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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 19-11594
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
Agency No. A209-082-297
SAMUEL BOATENG,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
________________________
(April 29, 2020)
Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Samuel Boateng, a native and citizen of Ghana, petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision. In its decision, the BIA
affirmed the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of Boateng’s application for asylum,
withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), and
humanitarian asylum. After careful consideration, we deny his petition.
I. BACKGROUND
Boateng entered the United States in Laredo, Texas, without valid entry
documents. He was detained by border patrol agents and later participated in a
credible fear interview. In his interview, Boateng reported that that he feared
returning to Ghana because he was subject to persecution there due to his Christian
faith. He stated that Muslim members of his community threatened, beat, and
stabbed him in an attempt to force his conversion to Islam. He said that the
attackers used harsh language. He indicated that he spoke English and Asante Twi.
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) served Boateng with a
notice to appear (“NTA”), charging him as removable as an applicant for
admission without a valid entry document. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). At
a hearing, Boateng conceded his removability.
Boateng filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman,
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”), asserting persecution based on
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his religious beliefs. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c). 1 In his application, Boateng checked
a box indicating that he was not fluent in English, but he wrote that he was fluent
in both Twi and English. He claimed that Muslim members of his community
wanted him to convert to Islam, and they threatened to kill him and stabbed him
with knives when he would not convert. He claimed that he would be killed if
forced to return to Ghana because he wanted to practice his religion, Christianity,
freely.
At his initial merits hearing, Boateng, acting pro se, testified through an
interpreter. He told the IJ that he did not speak English; however, he would often
interrupt the interpreter and respond in English. The IJ noted that Boateng was
fluent in English but instructed that Boateng needed to wait for the interpreter to
speak “because [he] requested an interpreter.” AR. at 677.2
Boateng testified that after his mother passed away, he lived with his
stepfather. His stepfather would not permit him to practice Christianity and
attempted to force him to convert to Islam. In response to the IJ’s question why
Boateng did not leave his stepfather’s home despite being an adult, Boateng
testified that he “didn’t know much.”
Id. at 682. The IJ observed that Ghana is 71
1
Although Boateng did not select a box on the application indicating why he was seeking
asylum and withholding of removal, his answers to the substantive responses make clear that his
religious beliefs are the basis for his claim of persecution.
2
Citations to “AR” refer to the administrative record.
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percent Christian, so Boateng could have moved to many different cities in Ghana
and practiced Christianity free from persecution. The IJ stated that Boateng was “a
grown man . . . and [he] c[ould] go to any church [he] want[ed] anywhere in [his]
country.”
Id. at 684. The government did not ask Boateng any questions or
present any evidence. The IJ then denied Boateng’s claims for asylum,
withholding, and CAT relief.
Boateng appealed to the BIA, arguing that his pro se status prevented him
from adequately explaining the merits of his religious persecution claim. The BIA
remanded Boateng’s case to the IJ because the IJ had failed to provide a sufficient
written or oral decision separate and distinct from the transcript.
The IJ issued a written decision denying Boateng’s application for asylum,
withholding for removal, and CAT relief. The IJ found Boateng to be “generally
credible.”
Id. at 581. The IJ determined that Boateng had established past
persecution because he had shown that he was stabbed due to his refusal “to join
the Muslim religion.”
Id. at 583. Boateng therefore had met the requirements to
gain a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. Nevertheless, the
IJ found that the government had met its burden of rebutting the presumption of a
well-founded fear of future persecution because the government had proven that
Boateng could relocate within Ghana and likely obtain the Ghanaian government’s
protection to practice his religious beliefs. The IJ further concluded that conditions
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in Ghana were safe for Christians because 71 percent of Ghana’s population is
Christian. Therefore, the IJ found Boateng ineligible for asylum. After finding
Boateng ineligible for asylum, the IJ also found that he was ineligible for
withholding of removal due to its “more stringent standard.”
Id. at 585. Finally,
the IJ found that Boateng was ineligible for CAT relief because he failed to present
evidence that the Ghanaian government was likely to torture him upon his return to
Ghana.
Boateng appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA, arguing that the IJ had failed
to account for the change of circumstances in Ghana. He also argued that the
government had not met its burden of rebutting the presumption of a well-founded
fear of future persecution because it failed to present testimony or ask questions at
the hearing. Even if the BIA were to conclude that the government had
successfully met its burden, Boateng argued, the IJ still erred for failing to consider
his eligibility for asylum under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii), or “humanitarian
asylum.”
Id. at 530. The BIA remanded Boateng’s case to the IJ to: (1) “further
analyze whether [Boateng] could safely relocate within Ghana and whether it
would be reasonable under all the circumstances to expect him to relocate”; and
(2) analyze whether the government showed a fundamental change of
circumstances in Ghana, as necessary to rebut the presumption of a well-founded
fear of future persecution.
Id. at 531-32. The BIA also instructed that the IJ could
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reassess “whether the respondent has demonstrated that he warrants a
‘humanitarian’ grant,” in other words, whether Boateng qualifies for humanitarian
asylum under § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii).
Id. at 532.
In light of the BIA’s decision, the IJ held a merits hearing at which Boateng
appeared pro se. The government submitted a 2017 Ghanaian Human Rights
Report (“GHR”) and an International Religious Freedom Report (“IRF”). Boateng
testified that his stepfather insisted that he convert to “the Muslim religion” after
his mother’s death.
Id. at 110. His stepfather brought him to a mosque, but
Boateng told the imam of the mosque that he would not convert to Islam. After
leaving the mosque, he was cornered by “Muslim youth” who beat him and
stabbed him for attempting to spy on Muslims at the mosque.
Id. at 110-11.
Boateng stated that the mosque recorded his refusal to convert to Islam, which was
broadcast on television and radio. He reported two additional incidents where he
was beaten for refusing to convert to Islam, one of which occurred outside of his
home community while he was on a trip with his football team. During one of
these incidents, Boateng testified his stepfather’s religious associates broke his arm
and beat him for being disrespectful and insolent. He further testified that he was
afraid that if he were to return to Ghana he would be killed.
The IJ asked Boateng if he could relocate to a different part of Ghana.
Boateng responded that he would be unable to return to a Muslim community
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because his refusal to convert to Islam had been broadcast on local public
television and radio stations. He testified that “because [he] came on the TV,”
most Muslims recognized him.
Id. at 119. He also testified that he had been
beaten “away from where [he] lived,” drawing the conclusion that Muslims outside
of his immediate community had seen the broadcast.
Id. at 119-20.
Boateng testified that he fled from his stepfather’s home, but his church
could not care for him without his stepfather’s permission, which his stepfather
refused to give. Boateng also testified that he had reported one of his beatings to
the police, but the police did not investigate.
According to Boateng, there were approximately 200 members of his
Christian church in the community where he lived but those members were not
persecuted because they grew up in Christian families. He could not live on his
own in Ghana because he recently developed leg problems and his health was
deteriorating. He testified that he planned to learn a trade in the United States once
he recovered from leg surgery.
The IJ denied Boateng’s claims of asylum, withholding of removal, and
CAT relief. In a written decision, the IJ again found Boateng to be “generally
credible” and noted that the government did not challenge that Boateng had
suffered past persecution.
Id. at 83-84. The IJ concluded, however, that the
government had rebutted through its introduction of the IRF the presumption of a
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well-founded fear of future persecution by demonstrating differences amounting to
a fundamental change in circumstances in Ghana. The IJ noted that the IRF
indicated that there was a newfound focus in Ghana on promoting religious
tolerance that, the IJ concluded, “likely reached all areas of Ghana.”
Id. at 85.
The IJ also found that, even if the government failed to prove a change in
circumstances, it had shown that Boateng could reasonably relocate within Ghana.
Relying on the IRF, the IJ found that 71 percent of Ghana was Christian and
Boateng could relocate to the Upper West Region of Ghana where there was very
little Muslim presence. The IJ also noted that the persecution Boateng suffered
occurred in his home community. Because other members of his church were not
persecuted in this community, the IJ found that Boateng’s persecution was “limited
to his specific situation of living in a Muslim household in his community.”
Id. at
86-87.
The IJ concluded that it was reasonable for Boateng to relocate because he
was a young, “relatively healthy male.”
Id. at 87. Although Boateng had leg
injuries, he was still able to move normally. Further, the IJ found that Boateng
would likely receive the support of the Christian community in Ghana upon his
return. The IJ noted that Boateng admitted that he was willing to learn a trade in
Ghana. After acknowledging that Twi is only spoken by 16% of the population of
Ghana, the IJ observed that Boateng had indicated on his asylum application that
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he spoke English. The IJ concluded that Boateng had no well-founded fear of
future persecution.
Turning specifically to whether Boateng was eligible for asylum under
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(iii), or humanitarian asylum, the IJ found that Boateng had failed
to demonstrate that his past persecution was sufficiently severe to render him
eligible for humanitarian asylum. The IJ noted that Boateng had been stabbed and
beaten but found that he failed to demonstrate that his present injuries were at all
related to those attacks. Noting that humanitarian asylum is reserved for applicants
who suffer atrocious forms of persecution, the IJ determined that Boateng’s
beatings, although severe, did not rise to the “extreme level of persecution
necessary for a grant of humanitarian asylum.”
Id. at 89. Additionally, the IJ
found that Boateng failed to present evidence of a reasonable probability that he
would suffer serious harm upon his return to Ghana. Thus, the IJ denied Boateng’s
humanitarian asylum claim.
Because the IJ found Boateng ineligible for asylum, it also found that he was
ineligible for withholding of removal relief because withholding of removal carries
a “more stringent standard.”
Id. at 90. Finally, the IJ found that Boateng was
ineligible for CAT relief because he failed to prove that the Ghanaian government
was likely to torture him upon his return to Ghana.
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The BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of asylum and withholding of removal.
The BIA found that Boateng could reasonably relocate within Ghana and therefore
did not discuss whether circumstances in Ghana had changed. The BIA also noted
that Boateng did not present his CAT claim on appeal.
In discussing the asylum claim, the BIA noted that Boateng was entitled to a
rebuttable presumption that he would suffer future persecution, but it concluded
that the government had met its burden of showing that Boateng could reasonably
relocate within Ghana. Because Boateng had not “present[ed] arguments upon
which to find clear error in the [IJ’s] conclusion that there are areas to which he
could relocate in Ghana without experiencing religious persecution,” the BIA
“assume[d] that he concede[d] that the [IJ] correctly found ‘a specific area of the
country where the risk of persecution to the respondent falls below the well-
founded fear level.’”
Id. at 13 (citations omitted).
The BIA then rejected Boateng’s argument that relocation was unreasonable.
It concluded that the government had met its burden of showing that Boateng was
reasonably able to relocate within Ghana and, therefore, he was not eligible for
asylum or withholding of removal.
As to humanitarian asylum, the BIA held that the IJ did not err when it
found that Boateng was unlikely to suffer abuse from those who beat him in the
past. Further, the BIA concluded that Boateng’s past persecution was not
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sufficiently severe to satisfy humanitarian asylum. Accordingly, the BIA
dismissed Boateng’s appeal. Boateng filed a petition for review in our Court.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the BIA’s decision only, except to the extent that the BIA
expressly adopted or explicitly agreed with the immigration judge’s opinion. Tang
v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
578 F.3d 1270, 1275 (11th Cir. 2009). “We review the BIA’s
legal conclusions de novo and its factual determinations under the substantial
evidence test.” Lopez v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
914 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2019).
Under the substantial evidence test, we will affirm the BIA’s factual findings
as long as they are “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence
on the record considered as a whole.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “We
will reverse the BIA’s factual findings only if the record compels reversal, and the
mere fact that the record may support a contrary conclusion is insufficient to justify
reversal of the BIA’s findings.”
Id.
II. ANALYSIS
Boateng argues that the BIA erred in determining that he could safely
relocate within Ghana. Boateng also argues that the BIA erred in concluding that
he was not eligible for humanitarian asylum. We discuss each of Boateng’s
challenges in turn.
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A. Substantial Evidence Supports the BIA’s Determination that Boateng Was
Ineligible for Asylum and Withholding of Removal Because He Can
Reasonably Relocate Within Ghana.
Boateng argues that the BIA erred in determining that he was ineligible for
asylum and withholding of removal. “Any alien who is physically present in the
United States . . . may apply for asylum.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). The government
has discretion to grant asylum if the applicant establishes that he is a “refugee.”
Id.
§ 1158(b)(1)(A). A refugee is a person “who is unable or unwilling to return to,
and is unable or unwilling to avail himself . . . of the protection of, [his . . . country
of nationality] because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.”
Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
To establish asylum eligibility, the applicant must, with specific and credible
evidence, show “(1) past persecution on account of a statutorily listed factor,” or
(2) “a well-founded fear that the statutorily listed factor will cause . . . future
persecution.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
An applicant who establishes past persecution is presumed to have a well-
founded fear of future persecution. See Diallo v. U.S. Att’y. Gen.,
596 F.3d 1329,
1332 (11th Cir. 2010). The government can rebut the presumption by showing, by
a preponderance of evidence, either (1) a fundamental change in circumstances in
the applicant’s country of nationality such that the applicant no longer has a well-
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founded fear of persecution because of a statutorily-protected ground, or (2) that
the applicant could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of his
country of nationality, and—under all the circumstances—it would be reasonable
to expect the applicant to relocate. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A)-(B).
Here, both the IJ and the BIA were satisfied that Boateng suffered past
persecution. We therefore discuss whether substantial evidence supports the BIA’s
determination that Boateng lacked a well-founded fear of future persecution.
Because the BIA’s decision discussed only whether Boateng could reasonably
relocate within Ghana to avoid future persecution, we focus our analysis on that
question. 3 Boateng argues that substantial evidence does not support the finding
that he can reasonably relocate within Ghana. 4 In determining whether relocation
would be reasonable, the factfinder must consider the following factors:
3
Although the IJ also concluded that the government had met its burden by establishing a
fundamental change of circumstances in Ghana, the BIA did not address this issue, having
concluded that the government had met its burden to show that Boateng could relocate within
Ghana. Because we review only those portions of the IJ’s decision that the BIA adopts or agrees
with, we do not address whether the government has proven that circumstances have changed in
Ghana. Malu v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
764 F.3d 1282, 1289 (11th Cir. 2014).
4
Boateng also argues that the BIA erred in concluding that he had not challenged the IJ’s
determination that he could avoid future persecution by relocating within Ghana—the first
question in the relocation analysis. Specifically, he argues that the BIA erred in finding that he
had conceded that the IJ “correctly found ‘a specific area of the country where the risk of
persecution to the respondent falls below the well-founded fear level.’” AR. at 12. To properly
raise an issue before the BIA, precise legal terminology and well-developed arguments are not
required, but the petitioner must make more than “[u]nadorned, conclusory statements.”
Indrawati v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
779 F.3d 1284, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015). The petitioner must argue
the “core issue now on appeal” before the BIA and do so sufficiently for the BIA to review and
correct any asserted errors.
Id. at 1297 (internal quotation marks omitted). Unless the issue is a
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[W]hether the applicant would face other serious harm in the place of
suggested relocation; any ongoing civil strife within the country;
administrative, economic, or judicial infrastructure; geographical
limitations; and social and cultural constraints, such as age, gender,
health, and social and familial ties.
Id. § 1208.13(b)(3).
Here, the BIA determined that the government had successfully met its
burden in rebutting the presumption of future persecution by demonstrating that it
was reasonable for Boateng to relocate within Ghana. Boateng disagrees.
Boateng first argues that relocation would be unreasonable because he is not
fluent in English and the record does not support the BIA’s determination that he
can speak English. 5 The BIA’s determination is supported by substantial evidence,
purely legal one, “the BIA cannot review and correct errors without the petitioner first providing
[his] argument’s relevant factual underpinnings.”
Id. at 1298. In his brief to the BIA, Boateng
made nothing more than conclusory statements that the government had failed to prove he could
avoid future persecution by relocating to another area within Ghana. Boateng’s brief merely
restated the legal test, that relocation “must be in an area of the country where [the applicant] has
no well-founded fear of persecution” and “the location must present circumstances that are
substantially better than those giving rise to the original claim.” AR. at 28-29. Although these
are correct statements of law, Boateng provided no facts or explanation showing why these
requirements were not met in his case. Although he argued thoroughly that relocation given his
circumstances would be unreasonable, he articulated no reasons why he cannot avoid future
persecution by relocating outside of majority Muslim areas. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A)-
(B). Because Boateng failed to contest the reasons for the IJ’s findings on this issue to the BIA
on appeal, we lack jurisdiction to consider it.
5
Boateng also argues that relocation would be unreasonable because, as a result of the
television broadcast of his interaction with the imam in the mosque, he is known in the Muslim
community throughout Ghana—as evidenced by the fact that he was beaten away from his
community. This argument, however, goes to whether Boateng would face future persecution in
other parts of Ghana because of his Christian faith, the first part of the relocation analysis.
Because, as we have explained, Boateng did not make this argument to the BIA, we may not
address it.
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however. Despite the fact that Boateng checked a box on his asylum application
that he was not fluent in English, he indicated elsewhere on the application that he
speaks English and Twi, and at his hearing he often interrupted his interpreter to
respond directly to questions in English.
Boateng next argues that the BIA failed to evaluate whether Boateng will
suffer other ills and persecution if he were to relocate because he is physically
disabled and lacks familial ties in other parts of Ghana. Although Boateng has leg
injuries, evidence in the record suggests that he can still move normally and
controls his pain with medication. Additionally, although Boateng’s lack of
familial support elsewhere in Ghana supports his position that relocation in his
case is not reasonable, it is only one relevant consideration. See
id. § 1208.13.
Here, the BIA evaluated Boateng’s arguments, including that he suffers from leg
injuries and potentially lacks familial support, and weighed them against the other
factors suggesting he could relocate, such as that he is an adult, is willing to learn a
trade, and successfully traveled through other countries to the United States. We
can reverse a factual determination by the BIA only where the evidence compels a
contrary conclusion.
Lopez, 914 F.3d at 1297. We cannot say that is the case here.
We thus conclude that the BIA did not err in determining that despite the
presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution arising out of Boateng’s
proof of past persecution, the government met its burden to rebut the presumption
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by establishing that it was reasonable for Boateng to relocate within Ghana. And
because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Boateng failed
to satisfy the standard for asylum eligibility, we also conclude that substantial
evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that he failed to satisfy the higher standard
for withholding of removal. See Zheng v. U.S. Att’y. Gen.,
451 F.3d 1287, 1292
(11th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that when a petitioner fails to establish a claim of
asylum on the merits, he also fails to establish eligibility for withholding of
removal).
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the BIA’s Conclusion that Boateng Is
Ineligible for Humanitarian Asylum.
We now turn to Boateng’s argument that the BIA erred in concluding that he
was ineligible, alternatively, for humanitarian asylum. An asylum applicant may
qualify for asylum despite being unable to show a well-founded fear of future
persecution if he can: (1) “demonstrate[] compelling reasons for being unwilling
or unable to return to the country arising out of the severity of the past
persecution;” or (2) “establish[] that there is a reasonable possibility that he or she
may suffer other serious harm upon removal to that country.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(iii). Courts refer to relief under this provision as “humanitarian
asylum.” Mehmeti v. U.S. Att’y. Gen.,
572 F.3d 1196, 1200 (11th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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Humanitarian asylum requires the petitioner “first to show severe harm and
long-lasting effects.”
Id. This relief is reserved for only the most extraordinary
cases.
Id. at 1200-01; see also Bucur v. I.N.S.,
109 F.3d 399, 405 (7th Cir. 1997)
(describing humanitarian asylum as being reserved for extreme persecution such as
“the case of the German Jews, the victims of the Chinese ‘Cultural Revolution,’
survivors of the Cambodian genocide, and a few other such extreme cases”
(internal citation omitted)).
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that the harm Boateng
suffered, although severe, does not rise to the level of severity required to
demonstrate eligibility for humanitarian asylum. See
Mehmeti, 572 F.3d at 1200-
01. Boateng was beaten on multiple occasions, but these beatings did not result in
injuries that required him to seek further medical treatment. He has leg injuries,
but there is no evidence in the record that these injuries are in any way related to
his persecution in Ghana. Accordingly, we conclude that the BIA did not err in
determining that Boateng was ineligible for humanitarian asylum.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Boateng’s petition is denied.
PETITION DENIED.
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