USCA11 Case: 20-11708 Date Filed: 03/19/2021 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 20-11708
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 5:19-cv-00377-RBD-PRL
ALIMAMY BARRIE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
WARDEN, FCC COLEMAN,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(March 19, 2021)
Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
USCA11 Case: 20-11708 Date Filed: 03/19/2021 Page: 2 of 3
Alimamy Barrie, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of his
28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition challenging the result
of a prison disciplinary hearing for possession of amphetamines that resulted in
him losing good conduct time. Barrie asserts the district court erred in finding that
some evidence supported the conclusion that Barrie was in possession of
amphetamines because the Narcotics Identification Kit (NIK) tests were unreliable.
After review,1 we affirm the district court.
The Supreme Court has held that the following minimum due-process
procedures are required in a prisoner’s disciplinary proceeding: (1) at least
24 hours’ notice of the charges so that the prisoner can prepare for the hearing;
(2) a written statement by the factfinder detailing what evidence was relied upon
and why disciplinary action was taken; and (3) the qualified right to call witnesses
and present documentary evidence, if not “unduly hazardous to institutional safety
or correctional goals.” Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 563-66 (1974). In
determining whether a prisoner has received due process, in the context of
revocation of GCT, a court is not required to examine the entire record, weigh the
evidence, or independently assess the credibility of witnesses. Superintendent,
1
We review de novo the district court’s denial of habeas relief under § 2241 and its fact
findings for clear error. Bowers v. Keller,
651 F.3d 1277, 1291 (11th Cir. 2011). Pro se
pleadings are liberally construed. Tannenbaum v. United States,
148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.
1998).
2
USCA11 Case: 20-11708 Date Filed: 03/19/2021 Page: 3 of 3
Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill,
472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985); Yarbrough v.
Decatur Hous. Auth.,
941 F.3d 1022, 1028 (11th Cir. 2019). The relevant question
is only whether the hearing officer’s findings are supported “by some evidence in
the record.” Hill,
472 U.S. at 454. This does not require a robust substantive
evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence behind the administrative decision
and is not a guarantee against ill-advised or incorrect decisions. Yarbrough,
941 F.3d at 1027. The decision need only have some basis in fact. Id. at 1028.
Barrie’s disciplinary proceeding satisfied the due process requirements
outlined in Wolff and the district court did not err in finding that some evidence
supported the discipline hearing officer’s (DHO) findings. Regarding due process,
Barrie was notified of the DHO hearing 23 days beforehand, the report explained
the evidence it relied upon, and Barrie could have requested a staff representative
or witnesses. See Wolff,
418 U.S. at 563-66. Regarding the evidence, the district
court did not err in concluding the positive NIK test results were sufficient to
satisfy the “some evidence” standard because it did not need to address the
sufficiency or credibility of the evidence. Yarbrough, 941 F.3d at 1027-28.
Hence, although Barrie argues the NIK tests were unreliable and cannot be relied
upon, the district court was not required to assess those tests. The district court did
not err in finding the positive test results satisfied the “some evidence” standard.
AFFIRMED.
3
