Dessie Antonya Brown-Gaudet-Evans v. Commissioner of Social Security , 673 F. App'x 902 ( 2016 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-15305
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-00821-SRW
DESSIE ANTONYA BROWN-GAUDET-EVANS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
________________________
(December 8, 2016)
Before HULL, WILSON, and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In January 2011, Dessie Brown-Gaudet-Evans applied for Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied
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her claim after a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). The
district court affirmed the denial, and this is Brown-Gaudet-Evans’s appeal. She
argues that the ALJ erred by according “little weight” to the Department of
Veterans Affairs’s (“VA”) determination that she was disabled and that the ALJ’s
finding she still had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a full
range of light work was not supported by substantial evidence. After careful
review, we reverse and remand.
I.
We review SSA decisions to determine if they are supported by substantial
evidence, but review de novo the legal principles upon which the decisions rest.
Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
“Substantial evidence is less than preponderance, but rather [is] such relevant
evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. This review is limited and does not involve finding new facts,
determining credibility, or reweighing the evidence. Id. The person claiming
Social Security benefits bears the burden of proving an eligible disability. Id.; 20
C.F.R. § 404.1512(a).
II.
Brown-Gaudet-Evans first argues that the ALJ erred in according “little
weight” to the VA’s disability determination, because disability determinations by
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other agencies are entitled to “great weight.” Because this argument is about the
legal principles upon which the ALJ based his decision, we review it de novo. See
Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211.
The VA determined in 2003 that Brown-Gaudet-Evans was rated at 80% for
a military-service-connected disability and 100% for unemployability. On that
basis, the VA granted her “Individual Unemployability.” The ALJ stated: “The
undersigned has considered this [VA] opinion, noting that such program has
different criteria for deciding whether an individual is ‘disabled’ or
‘unemployable’, and, therefore, gives this opinion little weight.”
The ALJ erred. It is the law of this Circuit that “[a]lthough the V.A.’s
disability rating is not binding on the [SSA], it is evidence that should be given
great weight.” Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 921 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)
(quotation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504 (providing that other
government agency decisions about a person’s disability status based on that
agency’s own rules are not binding on the SSA). It is not disputed that the VA’s
“disability” determination relies on different criteria than the SSA’s determination.
But that does not mean that the ALJ can summarily ignore the VA’s determination
nor give it “little weight.” Therefore, the ALJ erred.
On remand, the ALJ is not required to give the VA’s disability determination
controlling weight. In making his own determination of whether Brown-Gaudet-
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Evans is disabled, however, the ALJ must seriously consider and closely scrutinize
the VA’s disability determination and must give specific reasons if the ALJ
discounts that determination. See Rodrgiuez v. Schweiker, 640 F.2d 682, 686 (5th
Cir. Unit A Mar. 25, 1981) (“A VA rating of 100% disability should have been
more closely scrutinized by the ALJ.”).
III.
Brown-Gaudet-Evans next argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination, that
she could perform the full range of light work, was not supported by substantial
evidence. She says that the ALJ selectively cited to records about the effects of her
carpal tunnel syndrome and recurrent ganglion cysts in her wrists. She also asserts
that the ALJ erred when he failed to include limitations caused by fibromyalgia in
his RFC determination. We review the ALJ’s decision for substantial evidence.
Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211.
SSA regulations outline a five-step process used to determine whether a
claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Part of this process required the
ALJ to perform an RFC assessment based on all the relevant evidence in a
claimant’s record. Id. § 416.945(a). The fourth step of the process required the
ALJ to use the RFC assessment to determine whether Brown-Gaudet-Evans could
perform past relevant work, which in her case was “light work.” See id.; id. §
404.1567(b). “Light work” is defined as involving “lifting no more than 20 pounds
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at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds.”
Id. § 404.1567(b). A job in this category may require “a good deal of walking or
standing, or . . . sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or
leg controls.” Id. A claimant “must have the ability to do substantially all of these
activities” to be deemed capable of “light work.” Id. The claimant bears the
burden of showing that she cannot perform past relevant work. Moore, 405 F.3d at
1211.
Claims to establish disability based on pain or other subjective symptoms
must meet a “pain standard” that requires: “(1) evidence of an underlying medical
condition; and (2) either (a) objective medical evidence confirming the severity of
the alleged pain; or (b) that the objectively determined medical condition can
reasonably be expected to give rise to the claimed pain.” Wilson v. Barnhart, 284
F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). Under SSA regulations, if the ALJ
determines a claimed impairment could reasonably produce the pain or other
symptoms, then the ALJ must evaluate the extent to which the intensity and
persistence of those symptoms limit the ability to do work. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1529(a). The ALJ considers the claimant’s history, the medical signs and
laboratory findings, the claimant’s statements, statements made by medical
sources, and other evidence of how the pain affects the claimant’s daily activities
and ability to work. Id. § 404.1529(c). Testimony supported by medical evidence
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that satisfies the pain standard is sufficient to support a finding of disability. Foote
v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). If the ALJ decides to
discredit a claimant’s testimony about her symptoms, the ALJ must adequately
explain the reason for doing so. Id. at 1561–62.
A.
Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that Brown-Gaudet-
Evans’s impairments of carpal tunnel and ganglion cysts still permitted her to
perform light work during the relevant time period. The ALJ fully reviewed the
evidence of Brown-Gaudet-Evans’s recurrent ganglion cysts. He found that the
surgeries to remove them relieved her pain, that she was noted to be “doing well”
in her post-operation appointments, and that X-rays in 2003 indicated no problems.
As a result, the ALJ determined that no manipulative limitations were necessary
and Brown-Gaudet-Evans could perform the full range of light work.
Brown-Gaudet-Evans points to a physical therapy intake evaluation and
supports her argument by pointing to an injury she suffered while using hedge
clippers, which she says shows her low hand strength. However, Brown-Gaudet-
Evans asks us to reweigh the evidence, which the scope of our review does not
permit. See Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211. The ALJ’s decision was based on relevant
evidence that was adequate to support his conclusion, and that is as far as our
review may go. See id.
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B.
On the other hand, substantial evidence did not support the ALJ’s finding at
step four that the intensity and persistence of Brown-Gaudet-Evans’s fibromyalgia
symptoms did not limit her ability to do light work. The ALJ based his findings
that Brown-Gaudet-Evans’s statements about the severity of her fibromyalgia
symptoms were not credible and that she could perform a full range of light work
on the absence of records from the rheumatologist Brown-Gaudet-Evans was
referred to; the evidence that Brown-Gaudet-Evans’s fibromyalgia “has been
treated conservatively with medication;” and his conclusion that “[n]othing in the
record” suggested that Brown-Gaudet-Evans’s symptoms could not be alleviated
with the use of medication.
The record contradicts these findings. First, the record shows there were
some notes from the rheumatologist. And there were also notes from other doctors
repeatedly diagnosing Brown-Gaudet-Evans with fibromyalgia and prescribing
various medications to treat its symptoms. Second, the record contained evidence
to suggest Brown-Gaudet-Evans’s symptoms could not be alleviated with the use
of medication. Indeed it was the ineffectiveness of at least seven different
medications that resulted in Brown-Gaudet-Evans being referred to a
rheumatologist.
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This Court has recognized that fibromyalgia, a chronic pain illness, is
usually diagnosed based on an individual’s described symptoms because the
“hallmark” of the disease is “a lack of objective evidence.” Moore, 405 F.3d at
1211. This Court has also said that a claimant’s testimony supported by medical
evidence that satisfies the pain standard is sufficient to find a disability unless the
ALJ adequately explains otherwise. See Foote, 67 F.3d at 1561–62. In light of the
contradictions in the record, the ALJ failed to adequately explain why he did not
credit Brown-Gaudet-Evans’s testimony as to her pain. See id. On this record, the
ALJ’s determination that Brown-Gaudet-Evans’s fibromyalgia symptoms did not
prevent her from performing the full range of light work was not supported by
substantial evidence.
IV.
The ALJ erred by giving the VA’s determination “little weight,” and his
findings about Brown-Gaudet-Evans’s fibromyalgia symptoms were not supported
by substantial evidence. We therefore reverse and remand for the ALJ to
reconsider at steps four and five whether Brown-Gaudet-Evans has the RFC to
perform her past relevant work or other available work.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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