USCA11 Case: 20-13837 Date Filed: 03/16/2021 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 20-13837
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-05234-SDG
LEELAND DAVIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LG CHEM, LTD.,
Defendant-Appellee.
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No. 20-13838
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-02653-SDG
ETHAN FULLERTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LG CHEM, LTD.,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(March 16, 2021)
Before BRANCH, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellants Leeland Davis and Ethan Fullerton appeal the district court’s order
dismissing their suits against LG Chem, Ltd. for lack of personal jurisdiction. The
issue presented on appeal is whether the district court had specific personal
jurisdiction over LG Chem. Upon consideration, we conclude that it did not, and
AFFIRM the district court’s order dismissing both cases for lack of personal
jurisdiction.
I.
Davis and Fullerton are both Oklahoma residents. They suffered similar
injuries in Oklahoma, though in separate instances occurring several months apart—
each was walking with an LG 18650 lithium-ion battery in his pants pocket when
the battery exploded, caught fire, and burned his leg. In both cases, Davis and
Fullerton were using the LG 18650 battery as a replaceable, rechargeable battery to
power an e-cigarette device. The batteries that injured Davis and Fullerton were
manufactured and sold by LG Chem, a Korean company with headquarters and
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principal offices in Seoul, South Korea. But LG Chem does not market the battery
as a replaceable, rechargeable e-cigarette battery, and Davis and Fullerton did not
purchase their batteries directly from LG. Instead, they purchased them from
Oklahoma retailers, who had acquired the batteries from third parties. In both cases,
the third party had removed the exterior LG wrapper and re-wrapped the battery in
its own wrapper before placing it back into the stream of commerce en route to its
final destination in Oklahoma.
Davis and Fullerton originally sued LG Chem in Oklahoma state court. LG
Chem moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. To support its motion, LG
Chem introduced uncontroverted evidence showing that it did not market the LG
18650 battery as a replaceable, rechargeable battery for use in an e-cigarette device,
that it never authorized anyone else to do so, and that it never conducted business
with the third parties or retailers who handled the batteries that injured Davis and
Fullerton. The Oklahoma state court dismissed the claims against LG Chem, finding
that both general and specific personal jurisdiction were lacking.
Davis and Fullerton then filed lawsuits against LG Chem in Georgia state
court, also naming LG Chem’s Atlanta-based subsidiary, LG Chem America, Inc.,
as a defendant. The claims against Chem America were dismissed as time barred.
LG Chem then removed the case to federal district court, availing itself of the court’s
diversity jurisdiction.
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Once in federal court, LG Chem moved to dismiss both actions for lack of
personal jurisdiction. At a hearing on the motions, the district court clarified with
Davis and Fullerton’s counsel whether their arguments were about specific
jurisdiction or general jurisdiction; they explained that they were arguing only under
a theory of specific jurisdiction and not that Georgia courts had general personal
jurisdiction over LG Chem. The court issued a written order granting LG Chem’s
motions to dismiss, holding that Davis and Fullerton had failed to comply with
Georgia’s long-arm statute because neither had shown that their claims arose out of
any business that LG Chem had transacted in the state. Davis and Fullerton appealed.
II.
Davis and Fullerton raise several arguments on appeal. First, they argue that
Georgia’s long-arm statute provides for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
corporation transacting any business in the state, regardless of whether those
transactions are related to the events giving rise to the controversy. Alternatively,
they argue that their claims do in fact arise out of LG Chem’s in-state business
transactions. Second, if they can satisfy Georgia’s long-arm, they argue that
constitutional limitations on the exercise of personal jurisdiction over LG Chem
derive from the Fifth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. Personal
jurisdiction over LG Chem should therefore be based on its contact with the United
States, rather than the state of Georgia. Davis and Fullerton contend that they have
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alleged sufficient facts to satisfy this nationwide minimum contacts test. Third and
finally, Davis and Fullerton argue that, rather than affirm, the Court should remand
for jurisdictional discovery into LG Chem’s contacts with Georgia. Upon
consideration, we conclude that the district court correctly applied Georgia’s long-
arm statute and correctly dismissed both cases for lack of personal jurisdiction, so
we need not reach the constitutional due process arguments. And because further
discovery would not clarify whether Davis and Fullerton’s claims arise from LG
Chem’s contact with Georgia, the district court correctly denied their request for
jurisdictional discovery.
We review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss a complaint for lack
of personal jurisdiction. Waite v. All Acquisition Corp.,
901 F.3d 1307, 1312 (11th
Cir. 2018) (citing Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt., Inc.,
789 F.3d 1201, 1203 (11th
Cir. 2015)).
“A federal court sitting in diversity undertakes a two-step inquiry in
determining whether personal jurisdiction exists: the exercise of jurisdiction must
(1) be appropriate under the state long-arm statute and (2) not violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”
Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int’l, Inc.,
593 F.3d 1249, 1257–58
(11th Cir. 2010). This two-step inquiry is necessary because what is allowed under
a state’s long-arm statute is not always coextensive with what is allowed by
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procedural due process. Instead, the long-arm statute “imposes independent
obligations that a plaintiff must establish for the exercise of personal jurisdiction that
are distinct from the demands of procedural due process.”
Id. at 1259.
Georgia’s long-arm statute states that a court “may exercise personal
jurisdiction over any nonresident . . . as to a cause of action arising from any of the
acts, omissions, ownership, use, or possession enumerated in this Code section, in
the same manner as if he or she were a resident of this state,” provided that he
“[t]ransacts any business within this state.” O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 (emphasis added).
In other words, “Georgia’s long-arm statute permits jurisdiction where a plaintiff’s
cause of action ‘arises out of’ a nonresident defendant’s ‘transact[ion] of any
business within [Georgia].’” Diamond Crystal,
593 F.3d at 1264 (quoting O.C.G.A.
§ 9–10–91(1)).
“[W]e interpret and apply Georgia’s long-arm statute in the same way as
would the Georgia Supreme Court.” Id. at 1258. That court has adopted a rule of
“literal construction” of the state’s long-arm statute. Innovative Clinical &
Consulting Servs., LLC v. First Nat. Bank of Ames,
620 S.E.2d 352, 354 (Ga. 2005)
(citing Gust v. Flint,
356 S.E.2d 513, 514 (Ga. 1987)). Relevant here, the statute
requires that, for a Georgia court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant, the cause of action must be one “arising from” the defendant’s contact
with the state. Georgia courts have held that to satisfy the long-arm statute’s “arising
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from” requirement, a plaintiff must establish a connection between the defendant’s
contact with the state and the claims at issue. See Stubblefield v. Stubblefield,
769
S.E.2d 78, 82 (Ga. 2015) (holding that Georgia’s long arm statute was satisfied
where plaintiffs’ claims were “related directly” to defendants’ purposeful acts in
Georgia); Stanton v. Harris,
848 S.E.2d 186, 188 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020) (“[T]he Long
Arm Statute confers jurisdiction over a nonresident if the cause of action arises from
that nonresident’s transacting any business within the state.”). Thus, Davis and
Fullerton were required to show that their cause of action was one “arising from”
LG Chem’s contacts with Georgia. 1
Davis and Fullerton have failed to identify any connection between business
that LG Chem transacted in Georgia and the events of this case. Plaintiffs are
Oklahoma residents, they purchased their LG 18650 batteries in Oklahoma from
Oklahoma retailers, and their injuries occurred in Oklahoma. They have not alleged
that the batteries that injured them ever passed through Georgia. The sole connection
allegedly tying this case to Georgia is LG Chem’s Georgia-based subsidiary, Chem
America. But Chem America did not sell the batteries at issue here. It is undisputed
that the batteries that injured Davis and Fullerton were re-wrapped in another
1
As explained above, Davis and Fullerton expressly asked the district court not to consider whether
LG Chem might be subject to general jurisdiction. Cf. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Coleman,
658
S.E.2d 843 (Ga. App. 2008). “It is a cardinal rule of appellate review that a party may not challenge
as error a ruling or other trial proceeding invited by that party.” United States v. Ross,
131 F.3d
970, 988 (11th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, we do not address that theory of personal jurisdiction.
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company’s branded wrapper and sold to an Oklahoma retailer by third party
wholesalers. Accordingly, Davis and Fullerton have failed to show that their cause
of action is one “arising from” LG Chem’s contacts with Georgia.
Nor would Davis and Fullerton be aided by jurisdictional discovery. A district
court’s denial of a request for jurisdictional discovery is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer,
556 F.3d 1260, 1280 (11th Cir. 2009).
Davis and Fullerton request jurisdictional discovery “concerning LG’s Georgia
business and other contacts.” Even if such evidence existed, it would not affect the
outcome of this case. The district court’s decision was not based on the sufficiency
of LG Chem’s contact with Georgia, but whether Davis and Fullerton’s claims arise
from those contacts at all. The district court’s conclusion that they did not was based
on undisputed evidence and Plaintiff’s own statements at the hearing held on the
motions to dismiss. Accordingly, Davis and Fullerton are not entitled to
jurisdictional discovery.
III.
For these reasons, we conclude that the district court correctly granted LG
Chem’s motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and correctly denied
Davis and Fullerton’s request for jurisdictional discovery. AFFIRMED.
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