Interface Kanner, LLC v. JP Morgan CHase Bank, N.A. , 704 F.3d 927 ( 2013 )

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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 11-13579
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 2:10-cv-14068-DLG
INTERFACE KANNER, LLC,
Plaintiff-Counter-
Defendant-Appellant,
versus
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,
Defendant-Cross-Defendant-
Appellee,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
Defendant-Appellee,
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION AS RECEIVER FOR
WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK,
Intervenor-Cross
Claimant-Counter
Claimant-Appellee.
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________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(January 10, 2013)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
DUBINA, Chief Judge:
Appellant Interface Kanner, LLC (“Interface”) appeals two district court
orders that collectively granted Appellee JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.’s
(“JPMorgan”) motion for summary judgment, denied Interface’s motion for
summary judgment, and granted Appellee Intervenor Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation’s (the “FDIC”) request for declaratory relief. In its order granting
summary judgment, the district court found that Interface lacked standing to assert
a breach of lease claim against JPMorgan. The district court also declared that the
FDIC owes no damages to Interface. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the
judgment of the district court and remand with instructions to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
I.
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On April 15, 2008, Interface, as lessor, and Washington Mutual Bank
(“WaMu”), as lessee, entered into a lease agreement (the “Lease”) involving a
parcel of vacant real property located in Martin County, Florida. The Lease
obligated Interface to obtain necessary permits, approvals, and utilities for the
property and construct a bank on the premises. Thereafter, WaMu would use the
property as a bank branch location.
On September 25, 2008, prior to performance, WaMu closed as a “failed
bank” and entered receivership under the direction of the FDIC. Consequently,
under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
(“FIRREA”), Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 212 (codified as amended by 12
U.S.C. § 1821(c)), all of WaMu’s assets transferred to the FDIC. On the same day
that WaMu failed, the FDIC exercised powers afforded by FIRREA and entered a
Purchase and Assumption Agreement (“P & A Agreement”) with JPMorgan. The
P & A Agreement set forth the terms and conditions of the transfer of WaMu’s
assets and liabilities to JPMorgan. The P & A Agreement provided the following
language with respect to the rights of non-parties:
13.5 Successors. All terms and conditions of this Agreement shall be
binding on the successors and assigns of the Receiver, the Corporation
and [JPMorgan]. Except as otherwise specifically provided in this
Agreement, nothing expressed or referred to in this Agreement is
intended or shall be construed to give any Person other than the
Receiver, the Corporation and [JPMorgan] any legal or equitable
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right, remedy or claim under or with respect to this Agreement or any
provisions contained herein, it being the intention of the parties hereto
that this Agreement, the obligations and statements of responsibilities
hereunder, and all other conditions and provisions hereof are for the
sole and exclusive benefit of the Receiver, the Corporation and
[JPMorgan] and for the benefit of no other person.
[R. 37-3 at 45.]
Under the P & A Agreement, JPMorgan acquired some, but not all, of the
assets and liabilities which passed from WaMu to the FDIC. While the P & A
Agreement provides JPMorgan the option to accept or reject “Bank Premises”
leases, it does not include a similar allowance for “Other Real Estate” leases. 1
Interface argues that JPMorgan assumed the Lease automatically under the P & A
Agreement as “Other Real Estate,” while JPMorgan and the FDIC argue that
JPMorgan had ninety days to accept or reject the Lease as a “Bank Premises.”
Within ninety days of executing the P & A Agreement, JPMorgan gave the
FDIC and Interface notice that it would not assume the Lease. Following
1
Under the P & A Agreement, “Bank Premises” is defined as
the banking houses, drive-in banking facilities, and teller facilities (staffed or
automated) together with appurtenant parking, storage and service facilities and
structures connecting remote facilities to banking houses, and land on which the
foregoing are located, that are owned or leased by the Failed Bank and that are occupied
by the Failed Bank as of Bank Closing. [R. 23-4 at 2.]
“Other Real Estate” is defined as
all interests in real estate (other than Bank Premises and Fixtures) including but
not limited to mineral rights, leasehold rights, condominium and cooperative interests, air
rights and development rights that are owned by the Failed Bank. [Id. at 6.]
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JPMorgan’s election, the FDIC continued to treat the Lease as a retained liability.
Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1)(B), the FDIC, as receiver, is provided
discretion to “disaffirm or repudiate any . . . lease . . . which . . . [it] determines to
be burdensome.” On March 23, 2009, the FDIC provided Interface written notice
that it elected to exercise this statutory right and disaffirm the Lease.
Thereafter, neither the FDIC nor JPMorgan made any payments under the
Lease. Thus, on December 23, 2009, Interface provided JPMorgan with a default
notice. JPMorgan did not cure this alleged default, resulting in Interface filing this
lawsuit against JPMorgan in the Southern District of Florida asserting one count of
breach/repudiation and/or abandonment of the Lease. The FDIC intervened and
asserted both a counterclaim and cross-claim for declaratory relief. Specifically,
the FDIC sought a declaration that (1) the FDIC did not sell, transfer or assign the
Lease to JPMorgan, (2) the FDIC timely repudiated the Lease, and (3) Interface
failed to file a timely claim with the FDIC and is not entitled to damages.
Subsequently, Interface, JPMorgan, and the FDIC all filed cross-motions for
summary judgment.
Initially, the district court granted JPMorgan’s motion for summary
judgment, denied Interface’s motion for summary judgment, and instructed the
FDIC to notify the court within three days as to whether any issues remained to be
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litigated regarding its counterclaim and cross-claim. The district court reasoned in
its initial order that to assert a breach of lease claim against JPMorgan, Interface
must establish the existence of an enforceable contract between Interface and
JPMorgan. Further, because Interface and JPMorgan did not enter a contract with
each other, the only way that Interface could establish the right to bring suit for
breach of lease was through the P & A Agreement. The district court determined,
however, that Interface could not enforce the P & A Agreement because it is
neither a party to nor an intended third-party beneficiary of the P & A Agreement.
Interface appealed the initial district court order. This court dismissed
Interface’s appeal sua sponte, however, because the order did not dispose of all
claims against all parties. Following dismissal of the premature appeal, the district
court issued a second order pertaining to the FDIC’s request for declaratory relief
and Interface’s post-summary judgment motions for a new trial and
reconsideration. In its second order, the district court denied both of Interface’s
post-summary judgment motions and granted declaratory relief to the FDIC. This
timely appeal followed.
Interface contends that the district court erred and that it has standing to
maintain the current action because (1) it is an intended third-party beneficiary to
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the P & A Agreement and (2) it is in privity of estate with JPMorgan. Interface
also argues that the district court erred in granting declaratory relief to the FDIC.
II.
We review standing determinations de novo. Elend v. Basham, 471 F.3d
1199, 1204 (11th Cir. 2006). “We review a summary judgment ruling de novo,
viewing the materials presented and drawing all factual inferences in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party.” Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d
964, 975 (11th Cir. 2005).
III.
A. Interface’s Standing to Sue
The district court granted JPMorgan’s summary judgment motion on the
grounds that Interface is not an intended third-party beneficiary to the P & A
Agreement under Florida law. We hold that Interface cannot enforce the P & A
Agreement under federal common law because it is not an intended third-party
beneficiary of that contract. Consequently, the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over Interface’s claim against JPMorgan, and the judgment of the
district court is vacated. See Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Norton, 324 F.3d
1229, 1240 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[A]lthough we agree with the [district] court’s
conclusions regarding justiciability of these claims, . . . we vacate its order of
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summary judgment and remand to the district court with instructions to dismiss
these claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).”).
1. Applicable Law
The district court applied Florida law in determining that Interface is not an
intended third-party beneficiary to the P & A Agreement because “[t]he question
of whether, for standing purposes, a non-party to a contract has a legally
enforceable right is a matter of state law.” AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Nat’l Ass’n for
Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 494 F.3d 1356, 1360 (11th Cir. 2007). While this is
true, the P & A Agreement includes a choice-of-law provision which provides that
federal law controls:
13.4 Governing Law. This agreement and the rights and obligations
hereunder shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the
federal law of the United States of America, and in the absence of
controlling federal law, in accordance with the laws of the state in
which the main office of the failed bank is located.
[R. 37-3 at 35.]
In diversity cases, the choice-of-law rules of the forum state determine what
law governs, Am. Family Life Assur. Co. of Columbus, Ga. v. U.S. Fire Co., 885
F.2d 826, 830 (11th Cir. 1989), and under Florida law, courts “enforce choice-of-
law provisions unless the law of the chosen forum contravenes strong public
policy.” Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Techs, Inc., 433 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2005)
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(per curiam) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The parties have not
offered any reason why the choice-of-law provision above contravenes strong
public policy, and the court is aware of no such reason. Accordingly, federal law
applies in determining whether Interface is an intended third-party beneficiary to
the P & A Agreement.
2. Interface is not an intended third-party beneficiary to the P & A
Agreement
To assert a breach of lease claim against JPMorgan, Interface must establish
the existence of a contract between itself and JPMorgan. Interface seeks to do so
by enforcing its interpretation of the P & A Agreement entered between FDIC and
JPMorgan. That is, Interface argues that under the P & A Agreement, JPMorgan
now stands in the shoes of the FDIC who took over as lessee from WaMu when it
failed. JPMorgan and the FDIC contend that Interface lacks standing to do so.
“[S]tanding is a threshold jurisdictional question which must be addressed
prior to and independent of the merits of a party’s claims.” Bochese, 405 F.3d at
974 (quoting Dillard v. Baldwin Cnty. Comm’rs, 225 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir.
2000)). “In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to
have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” Koziara v.
City of Casselberry, 392 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Warth v.
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Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2205 (1975)). Interface can only
establish standing if it is an intended third-party beneficiary of the P & A
Agreement. See Bochese, 405 F.3d at 981; see also Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d
1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying federal common law in finding that “[a] party
can enforce a third-party contract only if it reflects an express or implied intention
of the parties to the contract to benefit the third party” (internal citations and
quotations omitted)).
Under federal common law, the court looks to general contract principles in
interpreting the P & A Agreement. Ellinger v. United States, 470 F.3d 1325, 1336
(11th Cir. 2006); see also Belize Telecom, Ltd. v. Gov’t of Belize, 528 F.3d 1298,
1307 n.11 (11th Cir. 2008) (“When interpreting contracts under federal law, courts
look to general common law on contracts.”) One such principle is that only a party
to a contract or an intended third-party beneficiary may sue to enforce the terms of
a contract. GECCMC, 2005-C1 Plummer St. Office L.P. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., 671 F.3d 1027, 1032-33 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying federal common law);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1981). In contrast, a beneficiary
whose benefit is merely incidental has no right to sue to enforce a contract as a
non-party. GECCMC, 671 F.3d at 1033; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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CONTRACTS § 315 (noting that an incidental beneficiary acquires “no right against
the promisor or the promisee”).
Further, government contracts, such as the P & A Agreement, “often benefit
the public, but individual members of the public are treated as incidental
beneficiaries unless a different intention is manifested.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 313(2) cmt. a. Thus, third parties to government contracts “are
generally assumed to be incidental beneficiaries.” Klamath Water Users
Protective Ass’n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 1999). To overcome
this presumption, Interface must show that the parties “clear[ly] inten[ded]” that
Interface be permitted to sue to enforce the P & A Agreement. Beckett v. Air Line
Pilots Ass’n, 995 F.2d 280, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Although Interface “need not be
specifically or individually identified in the contract, [Interface] must fall within a
class clearly intended to be benefited thereby.” Montana v. United States, 124
F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Interface’s task of demonstrating “clear intent” is made significantly more
difficult by the P & A Agreement’s express disclaimer to the contrary. As
referenced above, section 13.5 of the P & A Agreement expressly disclaims any
intent to create third-party beneficiaries. To overcome this disclaimer, Interface
points out that section 13.5 also states that this disclaimer is limited “as otherwise
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specifically provided in this Agreement.” Interface argues that this disclaimer
limitation, when read together with language from section 2.1, which provides that
“[JPMorgan] agrees to pay, perform, and discharge, all of the liabilities of [WaMu]
as of Bank Closing,” creates a clear intention to benefit a landlord such as
Interface.
In an almost identical case, GECCMC, 2005-C1 Plummer Street Office L.P.
v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
same argument that Interface asserts here, concluding that the P & A Agreement
did not “reflect a ‘clear intent’ to confer a benefit on [the landlord.]” 671 F.3d at
1034. More specifically, the court found that the landlord’s “reliance on section
2.1 . . . does not evince the specificity required to carve out enforceable rights as
contemplated by section 13.5,” nor does section 2.1 “show the ‘clear intent’ needed
to rebut the presumption that [the landlord] is merely an incidental beneficiary.”
Id. at 1035; see also Wichita Falls Office Assocs. v. Banc One Corp., No. 3:90-CV-
1301-H, Mem. Op. at 19 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 1993), aff’d without opinion, 40 F.3d
384 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that the phrase “except as otherwise specifically
provided” did not reference other sections of a P & A Agreement in a clear enough
manner to overcome the presumption against intended third-party beneficiaries).
We agree with this reasoning and find that the P & A Agreement does not provide
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a “clear intent” to benefit Interface. Thus, we conclude that Interface is not an
intended third-party beneficiary to the P & A Agreement and cannot sue to enforce
it.
3. Privity of Estate
Interface also argues that it has standing to sue JPMorgan for breach of lease
because the two are in privity of estate. This argument fails because it is
dependent on Interface’s ability to enforce its interpretation of the P & A
Agreement, which, as discussed above, Interface lacks standing to do.
B. FDIC’s Declaratory Relief
The district court declared that the FDIC owed no damages to Interface
based on any potential claim Interface had against the FDIC. This determination
was erroneous. The district court did not have the authority to grant declaratory
relief because Interface had yet to submit a claim against the FDIC through the
FIRREA administrative claims process. Except as otherwise provided in FIRREA,
“no court shall have jurisdiction over – (i) any claim or action for payment from, or
any action seeking a determination of rights with respect to, the assets of any
depository institution for which the [FDIC] has been appointed receiver. . . or (ii)
any claim relating to any act or omission of such institution or the [FDIC.]” 12
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U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D)(i)-(ii); 2 see also Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh,
Pa. v. City Sav., F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376, 385 (3rd Cir. 1994) (finding that the plain
meaning of § 1821(d)(13)(D)(i) includes declaratory judgment actions).
While FIRREA does not provide “an explicit mandate for exhaustion of
administrative remedies[,] [its] provisions are accepted by the cases and by
Congress as having that meaning.” F.D.I.C. v. Lacentra Trucking, Inc., 157 F.3d
1292, 1294 (11th Cir. 1998). Thus, for post-receivership claims—such as
Interface’s potential claim against the FDIC—the court has “no subject matter
jurisdiction unless the claimant has exhausted the administrative remedies.”
Damiano v. F.D.I.C., 104 F.3d 328, 333 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Aguilar v.
F.D.I.C., 63 F.3d 1059, 1061 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (noting that “[u]nder
FIRREA, federal courts generally lack the authority to decide claims against an
institution in federal receivership until the claimant has exhausted his
administrative remedies against the FDIC”). Because “FIRREA contains no
provision granting federal jurisdiction to claims filed after a receiver is appointed
but before administrative exhaustion,” Meliezer v. Resolution Trust Co., 952 F.2d
879, 882 (5th Cir. 1992), and because it is undisputed that Interface has not
submitted a claim against the FDIC through the FIRREA administrative claims
2
See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6) (providing for the option of filing suit after the FDIC’s
initial determination to allow or disallow a claim in one of two specified federal courts); id.
§ 1821(d)(7)(A) (providing for judicial review of the FDIC’s final administrative determination).
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process, the district court lacked jurisdiction to declare that Interface is not entitled
to damages from the FDIC. Accordingly, this portion of the district court’s
judgment is also vacated.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Interface is not an intended
third-party beneficiary of the P & A Agreement executed between FDIC and
JPMorgan, and, as a result, Interface lacks standing to enforce its interpretation of
that agreement. We also conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
award declaratory relief to the FDIC. Consequently, upon remand, the district
court should dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
VACATED and REMANDED.
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