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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 19-13253
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cv-00349-TPB-TGW
ELSAYED A. ELNENAEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
FIDELITY MANAGEMENT TRUST COMPANY, INC.,
FIDELITY INVESTMENTS INSTITUTIONAL SERVICES
COMPANY, INC.,
FMR LLC,
MERVAT OSMAN, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(October 7, 2020)
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Before GRANT, LUCK and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Elsayed Elnenaey, a plaintiff proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
order adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation dismissing his
first-amended complaint brought under 29 U.S.C. § 1132 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
68. The district court dismissed Elnenaey’s claims against Mervat Osman for lack
of jurisdiction, and dismissed with leave to amend the complaint against the
corporate defendants. Elnenaey asserts the district court erred when it dismissed
his complaint against Osman by applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine1 because
he did not attempt to invalidate the Nevada divorce decree, but instead sought to
recover damages stemming from fraud before, during, and after the divorce
proceeding. Additionally, he purports to raise issues regarding the district court’s
dismissal of his claims against the corporate defendants, the denial of his ex parte
motion for a preliminary injunction, the necessity of proceeding against all
defendants in one action, whether local counsel should comply with a subpoena to
test Osman’s forum contacts, and our denial of his motion to proceed in forma
pauperis. Lastly, he contends we should appoint him counsel under the Non-
1
Established in Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co.,
263 U.S. 413 (1923) and D.C. Ct. of Appeals
v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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Criminal Justice Act Counsel Appointments provision. After review, we affirm the
district court.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Rooker-Feldman
Application of Rooker-Feldman is a threshold jurisdictional matter. Brown
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
611 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2010). We review
the district court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine de novo. Lozman v.
City of Riviera Beach, Fla.,
713 F.3d 1066, 1069-70 (11th Cir. 2013). However,
we review a district court’s findings of jurisdictional fact for clear error.
Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc.,
572 F.3d 1271, 1279-80 (11th
Cir. 2009).
Alone among the federal courts, only the Supreme Court may exercise
appellate authority to reverse or modify a state-court judgment. Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280, 284-85 (2005). Accordingly,
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack jurisdiction to
review the final judgment of a state court.
Lozman, 713 F.3d at 1072. However, in
delineating the boundaries of Rooker-Feldman, the Supreme Court has clarified the
doctrine is narrow in scope, and only applies to cases “brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
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rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil
Corp., 544 U.S. at 284; see also
Lozman, 713 F.3d at 1072 (“We determine the applicability of Rooker-Feldman by
adhering to [this] language in Exxon Mobil . . . .” (quotations omitted)).
The district court did not err in dismissing Elnenaey’s claims against Osman
because they are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. If Elnenaey were to
succeed in his claims it would effectively nullify the state court judgment because
he would be awarded, at a minimum, the full amount Osman was awarded of his
pension benefits. He seeks damages in excess of the amount she was awarded, but
that does not change the fact that any award based upon her allegedly improper
receipt of his pension benefits would render the portion of the divorce decree
regarding the pension effectively void. His claim can only succeed if he proves the
Nevada court erred in awarding Osman the pension benefits. The district court did
not err in dismissing the action due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See
id.
B. Issues Waived on Appeal
We do not review an issue that a party does not prominently raise on appeal.
Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.,
739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). A
passing reference to the issue in the party’s brief is not enough, and the failure to
make arguments and cite authorities in support of the issue waives it. Miccosukee
Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. Cypress,
814 F.3d 1202, 1211 (11th Cir. 2015). We
apply this waiver standard against pro se parties.
Id. Also, we deem arguments
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raised for the first time on appeal waived. See Walker v. Jones,
10 F.3d 1569,
1572 (11th Cir. 1994).
On appeal, Elnenaey did not provide arguments as to why the dismissal of
his claims against the corporate defendants was improper. 2 Additionally, he
offered no arguments as to why—absent a motion for reconsideration—this Court
should reconsider its denial of his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Elnenaey
did not argue why it was an error for the court to deny his ex parte motion for
preliminary injunction. Moreover, his argument regarding the claims being
inseparable making it necessary to proceed against all defendants in one action did
not provide any legal authority or analysis. Because these issues purportedly
raised on appeal were not argued more than in passing reference and without
citation to authority, they have been waived on appeal. See
Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at
680. Lastly, Elnenaey did not raise the local counsel argument before the district
court, so it has also been waived. See
Walker, 10 F.3d at 1572.
2
We note the district court dismissed the claims against the corporate defendants without
prejudice with leave to amend by August 30, 2019. Elnenaey elected to pursue an appeal on
August 21, 2019, before the time to amend expired, thus waiving his right to amend the
complaint. See Garfield v. NDC Health Corp.,
466 F.3d 1255, 1260-61 (11th Cir. 2006)
(explaining when a complaint is involuntarily dismissed without prejudice with leave to amend,
and the plaintiff elects to pursue an appeal before the time to amend expires rather than amend
the complaint, the plaintiff waives his right to amend, thereby rendering the dismissal order final
and appealable), Van Poyck v. Singletary,
11 F.3d 146, 148 (11th Cir. 1994) (same).
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II. CONCLUSION
The district court did not err in dismissing Elnenaey’s claims against Osman
because they were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Further, the other
issues Elnenaey purports to raise on appeal have been waived due to lack of
argument and authority or his failure to raise them before the district court. Lastly,
as we are affirming the district court, we need not consider appointing Elnenaey
counsel for future proceedings.
AFFIRMED.
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