USCA11 Case: 22-12101 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 04/13/2023 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12101
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SANQUEZ DEONTRA QUEZ BIVENS,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cr-00432-WKW-KFP-4
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12101
Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Sanquez Deontra Quez Bivens appeals the district court’s or-
der revoking his supervised release and imposing a 24-month sen-
tence. Bivens contends he was denied due process because the dis-
trict court failed to conduct the proper balancing test under United
States v. Frazier,
26 F.3d 110 (11th Cir. 1994), before admitting pur-
ported hearsay evidence during his revocation hearing. After re-
view, we affirm the district court.
A defendant’s supervised release may be revoked if the dis-
trict court finds by a preponderance of the evidence “the defendant
violated a condition of supervised release.”
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).
The Sixth Amendment does not apply in hearings for the revoca-
tion of supervised release, probation, or parole. United States v.
Reese,
775 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir. 2015). Similarly, the Federal
Rules of Evidence do not apply in supervised release revocation
hearings. Frazier,
26 F.3d at 114. “Although the Federal Rules of
Evidence do not apply in supervised release revocation hearings,
the admissibility of hearsay is not automatic. Defendants involved
in revocation proceedings are entitled to certain minimal due pro-
cess requirements.”
Id. (citing Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471
(1972) (involving parole revocation) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411
U.S. 778 (1973) (involving probation revocation)). Among these
minimal requirements is the right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses, unless the factfinder specifically finds good
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22-12101 Opinion of the Court 3
cause for not allowing confrontation. Morrissey,
408 U.S. at 489.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1, “which applies to super-
vised release revocation, incorporates these same minimal due pro-
cess requirements.” Frazier,
26 F.3d at 114. Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) pro-
vides a person is entitled to the opportunity to appear, present evi-
dence, and question any adverse witness, unless the court deter-
mines the interest of justice does not require the witness to appear.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C).
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement made by a declarant
that a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter as-
serted in the statement. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). “[I]n deciding
whether or not to admit hearsay testimony, the court must balance
the defendant’s right to confront adverse witnesses against the
grounds asserted by the government for denying confrontation.”
Frazier,
26 F.3d at 114. The hearsay statement must also be relia-
ble.
Id.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking
Bivens’ supervised release. See United States v. Cunningham,
607
F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010) (reviewing a district court’s revo-
cation of supervised release for abuse of discretion). First, the dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion in finding Bivens’ and
Tatyana Pringle’s statements were either not hearsay or met a
hearsay exception, and thus, were not subject to the balancing test
under Frazier. See United States v. Novaton,
271 F.3d 968, 1005
(11th Cir. 2001) (reviewing evidentiary decisions only for a clear
abuse of discretion). As to Bivens’ own statements made on the
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12101
recorded jail calls, the court did not abuse its discretion finding his
statements were not hearsay, as they were statements made by a
party opponent, Bivens never refuted that he was the one who ini-
tiated the calls, and Probation Officer Marcus Simmons’ testimony
identified Bivens as the voice on the call. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A)
(providing a statement is not hearsay if the “statement is offered
against an opposing party and . . . was made by the party in an in-
dividual or representative capacity”).
As to Pringle’s statements in the recorded jail calls, the court
did not abuse its discretion in finding the threats from Bivens to
Pringle were meant to prevent her from testifying, and thus, her
statements fit squarely under Rule 804(b)(6). Fed. R. Evid.
804(b)(6) (providing hearsay may be admitted when the statement
is being offered against a party that wrongfully caused the declar-
ant’s unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result).
The court heard Simmons’ testimony regarding the calls, listened
to the phone calls, and then later made a finding that Pringle’s ab-
sence resulted from Bivens’ threats. On appeal, Bivens argues only
that it is unclear whether his statements were intended as threats.
However, we are bound by the district court’s factual finding that
Bivens’ statements were threats intended to prevent Pringle from
testifying. See United States v. Almand,
992 F.2d 316, 318 (11th Cir.
1993) (stating we are bound by the district court’s findings of fact
unless they are clearly erroneous). Thus, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in finding Pringle’s statements were admissible
under Rule 804(b)(6) and were, therefore, not hearsay, such that
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22-12101 Opinion of the Court 5
the Frazier balancing test was not required. See Frazier,
26 F.3d at
114.
Further, as to Pringle’s statements to Simmons on the night
of the shooting, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding her
statements met the excited utterance exception to Rule 803(2). See
Fed. R. Evid. 803(2) (providing that, regardless of whether the de-
clarant is available as a witness, an “excited utterance” is admissible
as a hearsay exception, as it is “[a] statement relating to a startling
event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress
of excitement that it caused”). Simmons testified he received the
call from Pringle shortly after the shooting occurred and she
seemed excited and angry, as she yelled into the phone. Though
Bivens contends on appeal the startling impact of the incident had
passed by the time of Pringle’s call to Simmons, and Pringle’s state-
ments were accusatory and not for the purpose of seeking aid, the
court found Simmons’ descriptions of that conversation to be cred-
ible. Because we are bound by that credibility determination, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Pringle’s state-
ments met the excited-utterance exception. See Almand, 992 F.3d
at 318; United States v. Copeland,
20 F.3d 412, 413 (11th Cir. 1994)
(stating credibility is in the province of the factfinder, and we ordi-
narily will not review a district court’s credibility determination).
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-12101
The district court did not abuse its discretion because the
challenged out-of-court statements either were not hearsay or
were subject to hearsay exceptions.1
AFFIRMED.
1 Even assuming the statements were hearsay, the court engaged in the proper
balancing test under Frazier by weighing Bivens’ right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses against the Government’s assertion of good cause for deny-
ing confrontation. Frazier,
26 F.3d at 114.
