Cleveland v. Secretary of the Treasury , 407 F. App'x 386 ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JAN 04, 2011
No. 10-12557 JOHN LEY
CLERK
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 3:08-cv-01751-CLS
THOMAS CLEVELAND,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(January 4, 2011)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, HULL and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Thomas Cleveland appeals from the district court’s grant of the
Treasury Department’s motion for summary judgment on his age discrimination
and retaliation claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a). On appeal, Cleveland argues that he produced
sufficient evidence to show that the Department’s failure to promote him was a
pretext for unlawful discrimination because, he showed that his qualifications were
superior to those of the individual selected for the promotion. He also contends
that the district court erred in failing to consider his retaliation claim under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
We review a trial court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo,
“viewing the record and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party.” HR Acquisition I Corp. v. Twin City Fire Ins.
Co., 547 F.3d 1309, 1313-14 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Patton v. Triad Guar. Ins.
Corp., 277 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2002). Summary judgment is proper “if the
pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
The ADEA prohibits various federal agencies from discriminating against
employees based on age. 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a). The ADEA also prohibits
retaliation against federal employees who complain of age discrimination.
Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 491, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1943, 170 L. Ed. 2d
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887 (2008). Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees
for engaging in activity protected under the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
Specifically, it prohibits discrimination because an employee “opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because [the
employee] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].” Id.
We evaluate ADEA age-discrimination claims that are based on
circumstantial evidence under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000). We also analyze
Title VII retaliation cases under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Brown v.
Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1181 (11th Cir. 2010). “First, the plaintiff
must establish a prima facie case, which raises a presumption that the employer’s
decision was more likely than not based on an impermissible factor.” Richardson
v. Leeds Police Dep’t, 71 F.3d 801, 805 (11th Cir. 1995). A plaintiff may establish
a prima facie case for an ADEA violation “by showing that he (1) was a member
of the protected age group, (2) was subjected to adverse employment action,
(3) was qualified to do the job, and (4) was replaced by or otherwise lost a position
to a younger individual.” Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024. To establish a prima facie
case for retaliation under Title VII, the plaintiff must show that “(1) he engaged in
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statutorily protected expression; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and
(3) there is some causal relation between the two events.” Pennington v. City of
Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001).
Once the plaintiff establishes his prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
defendant-employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its
action. Richardson, 71 F.3d at 805. If the employer carries this burden, the
plaintiff must persuade the trier of fact that the employer’s proffered reasons are a
pretext for discrimination. Id. at 806. To avoid summary judgment, a plaintiff
need not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons stated were
pretext, but must place material facts at issue. Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Pub.
Co., 9 F.3d 913, 921 (11th Cir. 1993). A plaintiff cannot prove pretext simply by
showing that he was better qualified than the person who received the coveted
position. Springer v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. Grp. Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1349
(11th Cir. 2007). Instead, he must show “that the disparities between the
successful applicant’s and his own qualifications were of such weight and
significance that no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could
have chosen the candidate selected over the plaintiff.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint
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contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
557, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). The purpose of this
requirement “is to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d
955, 974 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Factual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and must be
sufficient “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555, 570, 127 S. Ct. at 1965, 1974. The rule in Twombly applies to all civil
actions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868(2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at ___, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Rule 8(a)’s “simplified
notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment
motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious clams.”
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512, 122 S. Ct. 992, 998, 152 L. Ed.
2d 1 (2002) (holding that a complaint in an employment discrimination lawsuit
need not contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination).
We decline to decide whether the district court erred in failing to consider
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Cleveland’s retaliation claim under Title VII because, even if we evaluated his
claim under Title VII, Cleveland has not demonstrated that the Department’s
proffered reason for choosing the selectee based on his superior interview
performance, was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Cleveland has not
demonstrated that the disparities between his qualifications and those of the
selectee “were of such weight and significance that no reasonable person, in the
exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen” the selectee. He has also not
demonstrated that the Department’s promotion decision was motivated by age
discrimination, or was made in retaliation for Cleveland’s participation in any
protected activities.
For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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