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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 19-13315
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cr-00187-CG-MU-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WILLIE C. DENSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
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(March 18, 2020)
Before WILSON, LAGOA, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Willie C. Denson, a state prisoner who has not yet begun serving his federal
sentence, appeals the district court’s denial of his pro se motion for a nunc pro tunc
sentencing order to run his state and federal sentences concurrently under 18
U.S.C. § 3584. On appeal, still proceeding pro se, he argues that the district court
abused its discretion in denying his motion because it failed to properly consider
relevant factors that were due significant weight or committed a clear error in
judgment in doing so. For the following reasons, we affirm.
We review questions of the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction de
novo and can review such questions sua sponte. United States v. Al-Arian,
514
F.3d 1184, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); United States v. Straub,
508 F.3d
1003, 1008 (11th Cir. 2007). If the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider a
case on the merits, we possess jurisdiction on appeal solely to correct the district
court’s error in hearing the case. Boyd v. Homes of Legend, Inc.,
188 F.3d 1294,
1298 (11th Cir. 1999). And we may construe a district court’s improper merits
denial as a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and affirm with that understanding.
See Boda v. United States,
698 F.2d 1174, 1176–77 (11th Cir. 1983) (affirming
dismissal of civil suit but modifying it so that it rested solely on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction); Mahone v. Ray,
326 F.3d 1176, 1178 n.2 (11th Cir. 2003)
(construing denials of motions as dismissals for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction).
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Indeed, “[w]e may affirm on any ground supported by the record.” Castillo v.
United States,
816 F.3d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir. 2016).
In the sentencing context, a district court has “no inherent authority” to
modify an already imposed imprisonment sentence. See United States v. Diaz-
Clark,
292 F.3d 1310, 1315, 1319 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation mark
omitted). “The authority of a district court to modify an imprisonment sentence is
narrowly limited by statute.” United States v. Phillips,
597 F.3d 1190, 1194–95
(11th Cir. 2010); see 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Only one route to modification is
potentially relevant here: a district court may modify an imprisonment sentence “to
the extent otherwise expressly permitted by statute or by Rule 35 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B).
Here, the district court summarily denied Denson’s motion to modify his
federal sentence to run concurrently with his state sentence. “Multiple terms of
imprisonment imposed at different times run consecutively unless the court orders
that the terms are to run concurrently.” 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). And we see no
remotely applicable statute or rule that would have enabled the district court to
modify the federal sentence to run concurrently here upon Denson’s motion. Even
if we stretched to apply a statute or rule, the substantive relief Denson seeks is not
cognizable under any of them. See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) (allowing for
correction due to “arithmetical, technical, or other clear error”). Because the
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district court lacked authority to grant Denson the relief he sought, we construe the
district court’s summary dismissal as a proper dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and
affirm with that understanding.
AFFIRMED.
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