United States v. R. Peter Stanham ( 2010 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 07-14097 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCT 13, 2010
________________________
JOHN LEY
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 03-20951-CR-AJ
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ARIADNA PUERTO,
EDUARDO ORLANSKY,
HECTOR ORLANSKY,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(October 13, 2010)
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND REHEARING EN BANC
Before O’CONNOR,*Associate Justice Retired, CARNES and ANDERSON,
Circuit Judges.
__________________
*Honorable Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate Justice (Retired) of the United States Supreme
Court, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
No Judge in regular active service on the Court having requested that the
Court be polled on rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Fed.R.App.P.), the Petition for
Rehearing En Banc is DENIED. Turning to Eduardo’s subsidiary petition for
panel rehearing, we deny panel rehearing, but acknowledge the need to modify Part
II.F.1. of the panel opinion, issued on August 12, 2010. In his petition for
rehearing, Eduardo argues for the first time that the district court and the panel
opinion inappropriately relied upon the testimony of Dr. Gelblum and Dr. Crown
that, because neither they nor others examined or tested Eduardo earlier, they could
not opine with any degree of medical certainty that at the relevant times Eduardo
lacked the requisite mens rea or lacked the ability to appreciate the nature and
quality or wrongfulness of his acts. Eduardo’s new argument is that Fed.R.Evid.
704(b) precludes any expert opinion on such ultimate issues, and that the district
court and the panel opinion erred in requiring same. Eduardo now argues also that
the district court and the panel opinion erred in requiring that there should have
been contemporary mental health examinations or tests. We reject Eduardo’s new
argument. Neither the district court nor the panel opinion imposed a requirement
that, to be admissible, a mental health expert must testify as to the ultimate issue, or
a requirement that there be mental health examinations or tests during the relevant
2
time period. Obviously, there is no requirement that there shall have been mental
health examinations or tests during the relevant time period. We are in full
agreement with the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Long, 562 F.3d 325 (5th Cir.
2009), when that court said:
Obviously, neither Dr. Friedberg nor any other expert examined Long
during the commission of the crimes, and in any event, would have
been prevented under Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) from offering a
direct assessment of Long’s ability to appreciate the nature, quality,
and wrongfulness of his acts at the times he committed them. This
necessitates some degree of inference based on the characteristics of
Long’s illness at the time that he was examined and Long’s own report
of his mental state and motivation at the time that he acted.
Id. at 342 (Italics in original; footnote omitted).
Rather than imposing a requirement that a mental health expert testify as to
the ultimate issue, the district court construed the doctors’ candid admissions as
indicating that there was simply a paucity of evidence to conclude that Eduardo’s
mental deficiencies existed at the times of the crimes. In other words, there was a
paucity of evidence for the doctors to opine with any degree of medical certainty
about the level or degree of Eduardo’s mental deficiencies at the relevant times.
Thus, the district court found that “neither Dr. Gelblum nor Dr. Crown are able,
with any degree of medical or scientific certainty, to opine that Mr. Orlansky
suffered from dementia with significant cognitive loss during the time period.”
3
District Court Order, Doc. 625, at 1. We cannot conclude that the district court
abused its discretion in this regard. Indeed, although the doctors did at some points
testify (without objection) that they were unable to opine with the requisite medical
certainty about the ultimate issues, they also repeatedly disavowed any ability to
opine generally as to Eduardo’s state of mind or the degree of Eduardo’s mental
deficiencies at the relevant times or the date of onset of any significant cognitive
loss.*
The district court’s interpretation of the doctors’ admissions and its
conclusion that there was a paucity of evidence with respect to Eduardo’s mental
deficiencies at the relevant times are amply supported in the record. There was no
history of mental deficiencies. No such complaint had ever been communicated to
any doctor, or to anyone else, prior to Eduardo’s indictment. In light of the
admissions of the doctors that their examinations and tests were insufficient, the
only evidence in any way suggesting mental deficiencies at the relevant times was
*
Such testimony is not prohibited testimony on the ultimate issue. As the Fifth
Circuit in Long said: “Appropriate testimony . . . should ‘describe the characteristics of [the
defendant’s] mental illnesses and the effect of such illnesses on his ability to appreciate
wrongdoing.’” Id. at 333. In short, appropriate testimony includes testimony about “mental state
and motivation.” Id. at 334. See also United States v. Alexander, 805 F.2d 1458, 1463 (11th
Cir. 1986) (in discussing the prohibition on expert testimony on the ultimate issue, Fed.R.Evid.
704(b), we commented: “Psychiatrists, of course, must be permitted to testify fully about the
defendant’s diagnosis, mental state and motivation . . . at the time of the alleged act so as to
permit the jury or judge to reach the ultimate conclusion.”).
4
the testimony of Eduardo’s wife and a couple of employees in the business.
Eduardo’s wife testified vaguely at the Daubert hearing that he had begun to act
strangely, and that she had noted a decline in his intelligence and memory. An
employee, Mendez, testified at trial about some ritualistic behaviors and about
Eduardo’s poor business judgment and trouble understanding financial documents.
However, Eduardo never adduced pertinent expert testimony as to the significance
of such testimony. With respect to the two cursory emails from Dr. Gelblum and
Dr. Crown referring to that testimony, the district court concluded that the emails
were “conclusory and provided little to no basis for the opinions offered.” After
exhaustive exploration of, and hearings on, Eduardo’s medical evidence, the
district court effectively concluded that any opinions of Dr. Gelblum or Dr. Crown
about Eduardo’s mental state during the relevant time period would be mere
speculation. We cannot conclude the district court abused its discretion in this
regard. Accordingly, Eduardo’s petition for panel rehearing is denied. However,
because certain loose language in the panel opinion might contribute to the
misinterpretation adopted by Eduardo in his petition for rehearing, we modify Part
II.F.1. of that opinion (relating to the discussions of the Insanity Defense Reform
5
Act (“IDRA”), and relating to Fed.R.Evid. 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993)) to read as follows.**
II. DISCUSSION
F. Eduardo’s Mental State
1. Eduardo’s challenge to the district court’s exclusion of his experts’
mental health testimony
Eduardo sought to introduce evidence about his diminished mental state
during the relevant time period for three reasons. The first was to support his
insanity defense under the Insanity Defense Reform Act (“IDRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 17(2000). Second, he sought to introduce the evidence as a means of challenging the
Government’s argument that he had the requisite mens rea to commit the charged
crimes. Third, he sought to introduce evidence of his diminished mental state to
support his claim that he had been kept in the dark about the fraud and it had been
orchestrated by lower level management.
Eduardo submitted a Notice of Insanity Defense and Expert Evidence of
Mental Condition, which included reports from neuropsychologist Dr. Barry
Crown and neurologist Dr. Jeffrey Gelblum (Eduardo’s treating neurologist). He
also included the report from an MRI, which reportedly showed evidence of an old
**
All other parts of our opinion issued on August 12, 2010, remain unchanged.
6
stroke in his left caudate nucleus and a large, “very old” fluid accumulation in his
left temporal and temporal frontal region, which probably resulted from a stroke.
In response, the Government moved to exclude evidence that Eduardo suffered
from a mental defect, for a Daubert8 hearing, and to exclude the testimony of the
two doctors. The district court excluded the testimony of the two doctors both
because it was inadmissible under the IDRA and because it was inadmissible under
Fed. R. Evid. 702 and Daubert. Eduardo challenges both rulings; we address each
in turn.
a. The legal standard under the IDRA
Under the IDRA, insanity is an affirmative defense that the defendant must
prove by clear and convincing evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 17; United States v. Westcott,
83 F.3d 1354, 1357 (11th Cir. 1996). The Act restricted the definition of insanity:
at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the
defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable
to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts.
Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.
18 U.S.C. § 17(a). Before the Act’s passage, a defendant could also assert a valid
defense if he was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.
United States v. Freeman, 804 F.2d. 1574, 1576 (11th Cir. 1986). However, as the
8
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
7
second sentence of the Act recites, Congress prohibited the use of “‘non-insanity’
psychiatric evidence that points toward ‘exoneration or mitigation of an offense
because of a defendant’s supposed psychiatric compulsion or inability or failure to
engage in normal reflection.’” United States v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051, 1066
(11th Cir. 1990). “Congress intended to prohibit the presentation of evidence of
mental disease or defect, short of insanity, to excuse conduct.” Westcott, 83 F.3d
at 1357-58. In passing the IDRA, Congress considered that such prohibited
evidence would, if allowed to go to the jury, resurrect the former, broader version
of the insanity defense “in the guise of showing some other affirmative defense,
such as . . . diminished responsibility . . . and open the door, once again, to
needlessly confusing psychiatric testimony.” Cameron, 907 F.2d at 1066 (quoting
S. Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 229 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3411) (internal punctuation omitted). However, we have held
that Congress did not intend to exclude the use of psychiatric evidence that negated
specific intent. Westcott, 83 F.3d at 1358; Cameron, 907 F.2d at 1066-67.9 We
examine the testimony of each of the proffered experts in turn.
9
The distinction mentioned in the case law between psychiatric evidence that
negates specific intent, on the one hand, and psychiatric evidence that a defendant does not have
the capacity to form specific intent, on the other hand, is not relevant in this case. See Westcott,
83 F.3d at 1358; Cameron, 907 F.2d at 1066-67; see also United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889,
903-05 (3d Cir. 1987).
8
i. Dr. Jeffrey Gelblum
Eduardo’s treating neurologist testified at the four-day hearing in November
2005 about his diagnosis of Eduardo, the etiology of Eduardo’s illness, and his
opinion about Eduardo’s mental state. He testified that he had diagnosed Eduardo
in 2004 with progressive vascular dementia based on reports by his family of
deficits in activities of daily living and an MRI and an electroencephalogram
(“EEG”), neurological tests that pinpoint the dementia’s causes. The MRI showed
that a region in Eduardo’s brain’s left hemisphere was cavitated out, meaning that
the brain tissue had been replaced with fluid. Dr. Gelblum testified that Eduardo
had significant damage to the left temporal lobe, the left frontal lobe, and the left
parietal lobe, which suggests interference of brain functioning in a critical part of
the brain. He explained that the left side of the brain primarily controls right-sided
body function, as well as comprehension, arithmetic, executive planning, and
fluency. Memory is also impaired with this type of injury, with short-term memory
being most prominently affected because it is relegated to the left temporal lobe.
Dr. Gelblum opined that the damage to Eduardo’s brain was caused by an
arachnoid cyst and superimposed stroke syndrome. Arachnoid cysts are congenital,
meaning that the patient was born with the cyst, and Dr. Gelblum explained that
superimposed stroke syndrome refers to small, “silent” strokes. While the MRI
9
could not give an exact date of onset, Dr. Gelblum speculated that the degree of
whiteout in the brain suggested that the damaged area had been fluid-filled for “six,
seven, [or] eight years.” But he conceded that because he did not have access to
previous MRIs, he could not determine if the cyst had been growing or if it had
been that size since birth; the MRI and the EEG could only provide a snapshot of
the patient’s current condition.
At the time that Dr. Gelblum began to treat Eduardo, in May 2004, Dr.
Gelblum thought that Eduardo was legally insane. However, he testified that there
is no scientifically valid way for him to ascertain Eduardo’s mental state before that
time. Additionally, he agreed that talking to family about the patient’s past
behaviors could not scientifically determine the patient’s mental state in years past.
When asked if there was any scientifically reliable way of determining if Eduardo
had the capacity to deceive during the period from 1994 to 2003, Dr. Gelblum
answered “we don’t have those scans or studies, no.”
Because Dr. Gelblum testified that he relied upon the reports of family and
friends to make diagnoses, Eduardo introduced evidence from Eduardo’s wife,
Jane, and later trial testimony from his former employee, Mendez. Jane Orlansky
testified that Eduardo had begun to act strangely beginning in 1992 or 1993,
engaging in what she termed ritualistic behavior. She also noted a decline in his
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intelligence and short term memory. However, she testified that she did not
recommend to him that he seek any professional or medical help for the strange
behavior that he began to exhibit. Similarly, Mendez testified to Eduardo’s
ritualistic behavior. Although Jane Orlansky’s and Mendez’s testimony may have
suggested that Eduardo was beginning to develop dementia during the time period
at issue, Dr. Gelblum did not testify that, on the basis of the testimony of Jane and
Mendez, he could opine with any degree of medical certainty about Eduardo’s state
of mind at the relevant time period such that a fact-finder could infer that Eduardo
was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his actions
during the relevant time period.10
While Dr. Gelblum testified that accounts from family of behavior and
patient history comprise ninety-five percent of the information required for
diagnosis, as the district court noted, Dr. Gelblum did not state that he relied on
those accounts in his letters or reports when he wrote that, at the time of the crimes,
Eduardo suffered from severe mental defect such that he could not appreciate the
wrongfulness of his actions. And he affirmatively testified that he could not render
10
Furthermore, one of the Government’s experts, Dr. David Fishbain, reviewed
Eduardo’s business writing, correspondence and notes made from 1996 to 2003 and discerned no
signs of mental or cognitive deterioration. Additionally, Dr. Fishbain noted that Eduardo made
no complaints about forgetfulness, anxiety or being upset to his primary care physician until late
2004, after he was being treated by Dr. Gelblum and after he had been indicted.
11
an opinion about Eduardo’s ability or capacity to lie during that period. Although
he did try to rectify his opinion by testifying that he could rely on family reports to
make a retroactive diagnosis, he did not testify that he could opine with any degree
of medical certainty that Eduardo was unable to lie or deceive at the time of the
crimes.
ii. Dr. Barry Crown
Dr. Crown is a neuropsychologist who administered a series of psychological
tests to Eduardo in order to ascertain the severity of the damage caused by the
arachnoid cyst and the stroke syndrome identified by the neurologists. His report
stated that he would testify that at the time of Eduardo’s involvement in the
criminal acts, Eduardo was suffering from vascular dementia with significant
cognitive loss. Further, he wrote, Eduardo, “at best, would have been performing
at a twelve year old level” on his language-based critical thinking and abstract
problem-solving ability.
During the hearing, Dr. Crown testified that all of the tests he administered
to Eduardo only showed Eduardo’s capabilities at the time of the tests’
administration. When asked specifically if he could testify as to Eduardo’s mental
condition during the relevant period of the case, he stated that could not provide an
opinion. He testified that his statement in the report was based on his
12
understanding that Eduardo was not in the acute stage of the illness and that his
illness had been progressing for some time. However, he admitted that he had no
way to “date stamp it,” and that the rate of decline varies by individual. The
district court then asked Dr. Crown if he could say “to any degree of medical
certainty when that significant cognitive loss occurred?” Dr. Crown replied: “No,
other than Mrs. Orlansky relating to me that she felt that he deteriorated, and that
there were problems at or about the time of a civil lawsuit that took place well over
ten to 12, 14 years ago. But that’s the only historical bit of information that I have
that suggests a point of noticeability.” Finally, when asked if he could state with
any degree of scientific certainty that Eduardo was insane at any point during the
ten-year period that the charge embraced, Dr. Crown answered no.
iii. Analysis
The district court properly noted that the IDRA allows a defendant to put on
an affirmative defense that, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, he was
unable, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, to
appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. 18 U.S.C. §17(a).
We also noted above that in the IDRA, Congress intended to prohibit the use of
non-insanity psychiatric evidence that points to exoneration or mitigation of an
offense, but that Congress did not intend to exclude the use of psychiatric evidence
13
that negated specific intent. Westcott, 83 F.3d at 1358; Cameron, 907 F.2d at
1067. However, the IDRA specifically requires that such evidence focus on the
defendant’s state of mind at the time of the charged offense. See Cameron, 907
F.2d at 1067 (“Evidence offered as psychiatric evidence to negate specific intent is
admissible, however, when such evidence focuses on the defendant’s specific state
of mind at the time of the charged offense.”) (internal quotations omitted).
Eduardo’s problem is that neither Dr. Gelblum nor Dr. Crown could provide
testimony about what Eduardo’s state of mind was at the time of the charged acts.
At most, they could speculate that he had begun to decline during that period, but
they could not opine with any degree of medical certainty about Eduardo’s state of
mind (or the level or degree of his mental deficiencies) during the relevant time
period.*** Moreover, because they did not know what his mental state was during
***
In his petition for rehearing, Eduardo argues for the first time that the district court
erred by insisting that, to be admissible, Dr. Gelblum and Dr. Crown would have to have testified
to the ultimate issue – i.e., that Eduardo lacked the ability at the relevant time to appreciate the
nature and quality or wrongfulness of his acts. Eduardo now argues that the district court erred in
insisting upon testimony on the ultimate issue because such testimony is prohibited by
Fed.R.Evid. 704(b). Although it is true that the doctors did at some point testify without
objection that they were unable to opine with any degree of medical certainty as to that ultimate
issue, they also repeatedly testified to a similar inability to opine generally with respect to
Eduardo’s mental state at the relevant times (including the timing of significant cognitive loss).
The district court construed the doctors’ candid admissions as indicating that there was a paucity
of evidence with respect to Eduardo’s state of mind at the relevant times, such that the two
doctors could not opine with the requisite medical certainty that Eduardo suffered from dementia
with significant cognitive loss during the relevant time period. We cannot conclude that the
district court abused its discretion in this regard.
14
the relevant time, they also could not opine with any degree of medical certainty
with respect to his mens rea during the relevant time period. For this reason, the
district court held that the IDRA rendered the testimony of the two doctors
inadmissible.
The district court (Judge Adalberto Jordan) exhaustively explored this
evidence and its admissibility. First it held a four-day hearing in November 2005,
during which it actively questioned the experts and after which it produced two
well-reasoned and comprehensively analyzed orders excluding the evidence.
Additionally, the court undertook reconsideration of the decision mid-trial and
again determined that the evidence could not meet the IDRA’s standards.11 In view
11
Eduardo moved again mid-trial seeking reconsideration of the district court’s
decision to exclude the testimony of the doctors. Eduardo relied on the trial testimony of
employee and co-conspirator Mendez about Eduardo’s behavior during the relevant time, to wit:
that some of Eduardo’s business decisions made no sense; that he had trouble understanding
financial documents; that he had memory problems; and that he engaged in some ritualistic
behaviors. The FBI statement of another employee also reported ritualistic behaviors, like
repeatedly putting out his cigarette by pressing it against the bottom of the ashtray for an
inordinate amount of time. Eduardo did not proffer sworn testimony of either doctor to the effect
that the new evidence would permit them to testify with any degree of medical certainty as to
Eduardo’s state of mind as of the relevant time period. However, Eduardo did proffer brief
emails from the two doctors. The district court concluded that the emails were “conclusory and
provide little to no basis for the opinions offered.” We have considered the testimony of Mendez
and the statement of the other employee as well as the emails. We cannot conclude that the
district court abused its discretion. The emails are conclusory; they fail to explain how the
actions described would indicate either the timing or the degree of any cognitive impairment.
Moreover, especially in the absence of expert testimony, we doubt that the behaviors described
could indicate cognitive impairment to a degree that mens rea would be negated. For example,
the most significant behaviors – poor business judgment and trouble understanding financial
documents – would not seem to indicate cognitive impairment to the extent that a person would
not realize that it is wrong to fabricate accounts receivable in order to mislead one’s lender and
15
of the careful and comprehensive consideration by the district court,12 and because
neither doctor could testify with any degree of medical certainty about Eduardo’s
state of mind at the relevant times we cannot conclude that the district court abused
its discretion in excluding the testimony of Dr. Gelblum or Dr. Crown.13
b. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
The district court also denied admission of the testimony based on Rule 702
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which controls the admission of expert
testimony. It provides:
joint venture partner. In any event, in the absence of expert testimony to that effect, we cannot
conclude that the district court abused its discretion. We also note that after his indictment,
Eduardo’s own doctors initially opined that Eduardo was competent to stand trial.
12
In addition to the hearings the district court held on the evidence of Eduardo’s
mental state, it held a four-day hearing on the related issue of Eduardo’s competency before trial
began and ordered both an in-patient evaluation and an independent expert evaluation of
Eduardo’s competency. Moreover, as discussed below, the court re-examined Eduardo’s
competency both during the trial and after it, producing detailed analyses of the experts’
testimony and demonstrating an extensive understanding of Eduardo’s mental condition.
13
We noted above in Part II.F.1 that Eduardo sought to introduce the testimony of
the two doctors for three purposes: first, to support his insanity defense; second, to negate mens
rea; and third, to support his claim that he had been kept in the dark about the fraud. The district
court’s opinions, and our own opinion in the text above, specifically address the issue only with
respect to its use to support the insanity defense, and to negate mens rea. However, the same
rationale applies with equal force to Eduardo’s attempt to use the evidence to support his claim
that he had been kept in the dark about the fraud. We can assume arguendo, but we expressly do
not decide, that the IDRA would not present an absolute bar to the use of psychiatric evidence for
this third purpose. However, even assuming that, it is clear that the IDRA would require that the
evidence be focused on defendant’s state of mind at the time of the crime. Because the evidence
of the two doctors was not thus focused, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
implicitly holding that the IDRA renders the evidence inadmissible for this third purpose also.
16
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data,
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the
facts of the case.
The Supreme Court has instructed that Rule 702 compels the district courts to
perform a critical “gatekeeping” function concerning the admissibility of expert
scientific evidence. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589 n.7, 597,
113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 n.7, 2798 (1993). “This function ‘inherently require[s] the
trial court to conduct an exacting analysis’ of the foundations of expert opinions to
ensure they meet the standards for admissibility under Rule 702.” United States v.
Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting McCorvey v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2002)).
This court employs a three-part inquiry to determine admissibility under
Rule 702. The trial court must consider whether:
(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters
he intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert
reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the
sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and (3) the testimony assists the
trier of fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or
specialized expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue.
17
Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1260. Here, the district court denied admissibility of the
testimony of Doctors Gelblum and Crown based on the second and third prongs of
the inquiry, reliability and assistance to the trier of fact. While the Court in
Daubert recognized that “it would be unreasonable to conclude that the subject of
scientific testimony must be ‘known’ to a certainty,” it held that “in order to qualify
as ‘scientific knowledge,’ an inference or assertion must be derived by the
scientific method.” 509 U.S. at 590, 113 S. Ct. at 2795. “Proposed testimony must
be supported by appropriate validation – i.e., ‘good grounds,’ based on what is
known.” Id. Further, assistance to the trier of fact is primarily a question of
relevance. Id. at 591, 113 S. Ct. at 2795. Therefore, the question is whether the
evidence will help the jury decide a factual dispute; “Rule 702’s ‘helpfulness’
standard requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a
precondition to admissibility.” Id. at 591-92, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
As discussed in reference to the IDRA, there did not exist “‘good grounds,’
based on what is known.” Neither of the proposed expert witnesses could testify
with any medical certainty to evidence with respect to Eduardo’s state of mind at
the relevant times that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that
Eduardo was either insane at the time of the offenses or lacked the requisite mens
18
rea at the time of the offenses.14 Therefore, the district court’s conclusion that the
evidence failed both the reliability and assistance to the trier of fact prongs was not
an abuse of discretion.15
SO ORDERED.
14
The district court also properly rejected, on the basis of Daubert, Eduardo’s third
rationale for admitting the expert witness testimony about his mental state – to show that he was
easily influenced by his employees – because of the experts’ inability to testify with any medical
certainty about his mental state during the relevant time period.
15
In light of our decision that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding the testimony of the two doctors on the basis of the IDRA and Rule 702, we need not
address the district court’s alternative ground, Fed. R. Evid. 403.
19