USCA11 Case: 18-14802 Date Filed: 03/25/2021 Page: 1 of 12
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 18-14802
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:16-cv-14554-JEM
RICHARD MORRIS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(March 25, 2021)
Before WILSON, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
BRASHER, Circuit Judge:
Richard Morris appeals the district court’s dismissal of his federal habeas
petition as untimely. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)
sets a one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition that
USCA11 Case: 18-14802 Date Filed: 03/25/2021 Page: 2 of 12
challenges a state conviction.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute of limitations starts
to run when the state conviction is final, but it is tolled while a “properly filed”
application for state post-conviction relief is “pending.” Whether Morris’s habeas
petition is timely turns on one issue: whether Morris’s amended state-court motion
for postconviction relief relates back to his initial postconviction motion, tolling the
statute of limitations for the time in between his initial motion was dismissed and
his amended motion was filed. Because this Court’s and the Florida state courts’
precedents are clear that it does, we conclude that the district court erred in
dismissing Morris’s habeas petition as untimely. Accordingly, we reverse.
I. BACKGROUND
Richard Morris was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life
imprisonment. Determining whether the statute of limitations barred Morris’s
federal habeas petition requires us to examine the state post-conviction motions he
filed and when they were pending.
Morris’s conviction became final 90 days after the state court of appeals
affirmed his conviction and denied his motion for rehearing. See Morris v. State,
67
So.3d 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). Morris filed his first state habeas corpus
2
USCA11 Case: 18-14802 Date Filed: 03/25/2021 Page: 3 of 12
petition 65 days later. That matter was pending until the state court of appeals denied
a rehearing of its denial of the petition.
Morris then waited 166 days to file a Rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction
relief with the state trial court. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850. This initial Rule 3.850 motion
asserted several overlapping bases for relief, including ineffective assistance of
counsel, denial of due process, and other violations of state and federal law. Morris
requested an evidentiary hearing on the motion or, alternatively, for the court to
“revers[e] and remand for a new trial[.]” The state trial court dismissed the motion
without prejudice, noting that Morris’s motion was “difficult to interpret,” the
“relevant facts [we]re not sufficiently developed; [we]re not presented in the context
of an understandable chronology”; and were “interspersed with argument,
speculation, and irrelevant comment.” The court invited Morris to refile a “single,
comprehensive, legally sufficient motion, if amended claims [could] be made in
good faith.”
Morris filed a Rule 3.800(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence 96 days later.
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a).
Morris then followed the trial court’s instructions from his earlier case and
filed an amended Rule 3.850 motion. The court accepted the amended motion as
timely, considered the grounds for relief it asserted, and denied it on the merits. The
3
USCA11 Case: 18-14802 Date Filed: 03/25/2021 Page: 4 of 12
state appellate court affirmed. See Morris v. State,
149 So.3d 26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2014).
Without any additional breaks in time, Morris filed several more state court
motions and petitions. When the state appellate court eventually denied his last
motion for rehearing on his third Rule 3.850 motion, there were no more pending
applications for state post-conviction relief or collateral review. Morris filed a
federal habeas petition 66 days later.
In the district court, Morris asserted that he filed his federal habeas petition
within the one-year statute of limitations under AEDPA. The state disagreed and
asserted that Morris had filed his petition too late. To reach that conclusion, the state
added four units of untolled time: (1) the 65 days between his final judgment and
first state habeas petition, (2) the 166 days between the denial of that petition and
his first 3.850 motion, (3) the 96 days between the state court’s order denying his
initial Rule 3.850 motion and the filing of his Rule 3.800(a) motion to correct an
illegal sentence, and (4) the 66 days between the end of his state proceedings and his
federal habeas filing. The district court agreed with the state and dismissed Morris’s
federal habeas petition as untimely.
We granted Morris a certificate of appealability on two issues: whether his
amended Rule 3.850 motion relates back to his initial filing and tolled the 96-day
period and whether the statute of limitations should be tolled as a matter of equity.
4
USCA11 Case: 18-14802 Date Filed: 03/25/2021 Page: 5 of 12
After we appointed counsel, Morris abandoned the equitable tolling issue. So the
only issue remaining is whether Morris’s amended Rule 3.850 motion relates back
to his initial motion for tolling purposes.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo the dismissal of a federal habeas petition as time-
barred under
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Hall v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.,
921 F.3d 983, 986
(11th Cir. 2019) (citing Cole v. Warden, Ga. State Prison,
768 F.3d 1150, 1155 (11th
Cir. 2014)).
III. DISCUSSION
The federal habeas statute establishes “[a] 1–year period of limitation . . . [for]
an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court.”
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). It also says that “[t]he time
during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral
review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be
counted toward any period of limitation[.]”
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A Rule 3.850
motion is an application for review under that provision. Hall, 921 F.3d at 987 (citing
Day v. Crosby,
391 F.3d 1192, 1192–93 (11th Cir. 2004)). Accordingly, as long as
such a properly filed motion is pending, the federal statute of limitations is tolled.
This appeal turns on a single issue: whether Morris’s Rule 3.850 motion was
pending during the time between when it was dismissed without prejudice and when
5
USCA11 Case: 18-14802 Date Filed: 03/25/2021 Page: 6 of 12
he successfully amended it. No one disputes on appeal that the limitations period ran
untolled for periods of 65, 166, and 66 days—a total of 297 days. If the amended
motion does not relate back, then nothing was pending during the disputed 96-day
period, the limitations period ran untolled during that period, and Morris filed his
petition too late. If the amended motion does relate back, then it was pending during
the disputed period, the limitations period was tolled during that period, and Morris’s
petition is timely.
We agree with Morris that his amended motion relates back to his initial
motion, tolling the 96-day period. Under Florida law, when a post-conviction motion
is denied with leave to amend and a movant files a proper amended motion, the
amended motion relates back to the date of the original filing. See Bryant v. State,
901 So.2d 810, 818 (Fla. 2005); see also Russell v. State,
46 So.3d 151, 151–52 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a state court’s order dismissing a post-conviction
motion without prejudice is not a final, appealable order). As a matter of federal law,
we have held that, if an amended motion relates back, the limitations period is tolled
between the initial and amended motions. Bates v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.,
964 F.3d
1326, 1328 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[A] compliant Rule 3.850 motion relates back to the
date of filing of a noncompliant motion, such that the noncompliant motion was
‘properly filed’ and ‘pending’ as of that date for the purposes of tolling the
limitations period[.]”); Hall, 921 F.3d at 988 (“[N]ot only [is] the time between the
6
USCA11 Case: 18-14802 Date Filed: 03/25/2021 Page: 7 of 12
corrected Rule 3.850 motion and its disposition tolled, but so too [is] the time
between the original, deficient Rule 3.850 motion and the filing of its [compliant]
substitute.”); Green v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.,
877 F.3d 1244, 1248 (11th Cir. 2017).
In this scenario, a petitioner’s Rule 3.850 motion remains “pending” until “it is
denied with prejudice.” Hall, 921 F.3d at 990.
Applying these authorities here, Morris’s amended Rule 3.850 motion relates
back to his initial motion, tolling the AEDPA limitations period for the time in
between. The state trial court dismissed Morris’s initial motion “without prejudice
to file a single, comprehensive, legally sufficient motion, if amended claims can be
made in good faith.” The court provided no amendment deadline; it merely
instructed Morris to file an amended motion. Morris eventually did just that. Several
months later, he filed an amended Rule 3.850 motion that the court accepted as
timely and eventually denied on the merits.
The state concedes that, under our precedents, an amended motion would
normally relate back to the initial motion in these circumstances. But it argues that
Morris took too long to file his amended motion. The state argues that, to relate back
under Florida law, an amended motion must be filed by either (1) a deadline set by
the court, or (2) if no deadline is set, a “reasonable” amount of time. It contends that
“reasonable” in this context means no more than 30 days. Relatedly, the state argues
that, unless we create a 30-day relation-back rule as a matter of federal law, a state
7
USCA11 Case: 18-14802 Date Filed: 03/25/2021 Page: 8 of 12
inmate could “toll the time for years, if not indefinitely,” by successfully amending
previous state-court motions that were dismissed without prejudice. This would,
according to the state, “run contra to the purpose of AEDPA’s one-year limitations
period.”
The state’s arguments are unconvincing. Neither Florida law nor federal law
creates a 30-day default deadline for amending a post-conviction motion.
First, the state is wrong about Florida law. Florida’s relation-back rule does
not establish a default deadline when a court fails to specify one. The Florida
Supreme Court has held that, when a petitioner’s initial motion for postconviction
relief is deemed facially insufficient, the trial court must allow the petitioner at least
one opportunity to amend. Spera v. State,
971 So.2d 754, 761 (Fla. 2007) (citing
Bryant, 901 So.2d at 817–19). The court has explained that, when a petitioner files
an insufficient motion, “the proper procedure is to strike the motion with leave to
amend within a reasonable period.”
Id. “Normally,” the court has explained, the
deadline for an amendment should be “between ten and thirty days, although special
circumstances may dictate an extension greater than thirty days.” Bryant, 901 So.2d
at 819. But the Florida appellate courts ultimately leave the appropriate deadline for
filing an amended post-conviction motion to lower courts’ discretion. Nelson v.
State,
977 So.2d 710, 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (“The trial court has discretion
in determining the length of the defendant’s leave to amend,” and “in its discretion
8
USCA11 Case: 18-14802 Date Filed: 03/25/2021 Page: 9 of 12
may grant more than one opportunity to amend an insufficient claim[.]”). Here, the
state court did not impose a deadline, and nothing about Florida’s relation-back rule
established a default 30-day deadline.
Second, the state’s argument is inconsistent with our precedents. This Court
has never treated a state court’s silence in this context to create a default deadline of
30 days. In Bates, the state court did not set a deadline by which the petitioner’s
amended postconviction motion was due. There, the time between the without-
prejudice dismissal of the petitioner’s initial motion and his amended motion was 31
days. Bates, 964 F.3d at 1327. This Court still found that the amended motion related
back for tolling purposes. Nor do our precedents suggest that allowing relation back
over periods longer than 30 days is unreasonable or unworkable in this context. In
Hall, the time between the initial and amended post-conviction motions was only 10
days, though the state court had granted the petitioner 60 days. 921 F.3d at 985–86.
There we reiterated that “[t]he trial court has discretion in determining the length of
the defendant’s leave to amend” and that the Florida Supreme Court had merely
“suggested thirty days would be reasonable.” Id. at 989.
For its part, the state relies on decisions that are distinguishable. It argues that
its position is consistent with two earlier decisions by this Court: Tinker v. Moore,
255 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2001), and Webster v. Moore,
199 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir.
2000)). In deciding those appeals, this Court held that a Florida state prisoner’s
9
USCA11 Case: 18-14802 Date Filed: 03/25/2021 Page: 10 of 12
application for state post-conviction relief filed outside the one-year period provided
by AEDPA did not toll the limitations period even though the application was
properly filed within the two years permitted for Rule 3.850 motions under Florida
law. In both of those decisions, the limitations period had already expired by the
time the petitioner filed an initial post-conviction motion. See Tinker, 255 F.3d at
1333; Webster,
199 F.3d at 1259. Thus, no post-conviction motion was ever pending
during the year-long limitations period, and there was no question of an amendment
relating back for tolling purposes. By contrast, when Morris filed his initial Rule
3.850 motion, more than four months of the limitations period remained. Once the
state trial court accepted Morris’s amended motion as timely filed, its relation back
meant that the motion had been pending since the initial filing for tolling purposes.
Third, the state’s policy argument regarding AEDPA misconstrues that
statute. AEDPA expressly tolls the statute of limitations while properly filed
applications for state post-conviction relief are pending. This tolling is consistent
with one of the main purposes of AEDPA: to encourage “greater federal court
deference to state court decisions and to promote more federal-state judicial comity.”
Wright v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr.,
278 F.3d 1245, 1255 (11th Cir. 2002).
“Section 2244(d)(2) promotes the exhaustion of state remedies by protecting a state
prisoner’s ability later to apply for federal habeas relief[,]” while at the same time
“limit[ing] the harm to the interest in finality by according tolling effect only to
10
USCA11 Case: 18-14802 Date Filed: 03/25/2021 Page: 11 of 12
properly filed application[s] for State post-conviction or other collateral review.”
Duncan v. Walker,
533 U.S. 167, 179–180 (2001). Under AEDPA, we cannot
impose a default time limit for amending a state-court motion for postconviction
relief. Nor can we ignore the state court’s conclusion that Morris’s amended Rule
3.850 motion was timely and properly filed. Federalism and comity mean that we
cannot set a deadline for state courts to adjudicate state post-conviction motions.
In any event, Florida has already eliminated the possibility of unreasonable or
indefinite tolling when a state court does not impose a deadline for an amended
motion. The year after Morris’s initial Rule 3.850 motion was denied, Florida
amended Rule 3.850 to provide a default deadline of 60 days for filing an amended
motion when the state court’s order does not provide another one. See Fla. R. Crim.
P. 3.850(e); In re Amendments to Fla. Rules of Crim. Proc. & Fla. Rules of App.
Proc.,
132 So. 3d 734, 738 (Fla. 2013). Although that default deadline does not affect
the outcome of this case, it solves the problem going forward. Consequently, there
is no need to “narrow[] the scope” of our holdings in Bates, Hall, and Green—as the
state concedes it is asking this Court to do—by imposing a default 30-day deadline
for amending a Rule 3.850 motion when a state court has not specified one.
IV. CONCLUSION
The dismissal of Morris’s federal habeas petition as untimely is reversed, and
the petition is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
11
USCA11 Case: 18-14802 Date Filed: 03/25/2021 Page: 12 of 12
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
12
