Mt. Hebron District Missionary Baptist Association of Alabama, Inc. v. Landon Alexander, Sr. ( 2020 )


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  •           USCA11 Case: 20-11664     Date Filed: 11/03/2020    Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 20-11664
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 3:16-cv-00658-ECM-SRW
    MT. HEBRON DISTRICT MISSIONARY BAPTIST ASSOCIATION OF
    ALABAMA, INC.,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    LANDON ALEXANDER, SR.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Alabama
    ________________________
    (November 3, 2020)
    Before JORDAN, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    In 2016, a tornado came through Alabama and destroyed one of the
    buildings on the property of the Mt. Hebron District Missionary Baptist
    USCA11 Case: 20-11664      Date Filed: 11/03/2020   Page: 2 of 6
    Association of Alabama. Landon Alexander, Sr., a former board member of Mt.
    Hebron, had helped construct the building. After the insurance company issued a
    check payable to both Mt. Hebron and Alexander, Mt. Hebron sued to recover the
    full proceeds. The insurance company asked the district court to determine who
    had a right to the proceeds, and Mt. Hebron filed a motion for summary judgment.
    The district court granted Mt. Hebron’s motion and, after careful review, we
    affirm.
    I.
    Mt. Hebron, an association of multiple churches, began building a new
    facility on its land sometime in 2005-2006. The plan was to use the facility for
    social gatherings and other functions. Running low on capital, Mt. Hebron enlisted
    the help of some of its members to finish construction. Alexander, a pastor and (at
    the time) board member of the association, contributed his time, money, and
    physical labor to the construction; Mt. Hebron agreed to compensate him in return.
    The parties dispute the amount owed: Mt. Hebron contends that it agreed to pay
    Alexander $148,000 for his work, but Alexander claims the amount is closer to
    $500,000. To date, Mt. Hebron has paid Alexander approximately $160,000.
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    USCA11 Case: 20-11664       Date Filed: 11/03/2020   Page: 3 of 6
    Alexander described himself as the “general contractor” of the project, but he was
    not a licensed contractor in the state of Alabama.
    Construction finished, and Mt. Hebron purchased an insurance policy from
    Sentinel Insurance Company in 2010 to cover the building. The policy listed Mt.
    Hebron as the insured party, and, at times, included Alexander as having an
    “additional interest” as a “mortgagee.” Mt. Hebron renewed the policy annually
    through 2016. Alexander apparently paid some of the premiums, but the parties
    dispute how many and whether he was reimbursed.
    Then, the storm. A tornado destroyed Mt. Hebron’s building, and Sentinel
    issued a check payable to both Mt. Hebron and Alexander to cover the loss. After
    unsuccessfully attempting to deposit the check without Alexander’s endorsement,
    Mt. Hebron initiated this action against Sentinel to recover the full proceeds.
    Sentinel, denying any wrongdoing, asserted a counterclaim against Alexander and
    a complaint in interpleader, asking the district court to adjudicate the competing
    claims to the policy proceeds. For his part, Alexander brought counterclaims
    against Mt. Hebron for not paying him money owed for his work on the
    construction. Mt. Hebron then moved for summary judgment as to the interpleader
    claim and Alexander’s counterclaims.
    The district court granted summary judgment for Mt. Hebron with respect to
    the interpleader claim, finding that Alexander had no insurable interest in the
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    USCA11 Case: 20-11664        Date Filed: 11/03/2020    Page: 4 of 6
    building because of an Alabama law voiding contracts with unlicensed general
    contractors. It then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
    Alexander’s state law counterclaims and dismissed them without prejudice to his
    right to pursue them in state court. Alexander now contends that the district court
    erred in granting summary judgment to Mt. Hebron on the interpleader claim,
    arguing on appeal that his contract with Mt. Hebron and his work constructing the
    building gave rise to an insurable interest. We disagree, and therefore affirm the
    district court’s judgment.
    II.
    We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
    the same standards as the district court. McKnight Constr. Co., Inc. v. Dep’t of
    Def., 
    85 F.3d 565
    , 569 (11th Cir. 1996). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the
    movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
    movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
    Our consideration of the central issue here—whether Alexander had an
    insurable interest in the building—is controlled by Alabama law. Hanna v.
    Plumer, 
    380 U.S. 460
    , 465 (1965). In Alabama, an insured must have “an
    insurable interest in the insured property” at the time of loss to receive benefits
    under a property insurance contract. Hunter v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 
    543 So. 2d 679
    , 680 (Ala. 1989) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). An
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    insurable interest is “any actual, lawful and substantial economic interest in the
    safety or preservation of the subject of the insurance free from loss, destruction or
    pecuniary damage or impairment.” Ala. Code § 27-14-4(b). A fee title is not
    required, but the insured must suffer “economic disadvantage” upon the
    destruction of the property. 
    Hunter, 543 So. 2d at 680
    –81 (citation omitted).
    Here, Alexander’s construction contract with Mt. Hebron could not establish
    an insurable interest because it was void and unenforceable. Alabama law defines
    a general contractor as someone who undertakes to construct a building for a fee
    where the cost of the undertaking is $50,000 or more. Ala. Code § 34-8-1(a). And
    Alabama law is clear that a contract with an unlicensed general contractor to
    provide general contracting services is void. Cooper v. Johnston, 
    219 So. 2d 392
    ,
    396 (Ala. 1969). To determine whether a person was performing general
    contracting services, Alabama courts consider, among other factors, the intent of
    the parties and the type of work performed. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hugh Cole Builder,
    Inc., 
    127 F. Supp. 2d 1235
    , 1238 (M.D. Ala. 2001).
    Under Alabama’s framework, Alexander fits squarely within the definition
    of a general contractor: he helped construct a building for a fixed fee, and the cost
    of the undertaking was more than $50,000. Ala. Code § 34-8-1(a). What’s more,
    the evidence shows that the parties intended for him to act as a general contractor;
    in fact, he identified himself at his deposition as a “general contractor.” Although
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    Alexander appears to have changed his position in recent briefing, he cannot point
    to evidence in the record supporting his new argument that he was not a general
    contractor.
    Alexander also admits that he did not hold a general contractor’s license in
    the state of Alabama. That matters, because a license is required for a contract
    with a general contractor to be enforceable. Alexander’s contract with Mt. Hebron,
    therefore, was unenforceable and void as a matter of public policy under Alabama
    law. And a void contract such as this one cannot give rise to an insurable interest.
    Pope v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 
    34 So. 29
    , 30 (Ala. 1903).
    In addition, Alexander did not have an insurable interest merely from
    contributing time and labor to the construction. He needed to show that he would
    suffer financial loss if the building were destroyed. 
    Hunter, 543 So. 2d at 680
    .
    But even if Alexander invested substantial time and labor into constructing the
    property, and even if he was still owed money for that work, that does not show
    that he would suffer financial loss from the property being destroyed. Alexander
    needed to demonstrate that he had an actual, lawful, and substantial economic
    interest in the preservation of the facility, which he could not do.
    In sum, even after resolving all doubts in Alexander’s favor, no reasonable
    jury could find that he had an insurable interest in the property. Accordingly, the
    judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 20-11664

Filed Date: 11/3/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/3/2020