition, Dennis
telephoned Archie with addresses and telephone numbers for Bahnsen
and Darken.
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I.
Francis argues that his conviction must be reversed because he
was entrapped as a matter of law. Specifically, Francis argues the
government presented insufficient evidence to prove that he was
predisposed to commit murder.
A valid entrapment defense requires two elements: (1)
government inducement of the crime, and (2) defendant's lack of
predisposition to commit the crime prior to the inducement. See
United States v. Brown, 43 F.3d 618, 623 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing
Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 61 (1988). Once the
defendant has produced evidence of inducement, the government must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed
to commit the crime absent the government's role in assisting such
commission. Id. at 623-24.
Predisposition is a fact intensive inquiry into the
defendant's readiness and willingness to engage in the crime absent
any contact with the government's officers or agents. Id. at 624-
25. The government may not implant in an innocent person's mind
the disposition to commit a crime, and then induce the person to
commit the crime so it may prosecute. See Jacobson v. United
States, 503 U.S. 540, 548 (1992) (citing Sorrells v. United States,
287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932)).
The jury rejected Francis's claim that he was entrapped. When
a jury rejects an entrapment defense, our review is limited to
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determining whether the government presented sufficient evidence
for a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendant was
predisposed to take part in the crime. See Brown, 43 F.3d at 622.
Review is de novo, but we view all evidence and make all inferences
in favor of the government. Id. Furthermore, we cannot overturn
the jury's verdict if any reasonable construction of the evidence
would allow the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id.After thorough study of the record, we conclude the evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the government, was
sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that Francis was ready and
willing to commit the crime absent any contact with the government.
Green testified that Francis first raised the topic of murdering
Bahnsen, Darken, and Hardy and had attempted to hire Mauler to
perform the assassinations. Green also testified that Francis,
before being introduced to Archie, communicated with the Jamaicans
about performing the murders, asked Green to get passports for his
Jamaican associates, and asked Green to take pictures of one of the
intended targets if Green were released on bond.
The evidence supports the conclusion that the government did
not implant in Francis's mind the disposition to murder Bahnsen,
Darken, and Hardy. Although Green and Archie assisted Francis, and
Archie offered his services as an assassin, the government did not
initiate the assassination plot. Rather, the government merely
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provided Francis with a method of accomplishing the crime. "[T]he
fact that officers or employees of the Government merely afford
opportunities or facilities for the commission of the offense does
not defeat the prosecution. Artifice and stratagem may be employed
to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises." Jacobson, 503
U.S. at 548 (quoting Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441). We reject
Francis's entrapment argument.
II.
Francis also makes two arguments related to his sentence.
First, Francis argues that the district court clearly erred in
finding that Francis offered "something of pecuniary value" in
exchange for murder, resulting in a four level enhancement of his
offense level pursuant to USSG § 2A1.5(b)1 (1997). Second, Francis
argues that the district court clearly erred in finding that there
were two intended victims of the conspiracy plot. Francis claims
that the evidence supports a finding that Bahnsen, and not Darken,
was the only intended victim. Therefore, Francis claims that he
should not have been sentenced on the basis of two grouped counts
resulting in a two level enhancement pursuant to USSG §§ 1B1.2 and
3D1.4 (1997).3
3
Section 1B1.2(d) states, "A conviction on a count charging
a conspiracy to commit more than one offense shall be treated as
if the defendant had been convicted on a separate count of
conspiracy for each offense that the defendant conspired to
commit." Section 3D1.4 provides that the offense level should be
increased based on the number of "separate" conspiracies or
"units."
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In sentencing, we review the district court's factual findings
for clear error, and its application of those facts to the
Sentencing Guidelines de novo. See United States v. Shenberg, 89
F.3d 1461, 1473 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 961(1997). The government must prove the facts used in sentencing by
a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1476.
Francis sent Detective Archie $500 and Archie testified that,
based on his telephone conversations with Francis outlined above,
he understood the $500 to be a down payment from Francis for Archie
to commit the murders. After reviewing the conversations and
Archie's testimony, we conclude the district court did not clearly
err in finding that Francis offered something of pecuniary value in
exchange for murder.
Similarly, ample evidence exists to support the district
court's finding that Francis intended to kill both Bahnsen and
Darken. Green testified that Francis repeatedly spoke to Green
about killing both Bahnsen and Darken. In addition, Archie
testified that, based on his conversations with Francis and Dennis,
Francis wanted both Bahnsen and Darken killed. Furthermore,
Darken's wife testified that she received a telephone call from a
person threatening to kill Darken. And finally, Dennis, at
Francis's direction, conveyed information to Archie about both
Darken and Bahnsen. The district court did not clearly err in
finding that there were two intended victims of the conspiracy.
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III.
Francis and Dennis both argue that the district court erred in
allowing the government to introduce summaries of the wiretapped
telephone conversations. We review the district court's admission
of summaries for an abuse of discretion. See United States v.
Massey, 89 F.3d 1433, 1440 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S.Ct. 983 (1997).
Because Francis conducted his conversations in Jamaican
patois,4 the government had FBI Agent Wilfred Rattigan prepare
translated transcripts of the tape recorded conversations. From
the translations, Rattigan prepared summaries of the taped
conversations.
At trial, the district court accepted Agent Rattigan as an
expert in Jamaican patois and allowed Rattigan to testify
concerning the contents of the intercepted conversations. In
general, when testifying about a particular conversation, the
government would first admit Rattigan's prepared summary of the
conversation, which would be displayed as an exhibit before the
jury. Rattigan would then read to the jury his prepared summary.
Next, the court would admit the exhibit containing the translated
transcript of the intercepted telephone conversation, and then play
4
According to Agent Wilfred Rattigan, Jamaican patois is
approximately eighty percent English, but also contains West
African, Portuguese, French and Spanish words, with the words
arranged in a different order than in standard English.
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the tape for the jury. The court admitted and made available to
the jury all taped conversations, although some summaries and
transcripts were introduced without playing the accompanying tape.
Appellants first argue that the district court erred in
admitting summaries of the translated conversations in lieu of
playing all the taped conversations for the jury. We reject this
argument.
Rule 1006 of the Federal Rules of Evidence specifically
provides that the contents of voluminous recordings which cannot
conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of
a summary. Fed. R. Evid. 1006. Rule 1006 allows the district court
to admit the summaries as evidence where, in the court's
discretion, it would be inconvenient or unnecessarily time-
consuming to play every taped conversation for the jury. See United
States v. Clements, 588 F.2d 1030, 1039 (5th Cir. 1979);5 United
States v. Smyth, 556 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th Cir. 1977). To prevent
the necessity of playing all seventy-six conversations in their
entirety, the court exercised its discretion and admitted the
summaries into evidence. This was not an abuse of discretion.
Appellants also argue that the summaries were argumentative
and arranged to further the prosecution's position, thus
5
Decisions of the Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1,
1981, are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit until
overruled by the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc. Bonner v.
City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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prejudicing appellants' case.
First, we observe that neither Francis nor Dennis, whose
briefs are worded identically on this point, directed the court to
any specific argumentative summaries. This is in clear violation
of F.R.A.P 28(a)(4), and 28 (e). The burden of proof is on the
appellant, and this court is not required to search the forty-
volume transcript and numerous exhibits for error. See United
States v. Lynn, 608 F.2d 132, 135 (5th Cir. 1979).
Nevertheless, we recognize the potential prejudice of undue
editorializing when the government prepares summaries from
translations of tape recordings. Therefore, despite the lack of
guidance from appellants, we have compared a number of the
government prepared summaries with the transcripts of the tape
recordings and conclude that the ones examined are neither
argumentative nor unfair.
Some of the summaries are likely based on assumptions
favorable to the government. These assumptions are allowed "so
long as supporting evidence has been presented previously to the
jury ... and where the court has 'made it clear that the ultimate
decision should be made by the jury as to what weight should be
given to the evidence.'" United States v. Means, 695 F.2d 811, 817
(5th Cir. 1983) (citing United States v. Diez, 515 F.2d 892, 905
(5th Cir. 1975), and quoting United States v. Andrew, 606 F.2d 549,
550 (5th Cir. 1979)). See also Myers v. United States, 356 F.2d
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469 (5th Cir. 1966) (government not obligated to include the
appellant's version of the facts in its summary exhibit); Massey,
89 F.3d at 1441, n.9 (Rule 1006 does not require the fact finder to
accept the information presented in the summaries as true). Here,
supporting evidence, such as Green's testimony, Archie's testimony,
and the actual taped conversations were before the jury.
In addition, the district court repeatedly instructed the jury
that the summaries were the government's contentions of the
contents of the tapes and that the jury was the ultimate judge of
the accuracy of the summaries. When admitting the summaries, the
court instructed the jury that they were prepared by Agent
Rattigan, that the actual recordings were in evidence and available
to the jury, and that the recordings were the primary and governing
evidence of the contents of the conversations. The court further
explained that the summaries were intended to help explain or
summarize, or at least speed along, the explanation of the contents
of the tapes, and were for the jury's convenience. The court
instructed the jury that the court neither accepted nor rejected
the summaries and that the summaries did not represent the court's
conclusion about the content of the tapes. The court emphasized
that if the summaries in any way did not accurately reflect the
contents of the conversations, the jury should disregard them. The
court repeated these instructions on numerous occasions during the
presentation of evidence. These cautionary instructions limited
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any possible prejudice to appellants from the summaries.
Furthermore, any possible prejudice was neutralized by
appellants' extensive cross-examination of Agent Rattigan
concerning his knowledge of Jamaican patois and his meaning and
preparation of the summaries. In addition, Francis testified as to
his interpretation of the taped conversations. Under these
circumstances, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting the government-prepared summaries into evidence.
IV.
Dennis argues that the district court erred by denying her
motion to sever her trial. Dennis argues that she was severely
prejudiced by the government's presentation of Francis's prior drug
activity and because the evidence against her was small as compared
to Francis.
We have consistently held that persons who are charged
together as co-conspirators should be tried together. See United
States v. Knowles, 66 F.3d 1146, 1158 (11th Cir. 1995). In
considering a motion to sever, the district court must determine
whether the prejudice inherent in a joint trial outweighs the
public's interest in judicial economy. See United States v. Saget,
991 F.2d 702, 707 (11th Cir. 1993).
To establish that the district court abused its discretion in
refusing to sever, the defendant must demonstrate that the joint
trial resulted in specific and compelling prejudice to her defense.
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Id. This is done by showing that the jury was unable to make an
individualized guilt determination for each defendant. Id. "This
is a heavy burden, and one which mere conclusory allegations cannot
carry." United States v. Hogan, 986 F.2d 1364, 1375 (11th Cir.
1993). In addition, "cautionary instructions to the jury to
consider the evidence separately are presumed to guard adequately
against prejudice." United States v. Gonzalez, 940 F.2d 1413, 1428
(11th Cir. 1991).
Dennis has offered only conclusory allegations of compelling
prejudice. She has not demonstrated how the government's
presentation of evidence concerning Francis's prior drug activities
affected the jury's ability to make an individualized determination
of her guilt. Furthermore, compelling prejudice does not exist
merely because much of the evidence at trial applies only to a co-
defendant. United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1501, 1510 (11th Cir.
1990). The district court minimized any possible prejudice by
instructing the jury to consider the evidence against Francis and
Dennis separately. The district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Dennis's severance motion.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is AFFIRMED.
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