Rubens Aspilaire v. U.S. Attorney General ( 2021 )


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  •            USCA11 Case: 19-12605          Date Filed: 04/06/2021      Page: 1 of 19
    [PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 19-12605
    ________________________
    Agency No. A098-517-544
    RUBENS ASPILAIRE,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ________________________
    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    _______________________
    (April 6, 2021)
    Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge, and SELF, *
    District Judge.
    WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:
    *
    Honorable Tilman Eugene Self III, United States District Judge for the Middle District
    of Georgia, sitting by designation.
    USCA11 Case: 19-12605       Date Filed: 04/06/2021    Page: 2 of 19
    This petition for review requires us to decide whether a Florida conviction
    for being a felon in possession of a firearm, 
    Fla. Stat. § 790.23
    (1)(a), is
    categorically an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(43)(E)(ii). The Board of Immigration Appeals ordered Rubens
    Aspilaire removed based on his Florida felon-in-possession conviction. Aspilaire
    argues that his offense is not categorically an aggravated felony because Florida
    law defines as “firearms” some weapons that would not be considered firearms for
    purposes of federal law. Florida’s antique-firearm exception to its definition of a
    firearm, 
    Fla. Stat. § 790.001
    (6), does not apply when an antique firearm is used in
    the commission of an offense, unlike the federal exception. And Florida’s antique-
    firearm exception does not include all black-powder muzzleloaders, unlike the
    federal exception. But Aspilaire does not point to his own case or any other
    prosecution to establish that Florida prosecutes felons for possessing firearms that
    fall within the federal antique-firearm exception, and Florida’s definition of a
    firearm is not broader than the federal definition on its face. So we deny his
    petition for review.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Rubens Aspilaire is a native and citizen of Haiti. He entered the United
    States in 2006 and became a lawful permanent resident in 2007. In 2012, Aspilaire
    was convicted in Florida of possession of marijuana and carrying a concealed
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    firearm. He was sentenced to eight months in the county jail and two years of
    probation.
    After Aspilaire was arrested again in 2014 for violating his probation by
    possessing a firearm, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal
    proceedings. Aspilaire explored options to avoid removal by adjusting his
    immigration status. He was eventually released from custody in the spring of 2015,
    and the removal proceedings against him were administratively closed.
    But Aspilaire was arrested again in 2015 and charged by the State of Florida
    with driving a motor vehicle without a valid license, resisting arrest, possessing 20
    grams or less of marijuana, trafficking 28 grams or more of cocaine, being a felon
    in possession of a firearm or ammunition or a concealed weapon, and possessing
    heroin. The probable cause affidavit prepared in connection with the arrest
    specified that Aspilaire possessed a “Springfield Armory . . . 9mm” “semi-
    automatic handgun.” After a jury trial, he was convicted of “possession of [a]
    weapon or ammo” by a felon and sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment.
    Following Aspilaire’s felon-in-possession conviction, the government
    moved to re-calendar the closed removal proceeding. It amended the charges
    against Aspilaire to reflect the 2016 felon-in-possession conviction, which it
    charged was an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act.
    Aspilaire moved to terminate the removal proceedings. He argued that his Florida
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    felon-in-possession conviction could not trigger deportability for two reasons:
    because the Florida statute, unlike the federal statute, “[r]elates to ammunition and
    other non-firearm weapons,” namely “[e]lectric [w]eapons,” and because Florida’s
    definition of a firearm “[i]ncorporates antique firearms specifically excluded from
    the federal firearm definition.” The immigration judge denied the motion to
    terminate the removal proceedings and later ordered Aspilaire removed to Haiti.
    Aspilaire appealed the removal order to the Board of Immigration Appeals.
    The Board dismissed the appeal based solely on Aspilaire’s 2016 felon-in-
    possession conviction. It rejected Aspilaire’s “electric weapon” argument by
    “‘peek[ing]’ at [his] conviction record” to determine “that [the statute of conviction
    was] a divisible statute with respect to the types of weapons it covers.” So it
    applied the modified categorical approach to look at the jury verdict and
    determined that Aspilaire was convicted “of possessing a ‘firearm or ammunition’
    to the exclusion of all other weapons,” consistent with the generic federal offense.
    The Board then turned to Aspilaire’s antique-firearm arguments. Aspilaire
    argued that Florida’s definition of a firearm was overbroad because its antique-
    firearm definition did not include black-powder muzzleloaders like the federal
    definition, and because it excluded weapons used in the commission of an offense,
    unlike the federal definition. Citing Supreme Court dicta from Moncrieffe v.
    Holder, 
    569 U.S. 184
     (2013), the Board explained that Aspilaire could carry his
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    burden only by pointing to exemplar prosecutions by Florida of antique weapons.
    Because he failed to do so, it rejected his arguments.
    Aspilaire petitioned for review, but the government moved to dismiss the
    petition and remand for the Board to reconsider whether Moncrieffe requires an
    alien to point to exemplar prosecutions involving antique firearms. We vacated the
    removal order and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the parties did
    not pursue the Moncrieffe question, and the Board issued a new order dismissing
    the appeal for the same reasons it dismissed the first appeal.
    Aspilaire again petitioned for review. He maintains that “[t]he sole issue
    presented in the instant petition” “is whether removal consequences may be
    triggered where . . . the Florida ‘antique firearms’ exception is more narrow than
    the federal exception” and where “the Florida offense permits conviction of a
    ‘firearms offense’ where an otherwise excepted ‘antique firearm’ is used in the
    commission of an offense.” Neither party discusses the divisibility of Florida’s
    felon-in-possession statute with respect to “electric weapons.”
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review only the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, except to
    the extent that the Board adopts the opinion of the immigration judge. Kazemzadeh
    v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    577 F.3d 1341
    , 1350 (11th Cir. 2009). We review de novo
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    whether a crime is an aggravated felony for purposes of the Immigration and
    Nationality Act. Cintron v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    882 F.3d 1380
    , 1383 (11th Cir. 2018).
    III. DISCUSSION
    We divide our discussion in three parts. First, we explain the categorical
    approach and examine the relevant statutes. Then, we discuss Aspilaire’s
    exemplar-prosecutions argument and conclude that none of the decisions he cites
    establishes that Florida prosecutes felons for possessing firearms that would be
    considered antique firearms under the federal definition. Finally, we discuss
    Aspilaire’s statutory-language arguments and explain that Florida’s felon-in-
    possession statute is not broader than the federal statute on its face.
    A. The Categorical Approach and the Relevant Statutes.
    Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, “[a]ny alien who is convicted of
    an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(2)(A)(iii). The Act defines an “aggravated felony” to include the federal
    felon-in-possession statute. 
    Id.
     § 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii); 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1). And
    the Act makes clear that “[t]he term [aggravated felony] applies to an offense . . .
    whether in violation of Federal or State law.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(43).
    To determine whether a state-law conviction constitutes an aggravated
    felony under the Act, we apply either the categorical or modified categorical
    approach, depending on whether the state statute is divisible. Donawa v. U.S. Att’y
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    Gen., 
    735 F.3d 1275
    , 1280 (11th Cir. 2013). When a state statute is not divisible,
    we apply the categorical approach and “confine [our] consideration only to the fact
    of conviction and the statutory definition of the offense.” 
    Id.
     “A state offense is an
    aggravated felony for [Immigration and Nationality Act] purposes only if it
    necessarily involves facts equating the generic federal offense.” 
    Id.
     When a state
    statute is divisible, we apply the modified categorical approach, under which we
    “expand our inquiry beyond the fact of conviction and also look to the record of
    conviction—including documents involving the charge, plea agreement, or
    sentence.” 
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks omitted).
    The parties agree that the categorical approach applies to the question
    presented in this petition for review. And in any event, the record does not include
    any documents that we could use to sharpen our analysis of Aspilaire’s antique-
    firearm arguments under the modified categorical approach. Additionally,
    Aspilaire does not argue the Board erred by concluding “that [Florida’s felon-in-
    possession statute was] a divisible statute with respect to the types of weapons it
    covers” and using the modified categorical approach to reject his electric-weapons
    argument. We express no opinion on the divisibility of the Florida statute.
    Aspilaire argues that, under the categorical approach, a Florida felon-in-
    possession conviction does not necessarily involve facts equating to a federal
    felon-in-possession conviction because Florida law defines as “firearms” some
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    weapons that would not be considered firearms for purposes of federal law. His
    arguments involve the scope of both the Florida and the federal antique-firearm
    exceptions.
    For purposes of the federal felon-in-possession statute, 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1), a “firearm” is defined as follows:
    (A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to
    or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an
    explosive; (B) the frame or receiver of any such weapon; (C) any
    firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or (D) any destructive device. Such
    term does not include an antique firearm.
    
    Id.
     § 921(a)(3) (emphasis added). For purposes of the Florida felon-in-possession
    statute, 
    Fla. Stat. § 790.23
    (1)(a), a “firearm” is defined as follows:
    any weapon (including a starter gun) which will, is designed to, or may
    readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive;
    the frame or receiver of any such weapon; any firearm muffler or
    firearm silencer; any destructive device; or any machine gun. The term
    “firearm” does not include an antique firearm unless the antique
    firearm is used in the commission of a crime.
    
    Id.
     § 790.001(6) (emphasis added).
    There is an obvious difference between the two antique-firearm exceptions.
    A weapon may be considered an antique firearm under federal law—but not under
    Florida law—if it is used in the commission of a crime. Aspilaire says the
    overbreadth of Florida’s antique-firearm exception as applied to antique firearms
    used in the commission of a crime means that his Florida felon-in-possession
    offense is not categorically an aggravated felony.
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    Federal law and Florida law also take different approaches to defining an
    “antique firearm.” For purposes of federal law, an “antique firearm” is defined as:
    (A) any firearm (including any firearm with a matchlock,
    flintlock, percussion cap, or similar type of ignition system)
    manufactured in or before 1898; or
    (B) any replica of any firearm described in subparagraph (A) if
    such replica—
    (i) is not designed or redesigned for using rimfire or
    conventional centerfire fixed ammunition, or
    (ii) uses rimfire or conventional centerfire fixed
    ammunition which is no longer manufactured in the United
    States and which is not readily available in the ordinary channels
    of commercial trade; or
    (C) any muzzle loading rifle, muzzle loading shotgun, or muzzle
    loading pistol, which is designed to use black powder, or a black
    powder substitute, and which cannot use fixed ammunition. For
    purposes of this subparagraph, the term “antique firearm” shall not
    include any weapon which incorporates a firearm frame or receiver, any
    firearm which is converted into a muzzle loading weapon, or any
    muzzle loading weapon which can be readily converted to fire fixed
    ammunition by replacing the barrel, bolt, breechblock, or any
    combination thereof.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 921
    (a)(16).
    Florida’s definition of an “antique firearm” is similar to the federal
    definition—in fact, it is more generous to felons with respect to manufacture
    dates—but it does not include a separate black-powder muzzleloader category:
    “Antique firearm” means any firearm manufactured in or before 1918
    (including any matchlock, flintlock, percussion cap, or similar early
    type of ignition system) or replica thereof, whether actually
    manufactured before or after the year 1918, and also any firearm using
    fixed ammunition manufactured in or before 1918, for which
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    ammunition is no longer manufactured in the United States and is not
    readily available in the ordinary channels of commercial trade.
    
    Fla. Stat. § 790.001
    (1). Aspilaire maintains that the fact that Florida’s antique-
    firearm definition does not include black-powder muzzleloaders like the federal
    definition means that a violation of Florida’s felon-in-possession statute is not
    categorically an aggravated felony.
    Determining that a state statute creates a crime outside the scope of a generic
    federal crime “requires more than the application of legal imagination to a state
    statute’s language.” Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 
    549 U.S. 183
    , 193 (2007). A
    petitioner must show a “realistic probability” that a state would apply the statute in
    the manner he suggests, which he may do by “point[ing] to his own case or other
    cases in which the state courts in fact did apply the statute” to reach conduct not
    covered by the equivalent federal statute. 
    Id.
     Alternatively, a petitioner may
    demonstrate that “statutory language itself, rather than the application of legal
    imagination to that language, creates [a] realistic probability that a state would
    apply the statute to conduct beyond” the reach of a federal statute. Ramos v. U.S.
    Att’y. Gen., 
    709 F.3d 1066
    , 1072 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks
    omitted).
    The Supreme Court has said in dicta that petitioners making antique-
    firearms arguments may not rely on statutory language alone. See Moncrieffe, 
    569 U.S. at
    205–06 (“To defeat the categorical comparison [by pointing to a state’s
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    lack of an antique-firearm exception], a noncitizen [must] demonstrate that the
    State actually prosecutes the relevant offense in cases involving antique
    firearms.”). We have doubts that requiring exemplar prosecutions in cases
    involving obviously overbroad language makes sense. But regardless of whether
    the Moncrieffe dicta controls our decision, Aspilaire’s arguments fail. We first
    discuss Aspilaire’s exemplar prosecutions before discussing his arguments about
    the statutory language.
    B. Aspilaire Is Not Entitled to Relief Based on Exemplar Prosecutions.
    To show a “realistic probability” that a state statute reaches conduct not
    covered by the equivalent federal statute, a petitioner may “point to his own case or
    other cases in which the state courts in fact did apply the statute” in the manner he
    suggests. Gonzales, 
    549 U.S. at 193
    . Aspilaire does not assert that his own felon-
    in-possession conviction involved an antique firearm. But he does point to
    exemplar prosecutions that he says establish Florida actually prosecutes felons for
    possession of federal antique firearms.
    Aspilaire makes two arguments. We first discuss the exemplar prosecutions
    Aspilaire presents in support of his argument that Florida’s treatment of antique
    firearms “used in the commission of a crime,” 
    Fla. Stat. § 790.001
    (6), exposes
    felons to criminal liability for possessing federal antique firearms. We then discuss
    the exemplar prosecutions he presents in support of his argument that Florida’s
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    antique-firearm exception is narrower than the federal exception because it does
    not cover all black-powder muzzleloaders.
    1. Aspilaire Does Not Point to Exemplar Prosecutions of Felons for Mere
    Possession of Federal Antique Firearms.
    Aspilaire argues that Florida’s exclusion from its antique-firearm exception
    of firearms “used in the commission of a crime,” 
    id.,
     means that under Florida law,
    unlike federal law, “an antique loses its exempted status if it merely is in the hands
    of a felon.” Aspilaire points to two exemplar prosecutions to support his argument:
    Margiotti v. State, 
    844 So. 2d 829
    , 830 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), and Williams v.
    State, 
    492 So. 2d 1051
    , 1054 (Fla. 1986), receded from by State v. Weeks, 
    202 So. 3d 1
     (Fla. 2016). Neither decision establishes that Florida prosecutes felons for the
    mere possession of federal antique firearms.
    Margiotti does not help Aspilaire because the prosecution did not involve
    Florida’s felon-in-possession statute at all. The court explained that “[d]uring [a]
    burglary, the defendant used an antique, inoperable firearm.” 844 So. 2d at 830
    (emphasis added). Florida law provides for a mandatory minimum sentence when a
    firearm is possessed during the commission of a burglary. 
    Fla. Stat. § 775.087
    (2)(a)1.d. Margiotti held that an antique firearm counts as a firearm for
    the purpose of triggering a mandatory minimum sentence. 844 So. 2d at 831. The
    decision has no bearing on Florida’s felon-in-possession statute, so it does not help
    Aspilaire.
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    Williams is at least on point, but it does not help Aspilaire either. In
    Williams, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed a felon-in-possession conviction and
    rejected the defendant’s antique-firearm argument because the court “[did] not
    believe that the legislature . . . intended that a convicted felon could be acquitted
    when possessing a concealed, loaded weapon by using the excuse that the weapon
    is an antique or a replica thereof.” 
    492 So. 2d at 1051, 1054
    . It continued, “This
    literal requirement of the statute exhalts form over substance to the detriment of
    public policy, and such a result is clearly absurd.” 
    Id. at 1054
    .
    But Williams is also useless to Aspilaire because it is no longer good law. In
    Weeks, the Florida Supreme Court held that a defendant “was entitled to the
    statutory exception of the felon-in-possession statute because his firearm was a
    permissible ‘replica’ of an ‘antique firearm.’” 202 So. 3d at 9–10. And it receded
    from the Williams decision to the extent the statutory interpretation in that decision
    was inconsistent. Id. at 9. Weeks does more than undermine Aspilaire’s only on-
    point exemplar prosecution; it proves that Florida does not expose felons to
    criminal liability for mere possession of an antique firearm.
    Aspilaire argues that Weeks cannot apply retroactively to deprive him of the
    benefit of Williams because he was convicted before Weeks was decided, but his
    argument misunderstands the nature of judicial decisions. “Judicial decisions have
    had retrospective operation for near a thousand years.” Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co.,
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    215 U.S. 349
    , 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Bryan A. Garner et al.,
    The Law of Judicial Precedent § 37, at 308–10 (2016). So “[a] judicial
    construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant
    before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to that construction.”
    Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 
    511 U.S. 298
    , 312–13 (1994). When a court
    corrects a wrong interpretation of a statute, “it is not accurate to say that [the
    decision] ‘changed’ the law.” 
    Id.
     at 313 n.12; see also Lester v. United States, 
    921 F.3d 1306
    , 1312 (11th Cir. 2019) (W. Pryor, J., respecting the denial of rehearing
    en banc) (“[W]e [must] be mindful of the difference between a change in judicial
    doctrine and a change in law.”). The same principle applies under Florida law. See
    Hester v. State, 
    267 So. 3d 1084
    , 1086 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Rivers,
    
    511 U.S. at
    313 n.12). The prosecution in Williams was never valid under Florida
    law, so Aspilaire may not rely on it as an example of how Florida law applies.
    2. Aspilaire Does Not Point to Exemplar Prosecutions of Felons for
    Possessing Black-Powder Muzzleloaders.
    Aspilaire also argues that Florida’s antique-firearm exception is narrower
    than the federal exception because it does not cover all black-powder
    muzzleloaders. He points to two exemplar prosecutions to support his argument:
    Weeks, 
    202 So. 3d 1
    , and Bostic v. State, 
    902 So. 2d 225
     (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005),
    disapproved of by Weeks, 
    202 So. 3d 1
    . Neither decision establishes that Florida
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    prosecutes felons for possessing black-powder muzzleloaders that would be
    considered antique firearms under federal law.
    As we have already discussed, Weeks cuts against Aspilaire’s argument. The
    Florida Supreme Court held that the black-powder muzzleloader possessed by the
    defendant was considered an antique firearm under Florida law, and it reversed his
    felon-in-possession conviction. 202 So. 3d at 9–10. In doing so, the Florida
    Supreme Court disapproved of the intermediate court’s contrary decision in Bostic,
    the other decision Aspilaire cites as an exemplar prosecution, and established that
    the Bostic prosecution was unlawful. Id. at 9. For the same reasons he cannot rely
    on the repudiated Williams decision, Aspilaire cannot rely on Bostic.
    Aspilaire was required to support his antique-firearm arguments by pointing
    to successful Florida felon-in-possession prosecutions involving federal antique
    firearms. Moncrieffe, 
    569 U.S. at 206
    . But the decisions he cites involved
    prosecutions for other crimes, Margiotti, 844 So. 2d at 830; unsuccessful
    prosecutions, Weeks, 202 So. 3d at 9–10; or unlawful prosecutions based on the
    misapplication of Florida law, Williams, 
    492 So. 2d at 1054
    , receded from by
    Weeks, 
    202 So. 3d 1
    ; Bostic, 
    902 So. 2d at
    228–29, disapproved of by Weeks, 
    202 So. 3d 1
    . So he has not satisfied his burden.
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    C. Aspilaire Is Not Entitled to Relief Based on the Statutory Language.
    Aspilaire also argues he is entitled to relief because Florida’s definition of a
    firearm is broader than the federal definition on its face, so that “the statutory
    language itself . . . creates the realistic probability that [Florida] would apply [its
    felon-in-possession] statute to conduct beyond” the reach of the federal statute.
    Ramos, 709 F.3d at 1072. [Bl. Br. at 27–28]. Even assuming that Aspilaire may
    rely solely on the statutory language without pointing to exemplar prosecutions,
    see Moncrieffe, 
    569 U.S. at
    205–06, his arguments are based on “the application of
    legal imagination” to Florida’s antique-firearm exception, not a “realistic
    probability” of prosecution created by “the statutory language itself.” Ramos, 709
    F.3d at 1072 (internal quotation marks omitted). So he is not entitled to relief.
    Start with Aspilaire’s argument that Florida’s felon-in-possession statute is
    overbroad based on the exclusion of antique firearms “used in the commission of a
    crime” from Florida’s antique-firearm exception. 
    Fla. Stat. § 790.001
    (6). Aspilaire
    says this difference means that “Florida punishes [the possession of] an otherwise-
    qualifying antique firearm . . . even in offenses as simple as ‘felon in possession.’”
    Aspilaire’s interpretation of the phrase “used in the commission of a crime” is
    linguistically implausible. Cf. Bailey v. United States, 
    516 U.S. 137
    , 142–43 (1995)
    (holding that the word “uses” in the phrase “during and in relation to any crime of
    violence or drug trafficking crime, uses or carries a firearm,” “must connote more
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    than mere possession” (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    And the Florida Supreme Court rejected his interpretation when it concluded that a
    felon was entitled to the benefit of the antique-firearm exception in Weeks. 202 So.
    3d at 9–10.
    “The ordinary meaning[] of the word[] ‘use[’] . . . connote[s] activity beyond
    simple possession.” Bailey, 
    516 U.S. at 145
     (alteration adopted) (internal quotation
    marks omitted). And that ordinary meaning applies in the context of Florida’s
    criminal code. Florida law draws a clear distinction between the “use” and
    “possession” of a firearm. See 
    Fla. Stat. § 775.087
    (2)(a)1. (“Any person who is
    convicted of [an enumerated] felony . . . , regardless of whether the use of a
    weapon is an element of the felony, . . . and during the commission of the offense,
    such person actually possessed a ‘firearm’ . . . , shall be sentenced to a minimum
    term of imprisonment of 10 years[.]” (emphasis added)). Aspilaire’s “use”
    argument does not find support in “the statutory language itself.” Ramos, 709 F.3d
    at 1072.
    Next, consider Aspilaire’s argument that Florida’s felon-in-possession
    statute is overbroad because Florida’s antique-firearm exception does not cover all
    black-powder muzzleloaders. To be sure, Florida does not classify muzzleloaders
    as antique firearms on the same basis as the federal government. The federal
    government defines antique firearms partially by reference to their loading
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    configurations and propellants. 
    18 U.S.C. § 921
    (a)(16)(C) (defining as an antique
    firearm “any muzzle loading rifle . . . designed to use black powder, or a black
    powder substitute”). Florida instead defines antique firearms partially by reference
    to their ignition systems. Weeks, 202 So. 3d at 9 (“[S]ection 790.001(1)
    emphasizes the ignition system as the distinctive feature of an ‘antique firearm,’
    and therefore requires that the firearm possess a certain type of ignition system
    explicitly mentioned by the statute.”). Aspilaire assumes the Florida ignition-
    system approach fails to cover weapons covered by the federal loading-
    configuration-and-propellant approach.
    But both approaches lead to the same results. Gunsmiths cannot freely
    combine different propellants and ignition systems—firearms technologies work
    only in specific combinations. Black-powder muzzleloaders generally use a
    “matchlock, flintlock, percussion cap, or similar early type of ignition system,”
    
    Fla. Stat. § 790.001
    (1), so they are typically considered antique firearms under
    Florida law by virtue of their ignition systems, see Toby Bridges, Muzzleloading
    12–21 (1997) (tracing the history of “muzzleloader ignition systems” through the
    “matchlock, wheellock, snaphaunce, miquelet, flintlock, percussion caplock[,] and
    in-line percussion caplock”). In fact, Florida’s unlawful prosecutions of black-
    powder weapons involved a “black powder muzzleloader rifle with a percussion
    cap ignition system,” Weeks, 202 So. 3d at 3 (emphasis added), and “an in-line
    18
    USCA11 Case: 19-12605        Date Filed: 04/06/2021    Page: 19 of 19
    percussion-cap, black-powder weapon,” Bostic, 
    902 So. 2d at 230
     (Sharp, J.,
    dissenting) (emphasis added).
    To be sure, changes in firearms technology could create close questions
    under Florida’s ignition-system approach. See, e.g., Mod. Muzzleloading, Inc. v.
    Magaw, 
    18 F. Supp. 2d 29
    , 36–37 (D.D.C. 1998) (deferring to agency
    interpretation that classified primer-based ignition system as non-antique); 
    U.S. Patent No. 7,197,843 B2
     (patent for electronic black-powder ignition system). But
    dreaming up hypothetical weapons designed to probe the boundaries of a state’s
    antique-firearm exception involves “the application of legal imagination.” Ramos,
    709 F.3d at 1072 (internal quotation marks omitted). The possibility of close
    questions in future cases does not prove that “the statutory language . . . creates the
    realistic probability that [Florida] would apply the statute to conduct beyond” the
    reach of the federal statute. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Florida’s felon-
    in-possession statute is not broader than the federal statute on its face, so Aspilaire
    is not entitled to relief based on the statutory language.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    We DENY Aspilaire’s petition for review.
    19