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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 20-10457
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 9:19-cr-80177-RLR-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CORNELIUS R. CAPLE,
a.k.a. Murda,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(December 4, 2020)
Before BRANCH, GRANT, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM:
Cornelius Caple appeals his 132-month total sentence imposed after Caple
pleaded guilty to four counts of possession with intent to distribute controlled
substances, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and (b)(1)(C). No reversible error
has been shown; we affirm.
Before sentencing, a probation officer prepared a Presentence Investigation
Report (“PSI”). In pertinent part, the PSI designated Caple as a career offender
under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). As predicate offenses for the career-offender
enhancement, the PSI listed (1) Caple’s 2006 Florida conviction for possession of
cocaine and heroin with intent to sell, in violation of
Fla. Stat. § 893.13(a)(1), and
(2) Caple’s 2018 conviction for aggravated assault with a firearm, in violation of
Fla. Stat. § 784.021. Based on Caple’s total offense level of 29 and criminal
history category of VI, Caple’s advisory guideline range was calculated as 151 to
188 months’ imprisonment.
Caple objected to the PSI’s career-offender designation. Caple, however,
acknowledged that his arguments were inconsistent with this Court’s existing
precedent. The sentencing court overruled Caple’s career-offender objection and
imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 132 months.
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On appeal, Caple reasserts his arguments challenging his designation as a
career offender. We review de novo the district court’s application of the
sentencing guidelines, including the district court’s determination that a defendant
qualifies as a career offender. See United States v. Pridgeon,
853 F.3d 1192, 1198
n.1 (11th Cir. 2017). We review de novo whether a prior conviction qualifies as a
“controlled substance offense” or a “crime of violence” under the guidelines. See
United States v. Lange,
862 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2017) (controlled substance
offense); United States v. Dixon,
874 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2017) (crime of
violence).
Under the sentencing guidelines, a defendant is subject to an enhanced
sentence as a career offender if (1) he was at least 18 years’ old when he
committed the instant offense; (2) the instant offense is a felony that is also either a
crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) “the defendant has at
least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). That Caple satisfied the first two criteria
is undisputed. Caple challenges only whether his prior Florida felony convictions
qualify as predicate offenses under the career-offender enhancement.
Caple first contends that his 2006 Florida drug conviction is not a
“controlled substance offense” as defined by the guidelines. Caple says the term
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“controlled substance offense” should be interpreted to include an implied mens
rea element. Because
Fla. Stat. § 893.13 includes no mens rea requirement about
the illicit nature of the controlled substance, Caple says his 2006 Florida drug
conviction cannot serve as a predicate offense under section 4B1.1(a).
Caple concedes his controlled-substance-offense argument is foreclosed by
our binding precedent. See United States v. Smith,
775 F.3d 1262, 1266-68 (11th
Cir. 2014) (concluding that a conviction under
Fla. Stat. § 893.13 constitutes a
“controlled substance offense” within the meaning of the guidelines: a predicate
state offense need not include “an element of mens rea with respect to the illicit
nature of the controlled substance.”); see also Pridgeon, 853 F.3d at 1197-98
(upholding the decision in Smith).
Caple next argues that his 2018 Florida conviction for aggravated assault
with a firearm constitutes no “crime of violence” under the guidelines. Caple
concedes that this argument is foreclosed by our binding decisions in Turner and in
Golden. See United States v. Turner,
709 F.3d 1328, 1338 (11th Cir. 2013)
(concluding that Florida aggravated assault qualifies categorically as a violent
felony under the “elements” clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”));
United States v. Golden,
854 F.3d 1256, 1257 (11th Cir. 2017) (reaffirming Turner
and concluding that Florida aggravated assault constitutes a “crime of violence”
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under the elements clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1): a clause identical to the
ACCA’s elements clause).
To the extent Caple contends that our decisions in Smith, Turner, and
Golden were wrongfully decided, we must decline to address those arguments on
appeal. Under our prior panel precedent rule, “a prior panel’s holding is binding
on all subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point
of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this court sitting en banc.” See United
States v. Archer,
531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008).
AFFIRMED.
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