USCA11 Case: 22-10785 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 04/11/2023 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10785
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RONALDO GARFIELD GREEN,
Defendant- Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 0:19-cr-60313-AHS-3
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10785
Before NEWSOM, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ronaldo Green appeals his conviction and 78-month prison
sentence for conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud. He con-
tends that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evi-
dence of a simultaneous lottery scam in which he and his codefend-
ants participated. Green also challenges the procedural and sub-
stantive reasonableness of his sentence. All his claims fall short,
and we affirm accordingly.
The facts are known to the parties, and we repeat them here
only as necessary to decide the case.
I.
Green first contends that the district court erred in admitting
evidence of an uncharged lottery scheme in which he took part
during the same time period as the wire and mail fraud counts for
which he was convicted. When an appellant challenges an eviden-
tiary ruling on appeal, we “will not disturb the [district] court’s
judgment absent a clear abuse of discretion.” United States v.
McLean,
138 F.3d 1398, 1403 (11th Cir. 1998).
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits the introduction
of evidence of an uncharged crime to “prove a person’s character
in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). The rule
allows such evidence, however, for other purposes, “such as
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22-10785 Opinion of the Court 3
proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident,” Fed.
R. Evid. 404(b)(2), at least so long as its probative value outweighs
its potential prejudice, Fed. R. Evid. 403.
The evidence of the uncharged lottery scheme was admissi-
ble because it went to Green’s motive or intent to commit the
charged offenses, an explicit Rule 404(b) exception. By pleading
not guilty, Green made his intent a material issue in the case, so the
government was entitled to prove his intent through evidence un-
der Rule 404(b). United States v. Edouard,
485 F.3d 1324, 1345
(11th Cir. 2007). The lottery scam evidence illustrated Green’s in-
tent and motive to defraud the Social Security Administration and
Veterans Administration because Green and his coconspirators ex-
ecuted the two schemes in factually similar manners. The two
schemes had similar targets, they both were based on financial
fraud committed by the same individuals, and the offenses oc-
curred for similar durations and during similar timeframes.
Based on those similarities, we agree with the district court
that the probative value of the lottery scheme evidence out-
weighed the risk of undue prejudice. To make that determination,
we consider: (1) the government’s incremental need for the evi-
dence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the similarity
of the extrinsic act and the charged offense; and (3) the closeness in
time between the extrinsic act and the charged offense. United
States v. Ellisor,
522 F.3d 1255, 1268 (11th Cir. 2008). All three of
those considerations are present here. The government required
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10785
the lottery scheme evidence to prove Green’s intent to commit the
charged offenses, and the factual and temporal circumstances of
both the charged and uncharged offenses are similar.
Any residual prejudicial concern was ameliorated by the dis-
trict court’s several admonitions to the jury that the evidence of the
lottery scheme solely be considered for its legitimate uses under
Rule 404(b). Thus, the district court didn’t abuse its discretion in
admitting evidence of the lottery scheme.
II.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of dis-
cretion. Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We review a
district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo
and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Grant,
397 F.3d 1330, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005). In reviewing the reasonable-
ness of a sentence, we first consider whether the district court com-
mitted a procedural error, such as failing to calculate or improperly
calculating the Guidelines range or failing to consider the § 3553(a)
factors. Gall,
552 U.S. at 51. Green first contends that the district
court erroneously imposed a two-level increase because it mistak-
enly calculated the guidelines as if Green had harmed more than
ten people. He alleges that he wasn’t eligible for the enhancement
because only two of his victims had yet to be reimbursed for their
losses.
The Sentencing Guidelines require increasing a defendant’s
offense level by two levels if the offense involved ten or more
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22-10785 Opinion of the Court 5
victims. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i). A person is a “victim” if the
individual “sustained any part of the actual loss” as determined by
§ 2B1.1(b)(1). Id. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.1. The Guidelines define an “ac-
tual loss” as a “reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted
from the offense.” Id. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3(A)(i).
In United States v. Lee, we held that a person who was re-
imbursed for his losses still qualified as a victim under
§ 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) because the Guidelines include reimbursed losses
in related loss calculations.
427 F.3d 881, 894–95 (11th Cir. 2005).
In other words, a victim who suffers losses is still a victim for
Guidelines-calculation purposes even if she has been reimbursed.
The district court didn’t err in imposing a two-level increase
for the number of victims of Green’s offense. First, this Court’s
precedent in Lee forecloses Green’s argument that the individual
victims who were reimbursed weren’t victims under
§ 2B1.1(b)(2)(A). See id. Second, to the extent that Green sepa-
rately contends that the individual victims can’t count for
§ 2B1.1(b)(2) purposes because the PSI listed only the VA and SSA
as victims, the PSI specified that the VA and SSA were the only vic-
tims “for restitution purposes.” The definition of “victims” for
§ 2B1.1(b)(2) and restitution purposes aren’t identical. Compare
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2). While reim-
bursement renders the individual victims ineligible for restitution,
it doesn’t negate their victim status under § 2B1.1(b)(2). See United
States v. Martin,
803 F.3d 581, 594 (11th Cir. 2015); Lee,
427 F.3d at
894–95. Therefore, the district court properly calculated Green’s
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-10785
guidelines by applying a two-level increase for having harmed
more than ten people.
Next, Green contends that the district court committed pro-
cedural error because his sentence reflects an unwarranted dispar-
ity in comparison to his codefendants. A “well-founded claim” that
the district court imposed a sentence with an unwarranted dispar-
ity “assumes that apples are being compared to apples,” meaning
that the defendant actually is similarly situated to the codefendants
to whom he wishes to be compared. United States v. Dougherty,
754 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 2014). Here, we have a case of apples
and oranges. While Green’s codefendants received lower sen-
tences than Green, all but one of them entered plea agreements.
Green, by contrast, pleaded not guilty and went to trial. Green also
conceded that the one coconspirator who didn’t enter a plea agree-
ment played a less significant role in the offense than he did. Thus,
Green’s sentence isn’t unduly disparate as compared to his code-
fendants because his codefendants weren’t similarly situated to
him.
Green further alleges that the district court improperly
weighed the relevant factors in imposing his sentence because it
overstated the seriousness of his offense. In particular, he points to
the district court’s failure to consider his inability to pay restitution
while in prison, general statistics on recidivism, and his extensive
employment history and family ties. This Court “commits to the
sound discretion of the district court the weight to be accorded to
each § 3553(a) factor,” United States v. Perkins,
787 F.3d 1329, 1342
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22-10785 Opinion of the Court 7
(11th Cir. 2015), and the district court is “permitted to attach great
weight to one factor over others,” United States v. Riley,
995 F.3d
1272, 1279 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). This Court
will vacate a district court’s sentence “only if [it is] left with the def-
inite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear
error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a
sentence that is outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated
by the facts of the case.” United States v. Goldman,
953 F.3d 1213,
1222 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). The record shows
the district court carefully weighed several relevant sentencing fac-
tors. To the extent that the district court didn’t specifically name
the particular factors that Green now raises on appeal, it wasn’t re-
quired to. United States v. Dorman,
488 F.3d 936, 944 (11th Cir.
2007) (holding that the district judge needn’t “state on the record
that [he] has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to
discuss each of the[m]”). Thus, we are not left with the “definite
and firm conviction” that the district court abused its considerable
discretion.
Finally, Green contends that his sentence was substantively
unreasonable because it was “greater than necessary” to fulfill the
purposes of § 3553(a). “Although we do not automatically pre-
sume a sentence within the guidelines range is reasonable, we ‘or-
dinarily . . . expect a sentence within the Guidelines range to be
reasonable.’” United States v. Hunt,
526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir.
2008) (alteration in original). A sentence “at the lowest end of the
applicable guidelines range” further supports the reasonableness of
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-10785
that sentence. United States v. Nagel,
835 F.3d 1371, 1377 (11th
Cir. 2016). Green was sentenced to the lowest possible sentence
within his sentencing guidelines range. For all the foregoing rea-
sons, we have no reason to conclude that the sentence is substan-
tively unreasonable, especially given the magnitude of Green’s ex-
pansive mail and wire fraud scheme. Thus, the district court im-
posed a substantively reasonable sentence, and we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
