Hal Mervin Rust v. U.S. Attorney General ( 2023 )


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  • USCA11 Case: 22-11239   Document: 17-1      Date Filed: 03/22/2023    Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eleventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 22-11239
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ____________________
    HAL MERVIN RUST,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ____________________
    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Agency No. A058-869-804
    ____________________
    USCA11 Case: 22-11239      Document: 17-1       Date Filed: 03/22/2023     Page: 2 of 6
    2                       Opinion of the Court                  22-11239
    Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Hal Rust petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
    Appeals’ (BIA) affirmance of the immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of
    his application for a good-faith-marriage waiver of the requirement
    to file a joint petition to remove conditions on his lawful perma-
    nent residence. Rust argues that the IJ and BIA weighed the evi-
    dence incorrectly and failed to consider the evidence that he pro-
    vided in support of his argument that the marriage was entered
    into in good faith.
    I
    We have an obligation to inquire into our own jurisdiction
    sua sponte and review jurisdictional questions de novo. Bing Quan
    Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    881 F.3d 860
    , 866 (11th Cir. 2018).
    We lack jurisdiction to review “any judgment regarding”
    certain forms of discretionary relief. See Immigration and Nation-
    ality Act (INA) § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(2)(B)(ii). We re-
    tain jurisdiction to review constitutional or legal claims. INA
    § 242(a)(2)(D), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(2)(D). The scope of that jurisdic-
    tion extends only to colorable questions of law and constitutional
    claims. Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    482 F.3d 1281
    , 1284 & n.2 (11th
    Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    971 F.3d 1258
    , 1275
    (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (clarifying that a legal claim must also be
    colorable), aff’d sub nom., Patel v. Garland, 
    142 S. Ct. 1614 (2022)
    .
    USCA11 Case: 22-11239     Document: 17-1     Date Filed: 03/22/2023    Page: 3 of 6
    22-11239               Opinion of the Court                       3
    We have held that petitioners may not mask “a garden-variety
    abuse-of-discretion argument—which can be made by virtually
    every alien subject to a final removal order”—as a constitutional or
    legal claim in order to invoke our jurisdiction. Alvarez Acosta v.
    U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    524 F.3d 1191
    , 1196–97 (11th Cir. 2008). We have
    called claims that the IJ improperly weighed the evidence “garden-
    variety abuse of discretion argument[s] that [are] insufficient to
    state a legal or constitutional claim.” Fynn v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    752 F.3d 1250
    , 1252 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quotation marks
    omitted). But whether the agency failed to give reasoned consid-
    eration to an issue is a question of law. Jeune v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
    
    810 F.3d 792
    , 799 (11th Cir. 2016). The agency does not need to
    specifically address each claim made or each piece of evidence pre-
    sented, but it must consider all the evidence submitted. 
    Id. at 803
    .
    A non-citizen who marries a United States citizen will obtain
    conditional residency status.        INA § 216(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.
    § 1186a(a)(1). The non-citizen can have the conditions removed
    upon filing a joint petition with his citizen spouse 90 days before
    their second anniversary. INA § 216(c)(1)(A), (d)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C.
    § 1186a(c)(1)(A), (d)(2)(A).
    Section 1186a(c)(4) provides that the Secretary of Homeland
    Security, “in the Secretary’s discretion, may remove the condi-
    tional basis of the permanent resident status for an alien” who
    demonstrates that “the qualifying marriage was entered into in
    good faith by the alien spouse, but the qualifying marriage has been
    terminated.”     INA § 216(c)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B)
    USCA11 Case: 22-11239       Document: 17-1      Date Filed: 03/22/2023      Page: 4 of 6
    4                       Opinion of the Court                   22-11239
    (emphasis added). The statute further provides that “[t]he deter-
    mination of what evidence is credible and the weight to be given
    that evidence shall be within the sole discretion of the Secretary of
    Homeland Security.” INA § 216(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4).
    In Fynn v. U.S. Attorney General, we held that we lacked
    jurisdiction to review evidence-weighing challenges to a denial of
    a good-faith-marriage waiver to the joint-filing requirement under
    the jurisdictional bar to discretionary determinations in INA
    § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(2)(B)(ii), based on the plain lan-
    guage of INA § 216(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4). 
    752 F.3d at
    1252–
    53. We also determined that we lacked jurisdiction to consider that
    petitioner’s argument that the IJ failed to consider certain probative
    testimony because he was essentially challenging the agency’s
    credibility determination and weighing of the evidence. 
    Id. at 1253
    .
    Rust frames his brief as a challenge to the agency’s decision
    because it was not based on “substantial evidence.” But “[a] rea-
    soned-consideration examination does not look to whether the
    agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Jeune, 
    810 F.3d at 803
    . Instead, a reasoned-consideration inquiry is a question
    of law that we retain jurisdiction to examine under § 1252. Id. at
    799. So, to the extent that Rust challenges the agency’s discretion-
    ary decision to deny his waiver on the ground that it was unsup-
    ported by “substantial evidence,” this is the type of evidence-
    weighing challenge that we lack jurisdiction to review under Fynn.
    
    752 F.3d at
    1252–53.
    USCA11 Case: 22-11239      Document: 17-1     Date Filed: 03/22/2023     Page: 5 of 6
    22-11239               Opinion of the Court                         5
    To the extent that Rust now seeks to present a reasoned-ex-
    amination challenge, he faces two barriers. First, we think it likely
    that he has abandoned any argument to that effect. A party aban-
    dons an argument when he only makes “passing references” to the
    issue. Lapaix v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    605 F.3d 1138
    , 1145 (11th Cir.
    2010). Rust’s brief cites Seck v. U.S. Attorney General, 
    663 F.3d 1356
    , 1368 (11th Cir. 2011), for the proposition that the “BIA is re-
    quired to consider all the evidence submitted by the applicant.”
    Brief of Pet. at 10. The citation is buried in a broader argument
    that the IJ and BIA failed to properly consider Rust’s brother’s tes-
    timony about Rust’s bona fide marriage.
    Even if Rust preserved the argument, it fails on the merits.
    The IJ summarized Rust’s brother’s testimony in a paragraph in its
    opinion. The IJ was not required to expressly address the testi-
    mony in its analysis. Jeune, 
    810 F.3d at 803
     (“[W]hile the agency is
    required to consider all evidence that a petitioner has submitted, it
    need not address specifically each claim the petitioner made or
    each piece of evidence the petitioner presented.” (quotation marks
    omitted)).
    II
    We lack jurisdiction to review Rust’s substantial-evidence
    arguments, which challenge the agency’s discretionary decision to
    deny his waiver and raise no colorable legal or constitutional issues.
    His brief forfeits any reasoned-examination challenge; and even if
    he raised one it would fail. Rust only challenges the IJ’s weighing
    USCA11 Case: 22-11239     Document: 17-1      Date Filed: 03/22/2023    Page: 6 of 6
    6                      Opinion of the Court                22-11239
    of the evidence and fails to show that the IJ ignored evidence in the
    record.
    PETITION DISMISSED.