USCA11 Case: 20-10462 Date Filed: 02/23/2021 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 20-10462
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:18-cv-62488-RAR
MARGUERITE T. MARTIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
TELEPERFORMANCE INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(February 23, 2021)
Before JORDAN, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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TPUSA hired Marguerite Martin to work in its call center as a customer
service representative. But just four months later, it fired her. Martin sued,
claiming that the company unlawfully discriminated against her because of a
disability—anemia. The district court disagreed, and granted summary judgment
in favor of TPUSA. We affirm.
I.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, “viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all
reasonable inferences in their favor.” Crane v. Lifemark Hosps., Inc.,
898 F.3d
1130, 1133–34 (11th Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Id. at 1134 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a)).
II.
To make a prima facie showing of disability discrimination, a plaintiff must
establish “that, at the time of the adverse employment action, she had a disability,
she was a qualified individual, and she was subjected to unlawful discrimination
because of her disability.” U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. St. Joseph’s
Hosp., Inc.,
842 F.3d 1333, 1343 (11th Cir. 2016). The Americans with
Disabilities Act defines “disability” in three ways. An individual is disabled if she
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(1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
her major life activities; (2) has a record of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded
as having such an impairment.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
Martin has not shown that she qualifies as disabled within the meaning of
the Act. First, she has not established that her impairment—anemia—
substantially limits any major life activity.
Id. § 12102(1)(A). 1 Although this is
not a “demanding standard,”
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i), Martin has “failed to
argue or present evidence” that her anemia “substantially limited” any major life
activities, Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc.,
161 F.3d 1318, 1327 (11th Cir. 1998).
She simply points to 2017 bloodwork indicating that she has anemia, and asserts
that she could “become impaired when the weather gets a little too cold” and
“anything can happen.” But she never points to any major life activity that is
impaired by her anemia. In fact, her own testimony confirms that her impairment
did not impact her work “in any way.” So Martin has not produced “evidence
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact that she is actually disabled.” Lewis v.
City of Union City,
934 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2019). And because Martin
has not established that her impairment substantially limits a major life activity,
1
Those activities include “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating,
sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading,
concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working,” as well as “the operation of a major
bodily function.”
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
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she necessarily has not shown a record of such an impairment. See Hilburn v.
Murata Electronics N. Am., Inc.,
181 F.3d 1220, 1229 (11th Cir. 1999).
Nor has Martin established that she was regarded as disabled. Under the
Act, a person is “regarded as” disabled if she establishes that she was subjected to
a prohibited act because of an “actual or perceived physical or mental impairment
whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.”
42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A). But nothing in the record indicates that TPUSA
regarded Martin as disabled. During Martin’s onboarding process, for example,
she stated that she did not have a mental or physical disability. She also stated
that she never provided TPUSA with any documents indicating that she was
anemic, and that she never told any of her managers that she was anemic. Nor did
she ever request a disability accommodation from TPUSA’s human resources
department. And finally, Martin confirmed that she did not inform her supervisor
of her anemia until after he told her that she was being fired. Martin has therefore
failed to establish a “disability” within the meaning of the Act.
Finally, Martin fleetingly asks that we consider a separate privacy claim.
We will not. Her amended complaint consists of a one-count discriminatory
termination claim under the Act. Martin did not “clearly present” her privacy
issue to the district court in a way that afforded it “an opportunity to recognize
and rule on it.” Ruckh v. Salus Rehab., LLC,
963 F.3d 1089, 1111 (11th Cir.
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2020) (quotation omitted). And in any event, a “passing reference to an issue in a
brief is not enough, and the failure to make arguments and cite authorities in
support of an issue waives it.” Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc.,
680
F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2012).
AFFIRMED.
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