Yoelmy Fernandez Rodriguez v. Nancy A. Berryhill ( 2020 )


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  •          USCA11 Case: 20-11390    Date Filed: 12/02/2020    Page: 1 of 22
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 20-11390
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-24554-CMA
    YOELMY FERNANDEZ RODRIGUEZ,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    versus
    NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
    Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (December 2, 2020)
    Before ROSENBAUM, ANDERSON and DUBINA.
    PER CURIAM:
    USCA11 Case: 20-11390        Date Filed: 12/02/2020    Page: 2 of 22
    Appellant Yoelmy Fernandez Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) appeals the district
    court’s order adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation (“R&R”)
    that granted summary judgment to the Social Security Commissioner
    (“Commissioner”), concluding that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
    properly denied Rodriguez’s applications for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”)
    and supplemental security income (“SSI”). Based on our review of the record, and
    after reading the parties’ briefs, we affirm the district court’s order.
    I.
    Rodriguez is a 43-year old male, who has a 12th grade education and
    difficulty communicating in English. He previously worked as a warehouse
    worker/stocker before his alleged disability. He applied for DIB and SSI on July
    28, 2015, alleging a disability onset date of June 1, 2013. In his disability report,
    Rodriguez stated that the conditions limiting his ability to work were his nerves
    and his bipolar disorder. He noted that he stopped working because his employer
    dismissed him for reasons unrelated to his health. In his functional report,
    Rodriguez asserted that his conditions limited his ability to work because he was
    disoriented, could not cope with stress, and suffered from insomnia. He stated that
    he was very depressed, stayed in bed most of the day and did not leave his house
    often. He explained that his conditions limited his communication skills, memory,
    concentration, understanding, and completion of tasks.
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    Rodriguez’s friend and roommate, Yohan Torres (“Torres”), completed a
    third-party function report, stating his observations that Rodriguez’s conditions
    limited his ability to work because he was not able to perform well in a social
    environment. Torres also explained that Rodriguez’s close friends noticed that
    Rodriguez had changed significantly since the onset of his conditions. Torres
    reported that Rodriguez performed light housework, went grocery shopping,
    handled money, and spent time with family and close friends.
    The Commissioner denied Rodriguez’s claim initially and on
    reconsideration. Rodriguez requested a hearing before an ALJ. At the hearing in
    October 2017, Rodriguez’s counsel amended his disability onset date to August 19,
    2015. Rodriguez testified that he had completed his high school education in
    Cuba, had never married, and did not have children. He stated that he previously
    worked in supermarkets and similar stores stocking merchandise and that he held
    these jobs from 2002 to 2012. He explained that his psychiatric problems began
    around the time his long-term partner raped his 12-year-old nephew. He stated that
    he began hearing voices, he enjoyed nothing, had no desires, slept very little during
    the night, did not enjoy being around other people, and mainly reclined during the
    day. At the time of the hearing, he lived with his mother, who did most of the
    cooking and cleaning for him. He admitted to using social media and playing
    video games on his phone, drinking alcohol when he was desperate and smoking
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    cigarettes. He testified that he could not work because he did not have the desire to
    do anything and at times he gave “bad responses to people.” (R. Doc. 14 at 40–
    49.)
    A vocational expert (“VE”) testified that Rodriguez previously worked as a
    warehouse worker, which equated to medium level work. The ALJ asked the VE
    to assume a hypothetical: whether an individual of Rodriguez’s age, education, and
    work history, who was limited to simple, routine and repetitive tasks that were not
    conducted at production rate pace, only had occasional interaction with
    supervisors, co-workers, and the public and did not engage in tasks concerning the
    safety and welfare of others, could perform Rodriguez’s past work as a warehouse
    worker. The VE responded that the individual could perform such work. The ALJ
    also asked the VE to assume the same hypothetical scenario, but the individual was
    off task 20% of the day. The VE responded that such an individual would not be
    able to maintain employment. Rodriguez’s attorney questioned the VE and asked
    her to assume the same hypothetical individual described by the ALJ, but with the
    limitations described by Dr. Carlos Danger, a consultative psychiatrist: that
    Rodriguez had mild limitations in understanding, remembering, and carrying out
    simple instructions and that he had marked limitations with more complex
    instructions, interacting with others, and responding appropriately to usual work
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    situations. The VE admitted that such an individual, with these limitations, would
    not be able to engage in substantial gainful activity. (R. Id. at 49–53.)
    The ALJ also had medical evidence in the record postdating Rodriguez’s
    application. This evidence showed that on August 19, 2015, Rodriguez visited
    Vivian Gonzalez-Diaz, Ph.D. for a consultative psychological examination at the
    request of the state agency. At the exam, Rodriguez reported loss of energy, lack
    of motivation to perform tasks or chores, increased appetite, difficulties
    concentrating, feelings of worthlessness, occasional auditory hallucinations, lack of
    motivation to get out of bed at times, tremors at times, passive death wishes at
    times, and weekly panic attacks characterized by an abrupt period exhibiting
    accelerated heart rate, tremulousness, and sweatiness. (R. Id. at 357–60.)
    Rodriguez stated that his symptoms began four years before, when his ex-partner
    sexually abused his nephew. Rodriguez denied suicidal thoughts and did not
    complain of delusions but stated that he had daily auditory hallucinations.
    Dr. Gonzalez-Diaz reported that Rodriguez’s behavior, attitude, and
    cooperation were adequate. Dr. Gonzalez-Diaz observed that Rodriguez was fully
    oriented in all spheres with goal-oriented associations, that his mental status
    examination revealed appropriate speech, a depressed mood, congruent affect, full
    orientation, logical associations and thought processes, normal stream of thought,
    and mild preoccupation and worries for his nephew. Dr. Gonzalez-Diaz diagnosed
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    Rodriguez as having low average intelligence and noted that his attention and
    concentration were adequate. He diagnosed Rodriguez with major depressive
    disorder, recurrent and severe, with psychotic features; tobacco use disorder,
    severe; and ruled out bipolar disorder, depressed type. He listed Rodriguez’s
    prognosis as fair/guarded. (R. Id.)
    The medical evidence also included a Psychiatric Review Technique form
    (“PRTF”) completed by Dr. Jennifer Meyer, Ph.D., a psychologist. The form
    indicated that Rodriguez had no restriction of activities of daily living, mild
    difficulties in maintaining social function, moderate difficulties in maintaining
    concentration, persistence or pace, and no repeated episodes of decompensation.
    In an accompanying Mental Residual Functional Capacity form, Dr. Meyer opined
    that Rodriguez had moderate limitations in his abilities to understand and
    remember detailed instructions; to carry out detailed instructions; to maintain
    attention and concentration for extended periods; to complete a normal workday
    and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to
    perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest
    periods; and to respond appropriately to changes in the work setting. She further
    stated that Rodriguez would have difficulty responding to high-stress and fast-
    paced work environments, but he appeared capable of completing simple,
    repetitive tasks and adapting to simple, gradual changes in the work environment.
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    (R. Doc. 14 at 66–76.) In connection with a second state agency review of
    Rodriguez’s file, Dr. George Grubbs, a state agency psychological consultant,
    affirmed Dr. Meyer’s opinions and statements. (R. Id. at 81–90, 91–100.)
    The medical evidence also included a report from Dr. Geraldine Mattia, a
    psychiatrist with Jackson Health System. Rodriguez visited Dr. Mattia for
    treatment for his depression, which he disclosed began after his ex-partner
    molested a relative. Dr. Mattia noted that Rodriguez had a history of major
    depression with psychotic features. He observed Rodriguez to be withdrawn and
    tearful, prescribed medication, and directed him to return. Rodriguez visited Dr.
    Mattia again, complaining of occasional poor sleep. Dr. Mattia noted that
    Rodriguez had coherent and relevant speech. Rodriguez saw Dr. Mattia again two
    months later, complaining of poor sleep, anger, and irritability. Dr. Mattia
    believed that an increase in one of the prescriptions would help because Rodriguez
    was difficult, had limited insight and judgment, a paucity of words, and a high
    degree of irritability. (R. Id. at 364–70.)
    When Rodriguez returned to Jackson Health System in July 2016, Louis
    Antoine, M.D., reported that Rodriguez’s condition was stable. He had normal
    orientation, normal activity, fair eye contact, broad affect, logical thoughts, and no
    suicidal thoughts. In September 2016, Rodriguez went to Jackson Behavioral
    Health Outpatient for a follow-up on his major depression, and an advanced
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    practice registered nurse met with him and noted that Rodriguez exhibited labile
    affect and mood, was angry, verbally explosive, and biting his nails. In November
    2016, Dr. Antoine reported that Rodriguez was less agitated, was oriented with fair
    eye contact, had logical thoughts, no delusions, and no suicidal ideas. In January
    2017, Rodriguez reported increased depression due to a recent family member’s
    death. Dr. Antoine documented that Rodriguez had regular orientation and
    activity, fair eye contact, a broad affect, a normal mood, logical thought processes,
    no delusions, and fair judgment. In March, Rodriguez saw Dr. Antoine, who noted
    that Rodriguez’s judgment and insight appeared fair and he had no suicidal ideas.
    Because Rodriguez reported no side effects from his medications, Dr. Antoine
    directed him to continue them. (R. Id. at 380–96.)
    In April 2017, Rodriguez had a consultative psychiatric examination with
    Carlos Danger, M.D., at the request of the ALJ. Rodriguez reported feelings of
    anxiety, unwellness, depression, thoughts of helplessness and hopelessness, low
    self-esteem, difficulty functioning and maintaining a job, and auditory
    hallucinations. Dr. Danger noted that Rodriguez was taking multiple medications
    that made diagnosis on the bipolar spectrum a possibility. Dr. Danger stated that
    although Rodriguez may have exaggerated his symptoms, Rodriguez appeared to
    have an underlying psychiatric illness that interfered with employability.
    Following the examination, Dr. Danger opined that Rodriguez had mild limitations
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    in understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple instructions and that he
    had marked limitations with more complex instructions, interacting with others,
    and responding appropriately to usual work situations. Dr. Danger completed an
    accompanying Mental Medical Source Statement of Ability to do Work-Related
    Activities wherein he stated that, among other things, Rodriguez exhibited
    “marked” limitations in his abilities to carry out complex instructions, make
    judgments on complex work-related decisions, interact appropriately with the
    public, with supervisors, and with coworkers, and respond appropriately to usual
    work situations and to changes in routine work setting. (R. Id. at 372–76.)
    In May 2017, Rodriguez met with Dr. Antoine, who reported that Rodriguez
    had no marked limitations. In July, however, Rodriguez informed Dr. Antoine that
    he was continuing to hear voices, was agitated, had mood swings, anxiety,
    paranoia, difficulty sleeping, and nightmares. Dr. Antoine documented that
    Rodriguez had moderate limitations with normal orientation, logical thought
    process, and a stable mental status. Dr. Antoine directed Rodriguez to continue his
    medications. In September, Rodriguez reported to Dr. Antoine that he was not
    doing well because a recent hurricane had knocked out his electricity and he was
    afraid of the dark. Dr. Antoine documented that Rodriguez’s mental status
    examinations revealed moderate limitations with normal orientation, logical
    thought process, fair insight and judgment, and a stable mental status. Dr. Antoine
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    also noted that Rodriguez exhibited fair eye contact, labile affect, dysphoric mood,
    obsessional thought process, and paranoid delusions. (R. Id. at 392–96, 417–18.)
    II.
    After the hearing, the ALJ denied Rodriguez’s applications, concluding that
    he was not disabled. The ALJ applied the five-step sequential approach set forth in
    the regulations and found that Rodriguez had not engaged in substantial gainful
    activity since the alleged onset date and that he had severe impairments of affective
    mood disorder with psychosis and anxiety disorder (steps one and two). At step
    three, the ALJ found that Rodriguez did not have an impairment or combination of
    impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed
    impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
    The ALJ assessed Rodriguez’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
    (defined in 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1545
     as “the most you can still do despite your
    limitations”), to determine if he could perform his past relevant work (step four).
    The ALJ concluded that Rodriguez had the RFC to perform a full range of work at
    all exertional levels and limited him to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, but not
    at production rate pace; only occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers,
    and the public; and no tasks involving the safety and welfare of others. The ALJ
    found that Rodriguez’s allegations were inconsistent with his mild objective
    medical findings, his daily activities, and the opinions of the state agency
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    psychological consultants. The ALJ considered the treatment records of the
    doctors and explained that she did not give great weight to Dr. Danger’s opinion
    because Rodriguez’s medical examinations did not reveal he was as limited as Dr.
    Danger opined. The ALJ gave weight to the opinions of Drs. Meyer and Grubbs,
    finding their opinions consistent with Rodriguez’s medical evidence. After
    assessing the RFC, the ALJ utilized the testimony of the VE to determine that
    Rodriguez could still perform his past work despite his impairments. Hence, the
    ALJ concluded that Rodriguez was not disabled as defined in the Social Security
    Act from his alleged onset date through the date of the decision.
    Rodriguez requested review of the ALJ’s decision, but the Appeals Council
    denied his request. Subsequently, Rodriguez filed a complaint in federal district
    court, seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision. Rodriguez moved
    for summary judgment, arguing that the ALJ improperly assessed the medical
    opinions, that the ALJ failed to evaluate properly his paragraph B criteria and
    assess his RFC, and that the ALJ improperly assessed his subjective symptoms.
    The Commissioner opposed the motion and moved for summary judgment.
    In its R&R, the magistrate judge recommended that the district court deny
    Rodriguez’s motion for summary judgment and grant the Commissioner’s motion
    for summary judgment. The magistrate judge concluded that substantial evidence
    supported the ALJ’s evaluation of the opinion evidence in the record, and it
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    supported the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Danger’s opinion because he was a
    consultative physician and his opinion was not entitled to the same deference as a
    treating physician’s opinion. The magistrate judge found that the ALJ did not err
    in affording great weight to Drs. Meyer’s and Grubbs’s opinions because they were
    consistent with Rodriguez’s treatment records. The magistrate judge also
    concluded that the ALJ’s paragraph B criteria findings and RFC determination
    were supported by substantial evidence, in part, because the ALJ relied on
    Rodriguez’s treatment notes. The magistrate judge lastly concluded that the ALJ’s
    evaluation of Rodriguez’s subjective complaints was supported by substantial
    evidence because the ALJ relied on Rodriguez’s treatment notes to find that his
    description of his symptoms was not consistent with the medical evidence.
    Rodriguez objected to the R&R, reiterating his arguments from his motion
    for summary judgment. He also objected on the basis that the ALJ should have
    accorded more deference to Dr. Danger’s opinion. The district court overruled
    both objections, adopted the R&R, granted the Commissioner’s motion for
    summary judgment, and denied Rodriguez’s motion for summary judgment.
    Rodriguez filed a timely appeal.
    III.
    In Social Security appeals, we review the Commissioner’s decision for
    substantial evidence and its application of legal principles de novo. Moore v.
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    Barnhart, 
    405 F.3d 1208
    , 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). “Under the substantial-evidence
    standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it
    contains ‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations.”
    Biestek v. Berryhill, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 
    139 S. Ct. 1148
    , 1154 (2019). Substantial
    evidence requires more than a scintilla of evidence and is such relevant evidence as
    a reasonable person would accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. Winschel
    v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
    631 F.3d 1176
    , 1178 (11th Cir. 2011). “A preponderance
    of the evidence is not required.” Hunter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    808 F.3d 818
    , 822 (11th Cir. 2015). “A court may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the
    evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” 
    Id.
     (quoting
    Phillips v. Barnhart, 
    357 F.3d 1232
    , 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004)). Thus, so long as
    the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, the court will
    defer to the decision, even if the evidence may preponderate against it. Crawford
    v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
    363 F.3d 1155
    , 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2004). The substantial
    evidence threshold “is not high” and defers to the presiding ALJ, who heard
    testimony and reviewed the medical evidence. Biestek v. Berryhill, ___ U.S. at
    ___, 
    139 S. Ct. at 1157
    .
    IV.
    A. Whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s evaluation of opinion
    evidence from Rodriguez’s medical record
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    On appeal, Rodriguez argues that the ALJ failed to articulate the weight she
    accorded to Drs. Mattia’s and Antoine’s opinions, accorded inadequate weight to
    Dr. Danger’s opinion, and accorded too much weight to Drs. Meyer’s and
    Grubbs’s opinions. Specifically, Rodriguez contends that the ALJ did not accord
    any weight to the opinions of his treating physicians, and this court cannot conduct
    a meaningful review because the ALJ did not state clearly the weight, if any,
    accorded to their opinions. Rodriguez also claims that the ALJ did not provide
    substantial evidence to support her decision to give Dr. Danger’s opinion only
    partial weight, and the ALJ failed to explain how the evidence was inconsistent
    with his opinions. Furthermore, Rodriguez argues that the ALJ did not provide any
    examples of how Drs. Meyer’s and Grubbs’s opinions were more consistent with
    the treatment records than Dr. Danger’s opinions. Thus, Rodriguez asserts that the
    ALJ committed reversible error.
    The Commissioner responds that the ALJ fully considered the medical
    opinions in the record and properly explained the weight she gave to each opinion.
    The ALJ relied on the treatment notes of Drs. Mattia and Antoine to determine that
    Rodriguez could perform work within his RFC. Although Rodriguez challenges
    the ALJ’s consideration of these treatment notes, he does not point to an actual
    opinion by these doctors that was inconsistent with the ALJ’s RFC finding. The
    Commissioner further contends that the ALJ properly considered Dr. Danger’s
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    opinion and gave it partial weight because he was a non-treating physician and his
    opined limitations were not supported by Rodriguez’s medical examinations.
    Additionally, the Commissioner claims that the ALJ properly gave weight to Drs.
    Meyer’s and Grubbs’s opinions because their opinions were consistent with the
    medical evidence. Thus, the Commissioner asserts that the record in its entirety
    supports the ALJ’s decision.
    In evaluating an individual’s eligibility for SSI benefits, the Commissioner
    considers medical opinions from acceptable medical sources, including licensed
    physicians and licensed psychologists. 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1502
    (a) (2012).1 Medical
    opinions are “statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments
    about the nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s), including [his]
    symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [he] can still do despite impairment(s),
    and [his] physical or mental restrictions.” 
    Id.
     at §§404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2)
    (2012). In determining an individual’s eligibility for DIB, the Commissioner
    considers the medical opinions and evidence in the record and generally gives
    more weight to an opinion from a treating source because the treating source is
    “likely to be the medical professional[] most able to provide a detailed,
    longitudinal picture” of the individual’s medical impairment. Id. at §
    1
    We cite to the relevant year’s rules that were in effect at the time of the ALJ’s decision and
    before the 2017 amendments.
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    404.1527(c)(2) (2012). Indeed, if the Commissioner finds a treating source’s
    opinion on the nature and severity of an impairment is “well-supported by
    medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not
    inconsistent with the other substantial evidence” in the record, the Commissioner
    will give the opinion “controlling weight.” Id.
    On review, an ALJ is not required to refer to every piece of evidence in her
    decision. See Dyer v. Barnhart, 
    395 F.3d 1206
    , 1211 (11th Cir. 2005).
    Nevertheless, the ALJ must clearly articulate reasons for giving less weight to a
    treating physician’s opinion, and the failure to do so is reversible error, unless the
    correct application of the regulations would not contradict the ALJ’s ultimate
    findings. See Diorio v. Heckler, 
    721 F.2d 726
    , 728 (11th Cir. 1983). “We will not
    second guess the ALJ about the weight the treating physician’s opinion deserves so
    long as he articulates a specific justification for it.” Hunter, 808 F.3d at 823.
    Based on our review of the record, we conclude that substantial evidence
    supports the ALJ’s evaluation of the opinion evidence in Rodriguez’s medical
    record. Drs. Mattia’s and Antoine’s treatment notes constituted medical opinions
    because they recorded the nature and severity of Rodriguez’s impairments, and his
    symptoms, diagnosis, and prognosis. 
    20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527
    (a)(2), 416.927(a)(2).
    Because the ALJ failed to articulate the weight she assigned to their opinions, she
    arguably erred in this respect; however, any error was harmless. The physicians’
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    findings did not contradict the ALJ’s conclusion that Rodriguez was not disabled.
    Their treatment notes indicated that Rodriguez had fair judgment, insight, and
    logical thought process, and that he was responding well to treatment. In addition,
    their treatment notes did not provide any findings as to possible work-related
    limitations that Rodriguez might encounter, but rather support the ALJ’s finding
    that Rodriguez was able to perform simple, routine tasks and engage in structured
    interactions with others. Significantly, Rodriguez does not identify any of Drs.
    Mattia’s and Antoine’s opinions that are inconsistent with the ALJ’s finding.
    We also conclude that substantial evidence supports the weight that the ALJ
    accorded to Dr. Danger’s opinion. As a consultative physician, Dr. Danger was
    not entitled to the same deference that an ALJ would accord to a treating physician.
    
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1527
    (c)(1)-(4); § 404.1527(c)(2). Some of Rodriguez’s treatment
    notes undercut the severity of the limitations that Dr. Danger described and explain
    the ALJ’s decision to give partial weight to Dr. Danger’s opinion. Indeed, the ALJ
    relied on those treatment notes to determine that Rodriguez’s limitations were not
    as severe as Dr. Danger opined and to adjust his range of work to exclude working
    at production rate pace or performing tasks involving the safety and welfare of
    others.
    We also conclude that the ALJ did not err in according Drs. Meyer’s and
    Grubbs’s opinions great weight. The ALJ’s determination was consistent with
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    Rodriguez’s treatment notes because those notes revealed that he had fair judgment
    and insight, logical thought process, and was responding well to his treatment.
    Drs. Mattia, Antoine, and Danger also noted the same in their treatment notes.
    Additionally, Drs. Meyer’s and Grubbs’s opinions were consistent with
    Rodriguez’s treatment notes that indicate he was not limited to the severity that he
    described. Accordingly, based on the record, we affirm the district court’s order in
    this respect.
    B. Whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s paragraph B criteria
    ratings and evaluation of Rodriguez’s RFC
    On appeal, Rodriguez argues that substantial evidence does not support the
    ALJ’s finding regarding his RFC at step four because the ALJ’s rationale was
    entirely inconsistent with Dr. Danger’s opinions about his RFC. Rodriguez also
    challenges the ALJ’s reliance on Drs. Meyer’s and Grubbs’s opinions because they
    did not examine him, and he argues that because the ALJ’s determination
    regarding his paragraph B ratings is inaccurate, the ALJ’s RFC assessment is
    invariably flawed as well.
    The Commissioner responds that the ALJ fully evaluated Rodriguez’s
    condition using the PRTF, and the ALJ supported her ratings when she discussed
    Rodriguez’s daily activities, which did not support greater restrictions/limitations.
    The Commissioner also posits that Rodriguez’s medical records support the ALJ’s
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    ratings, and, importantly, Rodriguez does not identify what limitations were
    missing from his RFC. Thus, because the ALJ considered the entire record and
    provided substantial evidence to support her assessment of Rodriguez’s RFC, the
    Commissioner urges this court to affirm as to this issue.
    Social Security regulations outline a five-step, sequential evaluation process
    to determine whether an individual is disabled. See 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1520
    (a)(4).
    The ALJ must evaluate whether (1) the individual engaged in substantial gainful
    activity; (2) the individual has a severe impairment; (3) the severe impairment
    meets or equals an impairment in the Listing of Impairments; (4) the individual has
    the RFC to perform past relevant work; and (5) in light of the individual’s RFC,
    age, education, and work experience, there are other jobs the individual can
    perform. Phillips v. Barnhart, 
    357 F.3d 1232
    , 1237 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing
    regulations). If the ALJ determines that the individual is not disabled at any step
    of the evaluation process, the inquiry ends. 
    20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520
    (a)(4),
    416.920(a)(4).
    The RFC is “that which an individual is still able to do despite the
    limitations caused by his or her impairments.” Phillips, 
    357 F.3d at 1238
    . The
    ALJ makes this determination by considering the individual’s ability to lift weight,
    sit, stand, push, pull, etc. 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1545
    (b). The individual’s residual
    functional capacity is then used to determine his or her capability for performing
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    various designated levels of work, such as sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and
    very heavy. See 
    id.
     at § 404.1567. The ALJ considers all the record evidence in
    making the determination of the individual’s RFC. Phillips, 
    357 F.3d at 1238
    .
    Based on our review of the record, we conclude that substantial evidence
    supports the ALJ’s findings regarding Rodriguez’s paragraph B criteria and his
    RFC at step four. The medical evidence showed that Rodriguez could care for
    himself, could prepare simple meals and perform housework, venture out of his
    home alone, and handle money. The medical evidence also noted that Rodriguez
    was consistently oriented to all spheres during his mental status examinations.
    Rodriguez did not report side effects from his medications, and Drs. Mattia,
    Antoine, and Danger noted that he was responding well to his treatment. As to the
    RFC, the ALJ discussed the treatment notes, noted that Rodriguez had not been
    hospitalized for his mental disorder, and that his daily activities reflected that he
    could function independently. The ALJ specifically accounted for the mild
    limitations that Rodriguez presented by limiting his RFC to exclude working at
    production rate pace or performing tasks involving the safety and welfare of others.
    Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s order as to this
    issue.
    C. Whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s evaluation of
    Rodriguez’s subjective allegations
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    Rodriguez asserts on appeal that the ALJ failed to assess properly his alleged
    symptoms because his description of his symptoms was consistent with the
    medical evidence. The Commissioner responds that the ALJ properly applied the
    standard for reviewing Rodriguez’s subjective complaints and that Rodriguez’s
    statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and functionally limiting effects
    of his symptoms were inconsistent with the medical evidence. The Commissioner
    posits that the ALJ articulated explicit, adequate reasons for her findings, and that
    Rodriguez fails to cite evidence from the medical record that allegedly supports his
    allegations. In sum, the Commissioner contends that the ALJ properly considered
    the entire record and provided substantial evidence to support her evaluation of
    Rodriguez’s subjective allegations.
    “In order to establish a disability based on testimony of pain and other
    symptoms, the claimant must satisfy two parts of a three-part test showing: (1)
    evidence of an underlying medical condition; and (2) either (a) objective medical
    evidence confirming the severity of the alleged pain; or (b) that the objectively
    determined medical condition can reasonably be expected to give rise to the
    claimed pain. Wilson v. Barnhart, 
    284 F.3d 1219
    , 1225 (11th Cir. 2002); see also
    
    20 C.F.R. § 416.929
    (a). “If the ALJ discredits subjective testimony, he must
    articulate explicit and adequate reasons for doing so.” Wilson, 
    284 F.3d at 1226
    .
    “Failure to articulate the reasons for discrediting subjective testimony requires, as a
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    USCA11 Case: 20-11390         Date Filed: 12/02/2020   Page: 22 of 22
    matter of law, that the testimony be accepted as true.” 
    Id.
     Additionally,
    “credibility determinations are the province of the ALJ, and [a court] will not
    disturb a clearly articulated credibility finding supported by substantial evidence.”
    Mitchell v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    771 F.3d 780
    , 782 (11th Cir. 2014).
    Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the ALJ’s determination
    that Rodriguez’s symptoms were not as severe as he alleged is supported by
    substantial evidence. Rodriguez’s treatment notes indicate that he had fair
    judgment and insight, logical thought process, and was responding well to his
    treatment. Moreover, the treatment notes undercut his description of his symptoms
    that he attested to during the hearing before the ALJ. In addition, his former
    roommate stated that Rodriguez was able to function independently, with only
    minor limitations. Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the
    ALJ’s evaluation of Rodriguez’s subjective symptoms, and we affirm the district
    court’s order on this issue as well.
    We conclude from the record that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
    determination that Rodriguez is not disabled. Accordingly, based on the
    aforementioned reasons, we affirm the district court’s order adopting the
    magistrate judge’s R&R granting summary judgment to the Commissioner on
    Rodriguez’s claims for SSI benefits and DIB.
    AFFIRMED.
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