USCA11 Case: 22-13529 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 04/03/2023 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13529
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LAWRENCE TWEED,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 6:19-cr-00064-PGB-DCI-1
____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-13529 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 04/03/2023 Page: 2 of 5
2 Opinion of the Court 22-13529
Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Lawrence Tweed is a federal prisoner serving a total of 90
months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to possession of child
pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2), and
receipt of child pornography, in violation of § 2252A(a)(2), (b)(1).
He appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for
compassionate release. However, in his briefing on appeal, he does
not address the district court’s reasons for denying his motion for
compassionate release. Instead, he argues for the first time on
appeal that the district court erred in denying his motion for
compassionate release because it overlooked that his convictions
allegedly violate the Double Jeopardy Clause and that there was an
Alleyne 1 violation at sentencing, which he contends constitute
extraordinary and compelling circumstances. After review, we
affirm.
In the district court, Tweed filed a pro se motion for
compassionate release because his mother had passed away and he
needed to care for his adult brother who is mentally incapacitated.
He maintained that he was not a danger to the community and that
1 Alleyne v. United States,
570 U.S. 99, 116 (2013) (holding that any facts that
increase a mandatory minimum sentence must be submitted to a jury and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt).
USCA11 Case: 22-13529 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 04/03/2023 Page: 3 of 5
22-13529 Opinion of the Court 3
the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors supported his request.
The government opposed the motion.
The district court denied Tweed’s motion, concluding that
Tweed failed to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling
circumstances for a sentence reduction because care for one’s
sibling did not fall under any of the extraordinary and compelling
circumstances set forth in Application Note 1 to U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(A)–(D). Moreover, the district court found that the
§ 3553(a) factors did not support Tweed’s request. Tweed,
proceeding pro se, appealed.
We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for an
18
U.S.C. § 3582(c) sentence reduction. United States v. Bryant,
996
F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
142 S. Ct. 583 (2021).
Although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed and held to
a less stringent standard that counseled pleadings, Tannenbaum v.
United States,
148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “issues not
briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned,”
Timson v. Sampson,
518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). 2
Under § 3582(c)(1)(A), the district court may reduce a
movant’s imprisonment term if: (1) there are extraordinary and
compelling reasons for doing so, (2) the factors listed in 18 U.S.C.
2 Tweed abandons any challenge to the district court’s determination that
sibling care did not qualify as an extraordinary and compelling reason and that
the § 3553(a) factors did not support his request by failing to brief those issues
on appeal. See Timson,
518 F.3d at 874.
USCA11 Case: 22-13529 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 04/03/2023 Page: 4 of 5
4 Opinion of the Court 22-13529
§ 3553(a) favor doing so, and (3) doing so is consistent with the
policy statements in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. United States v. Tinker,
14
F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021).
The Sentencing Commission defines “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” in Application Note 1 to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.
Pursuant to this definition, there are four circumstances under
which “extraordinary and compelling reasons exist”: (A) the
defendant suffers from (i) “a terminal illness” or (ii) a permanent
health condition “that substantially diminishes the ability of the
defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a
correctional facility from which he or she is not expected to
recover”; (B) the defendant is “at least 65 years old,” “is
experiencing a serious [age-related] deterioration in physical or
mental health,” and “has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of
his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less”; (C) the
defendant’s assistance is needed in caring for the defendant’s minor
child, spouse, or registered partner due to (i) “[t]he death or
incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant’s minor child or
minor children” or (ii) “[t]he incapacitation of the defendant’s
spouse or registered partner”; and (D) there exist “other”
extraordinary and compelling reasons “[a]s determined by the
Director of the Bureau of Prisons.” See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. (n.1
(A)–(D)). “[D]istrict courts are bound by the Commission’s
definition of ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ found in
[§] 1B1.13.” Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1262.
USCA11 Case: 22-13529 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 04/03/2023 Page: 5 of 5
22-13529 Opinion of the Court 5
On appeal, Tweed argues for the first time that
compassionate release was warranted because his convictions
allegedly violate the Double Jeopardy Clause and because there
was an Alleyne violation at sentencing, which he contends
constitute extraordinary and compelling circumstances under
§ 1B1.13’s catch-all provision.3 Tweed’s argument fails because the
alleged illegality of his conviction and his sentence is not a
qualifying basis for compassionate release. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13
cmt. (n.1 (A)–(D)). And contrary to Tweed’s argument, the
catchall provision in “Application Note 1(D) does not grant
discretion to courts to develop ‘other reasons’ that might justify a
reduction in a defendant’s sentence.” Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1248.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Tweed’s
motion.
AFFIRMED.
3 Issues not raised in the district court are reviewed only for plain error.
United States v. Hano,
922 F.3d 1272, 1283 (11th Cir. 2019). “For there to be
plain error, there must (1) be error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects the
substantial rights of the party, and (4) that seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of a judicial proceeding.”
Id. (quotation
omitted).
