City of South Miami v. Governor of the State of Florida ( 2023 )

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[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-13657
____________________
CITY OF SOUTH MIAMI,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
FLORIDA IMMIGRANT COALITION, INC.,
FARMWORKER ASSOCIATION OF FLORIDA, INC.,
FAMILY ACTION NETWORK MOVEMENT, INC.,
QLATINX,
WECOUNT!, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
PHILLIP K. STODDARD,
Plaintiff,
versus
GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13657
Defendants-Appellants.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-22927-BB
____________________
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, MARCUS, Circuit Judge, and
MIZELLE,* District Judge.
WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:
This appeal concerns whether several organizations may sue
the governor and attorney general of Florida in federal court to
challenge a state law that requires local law enforcement to coop-
erate with federal immigration officials. The state law provides that
local officials shall support the enforcement of federal immigration
law and cooperate with federal immigration initiatives and officials
and that local officials may transport aliens subject to an immigra-
tion detainer to federal custody. Several plaintiff organizations sued
the Florida governor and the Florida attorney general to enjoin en-
forcement of the law. The organizations alleged that the provisions
about support and cooperation were adopted with the intent to
* Honorable Kathryn Kimball Mizelle, United States District Judge for the
Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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21-13657 Opinion of the Court 3
discriminate based on race and national origin in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. And they maintained that the transport
provision is preempted by federal law. After a bench trial, the dis-
trict court permanently enjoined the governor and attorney gen-
eral from enforcing compliance with these provisions.
This controversy is not justiciable because the organizations
lack standing. The organizations have not established a cognizable
injury and cannot spend their way into standing without an im-
pending threat that the provisions will cause actual harm. Moreo-
ver, the organizations’ alleged injury is neither traceable to the gov-
ernor or attorney general nor redressable by a judgment against
them because they do not enforce the challenged provisions. In-
stead, local officials, based on the state law, must comply with fed-
eral immigration law. We vacate and remand with instructions to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2019, the Florida Legislature passed Senate Bill 168, Ch.
2019-102, § 1, Laws of Fla. (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 908.101–
908.109), to advance the state’s interest in “cooperat[ing] [with] and
assist[ing] the federal government in the enforcement of federal im-
migration laws within th[e] state.” Id. § 908.101. Among other
things, S.B. 168 prohibits so-called “sanctuary policies” by requiring
local law enforcement to assist federal authorities in enforcing fed-
eral immigration law.
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This appeal involves three provisions of S.B. 168. First, the
best-efforts provision, id. § 908.104(1), states that law enforcement
must “use best efforts to support the enforcement of federal immi-
gration law.” Second, the sanctuary provision forbids state and lo-
cal entities from adopting any “sanctuary policy.” Id. § 908.103.
The statute defines a “sanctuary policy” as “a law, policy, practice,
procedure, or custom . . . which prohibits or impedes a law en-
forcement agency from complying with” certain federal initiatives
and from cooperating with federal immigration officials regarding
access to prisoners and detainers. Id. § 908.102(6). And third, the
transport provision authorizes law enforcement officers to “se-
curely transport” an alien who is in their custody and “subject to
an immigration detainer” to a federal facility. Id. § 908.104(4).
Two other provisions of S.B. 168 are relevant. The statute
contains an explicit anti-discrimination provision that bars officers
from basing “actions under this chapter on the gender, race, reli-
gion, national origin, or physical disability of a person except to the
extent authorized by the United States Constitution or the State
Constitution.” Id. § 908.109. It also permits the governor and attor-
ney general to sue state and local officers to enjoin violations of the
statute. Id. § 908.107(1), (2).
Shortly after S.B. 168’s passage, a group of plaintiffs—includ-
ing a coalition of non-profit organizations devoted to immigrant
rights—sued to enjoin the governor and attorney general from en-
forcing S.B. 168. The organizational plaintiffs alleged that the best-
efforts requirement and the sanctuary provision were
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unconstitutional because they violated the Equal Protection
Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The organizations argued
that these provisions, although neutral on their face, were enacted
with purposeful discriminatory intent. The organizations main-
tained that these provisions would have a disparate impact on their
members because local law enforcement would profile racial mi-
norities while enforcing federal law. The organizations also alleged
that the transport provision was preempted by federal law.
When the organizational plaintiffs moved for a preliminary
injunction, the district court ruled that the organizations had estab-
lished standing to mount an equal-protection challenge on their
own behalf and on behalf of their members. With respect to organ-
izational standing, the district court concluded that the organiza-
tions had sufficiently alleged that they diverted resources “to ad-
dress member concerns about the law and its implications.” For
instance, the organizations operated a toll-free hotline to address
member concerns, hosted community meetings, and conducted
“Know Your Rights” presentations. With respect to associational
standing, the district court found that the organizations sufficiently
alleged that “S.B. 168 has, and will continue to, injure their individ-
ual members.” Specifically, the district court credited the organiza-
tions’ claim that their members would suffer harm “from racial and
ethnic profiling, and unlawfully prolonged stops, arrests, and de-
tentions on suspicion of civil immigration violations.” The district
court also found that the members would suffer harm because the
enforcement of S.B. 168 would “discourage [them] from accessing
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essential . . . services, . . . enforcing their legal rights, . . . and apply-
ing to and enrolling in public schools.” For similar reasons, the dis-
trict court ruled that the organizations had standing to challenge
the transport provision. The district court ruled that the organiza-
tions established associational standing because they alleged that
their members faced a threat of “unlawful detention, transporta-
tion, and enforcement under S.B. 168.” And the district court con-
cluded that the organizations had organizational standing because
they had to divert resources “away from core activities in order to
respond to member inquiries about S.B. 168’s enactment, implica-
tions, and enforcement.” The district court granted a preliminary
injunction with respect to the transport provision on the ground
that it was likely preempted but denied the motion with respect to
the remaining provisions.
The parties filed competing motions for summary judg-
ment. After reviewing the factors set forth in Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977), the district court denied summary judgment on the or-
ganizations’ equal-protection claims. But the district court ruled
that the transport provision was unconstitutional because it was
preempted by federal law and granted summary judgment in favor
of the organizational plaintiffs on their preemption claim. It made
permanent the injunction against enforcement of the transport
provision.
The case proceeded to a bench trial on the equal-protection
claims. After trial, the district court issued an opinion in which it
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ruled that the organizations had proved Article III standing for the
same reasons it had cited in its earlier order. That is, the organiza-
tions had to, and would continue to, “divert . . . limited resources
away from their core activities” and the members would “suffer[]
injuries relating to S.B. 168’s illegal enforcement and its chilling ef-
fect on immigrants’ willingness to access essential services.” And
the district court ruled that S.B. 168’s best-efforts provision and
sanctuary provisions violated the Equal Protection Clause because
they resulted in a racially disparate impact and were enacted with
discriminatory intent. Though the district court never addressed
whether the governor and attorney general were proper defend-
ants, the district court permanently enjoined the governor and at-
torney general from enforcing these provisions.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review issues of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo.
Brown v. Snow, 440 F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th Cir. 2006), overruled on
other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548
U.S. 53 (2006).
III. DISCUSSION
This Court has “an independent obligation to ensure that
subject-matter jurisdiction exists before reaching the merits of a
dispute.” Jacobson v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 974 F.3d 1236, 1245 (11th
Cir. 2020). Under Article III of the Constitution, our jurisdiction
encompasses only “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2. “To have a case or controversy, a litigant must establish
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that he has standing, which requires proof of three elements.” Ja-
cobson, 974 F.3d at 1245 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). “The litigant must prove (1) an injury in fact that (2) is
fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and (3) is
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. When, as here,
“plaintiffs seek prospective relief to prevent future injuries, they
must prove that their threatened injuries are ‘certainly impend-
ing.’” Id. (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401
(2013)). The organizational plaintiffs failed to prove any of the
three elements of standing.
A. The Organizations Did Not Prove an Injury in Fact.
An organization cannot sue without proof of an actual in-
jury. That is, the organizations must establish that they have al-
ready been harmed by, or face “certainly impending” harm from,
S.B. 168. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 401. An organization can establish
Article III standing either “through its members [or] . . . through its
own injury in fact.” Ga. Ass’n of Latino Elected Offs., Inc. v. Gwin-
nett Cnty. Bd. of Registration & Elections, 36 F.4th 1100, 1114 (11th
Cir. 2022).
The organizations assert that they established both types of
standing. First, the organizations maintain that their members have
suffered, and will continue to suffer, racial profiling by law enforce-
ment complying with S.B. 168. Second, the organizations assert
that they have diverted resources from existing programs to re-
spond to S.B. 168. Neither theory holds water.
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1. The Organizations Do Not Have Standing Based on Their
Members’ Alleged Injuries.
The organizations lack standing based on their members’ al-
leged injuries. “To establish associational standing, an organization
must prove that its members would otherwise have standing to sue
in their own right.” Jacobson, 974 F.3d at 1249 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). All agree that racial profiling qualifies
as an injury in fact. But the organizations have not established that
their members face present harm or a “certainly impending” threat
of racial profiling as a result of S.B. 168. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410.
The organizations’ alleged harm “rests on their highly spec-
ulative fear,” id., that: the federal government will target their
members for deportation; the federal government will enlist the
help of local authorities, even though street-level cooperation with
federal officials is exceedingly rare; local officials will invoke their
authority under S.B. 168 to justify cooperation; local authorities
will successfully target the organizations’ members; and local au-
thorities, following federal directives, will racially profile the organ-
izations’ members in the process despite S.B. 168’s explicit ban on
discrimination. This “highly attenuated chain of possibilities,” id.—
which “rest[s] on speculation about the decisions of independent
actors,” id. at 414 (noting the Supreme Court’s reluctance to en-
dorse such standing theories)—“does not satisfy the requirement
that threatened injury must be certainly impending,” id. at 410. It
is, if anything, improbable.
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The organizations resist this conclusion. They argue that
their members “have suffered injuries from racial and ethnic profil-
ing, unlawful or unfounded traffic stops, and illegal detentions by
law enforcement agencies that are attempting to comply with the
requirements of S.B. 168.” The organizations maintain that this ev-
idence “show[s] that [their] members have been and will be direct
targets of S.B. 168.”
We disagree. Forty years ago, the Supreme Court made
clear that past occurrences of unlawful conduct do not establish
standing to enjoin the threat of future unlawful conduct. See City
of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983). The members’
generic allegations of previous racial profiling by Florida law en-
forcement do not prove that any future injury is imminent.
The organizations try to solve their imminence problem by
alleging actual present harm under S.B. 168. That is, they argue that
their members have already been profiled because of the new law.
But their proof is lacking.
The record does not establish that S.B. 168 caused their al-
leged profiling. For example, one witness conceded on cross-exam-
ination that the alleged profiling occurred before S.B. 168’s effec-
tive date. Another member acknowledged that she did not know
why a stop occurred. As in Clapper, the members can “only specu-
late” that the alleged profiling occurred because of S.B. 168. 568
U.S. at 412–13. Instead of suing immediately to enjoin enforcement
of S.B. 168, the organizations would have been better off waiting
for concrete evidence that the enforcement of S.B. 168 would lead
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to profiling. In this sense, their challenge is not ripe for judgment.
See Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967). Even if the
organizations could prove that local officers profiled their mem-
bers, they have not proved that the officers acted based on S.B. 168.
The organizations also argue that their members have suf-
fered present harm because the members have refused “essential
health, social, and government services” to avoid racial profiling
under S.B. 168. But Clapper forecloses this theory. “Where a ‘hy-
pothetical future harm’ is not ‘certainly impending,’ plaintiffs ‘can-
not manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on them-
selves.’” Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 979 F.3d 917, 931
(11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 416). And
we have rejected the argument that plaintiffs have standing based
on their “subjective fear of . . . harm” and its “chilling effect.” Cor-
bett v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 930 F.3d 1225, 1238–39 (11th Cir.
2019). Because the members’ feared racial profiling is not “certainly
impending,” their self-imposed harms do not create a cognizable
injury sufficient to support Article III standing.
2. The Organizations Do Not Have Standing in Their Own Right.
The organizations also have not proved that they suffered
an Article III injury “in their own right.” Jacobson, 974 F.3d at 1249.
To establish standing, an organization, like an individual, must
prove that it either suffers actual present harm or faces a threat of
imminent harm. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409. An organization suffers
actual harm “if the defendant’s illegal acts impair [the organiza-
tion’s] ability to engage in its projects by forcing the organization
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to divert resources to counteract those illegal acts.” Fla. State Conf.
of NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1165 (11th Cir. 2008). In
Browning, for instance, the NAACP had standing to challenge a
new voting requirement because the NAACP “reasonably antici-
pate[d]” it would need to “divert personnel and time” from other
projects “to educating . . . voters on compliance with” the require-
ment. Id. at 1165–66; see also Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 554
F.3d 1340, 1350 (11th Cir. 2009). This Court recognized that be-
cause the NAACP does not have “limitless resources,” its diversion
of resources away from “registration drives and election-day . . .
monitoring” and in favor of voter education about the new law was
a “concrete injury” for purposes of Article III standing. Browning,
522 F.3d at 1165–66.
Although an organization can establish standing under a di-
version-of-resources theory, it cannot do so by inflicting harm on
itself to address its members’ “fears of hypothetical future harm
that is not certainly impending.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 416. To prove
injury in fact based on an organization’s diversion of resources to
protect individuals from harm, the organizational plaintiff must
prove both that it has diverted its resources and that the injury to
the identifiable community that the organization seeks to protect
is itself a legally cognizable Article III injury that is closely con-
nected to the diversion. As our sister circuit has explained, “an or-
ganization can no more spend its way into standing based on spec-
ulative fears of future harm than an individual can.” Shelby Advocs.
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for Valid Elections v. Hargett, 947 F.3d 977, 982 (6th Cir. 2020). The
harm must be concrete and imminent.
Our precedent is instructive. In each of the cases in which
this Court has found standing based on a resource-diversion the-
ory, the organizations pointed to a concrete harm to an identifiable
community, not speculative fears of future harm. In Browning, the
organizations helped black voters comply with new voting rules
that went into effect before an election. Those rules applied to all
voters, “forcing” the organizations to divert resources to educate
these voters before the election. Browning, 522 F.3d at 1165. Simi-
larly, in Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of
Georgia, 691 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2012), illegal immigrants faced a
“credible threat of detention” under a new immigration law. Id. at
1258. So the law “forc[ed]” the organizations to divert resources to
protect illegal immigrants from this imminent harm. Id. at 1260. In
sum, to establish an injury based on resource diversion, an organi-
zation must “present . . . concrete evidence to substantiate [its]
fears,” not commit resources based on “mere conjecture about pos-
sible governmental actions.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 420.
Our sister circuits agree that to establish standing, an organ-
ization must prove both a diversion of resources and a cognizable
injury to an identifiable community that is closely tied to the diver-
sion. In Equal Rights Center v. Post Properties, Inc., the District of
Columbia Circuit rejected an argument that standing based on a
diversion of resources depends solely on whether the diversion was
voluntary. 633 F.3d 1136, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Instead, our sister
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circuit explained that to determine whether there was a concrete
injury the district court needed to consider two things: “first,
whether [the defendant’s] alleged discriminatory conduct injured
the [plaintiff organization’s] interest in promoting fair housing and,
second, whether the [plaintiff organization] used its resources to
counteract that harm.” Id. It held that because the organization
failed to prove an injury from the law’s actual application to the
community the organization sought to support, any diversion was
a “self-inflicted” injury that could not support standing. Id. at 1142.
The Third Circuit has also held that the diversion of re-
sources, standing alone, does not suffice to establish standing. In
Fair Housing Council v. Montgomery Newspapers, the plaintiff
took issue with a purportedly discriminatory newspaper advertise-
ment and alleged that it would need to divert resources to counter-
act the discriminatory impact of the advertisement through an ed-
ucation program. 141 F.3d 71, 77 (3d Cir. 1998). The court deter-
mined that the plaintiff could not establish standing because it
failed to prove any member of the public was denied housing or
deterred from seeking housing because of the advertisement. Id. In
essence, the organization failed to prove the education was neces-
sary to address an actual, non-speculative harm caused by the ad-
vertisement. Id. As in Equal Rights Center, the organization lacked
standing because it failed to prove a cognizable injury to the com-
munity it sought to protect. In similar fashion, the Fifth Circuit has
held that an organization cannot establish standing based on diver-
sion of resources when it diverted resources “due to fear” of the
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challenged activity instead of “any concern over the impacts of” the
activity itself. El Paso Cnty v. Trump, 982 F.3d 332, 344 (5th Cir.
2020).
Although the organizations diverted resources, they failed
to produce concrete evidence that S.B. 168 is an imminent threat
to their members or the immigrant community. The record is rife
with speculative fears of future harm. But the record fails to estab-
lish that local officers profiled anyone based on S.B. 168. Cf. Lyons,
461 U.S. at 102 (“Past wrongs [are] evidence bearing on whether
there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). And the threat of enforce-
ment is not imminent because it rests on a “highly attenuated chain
of possibilities.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410; cf. Ga. Latino All. for
Hum. Rts., 691 F.3d at 1258 (immigrants faced a “credible threat of
detention”). At best, the organizational plaintiffs have diverted re-
sources to address “fears of hypothetical future harm that is not
certainly impending.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 416; El Paso Cnty., 982
F.3d at 344.
In the same way that the members could not “manufacture
standing,” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 402, by inflicting harm on them-
selves based on “highly speculative” fears, id. at 410, neither can
the organizations do so. The organizations’ commitment of re-
sources amounts to a self-imposed injury “based on speculative
fears of future harm.” Shelby Advocs., 947 F.3d at 982; see also
Equal Rts. Ctr., 633 F.3d at 1142. Speculative harms are no more
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cognizable dressed up as an organizational injury than as an associ-
ational one.
B. The Organizations Failed to Prove that Their Alleged Injuries
Are Traceable to Or Redressable by Relief Against the Florida
Governor or Attorney General.
It should come as no surprise, in a case that so profoundly
fails to establish an injury in fact based on highly speculative harm,
that traceability and redressability are also lacking. Indeed, it is hard
to imagine a circumstance where a plaintiff who could not establish
that he has suffered a legally cognizable injury in fact could never-
theless prove that an insufficient injury was traceable to a defend-
ant. This case is no exception.
The organizations’ alleged injuries are neither traceable to
the Florida governor or attorney general nor redressable by an in-
junction against these officials. To establish Article III standing, the
plaintiff “must show a ‘causal connection’ between [its] injury and
the challenged action of the defendant . . . , as opposed to the action
of an absent third party.” Lewis v. Governor of Ala., 944 F.3d 1287,
1296 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). Similarly, “the plaintiff must show that it
is likely, not merely speculative, that a favorable judgment will re-
dress [its] injury.” Id. The named state officials meet neither of
these criteria. The organizations’ grievance lies with absent third
parties.
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The organizations maintain that S.B. 168 will injure their
members because it will “lead to the erosion of trust in law enforce-
ment . . . [and] racial profiling.” In other words, the organizations
say that officers will target their members—consciously or uncon-
sciously—based on their ethnicity. But this argument misses the
real issue.
When traceability and redressability are at stake, the key
questions are who caused the injury and how it can be remedied.
See Jacobson, 974 F.3d at 1253–54 (holding that there was no stand-
ing where the alleged injury was not caused by the defendants and
the effect of the court’s judgment on the defendant would not re-
dress the injury). To answer those questions, we begin with the
statute itself. And then we evaluate the organizations’ evidence in
the light of the statute.
The disputed provisions of S.B. 168 regulate local law en-
forcement officers and governments. For example, the sanctuary
provision requires cities and municipalities to give federal officials
access to detainees in their custody. FLA. STAT. §§ 908.102(6),
908.103. It operates on officials at the local level. In similar fashion,
the best-efforts provision and transport provision demand cooper-
ation with federal officials from local authorities. The state law re-
quires local law enforcement officials to use their “best efforts” to
comply with federal immigration law. Id. § 908.104(1). It applies to
officials who are “acting within the scope of [their] official duties”
as “official[s] . . . of the entity or agency.” Id. And it permits “law
enforcement agenc[ies],” namely “county correctional facilit[ies],”
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to transport detainees into federal custody after receiving federal
detainers. Id. § 908.104(4). In sum, the disputed provisions give lo-
cal officials the authority to detain and transport illegal aliens. Nei-
ther the governor nor the attorney general acts under S.B. 168 in
such a way that the organizations’ injury is traceable to them or
redressable by enjoining them.
The district court’s findings make clear that any injury stems
from local law enforcement. The district court admitted expert tes-
timony about how people of different races interact with law en-
forcement. Based on that testimony, the district court found that
“proactive policing measures, like the one[s] at issue here” lead to
racial profiling due to the “differential views, whether conscious or
not, that police have regarding the likely criminality of non-white
persons.” The district court then found that local officials, with “ex-
pansive discretion on when and how to use their ‘best efforts,’”
would discriminate based on race while enforcing S.B. 168. The dis-
trict court cited evidence that the organizations “receive[d] reports
of racial profiling in encounters with law enforcement,” “noticed
increased law enforcement presence,” “saw an increase in callers
. . . who feared going to law enforcement,” and “raised concerns
relating to the scope of law enforcement agencies’ responsibilities.”
These are all harms caused by local law enforcement. The district
court itself explained, “Plaintiffs demonstrated that their members
have suffered injuries from racial and ethnic profiling, unlawful or
unfounded traffic stops, and illegal detentions by law enforcement
agencies that are attempting to comply with [S.B. 168].” (Emphasis
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added.) And the organizational plaintiffs agree with this assess-
ment.
The organizations nevertheless insist that their injuries are
both traceable to the governor and attorney general and redressa-
ble by an injunction against those officials because those officials
have sufficient control over local law enforcement. But the organ-
izations failed to produce any evidence at trial to support this claim.
Indeed, they have offered nothing to prove that the governor or
attorney general has enforced or threatened to enforce S.B. 168, let
alone that they have threatened to do so in a racially discriminatory
way.
Lewis is similar in this respect. In Lewis, two workers sued
the Alabama attorney general to enjoin a state law that preempted
a local minimum-wage ordinance. 944 F.3d at 1293–94. We held
that any injury the plaintiff workers suffered from receiving lower
wages was not caused by the attorney general because he “had
never enforced or threatened to enforce the law[] and the law itself
contemplated no role for the attorney general.” Jacobson, 974 F.3d
at 1254 (citing Lewis, 944 F.3d at 1296, 1298–99).
On the ground, where it counts, local officials enforce S.B.
168. Local officials commit the alleged profiling. Local officials co-
operate with federal officials in enforcing federal immigration law.
Local officials transport detainees in their custody into federal cus-
tody. As in Lewis, the organizations have pointed to no evidence
that the governor or attorney general have “enforced or threatened
to enforce” S.B. 168 against them or their members. Id. (citing
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20 Opinion of the Court 21-13657
Lewis, 944 F.3d at 1296, 1298–99). And the record contains no evi-
dence that an injunction against the governor or the attorney gen-
eral will curtail or otherwise redress racial profiling by local officials
who are not parties to this action. Without this evidence, the or-
ganizations have failed to meet their burden as to traceability and
redressability.
The organizations offer two arguments that we rejected in
Lewis and Jacobson. First, they maintain that the governor and at-
torney general have sufficient control over local officials because
“S.B. 168 expressly authorizes Defendants to enforce S.B. 168
against local officials and governments by filing a lawsuit.” But the
organizations in Jacobson made an identical argument. Id. at 1253.
There, several voters and organizations sued the Florida Secretary
of State to enjoin the enforcement of a law governing the order in
which candidates appear on the ballot. Id. at 1242. Because he did
not control the ballot order, we held that the Secretary of State was
not a proper defendant. Id. at 1254. Florida law instead “expressly
g[ave] a different, independent official control over the order in
which candidates appear on the ballot.” Id. The organizations in-
sisted that the secretary had control over the supervisors of elec-
tions because he could “bring actions . . . to enforce the perfor-
mance of [their] duties.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). We rejected that argument. As we explained, “[t]hat the
Secretary must resort to judicial process if the Supervisors fail to
perform their duties underscores her lack of authority over them.”
Id. So it is here. The governor and attorney general are limited to
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21-13657 Opinion of the Court 21
coercive suits and do not “enforce” S.B. 168 against the organiza-
tions or their members.
The organizations maintained at oral argument that S.B. 168
is distinguishable from the law in Jacobson because it specifically
contemplates that the governor will “enforce” the law. To be sure,
the governor may sue local officers “to enforce compliance” with
the disputed provisions. FLA. STAT. § 908.107(1) (emphasis added).
But the same was true in Jacobson. The Florida Code expressly
confers on the secretary the power to “[b]ring and maintain . . . ac-
tions at law or in equity . . . to enforce the performance of any du-
ties of a county supervisor of elections.” FLA. STAT. § 97.012(14)
(emphasis added). A statute’s use of the magic word “enforce” does
not conjure up standing to challenge that law.
Second, the organizations assert that the governor has suffi-
cient control over local officials because S.B. 168 provides that local
officials may be “subject to action by the governor in the exercise
of his or her authority under the State Constitution and state law.”
FLA. STAT. § 908.107(1). The organizations speculate that the gov-
ernor will use this statutory grant of general authority together
with his preexisting authority under article IV of the Florida Con-
stitution to suspend local officials who refuse to enforce S.B. 168.
See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 7(a). Again, Lewis stands in their way.
In Lewis, the plaintiffs attempted to establish traceability by
pointing to the attorney general’s “general authorization” to insti-
tute proceedings against local officials “to protect the rights and in-
terests of the state.” 944 F.3d at 1300 (citation omitted). But we
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22 Opinion of the Court 21-13657
ruled that this standing theory “prove[d] entirely too much” be-
cause it would make the attorney general “a proper party defend-
ant under innumerable provisions of the Alabama Code.” Id. The
same is true here. As the governor and attorney general argue, if
the governor’s ability to suspend officials for cause established
traceability, then the governor “would be a proper defendant in
any challenge to State or local policy.”
At oral argument, the organizations attempted to distin-
guish Lewis on the ground that S.B. 168 specifically recognizes the
governor’s constitutional powers and the challenged provision in
Lewis did not cite a corresponding constitutional authority. But
this distinction is not meaningful. To establish traceability and re-
dressability, the organizations had to prove that the governor’s en-
forcement would cause them injury and that a favorable judgment
would “likely” redress their injury. See Lewis, 944 F.3d at 1296 (em-
phasis added). Even indulging the unlikely assumption that the
boilerplate provision in S.B. 168 reminded the governor that he
could suspend officials for cause, the organizations still had to
prove that the governor’s ability to suspend officials for violations
of S.B. 168 would contribute to their alleged harm: racial profiling
by local officials. They failed to do so.
Local officials have an independent obligation to follow the
law. FLA. STAT. § 112.311(6) (local officials “are bound to uphold
. . . the State Constitution and to perform efficiently and faithfully
their duties under the laws of the . . . state”). So does the governor.
Id. And S.B. 168 explicitly prohibits discrimination. Id. § 908.109. In
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21-13657 Opinion of the Court 23
this pre-enforcement posture, the record does not establish that it
is likely that officers will discriminate based on race under S.B.
168—which would violate the law itself.
The record contains no evidence—none—that Governor
DeSantis would use his suspension authority to encourage racial
profiling. There was no evidence that, for instance, the governor
made any statement or in any way suggested that a state or local
official ought to use racial profiling in connection with enforcing
S.B. 168—a statute that requires race neutrality—or cooperating
with federal immigration priorities. Indeed, the organizations of-
fered no evidence that Governor DeSantis said anything about how
or under what circumstances he would enforce S.B. 168. If any-
thing, Governor DeSantis would presumably follow the law and
seek to curtail the discrimination that S.B. 168 expressly prohibits.
So, in the absence of contrary evidence, an injunction against the
governor’s enforcement of S.B. 168 ironically would harm the or-
ganizations because it would inhibit the governor’s oversight un-
der the antidiscrimination provision. The provision for gubernato-
rial enforcement does not establish traceability or redressability.
The organizations’ failure to produce any evidence to trace
any injury to the governor and attorney general does not foreclose
the possibility that these officials could be proper defendants on a
different record, as our precedents make clear. For example, in
Georgia Latino Alliance, the governor and attorney general of
Georgia were named defendants in a preenforcement challenge to
a state immigration law. 691 F.3d at 1256–57. The plaintiffs argued
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24 Opinion of the Court 21-13657
that federal law preempted the state law, which “authorize[d]
Georgia law enforcement officers to investigate the immigration
status of an individual if the officer ha[d] probable cause to believe
the individual ha[d] committed another crime and the individual
[could not] provide one of the pieces of identification listed in the
statute.” Id. at 1256. The district court entered a preliminary injunc-
tion against the state officials. Id. at 1257. On appeal, we held, based
on the plaintiffs’ allegations and declarations, that the state officials
had sufficient enforcement authority to establish traceability and
redressability because the governor had “sufficient, albeit indirect,
contact with the program’s enforcement.” See id. at 1260 n.5.
For that proposition, Georgia Latino Alliance relied on
Luckey v. Harris, a suit against the governor and state judges on
behalf of a class of indigent criminal defendants and their attorneys.
860 F.2d 1012, 1013 (11th Cir. 1988). The class alleged “systemic
deficiencies” in the provision of indigent criminal defense and
sought an injunction requiring state officials to meet “minimum
constitutional standards” in the provision of these services. Id. The
district court dismissed the suit at the pleading stage on the ground
that it was “in essence a suit against . . . Georgia and therefore was
barred by the eleventh amendment.” Id. We reversed.
We held that the governor was a proper defendant under Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), because “[a]ccording to the Geor-
gia constitution, the governor is responsible for law enforcement
in that state and is charged with executing the laws faithfully” and
“[t]he governor further has the residual power to commence
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21-13657 Opinion of the Court 25
criminal prosecutions and has the final authority to direct the at-
torney general to ‘institute and prosecute’ on behalf of the state.”
Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1016 (internal citation omitted). Part of the
Governor’s prosecutorial role included “furnish[ing] counsel” to in-
digent defendants. Id. We concluded that the class established
standing because the class members “alleg[ed] that they [we]re
presently being denied constitutional rights as a direct result of the
failure of [defendants] to furnish [constitutionally sufficient] coun-
sel.” Id. That is, they alleged an injury traceable to and redressable
by the governor.
Both Georgia Latino Alliance and Luckey establish that the
governor may be a proper defendant to enjoin the enforcement of
a state law when the governor has sufficient enforcement power to
remedy the plaintiff’s alleged harm. In the former, the plaintiffs al-
leged that they were injured by being subject to a state law that was
preempted by federal law. They established that a preliminary in-
junction redressed that injury because the governor had sufficient
contact with the state officers that implemented the law and would
presumably mandate its enforcement. Georgia Latino Alliance, 691
F.3d at 1256–57. In the latter, the plaintiff class alleged that it was
injured because state officials failed to provide it with constitu-
tional protections during criminal prosecutions. Luckey, 860 F.2d
at 1016. The class alleged that an injunction against the governor
would redress that injury, which was a “direct result” of the gover-
nor’s oversight of state prosecutions and his “failure . . . to furnish
[constitutionally sufficient] counsel.” Id. In both cases, an
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26 Opinion of the Court 21-13657
injunction against the governor at least partially remedied the
plaintiffs’ injury because the governor’s enforcement power at least
partially caused, or threatened to cause, that injury. See Lujan, 504
U.S. at 560.
In contrast with Georgia Latino Alliance and Luckey, this
appeal involves a permanent injunction following trial where the
organizations failed to present any evidence—as they must—that
the governor or attorney general would enforce S.B. 168, or that
any enforcement would cause them harm. Unlike both Georgia La-
tino Alliance and Luckey, the organizations’ case went to trial,
where they had the burden to establish each element of standing.
The organizations alleged a specific harm and bore the burden to
produce evidence tying that alleged harm to the governor or attor-
ney general. They failed to do so. This failure distinguishes our case
from Georgia Latino Alliance and Luckey.
The record lacks any evidence that links the governor or at-
torney general to racial profiling by local officers under S.B. 168.
That absence of proof makes sense because S.B. 168 provides the
governor with few, if any, tools to make the judgment calls that
might result in racial profiling. Federal officials tell local officials
which individuals are subject to a detainer. Federal officials request
cooperation. Local officials make the arrests. Local officials
transport detainees to federal custody. S.B. 168 does not involve
the governor or attorney general in incidents of racial profiling.
Moreover, the organizations will allegedly be harmed in the
same manner whether the governor or attorney general are
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21-13657 Opinion of the Court 27
enjoined or not. “[W]e have held traceability to be lacking if the
plaintiff would have been injured in precisely the same way with-
out the defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Walters v. Fast AC, LLC,
60 F.4th 642, 650 (11th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks and ci-
tation omitted). In other words, “a plaintiff lacks standing to sue
over a defendant’s action if an independent source would have
caused him to suffer the same injury.” Id. at 650–51 (internal quo-
tation marks and citation omitted). In this case, the source of the
organization’s alleged injury is local law enforcement. There is no
“remotely plausible causal chain,” Cordoba v. DIRECTTV, LLC,
942 F.3d 1259, 1272 (11th Cir. 2019), linking racial profiling by local
officials to the governor or attorney general of Florida.
The organizations failed to prove standing. They had to es-
tablish a concrete threat of enforcement by the governor or attor-
ney general that would lead to racial profiling. But, as in Lewis,
they conjured up only a “specter” of enforcement by these officials
that is unconnected to the harm that they have suffered. 944 F.3d
at 1298.
Because the organizations lack standing, we cannot opine on
the merits of this case. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514
(1868). But our holding that the organizations lack standing should
not be read as suggesting that we agree with the district court on
the merits. Indeed, we have grave doubts about the merits, but the
district court lacked jurisdiction to rule on them.
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28 Opinion of the Court 21-13657
IV. CONCLUSION
We VACATE the judgment against the governor and attor-
ney general and REMAND with instructions to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction.
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21-13657 MIZELLE, J., Concurring 1
KATHRYN KIMBALL MIZELLE, District Judge, Concurring:
The majority’s opinion correctly holds that the district court
lacks jurisdiction. This concurrence addresses a discrete issue with
the district court’s analysis.
In concluding that the Florida Legislature enacted S.B. 168
with discriminatory intent, the district court relied, in part, on the
fact that the committee staff analysis in support of the bill refer-
enced data from the Federation for American Immigration Reform
(FAIR) and the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS), organizations
labeled as “hate groups” by the plaintiffs’ counsel. The district court
reasoned that because the bill’s sponsor made “no effort to explain
why these groups’ research on the counties listed was reliable or
how their data was untainted by the racist, anti-immigrant views
that they espoused,” those discriminatory views necessarily in-
fected the entire legislative process.
This reasoning is not only legally flawed—there was no basis
to flip the burden of proof to the defendants to show that the data
the Legislature cited was trustworthy, rather than requiring the
plaintiffs to show that it was untrustworthy—but more problemat-
ically, it wrongly assumes that objectively verifiable facts and data
can be “tainted” solely because of the identity of the speaker.
Unlike subjective statements, which are “based on an indi-
vidual’s perceptions, feelings, or intentions,” see subjective, Black’s
Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019), objective statements are “based on
externally verifiable phenomena,” and are “without bias or
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2 MIZELLE, J., Concurring 21-13657
prejudice,” see objective, Black’s Law Dictionary, supra. Whether
a dinner plate should be square or round (or some other shape)
might be subject to debate, with each advocate bringing his own
subjective views to the table; that a triangle has three sides is true
regardless of who says it. Put another way, an objective statement
is either true or false, and the speaker’s motive in offering it is irrel-
evant to the statement’s veracity.
Turning to the data here, the district court took issue with a
report produced by FAIR that defines “sanctuary jurisdiction” and
provides a list of jurisdictions that meet the definition. Each entry
contains the name of the city, the specific policy that satisfied the
definition, and hyperlinks to sources for that determination.
FAIR’s definition of a “sanctuary jurisdiction” is, of course,
subjective, because it is based on FAIR’s perception of what policies
and practices constitute such a jurisdiction. The term “sanctuary
jurisdiction” is used by all kinds of groups to describe all kinds of
local policies affecting immigration. As the committee staff analysis
of the bill notes, “organizations use different criteria for making
their determinations,” making it “difficult to determine how many
sanctuary jurisdictions exist” in Florida.
But whether a jurisdiction meets FAIR’s definition is an ob-
jective inquiry. It is either true that a city or county “fail[s] to honor
ICE detainers, prohibit[s] their employees from communicating
with ICE or CBP, or refus[es] to provide information in response
to federal requests,” or it is false. Because these determinations are
verifiable, they are either accurate or inaccurate. Thus, whether a
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21-13657 MIZELLE, J., Concurring 3
particular municipality satisfies that definition is an objective in-
quiry.
Of course, one can draw false conclusions from objective
statements. For example, one can use improper methods or mis-
read data to support a wrong conclusion. See generally, e.g.,
Thomas Sowell, Discrimination and Disparities (2018) (noting this
common error). An objective statement can also be offered with a
racist motive. But the motive of a speaker cannot undermine or
taint the truth of an objective statement. Thus, it was error for the
district court to assume that objectively verifiable data could be
tainted solely because of the alleged views of the speaker.
This does not end the problem. The district court went fur-
ther, imputing the alleged motive of the speaker—FAIR—to the
listener, the entire Florida Legislature, simply by virtue of the lis-
tener using the speaker’s data. This is a fallacy stacked on a fallacy.
Repeating the objective statement of a speaker indicates nothing
about whether the listener adheres to the subjective beliefs of the
speaker. A listener’s use of a fact implies only that the listener be-
lieves the fact to be true. Put in evidentiary terms, it makes it nei-
ther more nor less likely that the listener agreed with the subjective
motives for which the speaker offered the objective statement.
So what, if anything, could the data have proven? The dis-
trict court could have made two legitimate findings with respect to
the data. First, the court could have found the data simply inaccu-
rate. If the Legislature adopted demonstrably false statements in its
analysis (for example, that certain cities qualified as “sanctuary
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4 MIZELLE, J., Concurring 21-13657
jurisdictions” when they fell outside the proffered definition), that
might have been a relevant factor in an Arlington Heights analysis.
See generally Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev., 429
U.S. 252 (1977). But the record does not support this finding, and
the district court discerned no problem with FAIR’s conclusions
and identified no issues with its method.
Second, the district court could have taken issue with FAIR’s
definition of sanctuary jurisdiction by showing how certain ele-
ments of the definition were in fact pretext for racial bias and thus
any data derived from the definition was not reliable. Because it is
subjective, FAIR’s definition theoretically could be “tainted” by al-
leged animus. It is possible that, if the Legislature adopted that def-
inition, it also adopted the motivations behind it—though binding
precedent cautions against this kind of proof of motive in discrimi-
natory intent cases. See Thai Meditation Assoc. of Ala., Inc. v. City
of Mobile, Ala., 980 F.3d 821, 836 (11th Cir. 2020) (refusing to at-
tribute the bias of some community members to city officials); see
also Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2350
(2021) (“Under our form of government, legislators have a duty to
exercise their judgment and to represent their constituents. It is in-
sulting to suggest that they are mere dupes or tools.”). But the Leg-
islature did not adopt FAIR’s definition of sanctuary jurisdiction.
Instead, it created its own definition, which differed in several re-
spects from FAIR’s. See FLA. STAT. § 908.102(6). (While one might
think that definitional break severed any imputed animus, the dis-
trict court ruled that even consideration by the Legislature of the
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21-13657 MIZELLE, J., Concurring 5
definition and data “strongly suggests the existence of underlying
racial animus.”) Of course, the district court did not explain how
the elements of FAIR’s definition were discriminatory or why any
of the resulting data was tainted.
Instead of one of these legitimate findings, the district court
assumed that the data was suspect solely because of the alleged
views of FAIR and CIS. Then, the district court concluded that use
of the data was proof of racial animus by the Florida Legislature as
a whole. Such ad-hominem reasoning and compounding of atten-
uated inferences is error. The Florida Legislature is permitted to
use objectively verifiable data without being condemned because
of who collected the data. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S.
387, 398 (2012) (the Supreme Court relying on data compiled by
CIS without adopting all policy views of CIS). Or put more simply,
facts are facts, regardless of who says them.