USCA11 Case: 22-10931 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2023 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10931
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GARNELL DEWITT QUARTERMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cr-00064-WTM-CLR-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10931
Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Garnell Dewitt Quarterman appeals his 235-month sentence
following his conviction for one count of conspiracy to interfere
with commerce by robbery. On appeal, Quarterman argues that
his sentence is unreasonable because it is disparate in comparison
to his co-defendant’s sentence and because it is at the high end of
the guideline range. After thorough review, we affirm.
I.
We review the sentence a district court imposes for “reason-
ableness,” which “merely asks whether the trial court abused its
discretion.” United States v. Pugh,
515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir.
2008) (quotations omitted). That said, we only review for plain er-
ror a sentencing challenge raised for the first time on appeal.
United States v. Henderson,
409 F.3d 1293, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005).
To establish plain error, the defendant must show (1) an error, (2)
that is plain, and (3) that affected his substantial rights. United
States v. Turner,
474 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007). If the de-
fendant satisfies these conditions, we may exercise our discretion
to recognize the error only if it seriously affects the fairness, integ-
rity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
Id.
To preserve an issue for appeal, a defendant “must raise an
objection that is sufficient to apprise the trial court and the oppos-
ing party of the particular grounds upon which appellate relief will
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22-10931 Opinion of the Court 3
later be sought.” United States v. Straub,
508 F.3d 1003, 1011 (11th
Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). A defendant preserves the issue of
the substantive reasonableness of his sentence for review by advo-
cating for a less severe sentence. Holguin-Hernandez v. United
States,
140 S. Ct. 762, 766–67 (2020).
In reviewing sentences for reasonableness, we perform two
steps. Pugh,
515 F.3d at 1190. First, we “‘ensure that the district
court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to
calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating
the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) fac-
tors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing
to adequately explain the chosen sentence -- including an explana-
tion for any deviation from the Guidelines range.’” Id. (quoting
Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). 1 The district court is
not required to state on the record that it has explicitly considered
each of the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors if the record reflects the dis-
trict court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. United States v.
1 The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sen-
tence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for the
sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence; (4) the need to protect the
public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational
training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing
Guidelines range; (8) the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Com-
mission; (9) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the
need to provide restitution to victims.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10931
Cabezas-Montano,
949 F.3d 567, 609 (11th Cir. 2020). So, an ac-
knowledgment by the district court that it considered the § 3553(a)
factors is sufficient. Turner,
474 F.3d at 1281. Further, a failure to
discuss mitigating evidence does not indicate that the court “erro-
neously ‘ignored’ or failed to consider this evidence.” United States
v. Amedeo,
487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007). “[T]he adequacy of
a district court’s findings and sentence explanation is a classic pro-
cedural issue, not a substantive one.” United States v. Irey,
612
F.3d 1160, 1194 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
If we conclude that the district court did not procedurally
err, we consider the “substantive reasonableness of the sentence
imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard,” based on the “to-
tality of the circumstances.” Pugh,
515 F.3d at 1190 (quotations
omitted). A court may abuse its discretion if it (1) fails to consider
relevant factors that are due significant weight, (2) gives an im-
proper or irrelevant factor significant weight, or (3) commits a clear
error of judgment by balancing a proper factor unreasonably. Irey,
612 F.3d at 1189. Also, a court’s unjustified reliance on any one §
3553(a) factor may be a symptom of an unreasonable sentence.
United States v. Crisp,
454 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 2006).
We have “underscored” that we must give “due deference”
to the district court to consider and weigh the proper sentencing
factors. United States v. Shabazz,
887 F.3d 1204, 1224 (11th Cir.
2018) (quotations omitted). The district court does not have to
give all the factors equal weight and is given discretion to attach
great weight to one factor over another. United States v.
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22-10931 Opinion of the Court 5
Rosales-Bruno,
789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015). Sentencing
courts are also afforded “broad leeway in deciding how much
weight to give to prior crimes the defendant has committed.”
United States v. Butler,
39 F.4th 1349, 1355–56 (11th Cir. 2022).
We will vacate a sentence only if we are “left with the defi-
nite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear
error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a
sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dic-
tated by the facts of the case.” Irey,
612 F.3d at 1190 (quotations
omitted). We will not substitute our own judgment for that of the
sentencing court and will sometimes affirm the district court even
if we would have done something differently because the question
is whether the district court’s decision was “in the ballpark of per-
missible outcomes.” Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355 (quotations omitted).
A claim of unwarranted sentencing disparities requires that
the defendant be similarly situated to the defendants to whom he
compares himself. United States v. Duperval,
777 F.3d 1324, 1338
(11th Cir. 2015). District courts should not draw comparisons to
cases involving defendants who were convicted of less serious of-
fenses, pleaded guilty, or who lacked extensive criminal histories.
United States v. Jayyousi,
657 F.3d 1085, 1118 (11th Cir. 2011). In
other words, a well-founded claim of unwarranted disparity be-
tween sentences “assumes that apples are being compared to ap-
ples.” United States v. Docampo,
573 F.3d 1091, 1101 (11th Cir.
2009) (quotations omitted).
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-10931
We do not apply a presumption of reasonableness to sen-
tences within the guideline range, but we ordinarily expect these
sentences to be reasonable. United States v. Stanley,
739 F.3d 633,
656 (11th Cir. 2014). The party challenging the sentence bears the
burden of establishing that it is unreasonable based on the record
and the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Tome,
611 F.3d 1371,
1378 (11th Cir. 2010).
Here, Quarterman has not shown that his sentence is either
procedurally or substantively unreasonable. As the record reveals,
Quarterman and his codefendant, Malik Stephens, were charged
with several counts arising out of the robberies of businesses near
Savannah, Georgia. In the initial indictment, both were charged
with one count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, in vi-
olation of
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); Stephens was charged in three addi-
tional counts; and Quarterman was charged in thirteen additional
counts. After Stephens pleaded guilty to the initial indictment,
Quarterman was charged in a superseding indictment with twenty-
six counts, including conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, in
violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); four counts of attempted Hobbs
Act robbery, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); twelve counts of
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in vi-
olation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c); eight counts of Hobbs Act robbery, in
violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); and one count of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Quarterman later agreed to plead guilty to the conspiracy
count of the superseding indictment in exchange for the dismissal
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22-10931 Opinion of the Court 7
of the other counts, pursuant to a written agreement. After hear-
ing arguments in mitigation from Quarterman and his mother, the
district court said that it had considered the testimony, the parties’
arguments and the § 3553(a) factors, and emphasized “the egre-
gious conduct involved in the instant offense with the commission
of 12 armed robberies [, the victims’ testimony about how the rob-
beries have affected them, as well as] the defendant’s repeated vio-
lent criminal history, the criminal history here in this area and also
in Maryland.” It then sentenced Quarterman to 235 months’ im-
prisonment, at the high end of the guideline range.
To the extent that Quarterman now raises a procedural rea-
sonableness challenge to the explanation of the sentence, he failed
to raise any issue like this before the district court, despite being
given the opportunity to do so. Thus, we review his procedural
reasonableness challenge for plain error, and can find no error,
much less plain error. As we’ve said, the court was not required to
discuss each subpart of
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in explaining his sen-
tence. Kulhman, 711 F.3d at 1326. Further, the record -- including
the undisputed portions of his PSI -- reflects that his history and
characteristics, and his actions during the course of the offense con-
duct, supported the district court’s decision, as we’ll discuss.
As for Quarterman’s challenge to the substantive reasona-
bleness of his 235-month sentence, it was not a result of an unwar-
ranted sentencing disparity. This kind of claim “assumes that ap-
ples are being compared to apples,” but the record shows that the
codefendants here played significantly different roles in the offense
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-10931
conduct. While Stephens was charged with four counts in the ini-
tial indictment, Quarterman was charged in a superseding indict-
ment with twenty-six counts. Moreover, Stephens pleaded guilty
to the initial indictment, rather than the superseding indictment.
Ultimately, Stephens’s guideline range was 120 to 150 months im-
prisonment, while Quarterman’s was 188 to 235 months imprison-
ment, even though Stephens had a higher criminal history score
than Quarterman. On this record, there was no error in treating
Stephens and Quarterman differently for sentencing purposes.
Duperval,
777 F.3d at 1338.
Nor are we persuaded by Quarterman’s argument that the
235-month sentence was otherwise substantively unreasonable. In
sentencing Quarterman at the high end of the guideline range, the
district court emphasized his “egregious” conduct and “repeatedly
violent criminal history.” The court was permitted to attach
weight to these considerations,
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) -- even great
weight, Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355 -- and we will not second guess this
weight if the sentence is reasonable under the circumstances. Id.
Further, Quarterman has not shown that the district court failed to
consider any relevant factors, to give weight to any “improper or
irrelevant factor,” or to make any “clear error of judgment” in con-
sidering the relevant factors. Irey,
612 F.3d at 1189. Accordingly,
Quarterman has not shown the district court’s within-guideline
sentence was outside “the ballpark of permissible outcomes,” But-
ler, 39 F.4th at 1355, and we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
